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Abstract of Thesis
Author (Full names) :  ALAN SWARC
Title of thesis  :  Illegal Immigration to Palestine 1945-1948: The
French Connection
This thesis principally concerns the illegal immigration campaign launched by a 
secret organisation, the Mossad 1'Aliy  ah Bet (The Mossad), to breach  the British 
naval blockade of Palestine and thereby enable the entry of Jewish survivors of the 
Holocaust. My  primary objective  is to prove that from late 1945 to  April 1948 this 
campaign was largely facilitated by the covert help of elements within  the French 
coalition Governments, without which it would not have succeeded. Crucially, France 
takes centre stage because this was the  location,  par excellence,  chosen by the 
Mossad from which to carry out its operational activities.
Whilst the overall  historiography of illegal immigration to Palestine is vast 
and has included  many archival references to French involvement, this has not been 
clearly substantiated. On the basis of  archive sources, some only recently made 
available, and despite the paucity  of direct evidence of French complicity,  I will 
illustrate that there is a wealth  of documentation which, taken as a whole, provides 
compelling circumstantial evidence that this involvement was extensive. Furthermore, 
1  will argue that  French cooperation with Zionist leaders extended to political issues 
and military aid as well. Amongst other issues, I will  focus  on  die rather free 
environment in France, in the post-war era, which proved to be  so conducive to the 
operations of the Mossad. This includes considerations such as the political make-up 
of the French Government, the partisan approach of some of its ministers and civil 
servants, the  Jewish community’s  attitude towards  Zionism and the work of 
intermediaries between certain Government ministers and the Mossad. I will also 
examine  the effects of British diplomatic pressure on die French Ministries involved 
and the attempts of its Secret Service to prevent  illegal ships leaving France.
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In Serge Klarsfeld’s book Vichv. Auschwitz there are graphic photographs of Jews 
being  coerced onto railway  cattle-wagons by the French Gendarmerie in the 
presence of German soldiers. Their destination, possibly unknown at the time to the 
Vichy authorities responsible for these actions, was  Auschwitz. Deportations from 
France to this and other  Nazi extermination camps in the East extended over a period 
from March 1942 to July 1944 and involved some 76,000 Jews, the majority of whom 
were immigrants to France during the inter-war years.1   The strange and unforeseen 
irony is that less than two years later in March 1946 the French police authorities, this 
time in a port near Marseilles, again found themselves  processing foreign Jews for 
departure from France, but this time in a more sympathetic manner and, more 
importantly, to a destination of choice. Although, for sensitive political reasons, the 
passengers' visas indicated another country, the true destination, as many French 
officials privately knew, was Palestine where, despite British rule, there w as the hope 
of a new life. This phenomenon marked not only the sailing of the first so-called 
“illegal immigration ship” from France but also a level of complicity within post-war 
Government circles which made this and later sailings from the French coast possible. 
The act of  “illegal immigration” in relation to Jew's seeking to reach Palestine w as 
therefore not, by any means, regarded in and outside the French administration with 
the same intense  disapproval  as that displayed by  the British Government. On the 
contrary, certain Ministers quietly disregarded the known quota-policy of their former 
ally and gave covert and extensive assistance to the Mossad FAliyah Bet (literally 
‘Institute for Parallel Immigration') which facilitated the movement of Jewish 
refugees across France to the ports of embarkation. 2
Although this particular French involvement was ultimately recognised in 
the historiograph}' of Aliyah Bet, academic research into the underlying reasons for 
the Mossad's success in France, involving  the extensive use of relevant archival 
documents, has been sparse. This study is an attempt to redress the balance by
1   Serge Klarsfeld, Vichv-Auschwitz: Le Role de Vichv dans la Solution Finale de la Question Juive en 
France-1942 (Paris,  1983), 7.
2Mossad FAliyah Bet was a  secret  body  set up in  Palestine 1938 by the Jewish Agency. It was 
staffed, in the main, by  Labour-Zionists from the kibbutz (communal  settlement) movement Whilst 
this organisation  maintained  only a functional link to the  Jewish Agency’s  para-military forces, the 
Haganah,  its  leader, Shaul Meirov, was one of its top officers. He was a close associate of David Ben 
Gurion, the Chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.
4reviewing sources used in the past and then bringing into play an interpretation of 
more recently available documentation from a number of foreign archives. By this 
means, the role of the various elements within France, who assisted the Mossad and 
other Palestinian agencies, will be better defined and explained than has hitherto been 
the case.
To define the raison d’etre of the Mossad, one could point to its desire to 
circumvent the restrictive quota on the immigration of Jews into Palestine, w hich the 
British Government had imposed in  May 1939.3  This prescribed that any Jew 
attempting to bypass the quota by unauthorised entry  would be classed as an  “illegal 
immigrant” and would be arrested and interned.  The immediate reaction of the 
Jewish Agency, under David Ben Gurion, was to ignore  this fundamental  restriction 
on immigration at a time when, with the  emergence  of Nazi-inspired  antisemitism, 
the existence of the  Jews of Central and Eastern  Europe appeared most at risk. It 
therefore  decided to flout the regulations by actions in which clandestine 
immigration, or Aliyah Bet as it was termed, would play a leading part. In responding 
to the task allotted to it, and despite Ben Gurion’s inclination for centralisation of the 
decision-making process, the Mossad itself would ultimately determine  its own 
ideology and the operational policies to be pursued.4
The Mossad’s rescue operations after the beginning of the Second World War, 
continued from a base in Turkey as long as it was still possible to extract Jews from 
Eastern Europe, eventually to land than, undetected if possible, on the shores of 
Palestine. Following the end of the war, Zionist hopes for the abandonment of the 
1939 White Paper rose sharply. How ever it soon became clear that the new Labour 
Government in England, despite earlier indications to the contrary, was not prepared 
to allow  unrestricted  Jewish immigration into Palestine. The American President’s
3 The  historical background to this arbitrary move can best be judged from two diametrically opposed 
angles. From the Jewish standpoint it was a form of capitulation  to the Arab violence of the three 
previous years, whose intent was to prevent the fulfilment of Britain’s Mandate, which was the creation 
in Palestine of a National Home for the Jews.  The Arab standpoint, on the other hand,  viewed 
unrestricted Jewish immigration as  the erosion of the  demographies! position of the Palestinian Arab 
in a land which they considered their own.  British failure to give satisfaction to the aspirations of 
either party after  nearly two decades of the Mandate and innumerable conf erences and proposals was 
now crowned with a piece of legislation which clearly was intended to address  Arab concerns at a time 
when war in Europe  seemed imminent and Britain needed friends in the Middle East. The new 
regulations provided for a  quota limiting Jewish immigration to 75,000 over the next five years and 
restrictions on Jewish land purchases. At the expiry of the  initial  period  any  new quota would be 
subject to  Arab agreement and at the end often years there would be an independent  state  in which, 
inevitably,  the Jews would be  a minority. (For further analysis see Walter Laqueur, A History of 
Zionism. (London.  1972). Chapter 10  "European Catastrophe’').
5request to Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister, to provide 100,000 Entry 
Certificates  to the Jewish survivors of die Holocaust, then interned in Displaced 
Persons Camps in Germany, Austria and Italy, was politely turned down. Pending the 
results of an Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry into Jewish refugees, a quota 
on Jewish immigration, now set at 18,000 per year was  imposed.5  Given the 
thousands of Jews interned in Displaced Persons Camps after the end of the war, such 
an unacceptably low number was, for the Jewish Agency, the signal for the active 
renewal of Aliyah Bet activities. But how best to organise, from far away Tel Aviv, 
the release and onward movement of thousands of DPs in Europe to the 
Mediterranean and Adriatic coasts? The logical answer was to create an operational 
headquarters for the Mossad somewhere in Europe. After considering the few 
possibilities then existing, France  was chosen for a number of practical  reasons as 
the best location.
Without  the media coverage of the Exodus Affair in 1947 with its 4,500 
illegal immigrants, the  role  of France in the whole saga of illegal immigration would 
not have attracted much public  attention. Certainly little interest had previously been 
aroused in respect of thousands  of other  illegal  immigrants who  had progressively 
embarked in French ports. To place the matter in a separate  context, the  overall total 
of 16,200 Jews carried  on the  fifteen boats from France  effectively  represented  less 
than a quarter of the total number of immigrants who attempted the journey to 
Palestine  during the period under consideration. Indeed, of the eight countries used 
by the Mossad for illegal immigration, it was  from  Italy that the greatest number 
embarked for Palestine, comprising  half of all boats and nearly a third of all 
immigrants.6 This  relatively high number was linked to the availability of transit 
camps run by UNRRA,7 the influence of the local Mossad operatives 8 and  primarily
4 Ze’ev  Hadaii and Ze'ev Tsahor,  Voyage to Freedom: An Episode in the Dlegal Immigration to 
Palestine ( London,  1985), 78-79. Hereafter Hadari, Voyage to Freedom.
5 Yehuda  Bauer, Flight and Rescue. Brichah (New York,  1970), 93. Hereafter Bauer, Flight
6 See Appendix 1(b) for a breakdown by country of departure
UNRRA is the acronym for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency set up in 1943 to 
deal with an expected  post-war refugee problem. It  was replaced in 1947 by the International Refugee 
Organisation (IRO)
8 Elihu Bergman, “Adversaries and Facilitators: The Unconventional Diplomacy of Illegal Immigration 
to Palestine,  1945-1948”, Israel Affairs. No.8 (London, 2002),  14. In Italy the success of  the Mossad 
was due in no small measure to Yehuda Arazi and particularly to his successor  Ada Sereni, who used 
her extensive  contacts in government circles to convince them that by facilitating the flow’ of refugees 
out of the country they would  be  carrying out both  a humanitarian as well as a pragmatic gesture to 
serve their interests.
6the  lack of interference by the Italian authorities.9 Undoubtedly their passive attitude 
was largely influenced by the fact that although Italy  remained, until September 
1947, under Allied occupation, this did not prevent a clandestine flow of Jewish 
refugees from across die Austrian border. 10 Despite pressure from the British, the 
unofficial  Italian response was to enable them to move on and out of the country as 
speedily as possible.
In comparison to Italy, France, as one of the victorious Allies, regained  full 
sovereignty after its liberation, was responsible for its own internal and  foreign 
policy and, in theory at least,  controlled  all its border crossings.1 1  Furthermore, from 
the Mossad’s viewpoint, the political and public environment  then existing in post­
war  France  was especially  conducive  to setting up a headquarters for  those 
involved in the illegal immigration  campaign in Europe. Without the safe base that 
France represented, one that, unlike Italy, was  less susceptible  to direct  British 
interference, the Mossad, an intrinsically secretive organisation, could not have 
operated with so few constraints. The most crucial factor, however, was the extensive 
covert assistance afforded by certain Socialist Ministers in the Government,  powerful 
civil servants and a host of lesser officials.1 2
It is important to stress, even at this early stage, that these officials did not 
limit their assistance  to  the needs of Aliyah Bet only. Other matters of a more 
political nature arose  on which  die Jewish Agency was also  keen to obtain the 
support of its friends in the French Government When the  Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs  vacillated  over such  crucial issues  as the Palestine  Partition Plan  and the 
recognition of the State of Israel,  the Agency  used all its contacts, direct and indirect, 
to ensure that its voice was heard in the comdors of power. Again, when die British 
finally announced their departure from Palestine, the needs of the Yishuv (Jewish 
community in Palestine) for modem armaments with which to confront the expected 
Arab invasion, were swiftly taken on board by die French Government, albeit, as will 
be illustrated lata- , not without some controversial aspects
9 For a very full expose of  the political ramifications of  Aliyah Bet in Italy  see  Fritz Liebreich, 
Britain’s Naval and Political Reaction to the Illegal Immigration of Jews  to Palestine  1945-1948. 
(Oxford, 2005).
10  Zeev Mankowitz, Life between Memory and Hope:The Survivors of the Holocaust in Occupied 
Germany (Cambridge, 2002), 272.  Hereafter Mankowitz.
1 1   Tsilla Hershco. Entre Paris et Jerusalem: La France, le Sionisme et la Creation de L’Etat d’Israel, 
1945-1949 (Paris, 2003), 59.  Hereafter Hershco.
12 Ibid.,  271/272.
7It can be argued that the assistance rendered to the Jewish Agency and its 
more  clandestine wings in the  Mossad and the Haganah  in  post-war  France  has to 
be considered in the context of a country attempting to negate its Vichy past by 
emphasising the role of the  French  Resistance and die Free French Forces in 
liberating the country. Not surprisingly, the resistance by the paramilitary forces in 
Palestine  to British restrictions on immigration and later its fight for independence, in 
the face of Arab aggression, would  have a certain resonance with  former members of 
the  French Resistance. Many of these  found themselves in positions of authority 
after the war and  encouraged a  return to the old French traditions of welcoming 
refugees and affording  them  asylum or transit facilities.
Gratitude, arising from  the participation of Jews from Palestine in the Free 
French Forces and from  a shared experience with  French Zionists in the Resistance, 
led  some Socialist Government Ministers to use their positions of authority in 
internal affairs after the war, to  quietly extend a helping hand to the Mossad’s 
emissaries. They were quite aware  that  the sole  mission  of these emissaries was to 
organise  the  immigration  to Palestine from  French ports of those survivors of the 
Holocaust who otherwise would have remained interned in Displaced Persons Camps. 
The fact that, in the process, they did not take into their confidence  some of their 
coalition partners, epitomised the nature of French politics at the time.1 3  For one thing 
the Ministry7  of Foreign Affairs (MAE), under the control of one of the coalition 
partners, was concerned to maintain a close relationship with Britain for economic 
and strategic reasons. For another, it was anxious  to re-establish its cultural ties  in 
the Levant, from which it had been ejected, allegedly7  as a result of British intrigue. 
Thirdly, the MAE wished  to stem die influence of the Arab League over France’s 
North African possessions, with their large Moslem populations. All these sensitive 
areas of foreign policy were likely to be upset by any disclosure of pro-Zionist 
activity within  the Government. For historical scholarship, such a divergence of 
policy within die same Government, where illegal immigration to Palestine  is the 
point of conflict, represents an area worthy of exploration.
During  this particular  period, the sensitive issue of French support for 
Zionism w7 as enveloped, for justifiable  political and security7  reasons, in  a shroud of 
secrecy. Nevertheless, as this study reveals, there does  exist very pertinent  and
13 Sylvia K.Crosbie, A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day War (Princeton. New 
Jersey,  1974), 29. Hereafter Crosbie.
8revealing  primary material  on this subject in French and Israeli archives and to  some 
extent in  those of England and the USA. Together with  other compelling 
circumstantial evidence, this material  does much to further  recognition and 
assessment  of the impact of this  French connection to Aliyah Bet and, by extension, 
to other Zionist projects. Until now, this reality, although often alluded to in a number 
of French  non-academic works, has not been adequately  corroborated from archival 
sources  and  has, therefore,  remained  largely anecdotal in practice. The  main 
sources of information  used  were  the  memoirs of  two ex- Government Ministers, 
Edouard Depreux and Jules Moch;  the head of the counter-espionage Agency, Roger 
Wybot; and  two  pro-Zionist investigative reporters, Jacques Derogy  and Francois 
Armorin. French academic work on the subject  appears limited to a few  books, 
articles and dissertations and, even in these,  the  facilities which the Mossad 
infrastructure  received from a number of agencies in France,  although  recognised 
as  one  of the indispensable elements on which the success of Aliyah Bet in the 
post-war era rested, are not covered in any depth.  Moreover, whilst in Israel works on 
the overall subject of illegal immigration abound, largely fed by Mossad records of all 
kinds, most  references to French complicity are  seriously lacking in supportive 
documentation
The exercise of absolute discretion  was, of necessity, a vital  element in the 
Mossad's contacts with those Government officials  in the Ministries of the Interior 
and Transport, who particularly favoured their enterprise. The essential objective at 
all times was to avoid  upsetting  the fragile coalition which made up die French 
Government Another reason for maintaining a veil of secrecy7   over Mossad/ 
Government contacts  was the known  presence on French soil of die British 
Intelligence service (SIS), which  was constandy trying to monitor the movements of 
suspect ships  and  individuals  involved in illegal immigration from  French ports. 
Direct  contacts were  avoided by the use  of Zionist intermediaries who, as  former 
members of die Resistance, were  highly regarded in Socialist Party circles. However, 
as all  these contacts went unrecorded by both sides, this potential documentary 
source  was not available to  earlier scholars. Furthermore, the application of a 60- 
year rule  by the French  Archives  Nationales,  to the more sensitive or private 
papers, rendered access  somewhat difficult to achieve. Given these factors which led 
to researchers encountering  difficulties  in finding supportive  documentation, how7
9has the existing historiography  still  been able to assert confidently that there was 
truly a substantive French connection to Aliyah Bet?
One of the principal sources of support of this premise  is the published work of 
Ze'ev Hadari  which deals extensively with the activities of the Mossad in  Europe.1 4  
This Palestinian emissary was a senior operative of the Mossad in Paris between June 
1946 and late 1947. Whilst he relates in some detail his contacts with the various 
sections of the French Ministry of the Interior and especially7  the counter-espionage 
agency, the DST, he relies almost exclusively on his own memory and the Mossad 
files at the Haganah Archives in Tel Aviv. Few French sources are cited  here and 
certainly none that  relate to  any  Government documents confirming  the existence 
of the Mossad in France or its relationship with Ministry7  officials. Consequently, 
those parts of Hadari’s narrative which refer  to the  “French Connection”, bereft as 
they7  are  of explicit documentary7  evidence, must  also  be considered  anecdotal at 
best.
One of the more informative pieces of French academic work on the subject, is 
by Anne Grynberg.1 5 In her article there are very few citations, the work relying for 
the most part on interviews with those involved. These  deal mainly with the 
contribution of former members  of the Armee Juive (one  of the Jewish Resistance 
movements in France) to the setting up of the Mossad infrastructure in France. She 
notes with surprise  that support for Zionism by certain Ministers  was available at a 
time when, faced  with  comparatively  more important social and economic 
difficulties on the home front,  French politicians risked an open breach with the 
British, whose material support they needed.1 6   In her conclusion, Grynberg 
concedes  that more research was required into the motivation of senior political 
figures involved in helping the Mossad.
With regard to unpublished papers  on the subject, the laurels must go to 
Joseph Kennet for his voluminous Master’s Dissertation, which directly inspired the
14 Hadari’s books comprise: Voyage to Freedom: An Episode in the Illegal ImmipTation to Palestine 
(co-authored with Ze’ev Tsahor, London,  1985); Second Exodus. The Full story of Jewish Illegal 
Immigration To Palestine.  1945-1948 (Bear Sheva, Israel,  1991) and Ha’Mossad TAlivah Ret:  Yoman 
Mevazi’im-Paris 1947 (Beer Sheva, Israel, 1991).
,5Aime Grynberg, «France 1944-1947, Ouvrir les Prates de Sion: De la Resistance Contre le Nazisme a 
la Solidarity avec Israel » Les Nouveaux Cahiers. No.90 (Automne,  1987), 20. Hereafter Grynberg.
16 This was the era of the Marshall Plan  few the post-war rehabilitation of European economies, put 
forward by the US Secretary of State, George Marshall, during a speech at Harvard University on 5* 
June 1947. France had every economic and material  interest in coordinating the successful fulfilment 
of this Plan with Great Britain. Equally the onset of the “Cold War” with the Soviet Union necessitated 
France playing her part with her former British and American Allies.
10further  research work  invested in this study.17 As to the  few relevant  books, the 
most noteworthy is that of David  Lazard.1 8 As the title of his book  implies, die 
nature of French public opinion towards the creation of a Jewish State  is the main 
subject matter. His  evidence is accumulated  from  a wide range  of articles in the 
French press, sometimes by pro-Zionist  reporters,  who had been invited by the 
Mossad to accompany immigrants on board illegal ships.  However, source 
references, as such, are few and far between and Lazard has relied heavily for  his 
facts  on his interviews with some of the central characters, either employed or 
connected with the Mossad in Paris during 1946 and 1947. His principal assertion is 
that, in addition to Government Ministers, a whole host of civil servants, policemen 
and dock officials were not only aware of illegal immigration activities but lent vital 
support  when it was necessary.19
Lazard’s book was preceded in 1969 by that of Jacques Derogy, a pro-Zionist 
investigative reporter.20 Derogy’s detailed account of the Exodus Affair and 
particular!}7   the precise nature  of his  information regarding the  activities of the 
British Secret Service in die Marseilles area, would  suggest  his sources to have been 
officials within the Government. Not surprisingly, he provides no citations, but  the 
memoirs of Roger Wybot, the head of the French counter-espionage Agency, the 
DST, published  some six years later, clearly point to Derogy’s source  as being 
Wybot himself.21 The fact that the former  Interior Minister, Edouard Depreux, in his 
own memoirs, particularly commends Derogy’s book for the accuracy of its reporting 
about the Exodus Affair tends  to transform what was, at die time,  an uncorroborated 
story, into an officially  approved historical account.22
Another French Minister, to an even  greater extent than Depreux, proclaimed in his 
memoirs how he used his position to give assistance to Aliyah Bet and other pro- 
Zionist activities. This was Jules Moch, the Minister for Public Works and Transport
1   Joseph Kermet, L’Anglcterre. la France et rimmigration Clandestine en Palestine. 1945-1948 
Master’s Dissertation ( Memoire de Maitrise), Uniuersite de Paris  1, la Sorbonne (Paris,  1985),  1-303. 
In relation to  the French attitude towards illegal immigration  he relied extensively on the private 
papa's of Andre Blumel, which included copies of many  French ministerial documents not otherwise 
available because of the  60 year non-accessibility  rule. ( Livre  2 du Code du Patrimome consaere aux 
archives et du decret no.79-1038 du 3 decembre 1979). Hereafter Kennet.
18David Lazard, L’Opinion Francaise et la Naissance de l’Etat d’IsraeL  1945-1949 (Paris,  1972).
19 Ibid., 96.
20Jacques Derogy, La Loi du Retour. La Secrete et Veritable Histoire de l’Exodus  (Paris,  1969). 
Hereafter Derogy, La Loi du Retour.
21 Philippe Bemert, Roger Wybot et la Bataille pour la DST (Paris,  1975). Hereafter Bemert.
22Edouard Depreux,  Souvenirs d’un Militant: de la Social-Democratie au Socialisme.  Un Demi-Siecle 
de Luttes (Paris,  1972). Hereafter Depreux.
11who later replaced Depreux at the Ministry of the Interior.23  Yet a  third  Socialist, 
Vincent Auriol, who became the first  President of France in the post-war era, adds 
spice to their  narrative with a few obscure revelations  in his diary,  relating in the 
main to cabinet meetings.24 As President, he was required to preside over these 
meetings in which, by tradition, no formal minutes were taken. Due to  their absence, 
there has been a tendency by some historians to accept  his diary  entries as a 
reasonable reflection of  what actually transpired. Given Auriol’s political leanings, 
reliance on his memoirs as well as  those  of Depreux and Moch  requires a  certain 
amount of caution.  Consequently, in dealing with their various assertions, I have 
taken care to seek  corroborative evidence wherever possible.
Those Israeli and French  historians who specifically  refer to the French 
connection  to illegal immigration, rely largely on  the  sources detailed above, but 
without, as has been pointed out,  the  support of primary documentation to 
corroborate the narrative. Consequently, the overall effect is one of inordinate reliance 
on anecdotal evidence, from which it was concluded that there had been French 
Government complicity in Aliyah Bet. This generally accepted view is expressed in 
the works of Catherine  Nicaud25 and Frederique Schillo.26 Both assert  that  the 
Socialist Ministers within the Government coalition  had a natural affinity with 
French Zionists. Furthermore those Zionists who were  also members of the SFIO 
(French Socialist Party )  provided the necessary' links between the Socialist 
Ministers, their officials  and the leaders of the Mossad. Also significant w ere the 
bonds established during the war-time  occupation, when Socialists and Zionists, 
active in the Resistance, supported each other both materially and psy chologically in 
their fight against both the Vichy regime and the Germans.  But again, the support of 
primary documentation for all  these assertions is seriously lacking.
Even when examining the role of one supposedly  opposed to the pro-Zionists 
within the  Socialist Party7 , namely7   Georges Bidault, the leader of  the Mouvement 
Republicain Populaire ( MRP), there are a large number  of contradictory7  stories as to 
his true attitude. Though representing the  conservative forces  in the  coalition 
Government,  Bidault, as  former head of the war-time  Committee for National
23Jules Moch, Une si Longue Vie  (Paris,  1976). Hereafter Moch.
24Vincent Auriol, Journal du Septennat.  1947-1954 (Paris,  1970).  Hereafter Auriol.
25Catherine Nicaud, La France et le Sionisme  1897-1948: Une Rencontre Manquee? (Paris,  1992) 
Herafter Nicaud.
20 Frederique Schillo, La France et la Creation de l’Etat d’Israel: 18 fevrierl947-11  mai  1949 (Paris,
1997). Hereafter Schillo.
12Resistance (CNR),  was accorded a high level of respect by the Socialists despite his 
political affiliation. Invariably, even under a succession of Socialist Prime Ministers, 
he retained the portfolio for Foreign Affairs. However the Departement de F Affique - 
Levant  (Middle East  Department) within his  Ministry  was  perceived by many of 
his colleagues in the coalition Government to have strong pro-Arab tendencies. This 
suspicion  arose because  of the Department's considered  view that  only  the 
pursuit of friendly relations with the Arab League would help to  maintain French 
hegemony over its  North African possessions. Inevitably, however, this justification 
precluded any sympathy within the Department for the Zionist cause.27
In the historiography, confusion  persists as to  Bidault’s real  attitude towards 
Zionism. This derives from  his inept  attempts to stem the flow of illegal immigration 
from France so as to placate  the British,  his prevarication  on the Palestine Partition 
vote in the UN Assembly  and  his apparent later conversion to the Zionist cause. On 
the  one hand he is accused of a marked hesitancy and caution  in all his actions 
concerning the Palestine issue whilst, on the other, he is credited  with having an 
empathy for Zionism.28 This  inconsistency leads to a number of questions.  For 
instance, did he share  the British Foreign Minister’s aversion to the notion of a 
Jewish State  or did he, more likely, just leave it to his officials at the Quai d’Orsay to 
determine policy on Palestine, whilst he concentrated mainly on European affairs, as 
Hershco suggests? 29  To add to the confusion, Jules Moch in his memoirs  virtually 
suggests that Bidauh’s irascibility concerning illegal immigration was all part of a 
great  masquerade to impress the British.30
Unhelpfully, Bidault in his own memoirs does not  refer once  to the subject of 
Palestine, leaving the impression that, for him at least, it was  an unimportant issue.3 1  
Even a later interview with an Israeli reporter, concerning the clandestine  shipment of 
arms on the Altaiena for the benefit of the para-military Irgun Zvai Leumi (National 
Military Organisation), shed little light on his true intentions. Fortunately, however, in 
respect of this one affair, archival sources, some of them containing significant
27 Idith Zertal, « Le cinquieme Cote du Triangle: La France, les Juifs et la question de la Palestine,
1945-1948 »  in  Irad Malkin and  J. Brill, eds., La France et la Mediterranee  vinpt-sept Siecles
d’Interdependences. (Leiden, Netherlands,  1990), 418. Hereafter Zertal,  « Le Cinquieme Cote du 
Triangle ».
28  Jacques Dalloz, Georges Bidault: Bibliographic Politique (Paris,  1992), 274.
29 Hershco, 45.
30 Moch, 269.
31  Georges Bidault, Resistance:The Political  Autobiography of Georges Bidault (London.  1967) 
(Translated from the French: d une Resistance a une autre). These memoirs were written by Bidault 
whilst he was in exile in Brazil and Belgium between 1963 and 1967.
13unpublished material do provide, as I will illustrate, a new insight into  Bidault’s 
actions and those of his officials  at the time (See Chapter 8).
Not surprisingly, extensive  research work on  Aliyah Bet has been  carried 
out by Israelis  in and out of Israel. From small beginnings it  has developed into a 
vast body of academic and non-academic literature. In the early years of the State, the 
subject took  on an almost mystical aura and  was construed as one of the major 
strategic achievements of the Yishuv and its  most eminent and charismatic  leader, 
David Ben Gurion. Almost inevitably  a  number of legends and stories emerged, 
rising to mythical proportions,  as to the activities of the Mossad ami die Palmach
32 (shock-troops of the Haganah)  during the British Mandate.
Eventually  breaking cover,  those who had actually  been involved in Aliyah 
Bet, began to publish their own  personal memoirs in the 1960s.33 From these 
necessarily subjective  beginnings, a historiography finally emerged. Under the 
direction of Anita Shapira of Tel Aviv University and  with die collaboration of four 
other  universities, “The Shaul Avigur [formerly Meirov] Inter-University Project for 
the Study of Aliyah Bet” was launched. The first 17 studies resulting from this 
project, were published in Tel Aviv in 1990.34  Included was  a monograph on the 
epic story of the Haganah ship  Exodus ‘47’.
The  trials and tribulations of the passengers of  the Exodus, had  provoked 
worldwide interest and were later  the subject of innumerable books and a Hollywood 
feature film. But the first official account of the Exodus Affair, with its intrinsically 
French connection and certainly the biggest media event  of Aliyah Bet during its 
whole existence,  was published  in 1949 by a journalist, Bracha Habbas under the 
title The ship which Won: the History of die Exodus 1947.35 Eshewing his usual low- 
profile approach, the Mossad’s chief, Shaul Meirov, was the person  who supplied her 
with the material she used. Party political reasons were die main motivation for his 
involvement. Bang a member of Mapai (Israel Labour Party )  his  objective  was  to 
establish the  pre-eminent role  of the Mossad  in the  Aliyah Bet campaign and by so
32 Idith Zertal, From Catastrophe to Power: Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of Israel,
(Berkeley, California, 1998),  170. Hereafter  Zertal, Catastrophe.
33 They included  Yigal Allon , head of the Palmach, (Shield of David , 1960), Shaul Meirov,  head of 
the Mossad (With the Haganah Generation.  1961); Arye ‘Lova’ Eliav, Mossad operative (The Voyage 
of the Uluah.  1969);  Ehud Avriel, Second in Command of the Mossad (Open the Gates,  1975).
34 Its original  Hebrew title was  translated into English as  Ha'apalah : Studies in the History of Dleeal 
Immigration into Palestine, 1934-1948.
35 Dalia Ofer, “The Historiography of Aliyah Bet”, in  Yisrael Gutman and Gideon Greif, eds., 
Conference Proceedings. Fifth Yad Vashem International Historical Conference. Jerusalem  1983 
(Jerusalem, 1988),  599
14doing reduce that of the Palmach, which owed allegiance to a more extreme left-wing 
party, Map  am.36
In the annals of Aliyah Bet, the story of the Exodus rose to prominence 
because  the 4,500 immigrants die carried to Palestine were fiercely  resolute, despite 
the appalling conditions which they had to endure, in  refusing all blandishments to 
land in France after  the British  returned them to their country of departure. The 
British compounded this  initial public relations disaster  by finally  returning them to 
Germany. It was the only instance of its kind. The ground-breaking achievement of 
such studies as that  of the Exodus was that, for the first time, the immigrants 
themselves, the so-called  Ma'apilim, shared the stage with the more  high profile 
organisers and emissaries who, in the  earlier publications  referred to, had  been cast 
as the main  heroes.37
In more recent years, two other  Israeli academics,  An  eh Kochavi  and Idith 
Zertal, have devoted extensive chapters in their books  to illegal immigration 
activities in France. Both  have  brought to bear their  own  interpretations of available 
archival material, in Kochavi"s case  exclusively from British sources and in  Zertal's 
from  French  as well as Israeli sources. Kochavi took the questionable  view that the 
French  Socialist Ministers, whilst assisting  Jewish refugees to reach Palestine, saw 
no conflict with their desire for close relations with the British, as the issue was only 
' marginal”. 38 Zertal's main focus, which later  raised heated  controversy, was to 
suggest  that  Aliyah Bet was primarily a large-scale public relations exercise which 
viewed the establishment of a Jewish State as its only objective, with scant regard for 
the conditions under which immigrants were transported on un-seaworthy ships. She 
also contended that there was  friction  between the Palmach and the Mossad  over 
the former’s insistence that immigrants should physically resist British boarding 
parties at sea.39 By contrast, Tsilla Hershco's  book, although also  largely based on 
French sources,  only briefly covers Aliyah Bet and  concentrates primarily  on 
French and Zionist diplomatic  manoeuvring  over the 1947 Partition vote and  the 
eventual recognition of the State of Israel. Nevertheless, as many of the personalities 
involved  played a role directly or indirectly in Aliyah Bet, ter insights bring another
36  Aviva Halamish,  The Exodus Affair Holocaust Survivors and the Struggle for Palestine. (London.
1990), 269. Hereafter Halamish
37  Ze’ev Tsahor,  book review on  Anita Shajxra (ed) ” Ha’apalah: Studies in the History of Illegal 
immigration into Palestine,1934-1948”, in Studies in Contemporary Jewry. Vol. 9 (Oxford,  1993).
38 Arieh Kochavi. Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain. The United States and Jewish Refugees.  1945-1948 
(Chapel Hill and London, 2001), 274.
15useful dimension to the subject. In a more general context other authors  have also, 
with the passage of time, carefully reflected  on the  purpose, implementation  and 
overall effect of the illegal immigration campaign and some of the issues  they raise 
will be addressed later  in this thesis.
Among  the most recent works on illegal immigration is that of Fritz 
Liebreich, who concentrated on the British reaction to the phenomenon.40 Although 
he reserves a whole chapter to countries from which illegal immigrants set sail, very 
little  of his commentary  is devoted to France. The main focus of his wide-ranging 
research is directed towards  Italy, which he perceived as the more important  of the 
two locations. Nevertheless, Liebreich does recognise the two crucial factors which 
were specific to France, namely the close cooperation between the DST and the 
Mossad and the reluctance of Socialist Ministers in die coalition  Government to bow 
to British diplomatic pressure over illegal immigration.41
By drawing on die existing body of secondary7  literature described above  and 
even  more extensively  on documentation now7  available in  French, Israeli, American 
and British  archives, this  study  will decisively  demonstrate  that not only was 
there  a large-scale  and sympathetic French connection to Aliyah Bet  by specific 
elements within  the  Government,  but that this was an  essential prerequisite for the 
Mossad  to achieve  success in its enterprise. Furthermore, this study also reveals 
other areas of French support for the Zionist enterprise which, although  they 
follow ed in the footsteps of the illegal immigration campaign, have been  largely7  
ignored.
This  study7   begins with an examination  of Jewish domestic and political 
issues  in France  during die immediate post-war period  and the role  Zionist 
intermediaries played in relation to the  French Government. This first chapter is 
followed  by  a chapter which  explains how  the complexities of coalition politics 
enabled covert assistance by certain Ministers towards the Mossad to  be ongoing and 
remain  virtually unchallenged  within the Cabinet. A chapter is then devoted to the 
extensive activities of Palestinian emissaries, both official and unofficial, on French 
soil. The role of other  entities concerned with supporting or opposing  illegal 
immigration,  the American Jewish Distribution Committee and  British Intelligence
39  Zertal. Catastrophe.  168.
40 Fritz Liebreich, Britain’s Naval and Political Reaction to the Illegal Immigration of Jews to 
Palestine.  1945-1948 (Oxford, 2005). Hereafter Liebreich.
41 Ibid., 86 and 88.
16respectively,  is  examined in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 I address  the  principal 
objective of this study by setting out the  various aspects of the French connection to 
illegal immigration and how this was affected by British diplomatic pressure. A 
detailed account of the illegal ships which left from French ports, an analysis of the 
overall results achieved by  Aliyah Bet  and  a discussion on other perspectives  are 
set out in Chapter 6.  This is then  followed by a  chapter  specifically devoted to the 
Exodus Affair, which had such a dramatic effect on world  public opinion. The final 
chapter, in dealing with  French military aid in the first months of the nascent Israeli 
State, illustrates  how one form of French  assistance,  having come to its natural  end, 
w as replaced by  another as the needs of the moment dictated.
As previously indicated this study is based largely on  primary  documentation 
sourced  from  archives in four countries. The  approach adopted has been  to 
progressively  identify and visit those state and private archives  most likely to contain 
relevant data on  the subject matter. In die United Kingdom the files of die Admiralty, 
War Office, Foreign Office and Colonial Office  at  the National Archives, w ere the 
most immediately accessible and comprehensive. In the footnotes the relative files are 
indicated by a TNA  number, the prefix of which indicates the Ministry involved (For 
example: FO for Foreign Office).
In France, the Archives Nalionales  in Paris not only contained 
documents deposited by the various Ministries but also the private papers of various 
Ministers, such as Georges Bidault and Jules Moch. Branches of the  Archives 
Nationales in  Fontainebleau and  Marseilles were also visited  to inspect other 
relevant material. Invariably  most of the  files selected were subject to a 60  rather 
than the more common  30-year  rule and  die granting  of dispensation from this rule 
was a prerequisite to achieve access. This involved obtaining specific permission 
from the original  depositor of die documents, whether a Ministry or the relatives of a 
deceased  individual. Response times were anything from three months to a year but, 
with perseverance, approval was generally forthcoming.  The file reference  for 
private papers contain the letters AP (Archives Privees). Most Ministry of die Interior 
files  are numbered with  the prefix FI a or F7 and largely contain reports from the 
Renseignements Generaux  (Political Police branch of the Surete Nationale). In 
addition to those deposited  at die  Archives Nationales, many  Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MAE) files were retained  within die Ministry’s own  archives at the Quai 
d'Orsay . Other archives visited in Paris were generally non-State or private archives
17where access  to material was relatively  easy to obtain once the research project had 
been explained.
In New York, access to the archives of the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
committee  (The “Joint”) and  the Center for Jewish History (YIVO) presented no 
particular difficulty. In Israel the only constraint was the  language  when Hebrew text 
was involved but, as many of the documents inspected were in English or French, this 
w as not a major impediment. Other than that, the level of assistance received  in all 
five archives visited  in Israel  was the best encountered in all of the many archives 
visited.
A limited number of interviews were  carried out in France and Israel. 
Fortunately, in the case of those  who had direct involvement with illegal 
immigration, their ability to recall facts and answer detailed questions, despite their 
advancing years,  provided  very worthwhile first-hand testimony, which  have been 
extensively reproduced. Those  newspaper articles quoted presort a flavour of the 
times and are representative of certain political outlooks then prevailing.
To conclude this introduction, I would emphasise  that  this dissertation  is an 
attempt  to move the scholarship on  French involvement in Aliyah Bet  significantly 
forward. In view of the  difficulty in directly pinpointing  incontrovertible evidence 
of complicity between dements in the French Government and the Mossad, a rather 
empirical  method of research had to be  adopted. This wide-ranging effort consisted 
of identifying, analysing, comparing  and interpreting a great number  of primary 
documents from many sources, which had a  bearing on the subject.  The result of this 
exercise will demonstrate  that not only did such a complicity exist, but that it w as the 
key to a successful clandestine partnership in which illegal immigration, although the 
main area of activity, w as not die only area of cooperation involving French officials 
and the Zionist leadership.
18CHAPTER 1 Jewish consciousness in post-war France
In the aftermath of the war, the spirit of the anti-Nazi Resistance did not 
disappear amongst those of the Jewish native  elite and the  immigrants from Poland 
and other parts of Eastern Europe, who had been involved in its activities. They  had 
survived die war essentially by  recognising that the Vichy Government under Petain 
would not serve as a protective buffer between them and the Germans. Also signs of 
unity appeared as the pre-war dissensions between native  Jews and immigrant Jews 
were dissipated to a large extent through the shared expenence of Vichy-inspired 
discriminatory legislation. The deliberate  economic impoverishment of native Jews, 
banned from their businesses and liberal professions was matched by even worse 
measures against immigrant Jews involving, to a far  greater extent, their arrest by the 
French police and incarceration under the control of the Gendarmerie. From March 
1942, Vichy, initially hesitant and then more pro-active, became a  partner in the 
German “Final Solution to the Jewish Problem” and  permitted the removal of Jews 
out of France  to a so-called ‘unidentified destination' in the East, which the children 
in the Drancy detention camp outside Paris fancifully  called ‘Pitchi-Poi’. In reality its 
true name was Auschwitz-Birkenau.1
The major change in  outlook, even before final liberation, was that  the ideas 
of the  Zionists, previously given scant attention, now appealed to many Jews in 
France, both native and immigrant, as the ideal solution for the future. Even if this 
w as not a solution  for themselves,  then at least it did  provide the hope of a safe 
haven for those Jew's who were making their way into the Displaced Persons Camps 
in Austria and Germany and indeed for East  European Jews in general.
Proud of the opportunity to facilitate the  movement of these DPs across 
France to the Mediterranean ports for embarkation to British-controlled Palestine, 
former members of the specifically  Jewish Resistance and  other Jew's in the overall
1  For a detailed account of these events  see Michael R. Marius  and Robert O.  Paxton, Vichv France 
and the Jews ( New York ,1981) (Note . The first edition of this work was published in France as Vichv 
et les Juifs.  1981). This ground-breaking academic work directly exposed the Vichy Government, 
rather than the Goman occupation forces, as die prime  instigator of anti-Jewish legislation and 
repressive measures against the Jews  from late  1940 onwards.  Serge Klarsfelds Vichv-Auschwitz 
published two years later  provides extensive documentary evidence of Vichy's complicity with the 
Gestapo authorities in the round-up and deputation of thousands of Jews. Although  Klarsfeld  s work 
effectively complements that of  Marrus and Paxton,  he does  take issue with them  for not giving 
sufficient weight to the strength of  French public opinion in the Free Zone  and the  intervention of the 
Catholic clergy, which temporarily stopped the deportation process in  October 1942 (Page 9).
19French Resistance lent all their skills to this endeavour. This was carried out on both a 
logistical level (running  of transit camps and transport facilities) and on the  political 
level.
Using the strong  connections they had established undo- war-time conditions 
with the underground  Socialist party, the native Jewish elite sought  to ensure that 
the French bureaucracy  not only did not impede the exercise, but in many instances 
lent a hand. Given the opposing  attitudes towards Zionism reflected in  post war 
French coalitions, the more pro-Zionist  Socialist Ministers tended to be very 
circumspect in their dealings with both  French  Zionist intermediaries and the 
Palestinian emissaries that had set up covert operations in  Paris after die  Liberation.
In recognising that most French Jews, in the post-war era, did not see 
immigration to Palestine as a solution for themselves, one has to acknowledge that 
they had at the time more urgent preoccupations. Equally, the majority of the Jewish 
community, despite their sufferings and insecurity under the Vichy Government, 
maintained a strong attachment to the French way of life and its culture. Thus, 
although a number of Zionist intermediaries  in France were  keen to facilitate illegal 
immigration to Palestine for Jewish DPs in Germany and Austria, they themselves 
remained wedded  to their country of birth or adoption.
In order to understand  these apparent contradictions,  how then  should  one 
characterise  the preoccupations and  attitudes of the Jewish community and its 
Zionist intermediaries?
1.1  The Jewish community
This pre-war  community  had been diverse, both in origin and also in its 
social and political spheres. Among its 320,000 members, over half were immigrants 
and they themselves were divided between various factions covering the whole 
political spectrum.
In this hodge-podge of organisations, the Zionists were on the margins, riven, 
like  other factions, by their own  internal splits.2 Nevertheless the immigrant 
umbrella organisation, the Federation des Societes Junes de France (FSJF),  was 
certainly pro-Zionist in its approach. There was also this tendency' in the leadership of 
the Eclaireurs Israelites de France (EIF). This was the  scouting movement, supported
2 The ideology of the individual Zionist parties in France  reflected  that of their sister parties  in 
Palestine.
20by the French Jewish elite and the Central  Consistoire, the  recognised rabbinical 
authority.  The suffering in die war years was to cement among many youngsters a 
greater attachment to Zionist thought and philosophy. This was due in no small 
measure to the clandestine activities of Zionist groups both in and outside the French 
Resistance.
Even the Jewish Communists allied themselves with a growing Zionist trend 
within the Jewish community at large.  During the war, in the so-called Free Zone, 
Joseph Fischer of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO)  together with Nahum 
Hermann, Director of the Jewish National Fund, forged strong  links with Marc 
Jarblum's clandestine network of the French Zionist Organisation. In September 
1944, towards the aid of the Goman occupation, the various trends in French 
Judaism (the Consistoire Central, the Zionists and the Jewish Communists) came 
together in Lyons to create a new Jewish representative body, the Conseil 
Representatif des Israelites de France  (CRIF). Lata the term “Israelites” was dropped 
in favour of “Institutions Juives”. As a mark of the coming of age of Zionism within 
the Jewish community, the charter of CRIF specifically mentioned unlimited 
emigration to Palestine and die abolition of die White Papa as  primary aims.3
Within the French Jewish community as a whole, immigrant Jew's and more 
importantly, because of their influence in Socialist politics, the French Jewish elite 
promoted the Zionist cause with all their energy. It had not been an easy conversion, 
for native  Jews, as opposed to the more numerous immigrants in die pre-war 
community,  had always regarded France as their sole homeland.
The effects of the posecution of the Jew's under Vichy  did not provoke a 
general movement towards Aliyah. In his  first report in March 1945 to the Jewish 
Agency its local co-Director in Paris, David Shaltiel, was relatively pessimistic as to 
the desire of Jews in France to onigrate to Palestine.4 Indeed, when he visited die 
Froich Embassy in London in November 1944 in pursuit of a visa for France, Shaltiel 
indicated that the 2,000 Palestine Entry Certificates  he carried were for stateless Jews 
only. He was careful to emphasise  to the French Ambassador that French Jews had 
never expressed a desire to go to Palestine. In any event, the policy of die Jewish 
Agency' w'as not to approach Jews already w ell-integrated in their  country of abode
3 Adam Rayski, Le Choix des Juifs sous Vichy: Entre Soumission et Resistance (Paris,  1992), 345.
4 Renee Poznanski,  “L’Heritage de la Guerre: le Sionisme en France dans les Annees 1944-1947”
in  Dons  Bensimon and  Benjamin Pinkus, eds.. Actes du Collogue International: Les Juifs de France, 
le Sionisme et l’Etat d'Israel (Paris,  1987), 258
21but to search out for immigration non-integrated Jews from Eastern  Europe. In 
passing, Shaltiel, in a clear recognition of French sensitivities  over their position in 
the Levant, pointed out the services which  die Jewish Agency was prepared to  render 
France in the Middle East and particularly in Lebanon.5
As it turned out later, there w as something of a hiatus in  the allocation of the 
2000 Entry Certificates. In late 1944 there were difficulties in acquiring shipping 
space for potential immigrants even if they could be assembled.6 Six  months later, the 
generally negative attitude of Jews in France  towards Aliyah  was reflected in a 
report by Eliahu Dobkin to the Mapai secretariat: “There is a real danger that the 
desire for Aliyah which we witnessed in the first months after the Liberation [of 
France] will disappear.”  Three hundred and fifty Entry Certificates to Palestine  sent 
to Paris to bring youngsters to Palestine had not been taken up. In October 1945 a 
similar situation was noted amongst Jews in Italy, Belgium and Holland.7
As dislocated  families tried to retrieve  their former homes and find their 
missing relatives, their major preoccupation was the  reconstruction of their former 
lives  within the French State. Emigration to an unknown land in an even more 
difficult environment did not appeal to Jews in France as a rational proposition.8 
Sir Herbert Emerson, die director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees 
reported in November 1944 that material conditions were definitely bad for all Jew s 
in France, but rather worse for immigrants than native Jews.9  As if to encapsulate this 
state of affairs, Marc Jarblum, the returning president of the FSJF, wrote on 1st 
December 1944
At the moment of Liberation nobody thought of the problems which face 
us now. Happy to have come out of the nightmare, to have got rid of the 
Germans and the SS and to be free of the danger of arrest or deportation, 
we forgot what our situation was. For each one of us our joy was firstly 
spoilt by the disappearance of parents, children and friends.
Reality reaffirms its rights. The majority find themselves at the edge of 
the abyss. Everything must be started again from zero. The majority of
5 Archives of the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (Hereafter MAE  Archives),  Sionisme.Dossier 
General, File 373, Cart  c h i 72,  Rene Massigli, French Ambassador in London to G. Bidault,  1.12.44.
6 Ze’ev Hadari. HaMossad FAliyah Bet:Yoman MevazTim- Paris 1947  (Beer Sheva, Israel,  1991), 36. 
Hereafter Hadari, HaMossad.
Ibid., The Second Exodus the Full Story of Jewish Illegal Immigration to Palestine. 1945-1948 
(London,  1991),  17. Hereafter Hadari, Second Exodus
8 Annette Wieviorka,« Les Juifs en France au lendemain de la Guerre : Etat des Lieux.» in Archives 
Juives no.28/1.  1“ Semestre (Paris,  1995),  10 and  18.
9  The National Archives (Hereafter TNA), FO 371/42885,  13.11.44.
22Jews have lost everything - their assets, the possibility of work, their 
businesses, their homes. 0
Jarblum was speaking from personal experience as, on his return to Paris in 
October 1944 from Switzerland, where he had taken refuge, he found that his flat had 
been ransacked by the Germans and that it was now occupied by a tenant, pending 
legal moves for its restitution. 1 1
Aside from these  difficult domestic problems, the leadership of the post-war 
community was concerned with the plight of orphaned  children. Some 10,000 Jewish 
children had lost their parents through deportation and  many Jewish organisations 
took them into care. Others, so-called “Hidden children”, had been placed for 
safeguarding in Catholic homes or institutions. Amongst then thee remained a very 
small minority, who would neither willingly leave their Catholic foster parents/ 
institutions to be retrieved by relatives or Jewish organisations nor be allowed to 
depart by the church authorities. Jarblum received a series of telegrams from the 
Jewish Agency' in Palestine  asking him to intervene with the French  authorities and 
indicating that they were prepared to receive  all Jewish orphans in France, 
Switzerland, Belgium and Holland under the auspices of Youth Alivah. Furthermore 
the British authorities in Palestine had already  allocated over 3,000 Entry Certificates 
for the purpose.1 2
Only recently has it come to light that the Vatican itself was directly  involved 
in preventing the return of Jewish children in France  even to their surviving parents 
if, in the interim, they had been baptised. The same  restriction applied  to  institutions 
“that are not in a position to guarantee them a Christian upbringing”. Clearly this 
eliminated Jewish organisations. Even  if the children had not been baptised, the 
Vatican’s instructions  stipulated  that children ought not to be entrusted to “persons 
who have no rights over them”.1 3   The “Finaly Affair" was a case in point. Here the 
Catholic Church aided and abetted a nun to hide two orphaned boy's in a convent in 
Spain, out of reach of the French courts who had demanded their release. Only in
10Renee Poznanski, Etre Juif en France Pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (Paris,  1994), 668. 
Hereafter Poznanski,  Etre Juif
11 Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (Hereafter CZA)  Jarblum Papers, A303/20, Letter from Jarblum 
to Mosheh Shertok,  14.10.44.
12 CZA,  Jarblum Papers,Telegrammes from Gruenbaum, Jerusalem to Jarblum,  14* and 15* October 
1944.
13 Article in The  Guardian 29.12.04, referring to the recent  publication by the Italian daily  Comere 
della Sera  of a letter dated 20th October  1946 sent by the Vatican to Angelo Ronealli, the Holy See’s 
envoy in Paris.
231953 did the French Catholic Church, assailed on all sides by Jewish as well as 
Christian protests, facilitate the reunion of the two boys with their aunt in Israel.1 4 
Previously in 1947, the Joint under the directorship in France of Laura Margolis, the 
wife of Marc Jarblum, funded  a “Commission de Depistage” (search committee) in 
conjunction with die French rabbinate, which sent out agents across the departments 
of France to identify and retrieve any remaining children. The results, however, were 
minimal.1 5
Another issue, as in the case of Jarblum, was die restitution of expropriated 
property to its rightful owners. Many Jewish-owned flats, abandoned by their owners 
as a result of arrest by the Vichy authorities or simply in order to seek refuge in the 
unoccupied Free Zone, had been allocated to those made homeless by Allied 
bombing. New French legislation in November 1944 restored the rights of the former 
owners but forbade the expulsion of the tenants unless alternative housing was 
available. The same law returned Jewish businesses that had been placed in the hands 
of provisional administrators by the Vichy regime. In both instances, even by the 
middle of 1951, only half of the Jews of Paris had recovered their assets.1 6
Yet a further  issue,  this time exclusively for foreign Jews, was their ardent 
desire for French nationality, die lack of which during the war, many believed, left 
them without protection. For those who  had served as volunteers in the French army 
this was a priority issue and they deplored the slowness of the authorities in 
addressing their demands.1 7
In an article on the problems of Jewish reconstruction in France in the post­
war era, David Weinberg asserted that “Antisemitism remained strong throughout the 
1940s and 1950s, as Frenchmen reacted with hostility to die arrival of East and
Central European Jews fleeing DP camps  ”18 Although this may be true of certain
sections of the French public there is, in  stark contrast,  the active but  covert  help
14 David  Weinberg, “The Reconstruction of the French Community after WWIF’,  in Yisrael  Gutman 
and A vital  Saf, eds., Conference Proceedings.  Sixth Yad Vashem International Historical Conference, 
Jerusalem  1985 (Jerusalem,  1990),  173. Hereafter Weinberg.
15  Consistoire de Paris, Service Archives. Letter from Laura Margolis, AJDC- Office Fear France, to 
Rabbi Apeloig, Consist oire Central.4.11.48.
16 Renee Poznanski, Etre Juif. 675.
'  Archives Nationales, Minister® de l’Int6rieur,  Direction de la Surete Nationale Fla/4742. 
Renseignements Generaux  report c h i Congres National des Engages Volontaires et Combattants 
Immigres de la Resistance, 21 st and 22nd February,  1947. In 1946, fifteen thousand naturalisations had 
been approved and in 1947, 50,000 were anticipated. The Minister for the Population recognised that 
because of France’s low birth rate, she had great need of immigrants and therefore naturalisations 
would be expedited.
18 Weinberg,  176.
24given to these refugees by the French authorities and the agreement to allow the 
transit of 8,000 Jewish refugees through France at any time. (See Chapter 5 for a 
fuller discussion of these matters).
In the event, though  Aliyah as an alternative to a reestablishment of their 
lives in France scarcely captured the imagination of the majority of Jews in France, 
the commitment  of the community to the Zionist enterprise was widespread.
Zionist political activity was at once intense but fragmented because of the large 
numbers of factions representing different ideological tendencies. On the left were 
grouped the two wings of Poalei-Zion (reflecting  the 1944  split in Mapai, the Israel 
Labour Party)  and  Hashomer Hatsair. On the right were the Revisionists.
The centre was  represented by the General Zionists and religious Zionism by the 
Mizrachi party. The  Jewish communists, although not a Zionist party, were 
nevertheless heavily committed to unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine. They 
were represented by the Union des Juifs pour la Resistance et FEntraide (UJRE).
Most of the members of these parties were immigrant Jews. Despite their 
inter-party squabbles they often came together at mass meetings when particular 
events affecting the Yishuv demanded a show of solidarity.  A specific example is the 
meeting organised by the steenng committee of the Zionists of France  on 4th July 
1946  at the Mutualite which drew a  crowd in excess of the hall’s capacity. French 
Zionist leaders such as Marc Jarblum and Andre Blumel addressed  the meeting to 
protest the arrest on  29th June of leaders of the Jewish Agency Executive  and 
members of para-military  units by the British  in Palestine. However the largest 
ovation  was reserved for  David Ben Gurion, the Chairman of the Executive  now7  
literally exiled in Paris as a result of the British action.19
Mass meetings apart, political activity centred on electing delegates to the 22nd 
Zionist Congress to be held in Basle in December 1946. Here the factionalism among 
the parties was most evident, with each tendency striving to obtain votes for its 
preferred delegates.  However, electoral fraud was so wide-spread that on 20th 
October 1946, the Central Electoral Commission cancelled the results and 
rescheduled  the elections to a later date.20
Although not necessarily candidates themselves for immigration to Palestine, 
many Jews in France  attended Zionist meetings to give their political and material
19 CZA, A426/46.  Daily Bulletin  of Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 7.7.46
20 Archives Nationales, FI a/3368, Renseignements Generaux report, 21.10.46. Hereafter RG report.
25support. At the same time  many  youngsters who had been taught  about  Zionism 
whilst  hidden by Jewish organisations  during the war years, begged  their  parents to 
be allowed to go to Palestine. Usually persuaded  to renew and complete  their 
studies, they  were nevertheless among the first  to volunteer for the new Israeli  army, 
when it was formed after the creation of the State in May 1948. In the meantime  the 
more  adventurous  among them  worked as volunteer couriers and general helpers to 
the Mossad.21  This spirit of commitment  was demonstrated most forcibly at the time 
of the Exodus Affair in July 1947, when large numbers  of Zionist youth w ere 
mobilised in the Marseilles area in case  the British attempted to  forcibly disembark 
the immigrants from their prison-ships  (See Chapter 7)
1.2  French Zionist intermediaries
The part played by leading French Zionists in encouraging Socialist 
Government  Ministers, such as Edouard Depreux and  Jules Moch,  to  covertly assist 
the illegal immigration campaign was at all times essential to die success of the 
enterprise. In addition, the Jewish Agency' in Paris could  use the talents of these 
intermediaries in a more official capacity whenever an  attempt was needed  to 
influence  Government policy in its  favour. The major  personalities involved were 
Andre Blumel, Marc Jarblum and  a priest, L’Abbe Alexandre  Glasberg.
The  effectiveness  of these three  intermediaries  w as largely7  due to their 
tactful exploitation of die  bonds  of comradeship  established with members of the 
Resistance who became  highly placed Government Ministers and  officials in the 
post-war period. They in turn  covertly  facilitated illegal immigration and also 
rendered political support to the overall Zionist endeavour. All the while, the 
intermediaries endeavoured to ensure that  the risk of public and political  exposure 
of this support was kept to a minimum.  It is highly doubtful that, without such 
intermediaries working in the  shadow  of French politics, die Mossad’s activities
21 Interview' with Maurice Szwarc, former  membra- of  Machal (Foreign volunteers for Israel),  17.9.05. 
In early 1946, Maurice had planned to disobey- his parents and leave for Marseilles with his friend Dov 
Gurwitz, also nearly 16 years old  at the time. Unfortunately, just prior to departure, he found himself in 
hospital with  appendicitis. Dov made his way alone to Marseilles and managed to stowaway aboard 
the  liner  SS Champolion. He was discovered  prim- to arrival in Haifa, placed  in irons and later 
handed over to the British military. After a month spent in the Athlit detention camp he was released 
into the care of the Jewish Agency and wrait to live on a kibbutz. Two years later, on  13th May 1948, 
Maurice finally  left for Palestine on the liner SS Providence having been provided by the Haganah 
with  false identity papers (Aliyah Dalet) in case of interrogation by the British He celebrated his 
eighteenth birthday onboard ami arrived in the newly-created State on 22nd May. After a period of
26would  have been regarded with such a benign attitude by the French police 
authorities.
The following review  of their  personal backgrounds  goes a long way to 
explain their roles and extensive influence in the crucial post-war period:
Andre Blumel (1893-1973)
Bom in Paris and descended from an old-established Jewish family in Alsace 
by the name of Blum, Andre  Blumel became a  journalist and lawyer. He  was an 
ardent Socialist militant in die pre-war era. Under  his original name of Andre Blum 
he worked on the Socialist newspaper Le Populaire and when Leon Blum came to 
power at the head of the Front Populaire in 1936, he became the  Director General  of 
his office. At this point, to avoid confusion and any accusation of nepotism,  he 
changed his name to Blumel. In organising Blum’s office, he  worked closely with 
Jules Moch,  also a Jew but, like many in his circle, a Frenchman first and foremost. 
Later, Moch,  as a minister  in the post-war coalition Government, was to  greatly 
facilitate the task of illegal immigration.
After the occupation of France, Blumel  escaped to Spain to avoid arrest by 
the Gestapo, only to be returned to the Vichy authorities. He spent time in various 
internment camps in company with other Socialist enemies of the Vichy regime  After 
two years he managed to escape and join the resistance. At the time Leon Blum was 
held by the Germans in Buchenwald as a potential exchange prisoner for equally 
eminent Germans in British hands. Fearing for his safety -Leon Blum was Jewish 
after all- it was decided, by the Socialist underground, to send Blumel to London to 
find ways of effecting his release. He was received by Herbert Morrisson, then at the 
Home Office and also by Anthony Eden. They promised to find a military solution 
but this never came to fruition. He also approached Chaim Weizmann, the President 
of die Jewish Agency, whom he knew from before the war, with a request for a large 
sum to be made available to be used as a bribe. He was directed by Weizmann to a 
Jewish banker in New York  and there, with the consent of the Secretary of the 
Treasury; funds were collected for the purpose but again to no avail. Leon Blum was 
only released at the end of the war
initial military training he was posted to the Palmach, Israel’s shock-troops, and saw action near 
Jerusalem against the Jordanians and in the Sinai against the Egyptians.
27In the first provisional Government set up by General  De Gaulle in September 
1944, Blumel was appointed Director General of the Office of the Interior Minister 
Adrien  Tixier but a year later he  left government service to take up his profession at 
the Paris Bar. It was in his  capacity as ‘Maitre Blumel’ that  he was  often asked to 
represent members of the Haganah, the Irgun or the Stem group, when they were 
caught by the French police in illegal operations,  frequently connected with the 
hoarding of w eapons for shipment to Palestine or  operating clandestine radio 
transmitters. 22 It is clear that, as a result of his  close and ongoing  relationships with 
Socialist Ministers in the government, Blumel  was always  in a pivotal position to 
use his influence  whenever the Mossad or other Palestinian groups upset the French 
bureaucracy.
In May 1947 he set out, under the umbrella of the  French Zionist 
Federation, to create  the4  Union  Sioniste de France ’ which would  represent native 
French Zionists. Like himself, they  were not completely at ease with the existing 
immigrant Zionist parties, whose political  loyalty lay with  their sister parties in the 
Yishuv. Although an ardent Socialist, Blumel, unlike Jarblum had no affinity with  the 
Mapai party or any other  that was Palestine-based  and was never part of the inner 
circle around  Ben Gurion.23 Dismayed by what they saw as an attempt to introduce a 
new7  element into  French Zionist politics, each  existing Zionist faction signed a 
petition,  politely asking  Blumel  to desist from creating a constitution and a central 
committee for this  new entity, but in the end  to  no avail.24
During Blumel’s  visit to  Palestine in  April  1946  in company with  Joseph 
Fischer, former director of The Jewish National Fund,  and Leon Meiss, President of 
the Consistoire Central, the central rabbinical authority, his important  connections 
with Government circles afforded him and his companions  red-carpet treatment  by 
the  Consulate General.25  He was even allowed to use French diplomatic channels to 
convey a message from Chaim Weizmann to Leon Blum, then in Washington. The
22 CZA, Blumel Papers, A426/49 Translation of an article in Ma’anv (Israeli daily)  by Dr. David 
Lazare,  14.7.61.
23 Interview with French  historian Philippe Boukara, 6.10.04
24 CZA, Jewish Agency Offices in Paris, L10/146, Letter to Blumel signed by Hashomer Hatsair, 
Mizrahi, General Zionists, Jewish Workers Party (Poalei-Zion) and the United Revisionist Party, 
12.5.47
25 MAE Archives, Sionisme, File  373, carton 72. Telegramme from MAE, sous- Directi on du Levant a 
Consul General de France, Jerusalem,  10.4.46
28essence of the message was to implore the Americans to prevail upon the British to
26 issue 100,000 entry certificates to Palestine without pre-conditions.
Fischer’s success in convincing  Blumel and  Meiss to accompany him  to 
Palestine  was  significant  for its recognition of the place  that Zionism was now 
taking  in  French  Jewish circles. This was a great departure from the  pre-war 
attitude of the Consistoire which insisted that  French Jews  direct their loyalty  and 
patriotism exclusively towards France, their only homeland. It was then  totally 
opposed to supporting Zionist objectives.27
Although not as close as Marc Jarblum to the Mapai leadership in Palestine, 
Blumel was  co-opted as a  member  of the political office of the Jewish Agency in 
Paris. 28 In later years, Blumel’s Presidency of the France/USSR  Friendship League 
brought him into conflict with French and Israeli Zionists. Forced  to decide between 
the French Zionist Federation  and the League, he chose the latter as he felt he could 
use his Russian contacts to improve the situation of the Jews in Russia Having 
become an avowed admirer of the Soviet Union, Blumel was then considered a 
Communist fellow traveller29 and was avoided  by his former Zionist friends.30 
Nevertheless, despite their political differences,  he strove to maintain the  friendship 
of Marc Jarblum, to whom he owed a debt of gratitude for his help during the war.31
Blumel’s profile was enhanced by the Exodus affair in July 1947 (See Chapter 
7), when he  was delegated by the Minister of the Interior, Edouard Depreux, to 
represent the Ministry to the immigrants who had been brought back to French waters 
by the British. Some 15 years later, dismayed that a recent  book and film  on the 
subject had failed to emphasise  France’s role in the affair, he decided to write his 
own work, entitled “La Veritable Histoire de FExodus”. To this end he obtained from 
the Ministry of the Interior a number of relevant documents.32  Unfortunately, 
although Blumel completed the manuscript in 1963, it was never published.33
26 MAE Archives, Sionisme, File 373, Neuville [Consul-General] to MAE, Levant, 3.5.46.
27 Adam Rayski, Le Choix des Juifs sous Vichy (Paris, 1992), 335.
28 CZA, Blumel Papers, A426/26. Letter from Jarblum to Zionist office in London, 27.10.45.
29 Ibid.,  A426/49 Translation of article by Dr. David Lazare in Ma'ariv,  14.7.61.
30 CZA,,  Jarblum Papers, A303A/16 Letter from P.A. Gilbert to Marc Jarblum in Israel 8.9.69.
31 Ibid.,  Letter from Blumel to JarWum, 16.9.69.
32 Archives Nationales, F7/16089, Letter from Andre Blumel to Minister of the Interior,  19 .9 .62. 
Subsequently the Director General of the Sfrrete Nationale gave a favourable response to Blumel’s 
request, 3.10.63. The internal  documents obtained by Blumel were initially  the very  few  that gave 
some indication of the Government’s attitude towards illegal immigration. Fortunately his former 
legal partner made them available to researchers after Blumel’s death in 1973.
33 CZA, Blumel Papers, A426/46, Letter from Blumel to Jarblum in Israel, 23.10.63. “I have finished 
the ‘Exodus’, I must now find a publisher. ”
29Found  amongst his papers was  a dedication to Edouard Depreux. This he 
had intended to include  in his book to reflect his contribution in  the Exodus affair : 
“To Edouard Depreux, Socialist Minister, non-Jewish free-thinker, who was 
the prime  instigator of the French Government s steadfastness”.
Marc Jarblum ( 1887-1972)
With a background totally dissimilar  from that of Blumel - he was after all a 
Yiddish speaking  Jew from Warsaw7 , who spoke French with a heavy accent - Marc 
Jarblum nevertheless became one of the foremost Zionist personalities on die French 
scene. He became a member of the executive of the World Zionist Organisation and 
in 1937 was  elected president of the FSJF. This movement, as  opposed to the Jewish 
communists, became, under his influence  favourably disposed towards  Zionism.35
Originally he was one of the founding members with  Ben Gurion of Poalei- 
Zion in Poland and whilst Ben Gurion made his way to Palestine, Jarblum, in 1907 
moved to Paris and took up journalism In the 1930s he obtained a law degree and 
was the foreign correspondent of newspapers as  far away as Warsaw, Buenos Aires 
and Tel Aviv. He very soon entered the circle of  Leon Blum and when the latter took 
over  as leader of the SFIO in 1920, after  the  Communists departed and  set  up their 
own party,  he took up  SFIO membership. Amongst other Zionist and non-Zionist 
immigrants he was instrumental in raising funds for the SFIO and for its newspaper 
Le Populaire. a practice which continued during and after the war. Even as late as 
1951 he provided funds to assist the electoral chances of the Socialists.36
His relationship with Leon Blum became one of long standing  and enabled 
him to arrange discreet meetings betw een Leon Blum and Zionist personalities such 
as Chaim Weizmann. Sharing a similar vision that the British would eventually accept 
a Jewish State as the natural consequence of the Balfour Declaration, both men 
developed a very  high regard for each other and met on many occasions, often at 
Jarblum’s flat. Jarblum and his wife  also  accommodated  Ben Gurion when he 
visited Paris during the 1920s and 1930s.37
34 Haganah Archives, Blumel files, File 123/Blumel/l, undated front  page of manuscript.
Philippe Boukara, “L’Ami Pansien  Les Relations Politiques et Personelles entre David Ben 
Gourion ct Marc Jarblum » in Benjamin Pinkus and Doris Bensimon, eds., Actes du Collogue 
International: Les Juifs de France, le Sionisme et PEtat d" Israel  (Paris,  1987), 161.
36 CZA, Jarblum Papers, A303/16, Letter from Guy Mollet, deputy Prime Minister to Jarblum thanking 
him for his financial assistance to the election campaign in his constituency, 29.6.51.
37 Interview with Philippe Boukara, 6.10.04.
30In 1940,with the arrival of German troops in the capital, Jarblum, in common 
with the majority of Jewish leaders moved south into die Free Zone. He became the 
representative of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (The Joint) and 
conveyed its funds to various Jewish relief organisations and also to members of the 
SFIO as well. At the aid of 1942, after the occupation of the Free Zone, he was asked 
by the Jewish Resistance Movement (OJC) to  cross the frontier into Switzerland  38 
From Geneva he continued to  supply “Joint” funds to all the Jewish resistance 
movements. Blumel was also reliant on this material assistance whilst he lived under 
an assumed name in Paris in the spring of 1944.39
Soon after his return to Paris after the w ar Jarblum was requested by both 
Weizmann and Ben Gurion to be the Agency’s representative to the French 
authorities.40 Subsequently he  coupled  his membership of the  Paris  Political 
Committee of the Jewish Agency with the presidency of the “Federation des Sionistes 
de France”  with its  20,000 members.41
He was also the official delegate in France of the Socialist Committee for the 
Working Class  in Palestine. It was in this capacity that he attended the World  Trade 
Unionists’  International Conference  in Paris in Octoberl945. At a dinner for the 
delegates given by General de Gaulle, Jarblum was given die opportunity of 
discussing with the General the situation in Palestine  following the British refusal to 
allow unlimited immigration and  the creation of a Jewish state. Although De Gaulle 
did not commit himself to the Zionist cause, he did envisage a situation where a 
Jewish State, once formed, would need certain guaranties as to its continued 
existence, given  the Arab stales on its borders. He saw similarities with  the 
predicament of the Christians in Lebanon, following France’s forced departure from 
the area He assured Jarblum that France “ w ould remain faithful to its task and its 
commitments".42 In the event, just three months later, De Gaulle resigned from the
38 Yad Tabenkin Archives- Avraham Polonski Files, report on l’Organisation Juive de Combat. [Also 
known as L’Armee Juive]
39 CZA Jarblum Papers, A303/16, Letter from “Fleuret” [alias Blumel] to Jarblum, Paris, 23.5.44. 
Whilst thanking Jarblum for being such a generous  friend to him, Blumel complains of the delays in 
funds  reaching  him.
40 Ibid., A303/20/21  Letter from Weizmann in London  to Jarblum,  16.10.44 and telegramme from Ben 
Gurion in Jerusalem  to Jarblum, 20.10.44.
41 TNA CO 537/1705. CID report 28.5.46.
42 CZA, Jarblum Papers, A303A/20, Note on conversation with de Gaulle sent to  Weizmann, 9.10.45. 
Jarblum emphasised to Weizmann the need to intensity political contacts in France both within the 
Government and outside.
31Provisional Government and thereafter had no influence on policies towards 
Palestine, until his return as French President in 1958.
Jarblum’s close relationship with Leon Blum and the services that he had 
rendered him in the past, enabled him  to call upon Blum's goodwill, whenever a 
difficult situation arose.  In September 1945 he wrote to Blum, prior to the latter’s 
visit to London, to ask him to convey to Attlee and Bevin “our English friends” the 
need for a speedy solution to the problem of the DPs in the camps by opening the 
doors of Palestine. 43
In June 1946 discussions  between Britain  and the Jewish Agency were on 
the verge of breakdown, following the British  failure  to support the 
recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry7  into the Jewish 
refugee problem At this juncture, Jarblum interceded with Leon Blum to use his 
influence with Attlee and Bevin as quickly as possible. Jarblum noted that even 
Weizmann, usually so prudent in his criticisms, was depressed by Bevin's latest 
speech on the subject and warned of the danger of serious problems in Palestine 
unless current  British policy was reversed.44 In the event, Blum’s influence was of no 
avail as nine days later the colonial administration in Palestine took repressive  action 
against the Jewish Agency and all para-militaiy organisations.
During Leon Blum’s brief tenure of the Premiership, Jarblum took the 
opportunity, in January 1947, to introduce  Ben Gurion to him so that he could present 
his viewpoint on Britain’s proposals for a settlement of the Palestine problem. This 
meeting reflected Ben Gurion's enhanced  status  in  the Zionist political leadership.
In the previous month, at  the 22nd Congress of the World Zionist Organisation in 
Basle, he had effectively  replaced  Chaim Weizmann at the head of the Jewish 
Agency.45
Throughout the immediate post-war period Jarblum worked closely7  with 
Andre Blumel and also used his influence with Socialist Ministers to advance the 
Zionist cause and the work of the Mossad. 46 His dose  friendship  with Edouard 
Depreux, the Minister of die Interior, enabled him to intervene effectively  at the time 
of the Exodus affair in July 1947. He emigrated to Israel in 1954 but, having no
43 CZA, Jarblum Papers,, Letter from Jarblum to Blum,  10.9.45.
44 Archives Nationales, Ponds Leon Blum, 570AP25, letter from Jarblum to  Blum, 20.6.46.
45 Archives Nationales, Fla/4743, RG report, 30.12.46.
46 Hadari, Second Exodus. 148.
32political base in the country, was never appointed to a position which reflected the
47 prestige he had acquired as one of the foremost Zionist leaders in France.
L’Abbe  Alexandre Glasberg (1902-1981)
The third intermediary of some importance, Alexandre Glasberg was, as a 
Catholic priest, possibly the most unlikely recruit  to the Zionist cause. His adherence 
was brought about by Marc Jarblum, who introduced him to  the Mossad’s 
representative in Paris, Ehud Avriel, as an individual who was particularly concerned 
for the welfare of refuges and was noted for his war-time work in the Resistance.
A Jew converted to Catholicism by his parents in Jitomir (Ukraine),
Alexandre  Glasberg  came to France at the age of 30 to study at a Catholic seminary. 
He was ordained in 1938.48  His initial contact with foreign Jews  arose out of his 
work  with Jewish welfare organisations in Vichy’s internment camps in southern 
France. Representing l’Amitie Chretienne, a Resistance relief organisation  created in 
early 1942, he was particularly effective in August of that year when the first round­
up of Jews in the Free Zone  by the Vichy regime  took place. At the Venissieux fort, 
where die Jews were taken prior to being transported to Drancy for deportation to 
Auschwitz, he managed, as part of a hastily appointed screening team, to extricate 108 
children under the age of 16, sometimes in the face of parental opposition. When the 
local  Vichy prefet wanted to retrieve the children, Glasberg sought the help of 
Cardinal  Geriier, the chief Primate of France,  who agreed to take  the children under 
his protection.49 Thereafter Glasberg’s efforts during his time in the Resistance  was 
directed tow ards the rescue of Jewish children. The Germans, failing to apprehend 
him, condemned him to death  in his absence. Under the false name of “Corvin” he 
continued to escape their clutches. However his brother, Vila, mistaken by the 
Gestapo for Alexandre, was less fortunate.
After the war, Glasberg presided over a refugee aid organisation,  the Conseil 
Interoeuvres de l’Aide aux Emigrants et Transitaires Juifs (CLATJ). This Agency was 
the coordinating committee set up by some 17 Jewish organisations to process
47 Interview with Philippe Boukara, 6.10.04.
48 Hadari, Second Exodus.  147.
49 Annie Latour, La Resistance Juive en France.  1940-1944. (Paris,  1970), 58/60. For further  analysis 
on the rescue of Jewish children see: Lucien Lazaie, Rescue as Resistance: How Jewish Organisations 
Fought the Holocaust in France  (New York,  1996).
33applications for \isas for  Jews from Poland  wishing to  transit through France. 
Glasberg was now a  committed Zionist and an agent of the Mossad.
Amongst other code names he was referred to, in  the Mossad’s  secret radio 
transmissions, as “ HaKomer”  (The Priest). He  used his influence with Marcel 
Pages,  the head  of the  Direction de la Reglementation et des Etrangers ( Aliens 
office),  to convince him to facilitate the Mossad’s work in illegal immigration.
Pages’s reverence for biblical stories concerning the destiny of the  Jews  is 
suggested as having  been the key to Glasberg  acquiring the support of this 
particularly highly-placed  French civil servant.50
Glasberg, as a recruit to the Mossad, was one of their best assets as his 
vocation as a Catholic priest removed him from all suspicion and afforded him 
freedom of movement and access to leading French personalities. The plight of all 
refugees and Jewish refugees in particular was what motivated his actions, even if 
they courted illegality. According to his  former colleagues in the Mossad he was a 
fervent Zionist and supporter of a left-wing Jewish state in Palestine.5 1 When the 
Haganah decided to mobilise the Jewish youth of Europe in early 1948, Glasberg 
undertook a mission to Poland  with Ze’ev Hadan  to evaluate the possible levels of 
recruitment. As a result, one thousand Jews were trained in two camps opened by the 
Polish Secret Service and  were then allowed to leave the country. Again he was 
involved with the DST in procuring arms from the French arsenals, which were 
shipped to Palestine from Toulon before the creation of the State (See also Chapter 8).
In March 1948 he travelled to Palestine, on a British visa, ostensibly to review 
the situation of refugees on behalf of the Archbishop of Paris. In reality, however, he 
was hosted by the Mossad and taken on a tour of the kibbutzim and rural educational 
establishments. Whilst in the country he was invited to Jerusalem, then under Arab 
attack, by David Shahiel, the  local commander of the Haganah. They had  met  three 
years previously in Paris when Shaltiel represented the Jewish Agency. Shaltiel’s 
objective  was to establish a liaison network with die Catholic clergy in the city, a task 
for wiiich Glasberg was well suited. Accompanied by a Mossad emissary7 , Arieh 
Eliav, Glasberg undertook die journey on 15th April and despite encountering heavy 
fire en route managed to reach the city. Within two days Glasberg had succeeded in 
establishing a rapport between eminent Catholic priests and Shaltiel. With no little
50 Hadan, Second Exodus. 149.
51 Lucien Lazare, LAbbe Glasberg. (Paris,  1990), 87. Hereafter Lucien Lazare. I/Abbe Glasberg.
34difficulty he then managed to return to France, thanks to the help of the French 
Consul-General, deNeuville.52
Glasberg’s continued involvement with die Mossad and the rescue of Jewish 
refugees  from Arab countries after the creation of the State is another story, but there 
is no doubting the value of his contribution to illegal immigration as later chapters 
will illustrate.53 Later reports by die Renseignements Generaux (Political Police) refer 
to his far-left political leanings and his visits to Communist countries. At one stage, he 
was even suspected by the SDCE (External counter-espionage agency) of being an 
agent of the Kominform.54
1.3 Other influential lobbyists
Aside from matters concerned with illegal immigration, with which it  denied 
any official connection, the Jewish Agency in Paris  also pursued a more  stricdy 
political agenda. In this respect it  could call  on  the good services of Leon Blum, 
Marc Jarblum and  Andre Blumel and other heads of the  community  to act as a 
Zionist lobby whenever  French Government policy was vacillating on issues of direct 
concern  to the Yishuv.55 A prime example of this is the meeting held  with  the 
President of the Republic  and titular head of the Government, Vincent Auriol, over 
the issue of the forthcoming Partition vote in the UN General Assembly. The meeting 
at the Elysee Palace was attended by the foremost leaders of the Jewish community. 
The purpose  was to prevent a proposed  abstention by the French delegation at the 
UN when the issue came to a vote in November 1947.56
Another aspect of Jewish Agency7  activity  was to ensure that Government 
Ministers of the Jewish faith were kept  informed  of  unwelcome policy initiatives 
linked to Palestine, which usually  emanated  from the Ministry of Foreign affairs. It
52 Lucien Lazare, L’Abbe Glasberg. 102/3.
53 In January 2004, belatedly recognising their rescue work with Jewish children during the w ar, the 
Yad Vashem Authorities in Jerusalem awarded the medal of the ‘Righteous Among the Nations’ to the 
tw o Glasberg brothers, Alexandre and Vila  (the latter was deported in 1943).
54 Archives Nationales, F7/16107, RG  report, 12.12.55.
55 In Jewish circles, according to Philippe Boukara, these three gentlemen were known collectively in 
Yiddish as “di drei blumen” (“The three flowers”).
56 Archives Nationales, Fonds Rene Mayer, 363AP36, Note Verbale to French Government from  Leon 
Meiss, President of  CRIF, Rene Cassin, President  of the Alliance Universelle Israelite, Marc Jarblum, 
President  of the FSJF and Andre Blumel, President  of the Union Sioniste de France, 21.10.47.
35is clear from documents in the archives of Rene Mayer, member of the French UN
57 delegation and later Minister of Finance, that he  was an active Zionist lobbyist.
After the  de facto recognition  of the State of Israel By France in January 1949, 
Maurice Fischer, the Paris  representative of the Provisional Government wrote to him 
in recognition of his  efforts, both in and out of government, to intercede on behalf of 
the Zionist cause. In this letter  Fischer diplomatically  acknowledged that Mayer’s 
earlier  caution in  pressing for  recognition  was largely dictated by France’s fear of
CO
adverse reaction from its North African possessions.
Another  Minister who was lobbied, albeit indirectly,  by the Jewish Agency 
was Daniel Mayer, Minister of Work and Social Security. In this instance,  Fischer 
maintained an informal  contact with Mayer’s wife, Cletta, who worked under 
Jarblum at die FSJF. Originally from Romania, she had arrived in France in 1925 and 
threw herself into the activities of the Young Socialists. It was here that she met 
Daniel Mayer. She was active during the war in secretly removing Jewish children 
from internment camps in the south of France. She was  also involved  in reactivating 
the clandestine Socialist party and launching its newspaper Le Populaire. Fischer’s 
letters to Cletta Mayor covering such subjects as the Partition vote and the recognition 
by France of the State of Israel, once  included  the  request: “For reasons of 
confidentiality71  am sending you tw o pieces of information wiiich please convey to
Mr. Mayer  ”.59 The clear intention was to encourage  her husband to use his
influence  in Cabinet meetings  in  favour of Israel.
These  examples of lobbying activity in France on behalf of the Zionist cause 
provide further evidence of the extent to wiiich the emissaries of the Yishuv managed, 
through judicious use of friendly contacts, to make their case heard in the highest 
realms of the French  political establishment.
5/ Archives Nationales, Fonds Rene Mayer, 363AP36 .Letter from Rene Mayer  to Georges Bidault, 
protesting about proposal  for France to abstain in Palestine  Partition vote, 20.10.47.
58 Ibid., Letter from Maurice Fischer to Rene Mayer, 27.1.49.
59 Archives of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Fonds Cletta et Daniel Mayer, 3MA15, 
Letter from Fischer to Cletta Mayer regarding confidential  proposals made by R.  Schuman (Minister 
of Foreign Affairs)  to Egypt, as revealed by Arab sources,  15.11.48.
36CHAPTER 2 Coalition Politics in Post-war France
The problems facing France in the immediate post-war era were  enormous. 
War damage had severely depleted France’s transport systems by at least two thirds 
and destroyed thousands of its road and rail bridges together with 80% of its port 
facilities, to say nothing of die  massive destruction of its means of production.1  To 
resolve these problems, whilst  dealing with the political vacuum left by the demise 
of the Vichy Regime, a Provisional Government was set up by General de Gaulle 
into which he brought all the parties wiiich had been active in the Resistance or the 
Free French Forces.
With his resignation in January 1946 and as  no  individual party could hope 
to attain a majority in the National Assembly, these political parties determined to 
carry on by establishing a coalition Government. Thereafter, Cabinets reflected 
inertia and  tended to avoid contentious issues as  consensus on any  government 
programme was difficult to achieve. In the period under review, the coalition system 
was maintained throughout, although the complexion of the governments changed. 
Individual parties strengthened or weakened according to the results at the elections, 
which were carried out under the proportional representation system. The  National 
Assembly tended to be obstructive and adept at creating  ministerial crises,  bringing 
down Prime Ministers and then vacillating over prospective candidates for the post.
In die period September 1944 to July 1948 alone, eight Cabinets succeeded each 
other. This state of chaos  in politics was alleviated  by a capable  civil service 
which quietly moved things along. 2
It has bear  argued that the very7  nature of the  post-war coalition governments 
with their internal dissentions and suspicions enabled individual Ministers, often in 
the interests of their own parties, to develop their own partisan  policies without 
recourse to  Cabinet consent or supervision.3   Each party “colonised” the ministries 
for which it was responsible by placing civil servants with the same political outlook 
in the most important functions. 4 Often these civil servants, highly motivated
1  Jean-Jacques Becker,  Histoire Politique de la France  depuis 1945 (Paris. 2003), 35. Hereafter 
Becker.
2 Sylvia  Crosbie, A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day War (Princeton, New 
Jersey,  1974), 36.
3 Georgette Elgey,  Histoire de la 1 Ve Republique 1 ere Partie: la Republique des Illusions.  1945-1951. 
(Paris,  1993),  162.
4Becker, 35.
37bureaucrats and technocrats, developed policies of their own to which their Ministers 
gave their unofficial blessing, rather than seeking Cabinet approval. This to some 
extent explains the overall  political context in wiiich  a few determined Socialist 
Ministers, acting in concert with trusted  officials,  could provide  the  Mossad with a 
secure environment  in which it could  operate  effectively on French soil.
2.1  The effects of Tripartism
Such was the equality of strength of the three main parties within the 
coalition that they could only form a government on the basis of a tripartite 
arrangement. In the October 1945  election to create a Constituent Assembly, the 
dominant party was the French Communist Party (PCF) with 159 seats (26% of 
votes); followed by the  Popular Republican Movement ( MRP), a party created in 
November 1944 by anti-clerical Catholic intellectuals, with 150 seats; and the 
Socialist Party ( SFIO) with 146 seats. Other parties such as the Moderates, the 
Radical Socialists  and the Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance 
(UDSR) together held only 124 seats, whilst independents held 7 seats.5   After the 
elections,  General de Gaulle was elected by the main parties to head  the Provisional 
Government but, failing to impose his authority,  he resigned  on 20th January 1946. 
He  later set up a new party,  Rassemblement du Peuple Fran^ais (Rally  of the 
French People) which  had a landslide victory in the municipal elections in 1947. 
However he  had no direct  say in Government policies until his return to power as 
Prime Minister and then President in 1958.
The first coalition Government after the departure of de Gaulle was led by the 
Socialist Felix Gouin and lasted until  12th June 1946. Then  a new  election for a 
Constituent Assembly increased the number of MRP seats and this led to Georges 
Bidault taking over the Premiership. His tenure lasted until November 1946.6
Despite these frequent  changes, the governments were always composed of 
nearly equal numbers of Communist, MRP and Socialist Ministers. Crucially, the 
latter consistently held the portfolios which most directly affected the operations of 
the Mossad in France, namely that of the Ministry of the Interior (Edouard Depreux), 
which controlled the police forces,  and the Ministry7  of Public Works and Transport 
(Jules Moch), which controlled the ports.  Because of its control over foreign policy,
5 Becker ,14.
6 Ibid.,  35.
38the next  most influential party  in the coalition was the MRP. Through  its leader in 
the cabinet, Georges Bidault, it  exercised, except for a one month period, a continual 
monopoly over die Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1945 to 1948.7 This was the only 
Ministry' which consistently challenged the Socialist ministers in the matter of illegal 
immigration.
The provisional nature of the  Governments which had continued  since May 
1945 came to an aid  with the general  election to the first National Assembly of 
November 1946. For the first time, the Socialist bloc made up of the SFIO and the PCF 
did not receive  a clear  majority of the  votes cast.  As ever, the three parties were 
destined to maintain their coalition. Both the leaders of the Communist Party and the 
MRP failed to gain approval from the National Assonbly to take over  the premiership. 
So it was Leon Blum who was charged with maintaining a caretaker government for one 
month until a President  was elected. On 16th January 1947, the Fourth Republic came 
into being with the appointment of Vincent Auriol  as President of France. He asked a 
fellow Socialist, Paul Ramadier, to form a  new government. Despite the poor showing 
of die Socialists in the elections, they were granted nine of the ministerial portfolios 
with five going to the MRP and five to the Communists. Other parties picked up six 
portfolios.8
During these early post-war years, the coalition governments had to contend 
with an infrastructure largely destroyed during the war, the nationalisation of its 
major industries, the lack of food  (rationing was only abolished in 1949), rampant 
inflation and low salaries causing social unrest. Externally, France was engaged in a 
debilitating war to maintain control of Indo-China There was also the  unresolved 
problem of how to deal  with Germany, where the Soviet Union was flexing its 
muscles.9
In May' 1947 die Communist Ministers and Deputies  voted against the 
Government’s policy to restrict pay' rises. The Communist ministers were then 
summarily expelled  from the Government. Six months later  a series of strikes
' Archives Nationales, Fla/4742, Renseignements Generaux  repeats October 1946/April  1947. It was 
suggested, in one of these  reports, that it was the Communists who insisted on Bidault remaining at 
the MAE  to avoid the appointment of a Socialist. This was in order to prevent the negotiation of an 
Anglo/French Treaty which, had there been  a Socialist Minister at the MAE,  might have been 
envisaged. In the event during the short one month period (December  1946 /January 1947) that Leon 
Blum held  the  Ministry  of Foreign Affairs portfolio as well as that of the Premiership, such a treaty 
was indeed launched and  later signed when Bidault returned to the MAE.
8 Becker, 38.
9 Ibid.,  36 and 43.
39launched by the Communist trade unions put Ramadier’s Government under extreme 
pressure. On 19th November the Premiership passed to  the MRP’s Robert Schuman 
and this effectively marked the  aid of tripartism.  Although  Depreux then left the 
Cabinet he was replaced at the  Ministry of the Interior  by  Jules Moch, who 
energetically faced down what appeared to be a Communist insurrection. In turn, 
Moch’s  previous portfolio passed to another Socialist, Christian Pineau.1 0
Throughout  all these years of political and social unrest,  the Mossad was 
reassured by the fact that their friends in cabinet continued to occupy those 
Government  positions, which afforded protective cover  for their work.
2.2 Attitudes within the Socialist Party (SFIO) towards Zionism
Among the  Socialist  Ministers of the post-war coalition Governments,  the 
two  who were  regarded  as virtual guardian angels by the Mossad, headquartered in 
Paris, were Edouard  Depreux and Jules Moch.  Both maintained  close  relationships, 
through their officials, with the  official  Zionist leadership, Marc Jarblum and Andre 
Blumel. They in turn  acted as the  Mossad’s intermediaries, whenever a bureaucratic 
obstacle had to be removed.
Leon Blum who had returned from deportation in May 1945, remained the 
head of the Party  and, except for one brief period, remained outside Government. 
Nevertheless, his influence on Socialist Ministers, and most especially  on  matters 
concerned with  Palestine, continued to be  profound. One of his greatest 
disappointments was his failure to persuade Attlee, whom he greatly  admired, to 
change the British Government’s  policy on Palestine. One of his greatest 
achievements was to use his influence to sway the  French Cabinet, despite Bidault’s 
opposition, in favour of the Partition vote on Palestine.
Within the SFIO itself, die pro-Zionist attitudes of those appointed 
Government Ministers, were not necessarily shared by others on its Directorate. It is 
therefore perhaps not surprising that the subject of illegal immigration does not 
appear at all in the minutes of its “Comite Directeur”. As an example,  the arrival of 
the refugees from the Exodus at Port-de-Bouc on 29th July 1947, a major feature in 
that day’s press,  is not mentioned at all in die  minutes of 30th July; rather they
10 Becker, 50.
40concentrate  on  bilateral relations with the British Labour Party.1 1  Considering that 
Edouard Depreux was the  Government Minister most involved in issuing 
instructions for the reception of the refugees, the  apparent lack of discussion on this 
topic appears highly unusual.
Indeed as Socialists, not only was the SFIO conscious of the need for 
solidarity with the British workers  but also with Arab workers in France’s North 
African possessions. Another negative  element from the Zionist point of view  was 
the considerable influence that  the non-Zionist  Bund (Jewish Social Democrat 
Union) wielded over European Socialists. This  tended to counterbalance  that of the 
Palestinian Socialists at international Socialist conferences. Not that the Bund was 
against the immigration of Jews to Palestine but it  believed that Palestine was not the 
only answer to the Jewish problem Some SFIO members adopted this Bundist line. 1 2  
These factors  explain to some extent the  dilemma  faced by the Jewish 
members on the Directorate  as to how far they could promote Zionism, without 
being accused of partisanship by their colleagues. In the event, Daniel Mayer  was 
voted out of his position as  Secretary General at the SFIO congress in  August 1946. 
Leon Blum, the head of the Party,  thus lost his most effective acolyte. It was Leon 
Boutbien, a ferv ent  anti-Zionist on the Directorate, who  was instrumental in 
removing Daniel Mayer from his post  and replacing him with Guy Mollet. He spoke 
of the previous “Jewish majority” and its partisan  approach, which certain  SFIO 
members disapproved of. This criticism was furiously rebutted by the Jewish 
members.1 3
In October 1946 Guy Mollet  participated at a  pro-Zionist meeting to protest 
against die internment of Jews in Cyprus. At least officially, the SFIO  appeared in 
favour of the emigration of Jews to Palestine.14  Lewi Blum remained at the head of 
the SFIO but,  in practice  it was now under  new management. For many of Blum’s
11 Archives de IT Office Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste  (Hereafter Archives de  L’ours), 
Minutes of Comite Directeur, 30.7.47.
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situated  at the Mai son de la culture yiddish-Bibliotheque Medem in Paris.
13 Ibid, 98.
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41supporters the nature of the Party became  quite distinct from that which, forged  in 
the Resistance years,emerged as a unifying force  after the war.1 5
The  rumbling conflict within the directorate of the SFIO over the question of 
Palestine was finally laid bare a few days after the creation of the State of Israel.
At a meeting of the Directorate on 19th May 1948,  the subject was  debated openly 
and recorded in the minutes.  Guy Mollet  raised the question of the SFIO’s attitude 
to the recognition of Israel. Should the Directorate accept the Party’s International 
Commission recommendation for recognition? The most direct opposition was led, 
not unexpectedly, by  Boutbien, who generally adopted an anti-Zionist line
It would be a political error to unconditionally recognise the State of 
Israel. We shouldn’t approve a nationalist movement. Whilst having 
public sympathy for the Jews, we have to say that die Arab claims are 
legitimate. In the present situation it would be dangerous to recognise the 
State of Israel...  We have to find  a means to unite the Arabs and die 
Jews.
A different view  was presented by Grumbach who underlined the Socialist 
party’s acclaim of the UN  partition decision. In his view the greatest mistake for 
France would be to hesitate and lose the  goodwill  of the Jews without, by the same 
token, gaining that of the Arabs. After a number of other contributions, the 
Directorate voted unanimously to invite the French Government to recognise, without 
delay, the new State of Israel.1 6   Daniel Mayer, although present at the meeting, 
deliberately abstained from presenting  his  view's. As a  Minister of the Government 
he presumably found it judicious not to interv ene in the debate.
15 Idith Zertal, “Fratemite  Oblige; La SFIO et le Siomsme », in Benjamin Pinkus and Doris Bensimon, 
eds.. Actes du Collogue International: Le Sionisme et L’Etat d’Israel (Paris.  1987), 303.
16 Archives de l’Ours, Minutes of  Comite Directeur,  19.5.48. It is interesting to note that despite a 
similar consensus in the National Assembly, which included the Communists, the MRP, with its 
control over the MAE, refused to budge on this issue.
42CHAPTER 3 The activities of Palestinian emissaries  in France
Soon after the end of the war, the Zionist leadership in the Yishuv determined 
that  Paris would provide the best location from which to run  official and covert 
activities in Europe.1  A point in its favour was the relative proximity of London, where 
the Jewish Agency could have access to die British Foreign and Colonial offices, in 
pursuit of its demands concerning Palestine. Furthermore, transit through France  would 
provide a quick route between the DP Camps in Germany and Austria  and the ports on 
the Mediterranean, from where the survivors of the East European  Jewish communities, 
the ‘She'erit Hapletah" (Surviving Remnant) could be transported to Palestine. 2 Above 
all, for reasons wiiich have already been stated, there w as a political and social 
environment in France which was particularly  conducive to the  covert activities of the 
Mossad. But first it  would have to establish a headquarters operation in Paris. This was 
finally achieved  indie spring of 1946
David Shaltiel was the first Palestinian emissary to arrive in France just before 
the end of the war. He did so not only with the blessing of the British but with their 
assistance. His official  task as Director of the Palestinian Office of the Jewish Agency 
was to organise legal Jewish immigration to Palestine. David  Ben Gurion himself 
arrived soon after V.E. day and from that moment on  Paris was designated as the centre 
of the Haganah's  activities in Europe. The ready assistance which the members of the 
Jewish Resistance group, the Armee Juive (AJ), provided the Mossad, in its early days 
in Paris, enabled it to set up relatively quickly an efficient infrastructure. Other para- 
miltary forces in the Yishuv, the Revisionist Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military 
Organisation), and the extremist Stan Group  also set up their European headquarters in 
Paris. How' then did these various elements set about their tasks in France?
3.1  The Jewish Agency
The first accredited representative of the Jewish Agency in France was David 
Shaltiel, who arrived on the 27th November 1944.3 He had arrived earlier  in neutral 
Portugal and, given his status,  had  been  flown to London, courtesy' of the British Air
1  Philippe Boukara, « Dans la Mouvance de la ‘Federation’ (1944-1949) »  Le Monde Juif  (Paris,  1996), 
88.
2 From a biblical quotation: “For a remnant shall come forth from Jerusalem, survivors from Mount 
Zion”. 2 Kings 19, 30:31.
43Attache in Lisbon 4 There, after a visit to the French Embassy, he acquired a visa for 
France. (See Massigli report, Chapter 1.1) An Agency  office was soon opened at 83 
Avenue de la Grande Armee, which also housed the “Office Palestinien de France”, to 
deal specifically with immigration requests. The office  also centralised the work of 
similar offices in Belgium, Holland Germany and Austria.5
Within a  month or so, Shaltiel  had  a first contact  with Avraham Polonski, 
Lucien Lublin and Dyka Jefroykin, the former leaders of the  AJ. This specifically 
Jewish resistance movement had been  set up at the beginning of 1942  in the Free Zone 
of France. From the outset it was orientated towards Zionism and incorporated both 
Revisionist and left-wing tendencies. With the  mobilisation of active combat units in 
November 1943, the AJ, under its original  name of rOrganisation Juive de Combat 
joined elements of the EIF  (Jewish Scouting Movement) and the MJS (Y  oung Zionist 
Movement) in the mountains of Southern France, to harass the  Germans. Its other 
resistance activities consisted of organising the clandestine passage of Jewish children 
into Switzerland and also  across the Pyrenees into Spain en route for Palestine.6
Ties with die Jewish Agency already existed, as Polonski was in  possession of 
an  agreement w ith Eliahu Dobkin of the Jew ish Agency7 ,  which Dyka  Jefroykin had 
signed in Barcelona in July 1944. In this agreement,  the AJ  accepted  to work under 
the authority  of the Jewish  Agency. 7 Despite Shaltiel’s warm words, in which he 
expressed his respect for their  work during the war  and  later discussions held in the 
spring of 1945  with Moshe Shertok,  these initial contacts  were  not immediately 
fruitful. Anne Grynberg argues that the leaders of the AJ were hesitant to commit 
themselves, particularly because of the political strains existing  at the time between the 
President of the Jewish Agency Chaim Weizmann, whom they greatly respected,  and 
Ben Gurion.8
3 TNA, FO 371/42885, Note from Air Ministry to Transport Command, 24.11.44.
4 Ibid.,, Note from Air Ministry to FO,  13.11.44.
5 CZA, Blumel Papers, A426/26  Letter from Executive of the Jewish Agency to UNRRA headquarters, 
9.1.46.
6Anne  Grynberg, « France 1944-1947, Ouvrir les Portes de Sion, de la Resistance Contre le Nazisme a la 
Solidarity avec Israel «  Les Nouveaux Cahiers. No.90, Automne (Paris,  1987),  15.
7  Haganah Archives, Avraham Polonski files, Box 8.3.2.3 Section  123.
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44In February 1945, Shaltiel  was joined in Paris by Ruth Kluger, who w as to act 
as his co-Director of the Agency. Within Mossad circles she already had a formidable 
reputation for her work before and during the war  involved with extracting Jew's from 
Eastern Europe. Once in Paris she took on as a priority task the recovery of Jewish 
children from Christian and other institutions where they had been placed to safeguard 
them from deportation. In most cases they were now orphans and initially they were 
placed in centres run by Jewish communal organisations. Where they remained 
unclaimed by surviving relatives, the Jewish agency set about organising their transport 
to Palestine.9
Kluger’s charisma and attractive  personality' gained her the support of  many 
influential people particularly within the American military.1 0 Exploiting her contacts at 
USFET headquarters (United States Forces European Theatre), she was allocated a 
number of berths on a troopship bound for the Middle East. Four hundred and three 
children, accompanied by the American Red Cross  were checked by Kluger onto the 
Ascanius in Marseilles on 8th July 1945. In Naples they were trans-shipped onto 
another troop-ship, the Malaroa, and were joined by other Jewish refugees. In all 1,196 
immigrants disembarked in Haifa on 15th July. They were then taken to the Athlit camp 
for processing and subsequently' released into die care of the Jewish Agency. In 
September 1945, the Mataroa  returned with a further 991 Jewish refugees, including 
228 children. Many of these boys and girls under the age of 16 had survived 
concentration camps such as Buchenwald.1 1  According to Ehud Avriel, these arrivals 
w ere considered by the British  to be illegal immigrants. How ever, in view' of the 
involvement of USFET they decided not to make an issue of this breach of the quota 
system. Nevertheless they did deduct the number from die quota available in future 
months.12 In a sense, Ruth Kluger could be said to have launched illegal immigration 
from France even before the Mossad established its own headquarters in the French 
capital.
9 Ehud Avriel, Open the Gates : A Personal Story of ‘Illegal’ Immigration to Israel (London,  1975), 252. 
Hereafter Avriel.
10 For a limited  biography on Ruth Kluger see Ruth Eliav [formerly Kluger] and  Peggy Mann, The last 
Escape (London.  1974).
11 AJJDC Archives, File 255, Report by Cordelia Trimble, Field  Representative of the American Red 
Cross, October 1945.
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45Kluger’s area of activity  stretched across Europe and in July 1945 she was 
instrumental in recruiting an American Jewish chaplain, Eugene Lipman, to rescue 
Jewish refugees  held up by the Russians in Prague. In a covert  operation involving 
both  American military personnel  and the Jewish Brigade, 2,000 Jews were taken 
across the Danube in groups  and driven via Salzburg to Italy. Lipman narrowly escaped 
being court-martialled for contravening US army regulations.1 3  Kluger had also 
established strong contacts with the Jewish Brigade, even having an officer and two 
clerks seconded to her in Paris by its commanding officer, Brigadier Ernest Benjamin.1 4
Her high profile had not escaped the attention of the British and when she visited 
Palestine in January 1946, the CID were there to welcome her. In die event, they only 
temporarily confiscated die documents she was carrying.1 5  An MI5 report mentions the 
incident
Litde is known of the illegal immigration organisation in France, but the 
head of the Paris office of the Jewish Agency, Ruth Kluger, is known to do 
all in her pow er to facilitate the journeys of prominent Zionists and 
members of the Jewish Agency from Palestine and the UK to the continent, 
and it has been strongly suspected on more than one occasion that the 
primary reason for these visits has been in connection with illegal 
immigration. Mrs. Kluger’s baggage was searched when she arrived in 
Palestine by air on January 1st 1946 and a number of documents were found 
which indicated her active interest in both legal and illegal schemes for 
immigration to Palestine  from Italy, France and North-West Europe.1 6
In practice, accredited officials of the Jewish Agency , although suspected of 
being involved in activities which British  intelligence considered illegal, were not 
prevented, except in the second half of 1946, from carrying out their official duties 
whether in Palestine or abroad. The dual function of the Jewish Agency, namely 
carrying out both legal and illegal activities, was a characteristic of many  institutions 
involved in illegal activities against the British. This was as true  of the  Joint  and even 
UNRRA  working in the Displaced Persons Camps. The British, although fully  aw are 
of this phenomenon,  seemed  completely powerless to intervene.
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46The  pioneering work by the two Jewish Agency representatives  in Paris 
represented the first phase  of direct Palestinian activity in France. With the arrival of 
David Ben Gurion, the Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, in May 1945, a new 
and more intensive phase was set in motion.
Ben Gurion was no stranger to Paris. During the pre-war years he came to 
France almost once a year to attend meetings of the Zionist Executive or to represent 
Mapai before the International Socialist Movement.  Here, Ben Gurion had one close 
confidant, his “Parisian Friend” and ardent Zionist, Marc Jarblum, head  of the FSJF. 
Given Ben Gun  on's empathy for and connections in France, it is not surprising that  he 
frequently  used  Paris as  his own  headquarters in Europe. From here his 
representatives could use the political connections of Leon Blum, Andre Blumel  and 
Marc Jarblum to promote the Zionist viewpoint to  Socialist Cabinet Ministers like Rene
17 Mayer, Daniel Mayer and Jules Moch  all native Frenchmen of Jewish origin.
During  his May  visit to Paris, Ben Gurion set about  re-establishing  contact 
with  Jarblum and meeting  other French Zionist leaders to explore the possibilities of 
setting up a range of Haganah activities on French soil.1 8 In his meetings with  Ruth 
Kluger and David Shaltiel, Ben Gurion insisted that henceforth  they  w orked  closely 
with  Jarblum, whose contacts in the French administration, particularly with die 
Socialist Ministers, were second to none. Whilst they would  keep Jarblum informed on 
immigration matters he,  in turn, would disclose to them all his political activities.19
It was  Ruth Kluger who, anxious to deflect  the  scepticism  about  Ben Gurion 
demonstrated  by the three AJ leaders,  arranged an hour’s  meeting  between Ben 
Gurion  and  Polonski  on 18th May 1945.20  After this meeting Ben Gurion noted in his 
diary that of the original 2,000 operatives in the AJ, 800 had remained in contact. He 
also noted that some 3000 Jewish youngsters, who for the most part, had lost their 
parents through deportation, resided in children’s homes.21  Undoubtedly, in his mind, 
they would be prime candidates for Zionist education.
17 Benjamin Pinkus, « Ben Gourion, La France et les Juifs de France »  in Benjamin Pinkus and Doris 
Bensimon, eds., Actes du Collogue International: Les Juifs de France, le Sionisme et L’Etat d’Israel 
(Paris,  1987), 281.
18 Idith Zertal,  From Catastrophe to Power: Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of Israel (Berkeley, 
California,  1998), 77. Hereafter Zertal, Catastrophe.
19 Tsilla Hershco, Entre Paris et Jerusalem;La France, le Sionisme et la Creation de L Etat dlsrael.1945- 
1949 (Paris, 2003), 59. Hereafter Hershco
20  Grynberg,  16
21  Yehuda Ben David, Ha"Haganah Ba’Europa (Tel Aviv, 1995), 261. Hereafter Ben David.
47With the war over, the Jewish Agency office in London, relying on the 
sympathetic attitude of Churchill towards Dr. Weizmann and the Zionist cause, had  lost 
no time in asking  the British Government to abandon the 1939 White Paper and allow 
unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine. It set out the following  requests for 
consideration:
1.  That Palestine be declared a Jewish State.
2.  That the Jewish Agency should be authorised to take to Palestine as many new 
settlers as possible ami to develop all the country’s resources.
3.  That the transfer of Jews from Europe should be assisted by an international 
loan.
4.  That Germany should pay reparations in kind to the Jewish people for the 
development of Palestine. As a first instalment, all German property in Palestine 
to be requisitioned.
5.  That all international facilities be provided for the exit and transit from Europe 
of all Jews who wished to settle in Palestine.
In reporting these demands, the Manchester Guardian gently admonished the 
Agency for not waiting for the conclusion of the projected  peace conference and of 
disregarding the practical difficulties of their proposals. It pointed out that: “Their 
acceptance would undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences in the Arab world and 
upon our relationships and interests within it.”22
In the event, Weizmann was to be disappointed by Churchill’s refusal to 
consider the future of Palestine in advance of a peace conference. Within months, 
however, Churchill’s electoral upset at the first post-war elections seemed to presage  a 
new era for Palestine. This theme was taken up by die Manchester Guardian in its 
editorial of 31st July, 1945. It expressed the hope that the new Labour Government 
would “ find a solution acceptable to the United Nations which would safeguard die 
Jewish Home in Palestine ami permit the immigration of at least a portion of the Jews of
23 Europe.”  Perhaps more surprisingly and with great prescience, the editorial wait on to 
recognise that this might only be achieved by partition and the creation of a small but 
independent Jewish State. The record shows that  it was to take another two years of 
turmoil and indecision  for a British Government to be forced, by the United Nations 
Assembly, to finally7  accept such a solution.
22 Manchester Guardian. 26.5.45.
23 Ibid.,  31.7.45.
48With  the British Labour Party’s accession to power in July 1945,  Ben Gurion 
and the members of the Jewish Agency Executive assembled in London for the opening 
of the first World Zionist Conference since 1939, felt that at last their hopes would be 
realised. Their assumption was based on the pro-Zionist stance adopted by the Labour 
Party since 1939, when they vehemently opposed the White Paper. This illusion was to 
be  shattered in September 1945, when Clement Attlee  indicated that die White Paper 
would continue to be  maintained until his Government had finally determined its polic\7  
for Palestine.
Arriving in Paris on 29th September 1945, Ben Gurion, now determined to 
circumvent the continuing restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine, 
telegrammed the political head of the Haganah, Moshe Sneh, to launch military actions 
against the British in Palestine. He  also ordered his colleagues in Palestine to despatch 
to Paris both the head of the Mossad, Shaul Meirov and his second in command, Ehud 
Avriel, to organise both Aliyah Bet and Aliyah Gimmel.24
As a next step he sought out Polonski to determine the sort of assistance he 
could render to die Haganah in France. Since his first visit he had already  received 
from  Polonski  a full  and confidential report on the work of the AJ during the w ar. In 
his covering letter Polonski had expressed the hope of discussing with Ben Gurion the 
nature of the AJ’s future activities.25 By now the AJ had overcome its earlier 
misgivings about Ben Gurion and was eager to be of service. Ben Gurion  was invited to 
inaugurate die first transmission of the AJ’s secret radio station  in Paris, now dedicated 
to the future needs of the  Mossad.26  Polonski  also informed Ben Gurion  that he was 
now  fully prepared to put at his disposal the skills in forgery, transport and weapons 
usage  which his Resistance organisation had acquired fighting the Germans.
Given that no effective  Haganah infrastructure existed in France, Ben Gurion 
saw  the AJ  as providing the means to kick start operations. Later in October 1945, 
wTiting his report in London, Ben Gurion expressed his hopes for a fruitful collaboration
The important thing I discovered in Paris is die possibility of Aliyah 
Gimmel. despite the enormous difficulties of training, arms acquisition, 
transfer and communication. But the essential  prerequisites already exist:
24  Zertal, » Le Cinquieme Cote du Triangle » , 414.
25 Haganah Archives, Polonski files. Box no. 8.3.2.3, Letter from Polonski to David Ben Gurion at Jewish 
Agency, 77 Great Russell Street, London, 27.8.45.
26 Grynberg,17.
49the willingness of the men; the youth in the camps and the men of the 
Armee  Juive in France, under the leadership of our men from back home, 
are ready.27
Aliyah Gimmel, referred to Ben Gurion’s  controversial pre-war suggestion that 
a special force of young immigrants should be militarily trained before departure from 
Europe on illegal ships. Then if die British  were to  oppose their landing in Palestine, 
they, together with Haganah units already onshore, would take them on.  The 
occurrence of such incidents, with their inherent risk of casualties, Ben Gurion 
concluded, would have far-reaching positive  effects on world opinion, let alone on the 
British28 Ben Gurion  was soon dissuaded from this particular idea by Israel Galili and 
Moshe Sneh, respectively the military and political heads of the Haganah Even the AJ 
only showed luke-warm support and consequently directed the  military training activity 
of Aliyah Gimmel to more practical ends. 29 (See 3.3)
In December 1945 Ehud Avriel was die first senior Mossad emissary to arrive. 
The following month he went down to Marseilles to meet Shmaria ‘Rudi’ Zameret,  an 
American, who was the Mossad Station Chief and explained to him that Paris would 
shortly be the European headquarters of the Mossad. Rudi had already, since his arrival 
after die end of the war, explored the region to find suitable locations for transit camps. 
He had  rented  an estate, previously the property of a French collaborator who was 
now in prison. It had the benefit of a secluded bay and the main building could house at 
least 200 refugees. Together with other Mossad operatives in the area he began planning 
for the first illegal ship to leave France.30
On 11th  November 1945, Ben Gurion chaired a conference in Paris  of ex-AJ 
men, men of the Jewish Brigade and members of the Haganah Marc Jarblum and Ruth 
Kluger w ere also  present as well as 300 delegates. This marked the incorporation of the 
AJ into the Haganah under the acronym Matsav (The  Diaspora Civil Guards). Soon 
after, Ben Gurion managed to second Nahum Shadmi,  from the Haganah in Palestine, 
to head  the new organisation of the Haganah in Europe. His task was to command the
27 Renee Posnanski,, » I/heritage de la Guerre, le Sionisme et la France dans les Annees 1944-1947 ». in 
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28 Dvorah Hacohen, “Ben Gurion and the Second World War: Plans for Mass immigration to Palestine” in 
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50Haganah members in the Jewish Brigade and  to supervise Matsav under Polonski’s 
leadership. He was also to be responsible for coordinating the acquisition of arms, for 
their eventual transfer to Palestine and to assist the Mossad with its illegal immigration 
activities. In April 1946 Shad  mi  nominated Polonski as Haganah Commander for 
France and North Africa.3 1
Polonski was an essential  figure in assisting the various branches of die 
Haganah to set themselves up in France. His many contacts with former resistance 
members, now in official positions  even within die DST, greatly assisted this process. 
Also, problems which arose because  of the lack of knowledge of the language, culture 
and customs of France by  the European Haganah commander,  Nahum Shad  mi and the 
Mossad head, Shaul Meirov,  who had finally arrived in May 1946, were easily resolved 
by his intervention and his perfect knowledge of Hebrew.32
By now, Ben Gurion could be satisfied that he had accomplished his first task, 
which was to  set up a secret  infrastructure  in France from which  he could  confront 
the British in Palestine. His other  task, this time in the  political sphere, w as to win 
France’s  new Provisional Government and public opinion over to the Zionist cause.
On 10th November 1945, Jarblum  had arranged for him to meet  Georges Bidault, then 
Foreign Minister in de Gaulle’s cabinet Bidault told  him that he had  passed on  to 
Ernest Bevin  de Gaulle’s comment that when he  was in Palestine he saw7   that the Jews 
were the only community that was developing die country.33
Bidault, Minister of Foreign affairs for most of the period September 1944 to 
July 1948,  was moved to confront his Socialist coalition partners over their pro- 
Zionist views, whenever he considered the higher interests of France to be at stake. The 
question of illegal immigration, which often arose during his tenure of office, caused 
him the most anguish in his relations with Bevin.34 This does not mean, as  later events 
tend to reveal, that he was necessarily opposed to the Zionist enterprise.
Besides the work in their official capacity, both  Ruth Kluger  and David Shaltiel 
were also heavily involved  with Polonski, then still located in Toulouse, in setting up
31 Ben David, 264. The Jewish Agency was concerned that the 475,000  Jews living in the French  North 
African possessions of Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria among 19million Arabs could come under attack as 
Zionist efforts for a Jewish home in Palestine progressed. It was therefore considered  necessary  for local 
Jewish self-defence units to be brought to France for  training
32 Ibid.,
33 Pinkus, « Ben Gourion, La France et les Juifs de Fiance », 281.
34 Catherine Nicault, La France et le Sionisme 1897-1948: Une Rencontre Manquee? (Paris,  1992), 219.
51transit centres for illegal immigration  purposes.35  Ruth Kluger  also  travelled widely 
in  France, visiting Jewish communities and bringing word of events in Palestine.
This also provided the opportunity to recruit  young French Jews to sign up for 
Haganah activities in France prior to their own Aliy ah. ( See the case of Israel Avidor 
referred to later)
After die departure of David Shaltiel, Ruth Kluger was left in sole charge with 
an increasing work load.  In April 1946, just 14 months  after her arrival, she  indicated 
to her immediate superior, Eliahu Dobkin, in charge of immigration at the Jewish 
Agency in Palestine, that she wished to resign. Dobkin’s response was not on file. 
However, in early July he  asked  Eliezer Kaplan, the Jewish Agency treasurer, then in 
Paris, to prevail on  Kluger to await the arrival of her replacements, E.Najar  and 
A. Goldberg ,37
In late July, with no sign that her promised  successors  were  arriving, Kluger 
revealed, in two  detailed and emotional  letters to Dobkin, the reasons which had led 
her to resign. The underlying cause  was that her position in Paris had been usurped by 
the arrival  of new officials sent out from Palestine, who refused to accept her authority. 
In effect, the Paris office was being systematically precluded from overseeing the 
activities being carried out by emissaries  in the other European countries, for which it 
was responsible. In describing these “boycott and sabotage” activities, Kluger reported 
that those involved had  stated  that they would  act independently or only accept orders 
directly from Jerusalem. This  chaotic and anarchical situation was further exacerbated 
by the use of the Paris office as die transit centre for emissaries destined to move on to 
other countries, ostensibly  Germany and Austria and  the DP Camps. They often 
arrived without suitable clothing or visas for their ultimate destination.
The approval of the necessaiy authority  to cover the emissaries’ living costs  w ere also 
not forthcoming. Faced with unexpected delays -they had been told the Paris office had 
everything in hand, which clearly w as not the case- the emissaries vented their 
frustration  on Kluger  and interrupted the work of her meagre  and under-resourced 
offices  in the Avenue de la Grande Armee.38 This contretemps within the Jewish
35 Archives erf" Yad Tabenkin, Polonski Files, Box no8 File 6, Letter from Polonski to David Shaltiel and 
Ruth Kluger,  17.7.45.
36 Ibid., Invitation issued by Organisation Sioniste de France, Toulouse branch, to a meeting to be 
addressed by Ruth Kluger in Yiddish, 31.5.45.
37 CZA, Immigration Dept., S6/1657. Telegramme from Dobkin to Kaplan at Royal Monceau, 7.7.46.
38 Ibid., Letters  in Erelish  to Eliahu Dobkin from Ruth Kluger, dated 24< h  and 25th July 1946.
52Agency did not spell the end of Ruth Kluger’s services in Paris. Despite her warning 
that she was returning to Palestine on 15th August, she remained  until October 1946, to 
assist Ben Gurion, now in virtual exile, to continue  the work of the Executive of the 
Jewish Agency ,39
Ben Gurion’s enforced stay in the French capital arose out fear of arrest if he 
attempted to return to Palestine after the events of 29th June 1946 when British forces in 
Palestine launched a concerted action against the Jewish Agency and all paramilitary 
forces.  On that “Black Saturday” Ben Gurion was at his usual hotel, the Royal 
Monceau  in Paris, preparing to return to Palestine. His response to events back home 
was to demand an increase in the illegal immigration traffic, calling for die arrival, off 
the shores of Palestine, of at least one ship a week.40  From this date until the end of 
1946 the  members of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, who had  escaped arrest, 
held their meetings in Paris.41
The pretext  for  the British army ’s  widespread repressive action throughout 
Palestine, was the  havoc caused  to its communication lines wreaked by the Palmach 
twelve days previously. Prior to that there had been many attacks against British forces, 
largely in response to the failure of the British Government to respond positively7  to the 
recommendations of die  Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry into Jewish 
Refugees.  In reality, the  British operation, prepared months previously, was intended 
to crush all Jewish para-military activity in Palestine. This note from the High 
Commissioner for Palestine provides evidence to this effect
In the event of a major outrage, a plan is in existence which includes 
occupation of the Jewish Agency and detention of selected 
leaders... following slaughter of soldiers in Tel Aviv (seven soldiers killed 
on 25th April ..by 20 to 30 Jewish terrorists) there is more strain on troops.
Unless Jews disband their armed forces by agreement, action should be 
taken against them as soon as possible.42
In the countryside, kibbutzim w7 ere surrounded and widespread arms searches 
carried out, sometimes involving civilian casualties. In the towns the inhabitants were 
screened for Haganah and Irgun members, who were then interned.  Members of the 
Jewish Agency Executive were arrested and taken to the fortress at  Latrun, all except
39 Archives Nationales, Fla/3368,  RG report,  10.10.46.
40 Avriel, 288/292.
41  Zertal,  « Le cinquieme Cote du Triangle », 414.
53for Dr. Moshe Sneh, the political  head of the Haganah,  who managed to slip the net 
and, according to Idith Zertal, was smuggled out of Palestine to France.43  However this 
version  of his escape  is open to dispute. In effect, French archival sources reveal that 
the British had located Sneh but, rather than arrest him and risk unrest,  preferred to 
convince  him  to leave die country of his own accord. The Jewish Agency duly 
responded by approaching the French consulate and requesting a visa to France for him. 
This was granted on the spot.44
The comings and goings of Ben Gurion and his entourage at the Hotel Monceau, 
37, Avenue Hoche, were noted, on an almost daily basis, by agents of the 
Renseignements Generaux (French Political Police), who  invariably referred in their 
reports  to information supplied by “ reliable  Jewish circles in the capital.” 45 
These reports  illustrate die manner in which die French capital afforded a safe haven in 
which members of the Jewish Agency could carry on negotiating with the British  free 
of die danger of arrest, which had been their colleagues’ fate  in Palestine. For 
instance, it was revealed that in early June prior to these arrests, Ben Gurion had met the 
Colonial Secretary, George Hall, in London  on two occasions. On one of these he was 
accompanied by  Richard Crossman, a member of the Anglo-American Committee on 
Palestine. It was during one of these visits that Ben Gurion had cabled the Executive in 
Palestine in order to intercede for the release of five British officers who had been 
kidnapped by the Irgun.
Nine days after the second meeting, British forces launched their plan to 
neutralise the Haganah and the Irgun and arrest members of the Jewish Agency in 
Palestine. But by then, Ben Gurion was in Paris.46 His  response  and that of the other 
free  Agency members  was not long in coming. Despite attempts to keep its discussions
42 TNA, Cabinet Papers, CAB  121/644. Alan Cunningham to Secretary of State for Colonies, 29.4.46.
43 Zertal, “Le Cinqitieme Cote du Triangle”, 414.
44 MAE Archives, Sionisme, File 373, Carton 72, Telegramme from de Neuville, the Consular-General to 
MAE, Direction de 1 ’Afrique-Levant,  16.7.46.
45 The extent to which Zionist activities in France, both overt and covert, were under constant surveillance 
is illustrated by the detailed, but not always entirely accurate, repeats of  this particular branch of the 
French police  Behind its seemingly innocuous title “Renseignements Generaux” (General intelligence), 
there existed  (and  still exists today) a wide-scale  intelligence-gathering  organisation which, through 
hundreds of informers, concentrates its activities cm potentially subversive or dubious organisations and 
individuals within France. Responsible to the head of the Surete Nationale in the Ministry of the Interior, 
the  RG maintains offices in each department of France. Each Prefet then has at his disposal the means to 
investigate  any “political organisation or individual” which he deans worthy of attention.
Beyond that, the directorate of the RG frequently issued confidential  position papers  in which were 
expressed their considered  views on political  personalities and events and their relative influence on 
current affairs.
54confidential, it was discovered that at a conference  of the Executive  in Paris, a 
resolution was passed to create an independent Jewish State. Initially a small state 
would be created, but the struggle would then continue to seek its enlargement in Eretz 
Israel, even in the face of Arab opposition. The political leanings of die new state would 
be Zionist-Socialist.47
On 17th August, the Jewish leaders Stephen Wise, Nahum Goldman and Berl 
Locker met Ernest Bevin and George Hall, the Colonial Secretary at the Hotel George V 
in Paris to discuss a Round Table Conference to be held in London with Jewish and 
Arab delegates.48 Subsequendy in October an official from the Colonial Office met with 
Ben Gurion  to convince him to attend the London Round Table. He was unsuccessful, 
given Ben Gurion’s conditions, which included the release of the Agency’s leaders in 
Palestine. 49 There then came a change of Colonial Secretary which seemed to indicate a 
willingness by the British to compromise. Arthur Creech Jones, Hall’s successor, met 
with Chaim Weizmann ami other members of the Agency’s Executive in London to 
discuss a general amnesty of those detained in Palestine.50 A few weeks later the 
liberation was announced of the Jewish leaders in Palestine.5 1
Friction developed  between Ben Gurion and Weizmann as to how best to 
respond to the British call for a Round Table Conference on  Palestine. The subject was 
to be finally  debated at the 22nd World Zionist Organisation (WZO) Congress  in Basle 
in December 1946.  Renseignements Generaux reported that, according to  views it had 
received, if the WZO was in favour of a compromise with the British, which permitted 
the creation of a viable independent Jewish State, however small, all die Jewish leaders 
would return to their countries. If the contrary was the case, no leader would return to 
Eretz Israel, which would signify that Paris would become the  Yishuv’s temporary 
diplomatic centre.52 In its analysis, the RG foresaw that Weizmann would not be re­
elected at the Congress  because of the failure of his conciliatory policies tow ards the 
British over the question of Jewish  immigration to Palestine.53
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55At the Congress, 370 delegates  participated and among the  2,000 guests invited 
to attend there were 1,000  representatives from the Holocaust survivors in the DP 
Camps. As opposed to previous conferences the majority of the delegates came from the 
USA and Palestine, reflecting the demise of the East European communities.54 
Weizmann, ignoring the strength of those who opposed his policy vis-a-vis the British, 
made it a condition of his continued presidency of the Jewish Agency and the WZO that 
the Agency would unconditionally participate in the proposed London Conference. 
Furthermore  he declared that die principle of partition should be accepted, if it led to 
the creation of an independent Jewish State.
This ultimatum of Weizmann's created dismay among a number of the 
delegates, particularly those  with a more militant attitude.55 When the Congress voted 
not to attend the London Conference, Weizmann left Basle without standing for re- 
election. It was a triumph for  the policies of Ben Gurion and Abba Hillel Silver, the 
American Jewish leader. The Congress elected an Action Committee, which in turn 
elected a new Jewish Agency Executive, presided over by Ben Gurion Out of respect 
for Weizmann, die position of president of the two organisations was left vacant. 
Thereupon  Weizmann removed himself from political life, claiming ill-health.56
From the Dorchester Hotel in London, where he resided after returning from 
Basle, Weizmann wrote to Marc JarbJum expressing some of his thoughts after the 
rejection of his ideas at the Congress. He was particularly disappointed, not only by the 
behaviour of Abba Silver but also even more  by that of Ben Gurion and Moshe 
Shertok. He characterised the new Executive as resembling not so much a coalition as a 
Noah’s Ark, made up of pure and impure animals, where the latter would gain the upper 
hand. He suggested to Jarblum the formation of a group of moderates to include 
Jarblum, Andrd Blumel and Leon Blum.
This new faction  would be available if, as he feared, the new Executive clashed 
seriously with the British Government and chaos and bloodshed ensued in Palestine. 
Jarblum, using the utmost tact in his reply, counselled patience about the formation of 
such  a group, emphasising the need for all political tendencies to be represented. As to 
his adherence to such a group, Jarblum referred to his existing membership of die party 
[Mapai] and to the loyalty that this demanded. In any event he would be canvassing the
54 Archives Nationales, RG report, 11.12.46.
55 Ibid., 21.12.46.
56return of Weizmann as head of their movement.57 Clearly Jarblum recognised that 
Weizmann’s day had passed and that the new’  centre of power lay with Ben Gurion.
In a later report, Renseignements Generaux noted that the proceedings of the 
Round Table Conference were suspended and that, according to their usual well- 
informed Jewish circles in Paris, w ere unlikely to resume. This was because Bevin, in 
contrast  to the Colonial Office, was resolutely opposed to a partition plan for Palestine. 
Creech Jones envisaged a partition into three zones, one being an Arab state, the other a 
Jewish state and the third remaining a neutral zone.58
One of the more  enlightening sections of a  Renseignements Generaux report in 
early 1947,  directly concerned itself with illegal immigration. In this report, the French 
cast themselves purely in the role of passive onlookers. It noted, without at  this time 
any pretence at ignorance or ambiguity, that from the Mediterranean coasts to the Black 
Sea, boats of varying tonnage and type  set sail for Palestine each week. On the one 
hand, Polish, German, Austrian and Czech Jews  transited through French and Italian 
ports, whilst on the other Jews from Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania 
transited through Greek and Romanian ports.59  Renseignements Generaux showed that 
it w as quite  aware of the silent war being waged between the “Jewish organisations” 
and die British army and intelligence services. It noted that whilst the espionage and 
counter-espionage services of the British Admiralty kept w atch on boats suspected of 
covertly embarking Jews for Palestine, the  Intelligence Service pursued clandestine 
networks. 60
The  contents of this short  report  to the Ministry’ of the Interior is particularly’  
significant because it coincided with a period in which the Ministry7   found itself under 
severe attack from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. This was because of its alleged 
failure to verify die visas of ultimate destination of Jewish immigrants leaving from 
French ports. The Ministry’s response that visas for such unlikely destinations as 
Columbia, Cuba or Venezuela had been thoroughly checked and w’ere found to be in 
order must be set against the actual knowledge in its possession, clear from the RG 
report, that these same immigrants  were actually  leaving French or Italian ports for
56 Archives Nationales, RG reports 27.12.46 and 30.12.46.
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57Palestine. Clearly this exposes a deliberate exercise of bad faith  between government 
ministers. (For a full analysis of inter-ministerial  conflicts engendered by illegal 
immigration see Chapter 5.3)
In die spring of 1947, the Political Department  of the Jewish Agency in Paris 
considered how to respond  as the British began to show signs of relinquishing the 
Mandate. The coming Assembly of the United Nations, which was to discuss the issue, 
concentrated the minds of the Zionist leadership within the Political Department  into 
how they could mobilise their friends in the  French administration, other political 
parties  and public opinion in general, into supporting their cause. The former  political 
head of the Haganah, Dr. Moshe Sneh, in addressing  his colleagues, emphasised the 
need to create a real dialogue between it and the French administration to ensure  that its 
position at the next session of the UN was in line with those of the Agency. The 
necessity now was to move from the occasional visits and friendly conversations with 
Ministers  to  reach out to the permanent civil  servants who dealt with  policy on the 
Middle East. The objective was to influence these officials in the Agency’s favour in the 
weeks preceding die  Assembly’s meeting in September 1947. Sneh was under no 
illusion as to the obstacles that had to be surmounted. He had  recognised that, for a 
variety of reasons, mainly economic, France was presently  obliged to adopt a political 
line close to that of the British and the Americans. In addition, because of its interests in 
the Middle East and North Africa, France could not adopt a position which would 
alienate the Moslem world. Sneh proposed two devices  to counter these tendencies. 
One was to feed the French paranoia that both the British and Americans were 
conspiring  against ho- interests in the Middle East and North Africa The second was to 
convince the French that by supporting the Zionists she could better face the Arab 
threat.
Acknowledging  that calls for sympathy for the Jewish plight were no longer 
effective, Sneh suggested that instead one had to offer something in return by 
recognising the needs of one’s partners. For instance, the Jews could render services to 
the French in Lebanon, whilst in North Africa, a more difficult terrain, at least 
information could be supplied. The whole point was to counter die influence of the 
Americans, the British and the Muslims by proving the value of the Yishuv as a partner.
o0RG report, 25.1.47.
58The Jewish Agency’s  desire for  influence with  political parties was targeted 
mainly at  the  Communists. The arguments to be deployed here were  that  (a) the 
Yishuv was the only progressive community in the Middle East and that the existence of 
such a community could influence the progress of adjacent communities [such as the 
Arabs] and (b) that the Yishuv aspired to have total independence in a democratic 
framework and that it would, in consequence, be  an anti-imperialist force. Sneh also 
had a message for the Catholic Church, namely that the presence of Judaism in the 
Middle East was the only obstacle to  a Moslem monopoly and  would safeguard  the 
Christian presence both in Palestine and in adjacent countries.61
Undoubtedly, this meeting of the most eminent local Zionist  representatives 
underlined the importance Sneh  attached to creating, at all levels of influence in 
France, an atmosphere sympathetic to the establishment of a Jewish State.
As has been noted, the  work being carried out by the officials of the Jewish 
Agency and the use of Paris by Ben Gurion as his diplomatic home  during his virtual 
exile from  Palestine, was at all times subjected to the watchful  ey e of agents of 
Renseignements Generaux  Such surveillance was also extended to other Palestinian 
emissaries, such as those  from the Haganah, the Irgun or the Stem Group, who were 
engaged in more covert operations. They  were either treated benignly by the 
authorities, as in the case of illegal immigration,  or were pursued by the regular police 
when gun-running was involved. Whichever role they  chose to play, they all initially 
found in  France an environment conducive to the pursuit of their activities.
3.2  Mossad/Haganah, Irgun Zvai Leumi  and  Stem Group 
M ossad/Haganah
Shaul Meirov’s  first  post-war visit to Europe was to  Italy  where he inspected 
some of the DP  and Training Camps. With his subsequent move to Paris  in mid-May 
1946 the  decision  to establish there  the European headquarters of the Mossad  was in 
sight of fruition. Paris was a return journey for Meirov as he had already resided there 
before the war at the Hotel Metropole. 62 Initially, Ehud Avriel assisted  Meirov  and 
then in  June 1946 he  was joined by  Vern a Pomerantz, another experienced member
01  CZA, Immigration Dept.,  S6/1657, Minutes of Meeting of the Political Department of the Jewish
Agency in Paris on 30th May 1947. Present  Sneh, Jarblum, Blumel, Fischer, Goldberg and Jefroykin.
59of the Labour-Zionist Kibbutz movement, which was extensively involved in illegal 
immigration activities. In  the spring of 1947, on AvrieFs return to Palestine, Pomerantz 
succeeded him.63  Pomerantz, in later life, adopted the Hebrew name of  Ze’ev Hadari 
and it is under this name that he wrote a series of books about the Mossad’s activities.64
Meirov instilled in the emissaries who reported to him the necessity to observe a 
modest lifestyle and absolute probity when dealing with the substantial sums placed in 
their care for operational activities. This would include the purchase of ships, equipment 
and “greasing payments"' (bribes) for shipping agents, customs officials and military and 
police officers in various parts of Europe. On returning from a mission, the Mossad 
emissaries would first  report  to Meirov  on its results. Because of the need for secrecy, 
no receipts were expected but a  full  accounting of the money entrusted to them had to 
be given,  which was then accepted without query. Very little money was spent on 
administrative expenses or to cover the living costs of the emissaries. 65
They also received strict instructions to avoid being conspicuous, not to 
compromise civil serv ants or complicate the political and diplomatic moves of the 
French Government 66  From his headquarters in Paris, Meirov supervised the  Mossad 
leadership  in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Germany and Italy. He also
4\7 liaised with Pino Ginzburg in Geneva who controlled the Mossad’s finances.
In  Hadari’s memoirs,  Meirov  is described in the following terms:  “An austere 
person who lacked (harm and humour, his appearance was unimpressive and his
conversation was not brilliant  However his dedication, diligence and total
identification with the work of illegal immigration gave him undisputed prestige and 
authority...”68
This impression of Meirov was echoed by Arieh  ‘Lova’ Eliav  who, at the age 
of 25,  commanded the  ship the Ulua when it was intercepted by the British in February 
1947. Before that, for a short time, he worked in the Mossad’s office in Paris. His own
02 Arieh Boaz, Qlam Vnochet Becol: Havech Shaul Avigur (Unseen vet always Present: The life story of 
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the death of his son in the War of Independence in 1948. Hereafter Boaz.
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60recollection of Meirov was of an aesthetic but charismatic man with  the natural 
authority of a commander-in-chief, whom one obeyed without question. He lived in a 
small room in the  Hotel Metropole, Avenue Victor Hugo,  with his wife like “ a monk 
and a nun in a cell.” To his “soldiers”, for that is how they regarded themselves, he 
would show his regard  for them  by ritually inviting  them  to drink  a  cup of tea with 
him. For him, this was “having a good time.”69
Idith Zeital paints a different picture of the man. For her he was lacking in 
boldness, imagination and decision-making ability. “A man who did not inspire 
followers, who was hidden from view of those he commanded.” She contends that 
Meirov's uncontested leadership derived from  a personal history of militant Zionism 
and his work in the Mossad before the war. This was also aided by  his network of 
contacts within the political leadership and marriage ties (he was married to Moshe 
Shertok’s sister). However, Zertal effectively  undermines  her criticism  by  revealing 
Meirov's  philosophy as to the nature  of his role, effectively one  of management by 
delegation.  She quotes him as saying
In full awareness, I chose  not to intervene in the details of activity of our 
people on site... I was careful to give them all the feeling of space for their 
initiatives, imagination and ability to implement. I understood that for this 
grand enterprise  spread across almost the entire face of Europe and the seas, 
it would be  apractical impossibility to manage from one centre, one 
headquarters, and that the ‘modest’  job of headquarters was to assist, 
encourage, stimulate and come up with appropriate resources and people in 
the field. I would  coordinate and intervene in operating details only when 
there was an absolute need to do so.70
Meirov conducted operations from his room on die third floor of the Hotel 
Metropole, a small, nondescript two star hotel near the Arc de Triomphe, used by 
passing businessmen. Often whilst he was engaged with one or other visitor on Mossad 
business, his wife, Sarah, would cook their frugal meals on an electric stove before 
returning to her equally modestly-furnished  room Meirov’s main working tools were 
his desk  and  particularly his telephone which kept him in continuous touch with  New 
York, Geneva, Milan, Prague  and other locations. Passing international calls to
68 Hadari, Second Exodus. 22/23.
69 Telephone Interview with Arieh ‘Lova’ Eliav, 25.11.03.
70 Zertal, Catastrophe.  178/179.
61“Monsieur Meirov” was  a regular task for the hotel’s telephone operator. He also 
received daily deliveries of messages transmitted to die secret radio stations of the 
Haganah in the Paris area. From time to time he  made short journeys in Europe to 
discuss matters with his operatives on the spot Other than that, Meirov did  not leave 
the hotel often, except to visit the Mossad office, one of the radio stations or  conduct 
meetings held in small cafes or during walks along the Champs Elysees. Of course 
when Ben Gurion or Moshe Shertok came to the more high class Royal Monceau, he 
would visit them there. In April 1947 the Meirovs returned for a holiday to their home 
on Kibbutz Kinneret to meet up with their sixteen year old son, Gur. After a month 
Meirov returned to Paris alone.7 1
Like many of the institutions of the Yishuv, the Mossad was a quasi-autonomous 
organisation which did not automatically accept the authority of the Jewish Agency.
This had its advantages and disadvantages. It allowed the Agency to  disclaim, 
somewhat disingenuously, responsibility for illegal immigration  over which it had, 
ostensibly,  no direct control. However it also granted the Mossad a level of autonomy, 
which ran counter to Ben Gurion’s  attempts at centralisation of the decision-making 
process. Hadari contends that Shaul Meirov, together with Ehud Avriel, himself and, 
later in 1947, Yehuda Breginski, constituted the quartet which made the major decisions 
on the Mossad’s activities in Europe and elsewhere. They dealt with the appointment of 
emissaries to the Mdssad’s various branches, the choice of ports of departure, the 
acquisition of equipment and the covert transit routes to be used by the immigrants. No 
written records of their meetings  were kept. Mutual trust was the watchword.72
Although Meirov was never positively identified by  the British Intelligence 
services as the head of the Mossad, he as well as  Pomerantz,  Kluger,  Shaltiel  and 
thirty-six other named individuals  were identified in a letter from  Sir Alan 
Cunningham, the High Commissioner in Palestine as being  involved in illegal 
immigration activities. He particularly requested that the Italian authorities refuse to 
grant any of them  visas to Italy.73 It is highly doubtful that there was a positive 
response to this request as Palestinian emissaries appeared to have no difficulty in 
moving from country to country, as their work demanded.
71 Boaz, 205.
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62By the end of 1946 and in order to centralise the Agency’s  various secret 
activities,  Meirov had taken  under his wing four existing  autonomous units. The 
“Bricha” organisation  which directed displaced Jews to the camps in Austria and 
Germany; 74 “Haganah-Europe” which ensured transit to the ports of embarkation; 
“Ha’Apalah” (under the  control of Palyam escorts) which covered the sea journey to 
Palestine; and  “Rekhesh” which dealt with arms procurement. The heads of these 
activities did not formally report to Meirov but nevertheless respected die authority 
which Ben Gurion had endowed him with.75
In respect of Rekhesh, there are many accounts of arms being stolen from the 
British army by die Jewish Brigade whilst it was in Italy and of other arms being 
purchased from former French Resistance members. Their storage in depots in France, 
unlike illegal immigration, was not looked on benignly by the French authorities and
76 often  police raids and confiscation took place.
The daily  routine work  of the Mossad in Paris was carried out from an office  at 
5 rue Chabanais which was the Paris branch of a Palestinian-based travel agency.
The street was frequented by prostitutes and their clients and this  provided cover for 
the daily comings and goings of local Mossad operatives.77 The office was run  as a 
communications centre. From here coded  telephone messages were received from  and 
sent  to other  operatives. Only the minimum paper work relative to the centre’s use as a 
travel agency was retained, in case of inspection by the authorities.78
Altough Hadari insists that few written records  were  ever kept in Paris, the 
existence of the Paris  log of radio transmissions with ships at sea, Palestine and other 
Mossad centres in Europe does indicate the existence of at least one documentary
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63record of the Mossad’s  daily activities.79 The log was introduced by Hadari and 
covered the period January to September 1947. It is a series of partially coded messages 
dealing with ships, ship refurbishment and equipment, numbers of immigrants, fuel 
supplies and financial matters. Some of the most extensive radio traffic between Paris 
and Marseilles  concerned the last-minute difficulties over the departure of the Exodus 
in July 1947.80
In order to escape the vigilance of British intelligence, renowned for their skills
at wire-tapping and interception of radio transmissions, specific codes were allocated to
individuals, ships, countries and financial matters.81 After an initial brush with die
French authorities over the use of illegal transmissions (See Chapter 5.2), the Mossad
was allowed by  the DST to maintain its communication network in France as long as it
was prepared to  decipher, on request, selected transmissions.82
According to Hadari, it was the  newly-appointed  (June 1946) Socialist Minister
of the Interior, Edouard Depreux,  who laid down die rules for  covert contacts with the
Mossad. The main conduit was to be the head of the DST, Roger Wybot and his deputy
Stanislas Mangin.83 Hadari contends that the relationship with the French
administration was based solely on mutual respect and not on any written agreement. He
contended that without the aid afforded by large numbers of French officials it would
have been impossible to bring thousands of DPs to France and set up transit camps for
them prior to their departure from ports near Marseilles.84
Having obtained  the complicity of the Minister of the Interior, and the cover he
afforded, the Mossad was able to concentrate on securing the five prerequisites for its
work, namely:
-Ships flying flags of convenience;
- Supplies of ships’ diesel fuel;
-Suitable ports of embarkation;
-Transport facilities and assembly points close to the ports; and 
-An efficient communications network. 85
At the end of 1946, it was Hadari who first recruited a former member of the 
Jewish resistance, Georges Lomger, to the Mossad in Paris. Lomger, who was a Jew,
79 The  operations log book was given by Avraham Polonski to Idith Zertal prior his death in 1990.
80 Hadari. Hamossad.  108/114.
81 Ibid.,  13.
82 Ibid.,  18.
83 Hadari, Second Exodus.  144.
84 Ibid.,  145.
64had already established his reputation as a clandestine operator whilst smuggling Jewish 
children over die Swiss border in the latter part of 1942. He was recommended to the 
Mossad by Joseph Fischer as an accomplished man capable of dealing with the French 
bureaucracy at all levels. His appearance and demeanour were very much that of a 
native Frenchman, his family having long been established in Alsace Lorraine.
After a forty minute  interview conducted  by Hadari in  Meirov’s presence  at 
the Hotel Metropole, Loinger’s  future  role was carefully  spelled out to him. The 
Mossad were planning what they termed a spectacular event which would have 
w orldwide repercussions on public opinion and progress the establishment of a Jewish 
State. The plan was to run a ship with no less than  4,000 DPs through the British 
blockade and land them on the coast of Palestine. Such a large  number would easily 
dwarf all  the more modest  attempts made so far  and required far-reaching 
organisation.
Loinger’s task would be to establish himself in Marseilles and make contact with 
senior police officials and customs officers in order to allay their suspicions about the 
widespread activity which would soon be very visible in the ports in the area. He was to 
explain that the people who would be boarding a ship some months ahead w ould be 
Jewish DPs brought from camps in Germany and who were only transiting through 
France  with the blessing of the Ministry of the Interior. Given that the  local authorities 
were already  alert to the  wide spread smuggling of cigarettes from Italy, it was 
essential that they did not mistakenly judge the Mossad’s activities on the coast  as 
being against French interests. Basically,  Loinger’s job was  to wine and dine local 
officials and gain their confidence.
Through Hadari, Loinger  was  introduced to Edouard Depreux, the Minister of 
the Interior and then to his subordinates  Marcel Pages and his assistant Frangois-Xavier 
Rousseau. These two civil servants were responsible for die control of aliens in France 
and,  among other things, for the issue of transit visas. To ensure that Loinger was free 
of any official interference in canying out his tasks  he was provided with a letter signed 
by Marcel Pages, indicating  that he was accredited to the Ministry of the Interior.86
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65If nothing else, this account  serves to  underline the close and friendly 
relationships which the Mossad w ere able to establish at the heart of die French 
Ministry of the Interior. This aspect will be further explored in a later chapter.
Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stem Group
As compared to the activities of the Mossad  in illegal immigration, those of 
their political opponents, the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organisation), w ere 
minimal. Nevertheless they had played  an important part before the war. In February 
1939, heavily involved in illegal immigration, the heads of the  movement had met in 
Paris and decided that they would, together with the New Zionist Organisation 
(Jabotinski’s political party) and Betar, its youth organisation, expand their activities. 
As a result, the Irgun brought some 10,000 illegal immigrants from Romania and 
Poland to Palestine.87 However, after nine months’ activity, war broke out and all 
activity was suspended. In war-torn Eastern Europe the network was not entirely 
destroyed. Some members wait underground whilst others joined the partisans, 
organising sabotage and the welcoming of parachuted agents.
In Palestine, the Irgun provided the British with reconnaissance and sabotage 
teams to be used against the Vichy authorities in Syria, Lebanon and North Africa hi 
addition, the Irgun served British Intelligence in unmasking Axis agents in the region.88 
As a mark of gratitude the British released from prison in Palestine David Raziel, the 
head of the Irgun. He w as lata- killed in Iraq during a special mission on behalf of the 
British.89  In the post-war period, the Irgun,  did  not attempt to compete with the 
Mossad, but cooperated with both it and the Bricha
It is suggested by an Irgun sympathiser  that they ceased their illegal 
immigration operations after 1945 because their sole  strategic goal then was armed 
revolt in Palestine  90 Thus,  in Paris, the Irgun concentrated all  its efforts on 
propaganda and illegal arms procurement. Only once in 1947 and again in 1948, did it 
organise the despatch of immigrant ships to Palestine. 91
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66Its  representative in France, Schmuel Ariel, soon established a good rapport 
with Marcel Pages  of the Aliens Department. Soon after Ehud AvrieFs  arrival in Paris, 
Ariel  was instrumental in introducing  him to Pages.92  At their meeting, Pages 
indicated that he was prepared to make available thousands of transit visas to help 
Holocaust survivors find a new life in countries outside Europe.  This was later 
formalised in an  agreement signed by the Ministry of the Interior with the  Conseil 
Interoeuvres de FAide aux Emigrants et Transitaires Juifs (See Chapter 5.3).
These first acts of cooperation between representatives of the Irgun and the Haganah  do 
not appear to have endured and were most likely affected by changing attitudes in 
Palestine itself, where antagonism between the two para-military organisations was 
developing.
To ensure that the Irgun did not use  military  operations against  British 
institutions in France, Ariel was constrained to  provide verbal reassurances to that 
effect to Pages. This commitment was again repeated some eighteen months later in 
May 1948, but this time in writing, when  Princess Elizabeth and her husband were due 
to visit Paris.93  Of particuliar concern to the Foreign Office was the presence in France 
at the time of tw o  Palestinian  militants,  Lipa Zabrowski  of the Irgun and Yitzhak 
Yestemitski, of the Stem Group. Together with three others  they  had escaped from 
British internment in  Eritrea and had sought refuge in Djibouti. They were eventually 
brought to France, thanks to the  sympathetic attitude of Edouard Depreux and other 
Government Ministers  94
This grant of asylum was made  despite the grave concerns that had been 
expressed on a number of occasions by the British Embassy in Paris  at the delay in 
repatriating  these dangerous terrorists" back to  detention in Eritrea95 The French 
police  calmed British fears about the safety of the royal couple’s visit to Paris by 
temporarily removing the two gentlemen to the south of the country on the 12th of May. 
In passing this information to the Foreign Office, the  Paris Embassy  commented
92 Avriel, 266.
93 Jabotinski Institute Archives, 2/2 315, Personal  Papers of Schmuel Ariel.
94  Document supplied by Shlomo Nakdimon.  Copy  of letter from E.  Depreux to Prime Minister, 
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67The Ministry of Foreign Affairs were of course quite willing to help but 
as usual found themselves up against a blank wall in the case of the Ministry 
of die Interior. The Minister of the Interior, Monsieur Moch, is himself a 
Jew and as we progressed it became fairly clear from hints dropped to us by 
die police that these two Jews enjoy very high protection in political circles.
We do not know exacdy who is concerned  but Monsieur Moch  and
96 possibly Monsieur Blum  seem obvious guesses.
Yestemitski,  under his new  name of Yitzhak Shamir, was destined to become, 
at a much later stage, Prime Minister of Israel. The prime mover in obtaining for Shamir 
and his companion, now renamed Arye Ban Eliezer, political asylum in France in May 
1948 was Claire Vaydat, who had close connections in the higher readies of the French 
Government. As a result of her perseverance  both in Paris and Djibouti, they7  w ere 
released from custody and  transported from East Africa  on a French warship.  They 
eventually7  arrived in Paris on  1st May 1948 to be greeted at the railway station by 
Claire Vaydat, Schmuel Ariel and French government officials.
The direct  involvement of French government officials in the protection of 
these two men is highlighted in an anecdote of Jean Morin, one of Bidault's offidals 
many7  years later. It appears that in June 1948, Scotland Yard were putting pressure on 
Pierre Boursicot, the head of the Surete to locate Yestemitski. Boursicot aware of 
Morin’s close contacts with Schmuel Ariel, asked him to pass him a message  that he 
would like Yestemitzki to pay him a courtesy visit. Morin claims that he then warned 
Ariel that  his “dangerous terrorist” friend was at risk. However, “since the request came 
from a British source” he lied to  Boursicot that he was unable to contact Ariel. In the 
meantime Ariel spirited  Yestemitski  away7  from his home where he had been in hiding 
and eventually managed to get him to Palestine.97
Claire Vaydat, a Hungarian by birth, had come  at a young age to study in 
France. She later became known  to  Georges Bidault for her work in the Resistance 
w hen he was chairman of the Comite National de la Resistance (CNR). She also had 
close contacts with Bidault’s wife, Suzanne, through their work together in Vaydat's 
refiigee-aid Agency7 , the ‘Assistance aux Refugies et Deportes’. It was through these 
privileged contacts that she  first managed to introduce Schmuel Ariel to Marcel Pages
90 TNA, FO 371/ 68631, Paris Embassy' to Foreign Office,  12.5.48.
97 Jean Morin, “Menahig, Adam, Yedidi-Nefesh ”  in Yalkut Ariel :HaTsh Shel Altalena (Tel Aviv,  1994), 
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68at the Aliens Office  and later to the  MAE. 98 Later events were to suggest that, like 
many others, she fell under die charismatic influence of Schmuel Ariel and became 
more inclined to the Irgun’s philosophy. (See  Chapter 8 on arms shipments to the 
Irgun). Nevertheless, according to Vaydat, in helping the Zionist cause, she made no 
distinction between the Haganah and the Irgun. The humanitarian aspect was her major
99 concern.
Unlike the Haganah, whose watchword was discretion, the Irgun and  the Stem 
Group repeatedly managed to hit the headlines in the  French press. On  9th July 1947 
the French police discovered two large Irgun arms dumps in  Paris and in the suburb of 
Nanterre. Sixteen  Jews and French accomplices  were arrested including die apparent 
leader, Maurice Zizac,  a Jew of Polish extraction. He disclosed that 60 cases of 
munitions and explosives were to have been shipped soon to Palestine via Marseilles.10 0  
In an exhibition of bravado  he  also proclaimed to the police “You have not yet  won. 
You have discovered two arms depots, but we have others and other operatives”.1 0 1  
According to MI5 only two of the Irgun men were convicted and were sentenced to only 
a few month’s imprisonment with  light fines.102
Later in September 1947, an Amen can Rabbi, Baruch Korff,  of the Amencan 
Political Action Committee for Palestine,  a Stem Group ffont-organisation, was 
arrested at  Toussus-Le-Noble airport outside Paris together with a pilot by the name of 
Reginald Gilbert. They were about to take off in a small plane to drop propaganda 
leaflets over London. This was  to be followed later by another flight whereby fire 
extinguishers converted into aerial bombs were to be dropped on the Houses of 
Parliament.103 Whether this project had any chance of success appears doubtful. 
Nevertheless it was Gilbert, an  RAF pilot  during the war, who had alerted the French 
police. 104 Within days  he was flown out, for his own safety, on an RAF plane to 
London. There he was interv iew ed on the BBC and related his version of the  story.
As to the colourful  Rabbi Korff, he  had previously attracted the attention of the 
press in the USA by his announcement that he was about to  parachute illegal 
immigrants  into Palestine from American and Canadian war-surplus planes acquired
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69for the purpose. The Stem Group later published a communique denying any links with 
Rabbi Korff. In all ten persons were arrested, of whom two at least were strongly 
suspected  of being members of the Stem Group. One of  these was a certain Jacques 
Martinski, who had already come to the attention of MI5 when he landed in the UK on 
6th March 1947 the day before an explosion took place in the Colonial Office. All the 
persons arrested in the Korff incident  were released on indefinite bail.105  Not 
surprisingly, Maitre Blumel had been their defence counsel.106 Blumel was  often called 
to represent  members of the Stem Group or the Irgun, when they found themselves in 
trouble with the law.
These dramatic stories appealed to the local  press,  as any stoiy about die 
Irgun’s or the Stem Group’s activities whether in Palestine or France  tended to be good 
copy.  They were given  as much prominence as stones of armed robberies, the trials of 
war-time collaborators and the ongoing problems of French coalition governments.
The Haganah,  being far more discreet, did not rate much copy until the story of the 
Exodus preoccupied the press between July and September 1947. To the credit of the 
Mossad, its name never appeared in print and neither did the identity of its  team of 
operatives working quietly in Paris and Marseilles.
The strident publicity-seeking actions of the Irgun and die Stem Group  were 
commented on with a certain amount of sarcasm by a leader wTiter in Le Monde, a 
quality French daily. Under the heading of “ How Jewish Misery is exploited”, the 
WTiter, Edouard Sablier, exposed the venal nature of the many adventurers who were 
attracted by the finances available to  the sponsors in the USA of these two extremist 
organisations. Offers  to supply  submarines and torpedo boats  to sink British navy 
ships were some of the more  extravagant offerings.
Sablier mentions particularly the American League for a Free Palestine 
(associated with the Hebrew Committee for National Liberation) which, under die motto 
“Give us the money7  and we shall finish the job” attracted large contributions from 
American Jews and non-Jew's alike. The writer points out that there was little to show 
for the money7 , in terms of bringing Jew s to Palestine, and that in practice it w as the 
Haganah who were “doing die job” rather than the  extremist organisations. In effect, he 
accused these  sponsors  of establishing themselves comfortably in Paris, where, for
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70two years they had been  free to address their  propaganda efforts to all the local 
newspapers. He comments, finally, that if they had been attracted  by die  tourist 
attractions in France  and were happy to spend their  easily-acquired dollars,  then that 
was all to the good, as long as they didn’t give the police too many headaches.107
A typical example  of the type of posturing referred to by  Edouard Sablier was 
that of one of die leaders of the Hebrew Committee for National Liberation (HCNL), 
Peter Bergson, whose real name was Hillel  Kook. In December 1946  he held a press 
conference  in the USA before leaving  for  France. His self-proclaimed purpose was to 
head a special office in Paris, “which is preparing the establishment of a Government in 
Exile of the Hebrew Republic of Palestine.” 108  This project was at first supported 
‘"wholeheartedly” by the Irgun’s leader, Menachem Begin.109  Later he  disavowed  it as 
being too  premature.110 Given that the HNCL had no power base and therefore no 
political  legitimacy  in Palestine proper, compared to that of the  Jewish Agency, such a 
conclusion was inevitable.
Compared to the almost theatrical  antics of the Irgun and the Stem Group in 
France, one can surmise  that  the  quiet professionalism and low profile  of the Mossad 
must have commended itself to the Ministry of the Interior.
3.3  Training and Transit camps
France provided the essential secure environment in which the Haganah could at 
the same time promote illegal immigration  and train youngsters of military age for 
eventual action in Palestine. Using  centres  made available to diem  through the 
auspices of the  local Zionist organisations and supported financially by the Joint, the 
Haganah opened transit centres for refugees, but also other centres, of a more covert 
type, in which they  ran a number of training  courses. These  ranged from general 
military training to  more technically-oriented courses, such as those  for ships’ escorts, 
engineers and seamen.
It was Polonski who  set about organising  camps in secluded areas in France 
for recruits to Aliyah Gimmel, where suitable  youngsters, under the guise of
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71physical education  instruction, would be given military training. This involved  field 
work, navigation,  familiarity with personal weaponry and self-defence. They were 
also taught to identify the uniforms of British policemen and soldiers in case they 
had to oppose them in Palestine.
Polonski  also set up a naval school in Marseilles to train the Paly  am (Naval arm 
of the Palmach ) naval officers  who would navigate illegal ships to Palestine. Late in 
1947  a civil aviation  pilots’ school was opened  near Paris to train crews for a  future 
air-cargo fleet, which would arable the speedy  delivery of arms  to Palestine.1 1 1  In both 
instances  former officers of the French armed forces were recruited to provide the 
necessary professional training. It is more than  likely that the French Defence Ministry, 
which contained a number of pro-Zionist officers, turned a blind eye to these 
clandestine  activities on French soil.
At St. Jerome, one of the transit camps, former members of the AJ forgery team 
exercised their skills in preparing false  documents for immigrants travelling to 
Palestine on regular steamships, which would escape the attention of the British 
authorities in Haifa112  This was known as Aliyah Dalet, yet another form of 
clandestine immigration which complemented Aliyah  Bet and Aliyah Gimmel. 
Youngsters were either  recruited from die  Zionist youth movements or amongst former 
members of the  war-time  Jewish Resistance, the AJ. After initial training they w ent 
through a ceremony where they swore allegiance to the Haganah. They were then 
allotted specific missions in France pending their eventual departure for Palestine. The 
recollections of two of these recruits graphically  illustrate  the clandestine nature of the 
w ork of the Haganah in France in the immediate post-war era.
One of these recruits  was Israel Avidor from the town of Roanne (near Lyon). 
Bom in Poland in 1926 and brought to France in the early 30s, Avidor was part of a 
family with  strong Zionist tendencies.  In 1940, after the French debacle, the family 
temporality left Roanne when it was occupied by the Germans. They moved back after 
the Germans retreated over the newly established demarcation line, leaving a Free Zone 
in the south.  In November 1942, after the allied landings in North Africa, the Germans 
invaded the Free Zone. Soon afterwards, Avidor, now 16,  began a clandestine existence 
within the EIF and was involved in the safeguarding of Jewish children. Later, whilst he
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72remained hidden in a Catholic agricultural college, for his own safety, his own parents 
were deported.
The war left him  completely disorientated and in search of a new focus. A 
meeting with Ruth Kluger of the Jewish Agency, at a local Zionist meeting, soon after 
the end of the war, was to change the course of his life. Together with a childhood 
friend, Jacques Golan they were  sent for para-military training to a secluded site near 
Paris. After three weeks they participated in a ceremony where  they  swore allegiance 
to the Haganah.  As Palyam recruits, their role was to be trained as radio operators for 
the boats even then being prepared for illegal immigration. They  participated in  Morse 
code courses  at a Hachsharah (training farm) at La Madrague, near Marseilles. This led 
to proficiency^  in  the use of both the Hebrew and the English alphabet.
In June 1945 Avidor was told to  report to David Shaltiel at the offices of the 
Jewish Agency  in the Avenue de la Grande Armee, for his first mission. To his great 
disgust they lodged  him overnight in a hotel used as a brothel. The following day 
Shaltiel  instructed him to go to Toulouse and pick up  radio transmission equipment 
from Jacques Roitman, one of the leaders of the  AJ  His orders were  to set up a 
clandestine radio station in a villa called the Clos Marie in Bandol, near Marseilles.
Once established at the villa with his friend Jacques and a young DP called Lottie, they 
established radio contact with the Mossad in Palestine. A secret code based on the 
words  “Nof Ya’Arot Yirushalayim” (“view of the forests of Jerusalem”) was utilised 
for all messages. The first message received in October 1945  was new s of a raid by the 
Palmach to liberate  illegal immigrants interned by the British in Athlit. This and all 
other messages were decoded and deposited at the Panamanian Consulate in Marseilles 
on a daily basis. There they were picked up by  Rudi' Zameret, the  local Mossad chief. 
In turn “Rudi”would leave messages to be transmitted to Palestine.
For cigarettes  and other needs, Avidor and his companions were allowed to 
draw on American army supplies in a store-room at Les Eygaiates. The storeroom also 
contained large quantities of blankets, army uniforms and K-rations destined for the 
immigrant boats. There were also weapons, including machine guns, still in their 
original grease protection. Their stay at the Clos Marie was swiftly brought to an end 
due to a security mishap. A lorry loaded with grenades destined for the Haganah 
overturned near Marseilles and provoked the interest of the local Gendarmerie. Fearing 
discovery of the radio station as a result of the police investigation, Rudi ordered Avidor
73to close it down, bury their radio equipment and personal  weapons  and move to  the 
transit camp at St. Jerome in Marseilles, whilst waiting for passage to Palestine.
Avidor’s new mission was to work with a pioneering group from the English 
Zionist youth  movement, Habonim. The group of 20 young Zionists were to be trained 
to cany' out, in a thoroughly organised  and disciplined manner, the embarkation of 
some  hundreds of DPs onto a schooner which was being prepared  for the journey to 
Palestine. Every day they were  woken up  in the early hours by the sound of an alarm 
siren, which was to be  the signal for the embarkation. They were then  timed as they 
rushed to assemble in the courtyard with their rucksacks. Eventually, on  29th July 1946 
the actual operation was put into effect. Streams of British Army lorries, “borrowed” by 
the Jewish Brigade brought 754  DPs from St. Jerome and other transit points to the 
little fishing harbour of La Ciotat. They were mainly young men and women, survivors 
of the Holocaust, determined to reach the shores of Palestine. There was also a group of 
Hungarian Hasidim led by a Rabbi called Leiditch. Restricted to only one piece of 
luggage, because of the lack of space in a hold crammed full of tiered bunks, much had 
to be left behind.
Avidor was introduced to an American Jewish army chaplain, called Major 
Hazelkom. His batman, Cy Caller, was a Haganah man from Kfar Giladi who had 
joined the American arm}'. As there was no possibility of cooking on board, Caller 
organised large quantities of American K-rations to be supplied. Powerful radio 
equipment had been installed on board for Avidor to maintain contact with both France 
and Palestine, but this proved to be inoperable due to an insufficiency in the voltage 
supplied by the generators on board. They therefore  sailed without any possibility of 
radio  contact whatsoever. The ship, with a Turkish crew and sporting a Turkish flag, 
was named the Sagoiem. There were also two  former Spanish Republican sailors on 
board, who had come for the experience and because they hated the British. The ship 
was overcrowded, unsanitary and plainly unseaworthy. Nevertheless, at 2 pm on 29th 
July it set sail, without any interference from the French authorities.
Off the coast of Crete the ship was saved from crashing into the rocks by the two 
Spanish sailors who took over when the Turkish crew got drunk  In another  incident on 
board, Avidor  had to arrest at gun point a number of ex-partisans who w ere intent on 
supplementing their prescribed ration directly' from the water tanks. Their leader,
Vladik, threatened Avidor that once in Palestine, he would be die first to be hanged.
74As they approached Palestinian territorial waters they  were spotted by an RAF plane 
and soon they were caught up with by HMS Ajax of “River Plate” fame. At that point 
they changed the name of the boat to the Yagur and raised the Israeli flag. When British 
sailors boarded the ship on 11th August  a brief battle ensued to remove the flag, but it 
was finally allowed to remain.
Sighting  Haifa after 14 days at sea in appalling conditions, unwashed and 
hungry, the spirits of the immigrants were raised by the sight of the lights on Mount 
Carmel and die assumption that soon they would finally land in Eretz Israel (the Zionist 
name for Palestine). That night they were left on board guarded by Arab members of the 
Palestine police. The Jewish Agency was allowed to bring food aboard. But in  some of 
the loads of bread were messages addressed to the leadership and sticks of dynamite.
The messages announced  that the British intended to force them onto other boats 
which would then sail for Cyprus. Their instructions were to disable the boats, before 
departure, using die dynamite. However  because of the unknown risks involved no 
such action took place.
The following morning, under instructions to resist their removal, the DPs lay 
down in the hold and refused to budge. The soldiers used force and were attacked with 
tins of corned beef and other K-rations which had been the staple diet on board. 
Eventually, after being sprayed with DDT, all were removed to a prison ship,  the 
Empire Rival. Their possessions were left behind. On 13th August the ship  set sail for 
Cyprus which it reached a few hours later. There were 448 men and 306 women on 
board.
In Cyprus the internment camps were still in course of preparation, but barbed 
wire and watchtowers were already in place. Tents had to be put up, and the DPs  then 
segregated themselves into groups according to their political or religious persuasions. 
Thus the twenty English immigrants stay ed together, sharing the same tents  As an 
example of survivor resourcefulness  in the face of hardship, DPs, over the next days, 
suddenly appeared in new blue clothes which turned out to be the inner linings of the 
tents. Cypriot tailors had brought in sewing machines to do the job.
Haganah officers, who had slipped into the camps, began para-military training 
out of sight of the sentries. Also when journalists appeared to photograph and interview7  
the internees, lavish demonstrations were organised to emphasise their desire to be 
allowed into Palestine. The camp commandant, a Major Mitchell, allowed a great deal
75of autonomy in the camps in order to avoid disturbances. Nevertheless attempts were 
made to create chaos and embarrass the British in the eyes of the world. After a few 
months had  passed Jewish Agency representatives arrived with Palestine entry 
certificates, which gradually enabled the first arrivals to leave the camps, at the same 
time as newly captured illegal immigrants were arriving. Avidor and his future wife 
Rachel, from the English group  found themselves in Palestine in December 1946 and 
initially settled at Kfar Blum. In 1948 they moved to Kfar Hanassi were they remain to 
this day.
When, in 2002, it was put to Avidor that given a limit of 1500 Entry Certificates 
a month, the  real effect of illegal immigration was to deprive  legal immigrants of their 
rightful place in the queue, he responded that this was not a consideration. The desire of 
the DPs to leave the camps in Europe at any cost, was matched by the Jewish Agency's 
political need to create  the largest measure of embarrassment and difficulty for the 
British in the eyes of die world. There was a two-fold objective. Firstly to force the 
British to allow the creation of a Jewish State and secondly to increase the Jewish 
population in preparation for the anticipated war with the Arabs. In Avidor s view, 
illegal immigration, despite its very limited success  in terms of actual numbers  landed, 
fulfilled these aims. In his words ’The show paid offi”1 1 3
The American Jewish chaplain mentioned by  Avidor, Rabbi Abraham 
Hazelkom, was very much involved with the Mossad in the acquisition of arms.
With the help of a few American  Jewish soldiers stationed in Marseilles in 1946, he 
amassed a large stock of weapons and ammunition, some purchased from  former 
French Communist  resistance fighters. Together with his assistant Cy Caller, he was 
also  instrumental in setting up an illegal radio station in Toulon. This enabled the 
Mossad to have a radio link with Tel Aviv. Any messages received were brought to 
Hazelkom's office and read over the American  army’s telephone lines to the  Mossad's 
office in Paris and vice versa. Unfortunately,  after seven weeks, an army telephone 
operator overheard a conversation in Hebrew and warned Hazelkom that only English 
was permitted on military telephones.114
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76With regard to  Avidor’s ship,  the Sagolem, whilst it was Cy Caller  who 
provided the food from Amen  can storehouses, it was  Hazelkom who  obtained visas 
from a local South American consul to enable the immigrants to leave France. In return 
the  consul received treatment for an ailment from  an American army doctor.
Hazelkom continued to work for the Mossad until he left France at the end of 1946.1 1 5
The second testimony from a Haganah recruit concerns the specific task of 
training a group of instructors for the so-called ‘ Aliyah GimmeF project. Avraham 
Polonski, the legendary chief of the AJ, prevailed  on his former comrades-in-arms to 
provide the necessary infrastructure. Ore of his recruits was Jean Brauman, bom in 
Lodz (Poland) in January 1925. After two years of clandestine activity  in the Jewish 
resistance, under the name of Jean Denou, he  moved  easily into the new role 
assigned to  him by Polonski, that of military training instructor. The purpose was to 
train a team of instructors who would themselves run similar courses for the 
hundreds of youngsters which the Haganah intended recruiting from the Jewish 
communities  in France and North Africa.
To assist Brauman the Haganah despatched  from Palestine, in late 1945, an 
emissary called Hanan Jacobi. The first training camp was at Milles La Foret, just south 
of Paris. It comprised a secluded  country house in a large expanse of ground, eminently 
suitable for military-type  training. Although weapons were available to teach their use 
and maintenance, ammunition could not be used for fear of drawing the unwanted 
attention of the local police. The course lasted three weeks, at the end of which the 
thirty participants  swore  allegiance to the Haganah. Brauman recalls that for die 
occasion David Shaltiel attended the ceremony.
Brauman described Polonski,  the resistance leader around whom a legend had 
sprung,  as a small, nondescript man  but one who exuded a natural authority.  As in war 
time, the volunteers of the AJ did not question die purpose of a task allotted to them by 
“Monsieur Pol”, as he was known. Thus when Brauman was asked to move south to the 
Pau region, to extend the training programme, he accepted without demur. He later 
came under die orders of another Palestinian emissary, Emannuel Nishri,  the second-in- 
command of the Haganah in France  Nishri was a  gymnastics expert who concentrated 
on bringing the instructors themselves to the highest level of physical fitness. Once their
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77early morning training  was over they, in turn,  put  the new student instructors  through 
their paces.
During the summer months, Brauman would visit the  camps of Zionist youth 
movements, such as Dror and Habonim in order to find suitable recruits to be trained as 
instructors. The intention was to provide all Jewish communities in France and its North 
African possessions with trained personnel who could  create self-defence units to be 
used in case  of anti  Semitic incidents. Brauman’s own desire to go to Israel in  June 
1948 was frustrated because instead, he was sent on an inspection tour  to Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia to check out the state of self-defence preparedness of the 
communities. There he met up again with his former students, many of whom had only 
known him as Monsieur Jean.
When interviewed, Brauman stated his conviction that the French police and 
Gendarmerie were well aware of the nature of the training camps but, out of a feeling of 
sympathy, took no action. He was equally convinced that the opportunity to undermine 
the British presence in the Middle East and to take revenge for past perceived 
humiliations, fuelled their sympathy for the Zionist cause. Brauman dted the case of a 
friend, called Bernard Kwort, who had managed to get to England and join the Free 
French forces of General Leclerc  After the war Kwort joined die DST. Years later, 
now a captain in the Israel Defence Forces,  he w7 ould  relate how Roger Wybot, the 
Director of the DST. would often  ask him to quietly
resolve complications which his ‘Tellow Jews” had created on French territory. Often 
this involved gun-running.
Brauman himself was sometimes asked by Polonski to accompany a lorry load 
of arms, to ensure that the driver did not  get too curious about the contents.
Once delivery was made to the camp at Le Grand Arenas, some 7 kilometers from 
Marseille, his task was over  Given the strict conditions of segregation of 
responsibilities under which they operated, he never inquired into the origin  nor the 
final destination of the arms. A colleague of his called Fernand was actually arrested by 
the Gendarmes during the course of such an arms transport. Later, thanks to the 
intervention of Andre Blumel, he was quietly released.
From time to time, Brauman was exceptionally  posted  to Le Grand Arenas 
itself. The camp had previously been under military control. One part of it w as still 
occupied by German prisoners of w ar, whilst another part was occupied by people from
78Indochina awaiting their return home. Yet a third part was a Jewish refugee camp, or 
more correctly a transit point for those awaiting an illegal transport to Palestine.  When 
a boat became available the German POWs were used to move  the luggage of the 
immigrants onto  the lorries which would take them to their port of departure. The task 
of Brauman and his men was to marshal the hundreds of people involved and ensure 
that their identities matched  die selection that had  previously been made. Often they 
had to remove refugees who had hoped to jump the queue by hiding among the luggage.
In June 1947, Brauman was posted to the Chateau of Sanderval, near Marseilles, 
to take command, with his men, of four groups of 200 refugees each, temporarily 
lodged in tents, who were destined to embark on the President Warfield, later renamed 
the Exodus. Their wait lasted some two or three weeks before Brauman, at a special 
farewell ceremony, handed them over to the commander of the boat. That night dozens 
of lorries from a variety of transit camps brought some 4,500 immigrants to the Port of 
Sete.
Brauman felt that the emphasis on military training, for which he was made 
responsible, was veiy much a Palestinian as opposed to a French Jewish  reaction to the 
Holocaust. This reflected a conscious desire to ensure that Jewish communities now had 
a means of defence, wherever they might be situated. In addition, with the hope of 
bringing all Jews to Palestine, the Haganah viewed the military training as a means to 
bind  French Jewish youngsters to the Zionist enterprise. He also emphasised that the 
members of the AJ provided the Haganah with an infrastructure  for Aliyah Bet, which, 
given their lack of knowledge of France or its people, they could not have created by 
themselves. He insisted that, without a network of people used to w orking in a cohesive, 
clandestine manner and  with the technical  skills learnt in the resistance, the vast 
enterprise of Aliyah Bet in France would not have succeeded.11 6
That  premises controlled by Jewish organisations  w ere used for the storage of 
w eapons amassed by Rekhesh is confirmed  by at least one mishap. On June 3rd 1946 
the French police discovered in the Chateau de Cambe in the Lot and Garonne 
department 666 cases containing 35 tons of British small arms and ammunition. The 
chateau was used by ORT as an agricultural training centre for prospective immigrants 
to Palestine. The suspicion of the police had been aroused by the arrival, in broad
116 Interview with Jean Brauman in Pans on 9&  July 2003. He died suddenly in November 2003 and 
Georges Loinger gave the eulogy at the graveside.
79daylight, of a convoy of militaiy lorries whose drivers wore British battledress. The 
British Military Police were asked to inspect the find and identified one of the cases as 
being originally consigned to the Palestine Regiment. It was noted that a number of 
soldiers from this unit had been in Paris recently, in transit from Holland to Toulon
117 awaiting repatriation to the Middle East.
The camps in the south of France  were an essential half-way point in 
assembling and preparing the immigrants for the hardships of their clandestine voyage 
to Palestine. The internal staffing at these transit camps was provided by a motley crew 
made up of members of the Zionist youth movements and ex-members of the Jewish 
Brigades, who were also awaiting their turn to join one of the illegal boats.  One  of the 
duties  of former members of the AJ was to ensure the supply of food to the  transit 
camps in the Marseilles area118 At die camps the prospective immigrants were 
introduced to their Palestinian escorts, mainly  members of Paly  am, who instructed 
them as to the necessity for discipline and obedience to  orders. They were then 
provided with new identification papers specially designed to convince the police at the 
port of departure of their bona fides.
Officially the camps were under the control of the FSJF. Its operational 
headquarters, under the directorship of Frederic Thau  was at 24 rue des Convalescents 
in Marseilles. Its main food and clothing  depot however was at the Villa Les Tilleuls at 
St. Jerome, which was also a transit camp. From here some 14 other centres, which 
could lodge some 4,000 to 5,000 refugees, were supplied with their needs.119
A report from the RG in October 1946  expressed some signs of impatience with 
Thau because of his reluctance to deal with police inquiries and  to submit to  the 
controls that they wanted to impose. On instructions from the Ministry of the Interior 
Thau was reminded that in no case could the time limit on  transit visas be exceeded.
The report also threw doubt on the validity of the ultimate destination visas, which had 
proved to be false in the past. Finally the  writer pointed out the dangers inherent in
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80uncontrolled immigration.120 In a further report the RG stated categorically that the 
FSJF, under die cover of a welfare organisation was engaged in illegal immigration.1 2 1
A revealing insight into the extent of police  eaves-dropping, even within the 
offices of the FSJF, is provided by a report of an “  intercepted” conversation between 
Thau and the President of the National Movement Against Racism, in Marseilles on 
19th November 1946.  Closeted together, these two  apparently discussed Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, the procurement of boats for the purpose and new solutions to 
move  Jews from DP Camps against British wishes.122 From other reports of the RG it is 
clear that the police authorities were undo- no illusions as to the real activities of the 
FSJF in the Marseilles area. Nevertheless at no time, despite representations by the 
British Embassy, was there a concerted move to close the various centres that it 
controlled. From this one can surmise that the Ministry of the Interior disregarded the 
frequent RG reports on suspected illegal immigration  and was content to allow the 
FSJF great latitude in its activities.
The vote on partition in the UN Assembly on 29th November 1947 was the 
signal for the Haganah in Europe to move on to a war footing. In France this became 
known as the “Grande Mobilisation”. Funds for the Haganah were collected and 
Polonski’s Matsav organisation began recruiting hundreds of youngsters and putting 
them through Aliyah Gimmel training courses. To assist in this particular task, Yehuda 
Ben David, a member of the Haganah, was transferred from Germany in March 1948 
and became Polonski’s second in command.
Eleven militaiy training camps were discreetly established and 250 recruits 
trained during  each short course. In the two months after the creation of the State of 
Israel, some 2,500 to 3,000 recruits were despatched to Israel. Many had been brought 
over from North Africa During this same period, civilians with specialised skills such 
as  medical and nursing qualifications were sent over by plane. So were the trainees 
from the naval school. The pilot school, together with its two planes, w as retained in 
France in case of an emergency in North Africa, when arms might be required at short 
notice  to defend the Jewish community.1 2 3   The French authorities quietly made space
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81available in the military camps of Le Grand Arenas and St Thomas  near Marseilles, for 
the Haganah to carry out military training.1 24
A major concern of the police authorities  was to avoid the danger of violent 
clashes between the local  Arabs and the Zionist organisations in the Marseilles area, 
who were openly training volunteers for service in the new Israeli army.  According to a 
police report, one of these centres, which was also under the surveillance of Arab 
elements, was the Villa Clos-Joli on the Boulevard Peypin  in Marseilles. Every night 
military exercises took place in the open. From  5th of June convoys of empty lorries of 
American manufacture  arrived and were loaded, probably with arms and 
ammunition.125 Whilst the existence and location of transit and training camps was 
known to the  local Arab population, they7  did not attempt to interfere with their 
operation, certain in their belief that the nascent Jewish State  would be crushed at birth 
by the invading Arab armies. However, when this failed to materialise and a truce was 
arranged by the United Nations, a wave of militancy spread through  Marseilles’s Arab 
population, spurred on by the belief that outside interference - in this instance, the 
French Government- was helping the Zionists with political  and material support.1 26
Despite the alarm bells being rung by the Renseignements Generaux, the 
warnings  of sabotage to boats and attempts to stop Jewish immigration and the 
destruction of Jewish training and transit centres by  the Arabs of Marseilles do not 
appear to have  materialised  Marseilles became increasingly die favourite port of 
embarkation for immigrants to the new State of Israel.
Polonski’s organisation in France  continued to operate until it suddenly 
received instructions from Ben Gurion  at the end of 1950 to cut off all contact with 
Israeli institutions. Only operations in North Africa were to continue. In a subsequent 
enquiry7  held in Israel, held at Polonski’s request, he was cleared of a charge of having 
exceeded his authority.127 According to Georges Loinger there appeared to have been 
some question of the misuse of Haganah funds.12 8
The range of overt and covert  activities in France illustrated in this chapter 
bears testimony7  to the wide network of support available in France for the  Zionist 
endeavour. Throughout this period, die outstanding  contribution to its success  had
124 Archives Nationales,  F7/15589 Direction des Renseignements Generaux.  : Centre Officiel de Transit.
125 Archives Departementales des BDR, RG  report, 9.6.48.
126 Ibid.
127 Ben David, 74.
82been the relative  absence of arbitrary police  actions  which were such a feature of life 
in France  in the unsettled social  atmosphere of the immediate post-war era This 
phenomenon attests to the  complicity in Aliyah Bet  of many  Government officials 
who took their cue from the benign attitude towards Zionist activity of those Cabinet 
Ministers responsible for  internal affairs in France.
128 Interview with Georges Loinger, 10.11.02.
83CHAPTER 4 Other Entities concerned with illegal immigration
Although not among the major players in the whole saga of illegal immigration, 
there were two institutions which, respectively, by their covert actions, tried to assist or 
hinder  the campaign. On the one hand there was the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee (‘‘the Joint”) which, at least officially, was concerned purely with welfare 
activities and  yet unofficially was one of the financial backers of illegal immigration.1  On 
the other hand there was the British Intelligence Service, known variously as either MI6 
or the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), which was tasked by the British Government to 
prevent potential illegal  immigrants to Palestine from embarking at ports on the 
Mediterranean or the Adriatic coasts. Although the latter soon discovered that the Joint, 
despite its quasi official status (it liaised closely  with the American State Department and 
UNRRA)  was involved  in Bricha activities, it was unable to mount any effective 
counter action along die transit routes. In the absence of positive proof and despite its 
certitude that a large-scale movement of Jew’ s out of Eastern Europe w ould  severely test 
its policy of restricted immigration into Palestine,  the Foreign Office was averse to using 
diplomatic pressure on the Americans to restrain the Joint Even in Italy7 , where the British 
had a military presence, they did not take action against  Joint personnel, whom they 
suspected of covert activities.2 In  a vain attempt to stem the flow of Jews out of Poland 
and later through the Black Sea ports, the Foreign Office launched  a series of demarches 
to the new7   pro-Communist governments of Eastern Europe to have their borders closed 
to this Joint-assisted  movement.3
Referring  now  more  specifically7   to Aliyah Bet, where it is clear that the Joint 
provided a measure of direct financial assistance to the Mossad, it is useful to assess 
whether this w as indeed  crucial to the whole enterprise  or whether its significance has
1  The Joint’s creation in 1914 by American Jewish philanthropists had as its original aim  to bring  welfare 
assistance to the Jew's  of Palestine then facing a famine  It had no political line or  ideology.  It was simply 
there to provide financial assistance on a temporary basis when a particular crisis developed. In the course 
of its existence its original restricted  brief was to undergo radical changes as the needs of Jews worldwide 
had to be increasingly  addressed.
2 Aneh Kochavi, "British Response to the Involvement of the American Joint Distribution Committee in 
Illegal Immigration to Palestine”,  Immigrants and Minorities, Vol. 8 ( London, March,  1989), 231.
3 Manchester Guardian,  19.8.46. An account of British diplomatic pressure on the Czech Government to 
close their firm tier with Poland to Jewish refugees.
84been overrated. Equally, the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS),  directed 
now to concentrate its survdllance  efforts on the Mediterranean ports of departure,  are 
also  worthy of scrutiny to assess how far the British Government was prepared to use 
both  illicit  and diplomatic means to  stop the departure of the illegal ships.
4.1 The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (The Joint)
The  actual presence of the Joint  in France can be dated to the influx of Jewish 
refugees from Germany in 1933. Its approach was always to work through the existing 
communal welfare organisations, underpinning their social, medical, educational and 
cultural programmes. To that extent it acted purely as a financial resource. It relied 
principally for its funds  on an annual contribution from  the United Jewish Appeal in the 
USA.4 The Joint’s view of its unique mission, devoid of any political dimension,  was 
encapsulated in the following statement by its Chairman, Edward Warburg, of the 
American banking family: “In all of its history, JDC in its work of relief and rehabilitation 
of Jewish victims of war and persecution has scrupulously refrained from political 
activities, and has never deviated from its principle of exclusive adherence to its 
humanitarian role.”  5
During the Second World War the Joint continued to operate  in France, despite 
America’s invasion of French North Africa, which had led to a breakdown in diplomatic 
relations with  the Vichy Government. It  continued to find ways to maintain its  financial 
support to a Jewish population under persecution and in danger of deportation. Large 
sums of money were provided to Jewish organisations, such as OSE (medical /welfare) 
and the EIF (Jewish Scouting movement), for the safeguarding of children and, where 
necessary, their removal over the Swiss frontier. One of the clandestine representatives of 
the Joint in France was Jules (Dyka) Jefroykin, former president of die FSJF and now a 
leader of the MJS and  the AJ. Another  was Marc Jarblum, until he was forced in 1942 to 
take refuge in Switzerland to avoid arrest by the Gestapo.
After the war, a large part of the w ork of the Joint’s staff was devoted to the 
welfare of the inmates of the DP Camps set up by the British and the Americans.
4 Isabelle Goldsztein, “Le role de l’American Joint dans la Reconstruction de la Communaute”  Archives 
Juives No. 28/1, Ier semestre (Paris,  1995), 25.
5 Moses. A. Leavitt, The JDC Story: Highlights of JDC activities ( New' York,  1953), 4.
85Initially, however, the Joint’s role was often criticised by DPs who believed that they had 
arrived late on the scene and paid insufficient  attention to the  level and quality of the aid 
they were providing.6 A few months later however  Dr. Joseph Schwartz, the European 
Director of the Joint, was able to report that  there was almost universal appreciation of 
the Joint’s work in Germany’s DP camps. “No longer do we hear the kind of criticism that 
was prevalent in the early days.”7 The Joint organised mass supplementary feeding 
programmes, built extensive health services and created educational and recreational 
facilities. Starting with some 100,000 DPs at die end of the war, by 1947 this had 
increased to some 250,000, mainly as a result of the exodus from Poland.8  
In France as well, the Joint recommenced  its official activities  and was immediately 
involved in large-scale financial assistance to the Jewish community, a large part of which 
was destitute. However it is its relationship with die Mossad which provides an interesting 
area of study.
In practice, as archival documentation has revealed, political activity, specifically 
support for illegal immigration, was not neglected, although it did cause a great deal of 
heart-searching among die members of the Joint’s Board. The essential concern of the 
Joint w as that it depended for its funds on a philanthropic organisation, the United Jewish 
Appeal (UJA), which itself was apolitical and espoused strict adherence to American 
official policies. In the seven years following the end of the war, the Joint’s share of the 
UJA’s income was no less than $350 million, or an average of some $50 million for each 
year, a vast sum by today’s standards.9
The leadership of the Joint  w ere initially opposed to the encouragement that 
representatives of the Yishuv were giving to Eastern European Jews to leave their 
countries of origin for DP camps and, subsequently, Palestine. This contentious issue was 
finally resolved  at a meeting of the United Jewish Appeal in December 1945, w hen 
representatives of the Joint reconciled themselves to the idea that this was the principal 
means of resolving the DP  problem.1 0
6 Frederick. D. Bogin and Sybil Milton, eds., Archives of the Holocaust: American Joint Distribution 
Committee Vol. 10 Part 2 ( New York,  1995). Repeat on Bergen Belsen by Shlome Michael Gerber, 
Director-JDC activities in Paris, 28.6.46.
7 Ibid., Letter to Moses. A .Leavitt from Joseph Schwartz, 9.11.46.
8 Leavitt, 14.
9 Ibid.,  19.
10  Kochavi, “British Response", 223.
86In early 1946 the Joint found itself drawn into the activities of the Mossad. 
According to Hadari, a decision was taken at the  headquarters in Paris  to move from 
small  to larger ships capable of carrying thousands of immigrants. To finance these it was 
intended to procure funds from  the Joint and from institutions in the Yishuv. The 
possibility of raising loans from individuals in the USA was also discussed.1 1  The Joint 
w as already supplying food and clothing for the transit camps run by die Mossad in 
Southern France and a close rapport had been developed between Shaul Meirov and Dr. 
Joseph Schwartz in Paris. Now the Joint was to be approached with a request for direct 
aid to illegal immigration, a somewhat more delicate matter.1 2
Tad Szulc, a journalist on the New York Times, argues strongly that Meirov and 
Schwartz came to an informal  agreement in April 1946. This envisaged that, in addition 
to the legal cover  provided by the Joint for  Bncha  activities in Eastern Europe and the 
necessary finance already put in place,  it would, in a more covert manner, finance  illegal 
immigration activities. That Schwartz, a fervent Zionist, was consequently  acting outside 
the stated  remit of the organisation w as made abundantly clear to him by  the Joint’s 
Board back in New York. For the most part its members were not Zionists and would not 
tolerate what they considered illegal activities. On 10th May, after consulting the local 
Joint Director in France, Laura Margolis (die wife of Marc Jarblum), Schwartz cabled his 
resignation to Moses Leavitt, the Joint’s treasurer. In view' of the potential harm to the 
Joint’s reputation which such a public display of dissention would cause, the key 
members of the Board relented. On 12th May the Chairman of the Board, Edward 
Warburg, sent a cable to Schwartz rejecting his resignation “Forget it.... Of course we 
back you... I love you anyway.”1 3
Other than pointing to  Warburg  as the narrator of these events, no supportive 
documentation was cited by Szulc  to corroborate  this story. However what is not in 
dispute is that Schwartz  did at some  stage  commit  the Joint  to  a subsidy of 40 
Palestinian Pounds ($160)  for each of6,600 illegal immigrants the Mossad intended to 
bring  to  Palestine in the first half of 1946.14  The Haganah s own statement to the press
11 Hadari, Second Exodus.  142.
12 Ibid.,  124.
13 Tad Szulc, The Secret Alliance:The Extraordinary' Story of the Rescue of the Jews Since World War n. 
(London, 1991),  120.
14  Kochavi, “British Response”, 224.
87in June 1947 confirmed  that $160 was the cost of transporting one immigrant across the 
Mediterranean. A further $40 was required to move a refugee overland from Germany to 
the port of embarkation.1 5
Although Szulc contends that Schwarz’s judgement was never again questioned 
by the Board, this is not bome out in the Joint’s own documentatioa Indeed there were 
ongoing debates back in New York to find rational justifications for financing illegal 
immigration. A number of the Joint’s members in New York were very wary of the 
Joint’s involvement. The ultimate effect was that a stop-go situation emerged depending 
on which Board members were  winning the argument at the time.1 6
In July 1946, Joseph  Schwartz was approached in Paris by Eliezer Kaplan, the 
treasurer of the Jewish Agency, for funds to assist the illegal immigration of 13,500 
immigrants from a number of ports over the next two months. On the basis that only
10,000  could realistically be dealt with, Kaplan asked for a contribution towards the cost 
of die project of $120 per head, or $1.2 million in total. This, he indicated, was a 
reduction of $40 per head, which had been advanced on a previous occasion. [This refers 
to the first subsidy in respect of6,600 immigrants]. Schwartz’s response  was to limit the 
Joint’s contribution to $1 million. Crucially, Schwartz obtained Kaplan’s agreement that, 
should the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry’s report finally  succeed in forcing the 
British to grant 100,000 Entry Certificates to Palestine, illegal immigration would cease 
forthwith.1 7
In this instance the Joint had adopted the rationale that, as these immigrants 
were only temporarily interned and then released in  Palestine  against the monthly quota, 
they could not be strictly characterised as illegal, whatever the British viewpoint.
However, when the British authorities began interning illegal immigrants in Cyprus in 
August 1946 without deducting than from the monthly quota, attitudes changed. The 
Joint felt that to continue  to subsidise  immigration under these new  circumstances 
would clearly be illegal and  would put their  status at risk with the UJA  and the  US 
Government. As a result, subsidies ceased in October 1946.18 The Mossad had no choice
1 5 TNA, CAB 104/277, Answer to parliamentary question, 19.11.47.
1 6   Kochavi, “British Response”, 223-234.
17 AJJDC Archives, New York Collection 45/54, file 626, Memorandum of conversation between  Joseph 
Schwartz and Eliezer Kaplan in Paris cm  20.7.46.
1 8  AJJDC Archives, Minutes of discussion at Administrative Meeting re: Palestine Immigration, 11.3.47.
88but to source other funds to cover the cost of some 6,000 immigrants before Joint 
subsidies were again resumed in the spring of 1947.
At a  meeting in New York on 11th March 1947, Schwartz managed, against 
stiff opposition, to convince the Board to make available a further $1 million for illegal 
immigration. Underlying this decision was the fact that the British had begun to allocate 
part of the monthly quota to the Cyprus detainees in December 1946, thus  “legalising” 
their status.1 9 This offer was the subject of a meeting between representatives of the Joint 
and representatives of the Mossad two months later in New York. Initially the discussion 
revolved around the payment of $820,000 for the 8,200 immigrants who had arrived in 
Cyprus in April and May 1947. Although partial payment had been made by Saly Mayer, 
the Joint’s representative in Switzerland, the Mossad’s treasurer, Pino Ginsburg was 
anxious to receive the balance promptly. He was assured it would be paid in New York. 
At this point both Pino Ginsburg and Ze’ev Shind, the Mossad’s representative in the 
USA, advised the Joint of the difficult financial situation the Mossad was facing and its 
need for ready cash. They explained that they already had some  boats and agreements 
signed for more boats to enable the transport of an additional 40,000 persons. All moneys 
received from the Joint and the Jewish Agency had already been invested and more cash 
was needed.
Ginsburg and Shind  then disclosed the Mossad’s  current plans. The first was 
to bring Jews out of Germany to Italy  and  that 2,500 had already been moved despite the 
lack of help from the American authorities. The second plan was to move 10,000 
immigrants from Germany to France, and they already had 1,500 transit visas towards this 
end. Ginsburg was aware that the British authorities were pressurising the French to stop 
issuing transit visas, but that the French refused to discriminate between Jews and non- 
Jews. A third plan being considered was moving DPs from Germany to Romania, where 
the Romanian Government had agreed to the exit of50,000 Jews. Ginsburg felt that the 
situation for Jews in Romania was so bad that they had a priority case. However this was 
not accepted by the Joint representatives. They7  made it clear that an additional $1 million 
which the Mossad representatives w ere now looking for, if granted at all, w ould only be
1 9  AJJDC Archives, Minutes of discussion at Administrative Meeting re: Palestine Immigration, 11.3.47.
89available to move  10,000 DPs out of Germany.20  After a later discussion, Ginsburg and 
Shind’s request for an additional $1 million was approved but not until the State 
Department itself had been informally approached by Warburg and had  indicated its own 
approval.2 1
As the documents have  disclosed,  a total  sum amounting to  $4,056,000  was 
made available by the Joint to the Mossad in four instalments  during 1946 and 1947 to 
cover  the illegal immigration of 36,600 Jews who were in  DP camps in Germany, 
Austria  and Italy. In comparison to the total of some 69,600 who attempted to reach 
Palestine by this means, the Joint’s subsidies, although significant, could not be assessed 
as the crucial element in illegal immigration.  This was because, as clearly illustrated 
above, the Joint’s funding was not open aided.
Idith Zertal, in ha book, comments at length on the Joint’s subsidies to illegal 
immigration. However as against the figures shown above, she contends that the Joint 
subsidised the illegal immigration project in its entirety at a cost of $7,440,000. Her 
figures are, however, arrived at by simple extrapolation and she readily admits that the 
financial records of die Mossad, which might have resolved the issue, had not been found. 
22 Nevertheless she contends that die Mossad could never have functioned without the 
enormous assistance of the Joint23 However, since her figures appear to be somewhat 
unreliable  so must  be her contention. Similarly, the figures obtained by Arieh Kochavi in 
an interview with Joseph Schwartz in 1962 also appear to be excessive and are not 
supported by the documentation Schwartz estimated  that the Joint had contributed $10- 
$ 12 million to Bricha activities and a maximum of $18 million to illegal immigration.24
It must  be assumed that the Jewish Agency itself was able to call on various other 
resources to fund the Mossad’s activities. No doubt part of these resources were  funds 
received  by Pino Ginsburg  in Geneva and  this corresponds with  the assertion that Ben 
Gurion maintained “a special fund in Switzerland”, through which the Mossad drew its 
operating costs.25
20 AJJDC Archives, Memorandum of meeting with  "M r. Szmd and Mr.Pino”  Present for AJ JDC: Louis H. 
Sobel, Boris. M. Joffe and Dorothy L. Speiser, 23.5.47.
2 1  Ibid.,  File 626, Israel-Bricha. Memorandum from Evelyn M. Morrissey to Louis.H.Sobel, 12.6.47.
22 Zertal  Catastrophe. Note No.128 to Chapter 6 of her book.
23 Ibid., 211.
24 Kochavi “British Response"', 225.
25 Ben David, 26.
90On the same topic, Arieh Eliav  referred to the vast sums in dollars kept in Paris, 
which on one occasion he was ordered to spirit away to a safer location, in view of an 
expected police raid.26  Hadari contributes to the debate  on sources of finance by stating 
that, according to Meirov, the Jewish Agency7  only ever contributed some 25% of the 
costs, whilst private donations from wealthy individuals enabled the purchase in the USA 
of large ships, including the President Warfield and two Canadian corvettes. In other 
instances loans were procured which were  guaranteed by the local Jewish community. 
Perhaps even more interesting is Hadari’s assertion that large debts  were  incurred, and 
were then inherited by the new State of Israel in May 1948. 27
Whatev er the true origins of the  funds used by the Mossad for ship acquisition 
and refurbishment, Yehuda Bauer’s suggestion that illegal immigration was handicapped 
by shortages of ships and money is unlikely to have been die major factor. 28 Rather the 
sheer logistical problem of moving thousands of DPs out of the occupied zones of 
Germany and Austria  and across  France or Italy to ports of departure was a more logical 
limiting factor. As an  example, the embarkation of some 15,000  Romanian immigrants 
in a Bulgarian port in December 1947, indicates that where logistical problems could be 
overcome and British diplomatic pressures ignored, in this case  thanks to the ready7  
assistance of the Romanian and Bulgarian authorities, the availability of finance and 
ships was not an issue.29
The Joint, because of its concern at all times to maintain its status as a legal 
organisation concerned with humanitarian issues, deliberately avoided direct involvement 
in the actual organising of illegal immigration. Quite clearly, however, its personnel, on 
an individual basis, often  took actions  involving the movement of refugees, which w ere 
construed by British intelligence as effectively aiding die process. How then did  this 
organisation in particular respond both to the Joint and the other organisations involved in 
this traffic ?
26 Telephone Interview with Arieh ‘Lova’  Eliav, 25.11.03
27 Hadari  HaMossad. 29.
28 Bauer, Flight. 66.
914.2 British Intelligence
In order to provide the Cabinet with the most up-to-date information on the 
activities of those concerned with illegal immigration, MIS (Military Intelligence) 
coordinated the reports of SIS agents in the field.30 They could thus disseminate 
extensive data  on the use being  made of the DP camps as a jumping-off point  for illegal 
immigration and of the use of welfare organisations such as the Joint  as a cover for 
clandestine activities.
In a first report dated August 1946  covering some 13 pages, MIS covered such 
topics as ‘Routes through Europe, Organisation in Maritime Countries and Final 
Shipment to Palestine and the  implication of UNRRA and other relief organisations’. 
Throughout the report the complicity of the Joint, Bricha, the Jewish Brigade and 
Haganah members working under the umbrella of UNRRA were fully exposed and 
analysed. Whilst admitting that, as yet, little was known of the illegal immigration 
organisation in France, it suggested that the head of the Paris office, Ruth Kluger, 
facilitated the journeys of prominent Zionists and members of the Jewish Agency from 
Palestine and die UK to the continent and that it was suspected that the primary reason for 
these visits had been in connection with illegal immigradoa In its conclusions the MI5 
report stated “Members of the Jewish Agency and other Zionists have succeeded in 
building up an organisation which leaves hardly a country in Europe untouched...  The 
machinery  thus brought into being must be admitted to have achieved a considerable 
measure of success in neutralising British Immigration policy in Palestine.”31
In September and October 1946 an MI5 liaison officer toured France, Germany, 
Austria and Italy to cany out a general survey connected with arms-rurming and illegal 
immigration activities in Western Europe by “Jewish terrorists.” His second task  was to 
determine die intelligence coverage available to combat these activities. In his discussions 
with British intelligence agencies abroad, he emphasised the need to feed back 
information on these matters to London and also to satisfy Foreign Office requirements in 
the matter of producing concrete evidence of the complicity of named persons, officials or
29 Reference here is to the Mossad ships, the Pan Crescent and the Pan York which were intercepted by the 
Royal Navy on 31st December 1947 and escorted to Cyprus. For complete details see Ze’ev Hadari, Voyage 
to Freedom.
30 TNA,  KV 3/41, Notes on Jewish activities for MI5’s  Director General, 8.11.46.
3 1  TNA,  FO 371/56239, Appendix C, “Jewish Illegal Immigration from Europe to Palestine”, 8.8.46.
92institutions, especially Americans, UNRRA and the Joint which might enable diplomatic 
action to be taken vis-a-vis the ultimately responsible authorities. In addition, his report 
emphasised the importance  of supplying the Palestine Government, police and security 
authorities, through M15, with all possible intelligence on Jewish activities in Europe.
In a section of his report headed “Appreciation”, the liaison officer  gave his views 
on what French security coverage existed and how much of it might be used by MI6 (SIS) 
to advantage. With regard to the “Service de Documentaton Exterieure et Contre- 
Espionnage (SDECE)”, he noted that, although  their  counter-espionage brief only 
extended outside  France, they had also provided information collected inside France. 
Nevertheless, owing to known contacts between a “noted Zionist in Paris with an 
unidentified member of the SDECE”, there was too much of a security risk for MI5 to 
work with this security agency. His views on the DST were even more disparaging and he 
characterised the agency as un-cooperative. As to the Surete Nationale, political 
considerations precluded any high degree of cooperatioa The only security agencies 
which he termed as cooperative were the Renseignements Generaux (which carried out 
surveillance on potentially subversive elements) and the Seine Police Prefecture. The 
latter, on request, had promptly made available their dossier on Dr. Mosheh Sneh, the 
former political head of the Haganah, now exiled  in Paris. The liaison officer concluded 
that the assistance of the French Government and the security authorities could only be 
obtained on an ad hoc basis and after pressure had been exerted.32
In a  twenty-eight  page report  in February 1947, MI5 disclosed that the main 
camps which served as staging posts for illegal immigration were Hohne (Belsen) and, in 
the American zone, Landsberg.  The logistics  involved in moving refugees from Poland 
and via die camps was undertaken by an organisation using the pseudonym “TJnser Weg” 
(Our way).33 Furthermore, it noted that US army transport was often  used to ferry DPs to 
Brussels  via Frankfurt and Strasbourg. In  Brussels, which was the collecting point for 
DPs on their way to Marseilles, they were furnished with false identification papers.34
Faced with their failure to convince the French authorities to take appropriate 
action to stem the flow of illegal immigrants, the British Cabinet, through its Defence
32 TNA, KV 3/56 Report on tour of MI5 Liaison Officer between 5.9.46 and 8.10.46.
33 Most likely refers to  the Bricha.
93Committee on illegal immigration to Palestine, set about preparing its own  plan to secure 
“improved control of embarkation of illegal immigrants from  French ports and also from 
Italian ports”. The subject was discussed at an inter-departmental meeting on 18th March 
1947.35  Given that representatives of both MI5 (Military Intelligence) and MI6 ( SIS) 
were convened to that meeting, there can be little doubt that the intention was to increase 
covert surveillance operations on French soil. The objective was to pre-wam the Palestine 
authorities of suspect sailings and also to inform the  British Consulate in Marseille, so 
that diplomatic action could be taken.
A further  report by MI5  to British representatives in Europe reveals that 
intelligence work was very thorough, with substantial information about ships, activities 
in the camps, routes across Europe, ports of departure, sailing dates and numbers of illegal 
immigrants.36  The problem for British Intelligence, once a boat had been labelled as 
“suspect4 4 , was to follow her movements from one Mediterranean port to another, as she 
was fitted out  or re-fuelled, in order to determine in which port illegal embarkation was 
likely to take place. After that it was the role of British diplomacy to intervene.
There are  a number of examples of the extent  of British intelligence surveillance 
operations. For instance its reports on  the  Ulua, firstly in Sweden  (Trelleborg) and then 
in France (Le Havre)  generated feverish  British diplomatic activity  in a vain attempt 
to have her impounded before she attempted to sail to Palestine.37 In the case of the 
President Warfield (later renamed die Exodus) surveillance had already started whilst she 
was still in the USA. According to intelligence reports, she  initially attempted to pick up 
illegal immigrants in La Spezia but was prevented from doing so because of 4 4 the helpful 
attitude of die Italian authorities”.3* It is then perhaps purely by chance  that  she 
eventually sailed from France rather than Italy, from where she had been  expelled as a 
result of British diplomatic  interv ention.  Again, the appearance of the Pan Crescent in 
Marseilles  in October 1947, led to British  representations to the French government to
34 TNA, FO 371/61802, 26.2.47 “Jewish Illegal Immigration into Palestine, Summary’ No.9, for period 
16.10.46 to 17.2.47”.
35 TNA, FO 371/61804,9.4.47.
36 TNA, FO 371/57693. There were  frequent reports to the Foreign Office from Box  No.500, Parliament 
Street, B.O,  which was the  address of the Director General  of the Security Service  to whom  MIS 
reported.
3' TNA, FO 371/61801, Letters from MI5, to Foreign Office, 31.1.47 and 6.2.47.
38TNA, ,FO 188/595A, Telegramme from Secretary of State at  Foreign Office to Paris Embassy, 20.7.47.
94deny her fuel and prevent any embarkation.39 The final example of SIS surveillance  is 
that of the famous  Irgun ship the Altaiena (See Chapter 8) and two other suspect ships 
which  were spotted  in Genoa in January 1948.  The British Embassy implored the Italian 
Foreign Ministry to detain the ships until after the end of the Mandate, some four months
40 away.
There were many “suspect” ships  but not all turned out to be involved in illegal 
immigration. Nevertheless they were all systematically placed under surv eillance, a 
considerable effort for the British agents  involved in the task. It is likely that the choice 
of  port of departure  was  only determined by the Mossad at the last moment, in order to 
avoid the possibility of interference by the French or Italian authorities under diplomatic 
pressure from the British.
British Intelligence activity on French soil had already been noted by the Mossad 
in early 1946. A radio transmission from Paris  to the Mossad in Palestine by “Shimon” 
one of the code names of L 'Abbe  Alexandre Glasberg, noted that the Ministry of the 
Interior had been informed by  the British  of the departure of a suspect immigrant boat 
from a French port. They  demanded an investigation into the matter, as well as a report 
on Zionist activities in France.41 Glasberg completed his message with  the information 
that he was in touch with the “French security agency”  dealing with die matter. 42 
Glasberg, through his presidency of the Conseil Interoeuvres de l’Aide aux Immigrants et 
Transitaires Juifs,  had close contacts with  the Ministry of the Interior’s  agencies, not 
least of which was the DST which kept him informed  of all activities by the SIS which 
could interfere with the Mossad’s work  43
Central to the surveillance operations in the Marseilles  area was the British 
Consulate, to which all intelligence information was conveyed.  The reports were then 
conveyed  to the Foreign Office  and copied to the Embassy in Paris. But whereas  in the 
spring of  1947 this operation had sufficient resources and manpower,  such was not the 
case in 1946.Then forced to rely on one covert source known only as ‘P’ ( undoubtedly a
39 TNA, CO 537/2380, Telegramme from Foreign Office to Paris Embassy. It was feared that because of 
their size, both the Pan Crescent and the Pan York might prove to be "unboardable" and therefore would 
succeed in beaching themselves on the Palestine coast.
40 TNA CAB 104/279, Aide Memoire from British Embassy, Rome  to Italian Foreign Ministry, 14.1.48.
4 1  Gershon  (Col.) and A. Riviin, The Stranger Cannot Understand. Code Names in the Jewish Underground 
in Palestine (Tel Aviv, 1988), 430.
42Haganah Archives, Aliyah Bet files. Series 114,  Jan/April 1946. Shimon to Artzi, 5.2.46 at 1400 hours.
95French official), the Consul-General pleaded with the Foreign Office for the despatch  to 
the area of a ‘Special Investigation Officer’. In addition he sought permission to employ a 
naval cipher clerk.44 The following  revealing reply  from Duff Cooper, the Ambassador 
in Paris would tend to imply that  a  senior member of die DST, Maurice Cottentin,  was 
prepared, unknown to his superiors,  to work for the British
New Head of Surv eillance for whole Mediterranean littoral Monsieur Cottentin, who will 
shortly be arriving in Marseilles, has promised his assistance in watching and controlling 
this traffic. His co-operation will be given unofficially and without the knowledge of his 
superiors. You should therefore make no use of any information he may provide which 
could conceivably compromise him You should not, repeat not, inform him of our 
connections with P...
Monsieur Cottentin can now7  be asked to investigate any questions on which we 
need information. Moreover as you know contacts with P have now been taken off your 
hands. We understand that Foreign Office are reluctant to arrange for a special 
investigating officer to be sent out...45
Given  the pro-Zionist attitude  of his boss, Roger Wybot,  the Director of the 
DST,  it is more  than likely that Cottentin was deliberately using his connections with the 
British  Embassy to maintain watch on the intelligence gathering  activities of the SIS. 
Later in June 1948, after the creation of the State of Israel, Cottentin was to be 
instrumental in providing a secure environment for the loading of arms onto  the Irgun 
ship, the Altalena46 (See Chapter 8)
The operations of the  SIS in the Marseilles area revealed to the  DST  that the 
main agent suspected of being at the centre of this activity was a  British officer called 
Captain Frederic Harold  Courtney. 47 He was passing himself off as a representative of 
the wine merchants  Val Fleuron de Cassis. This position afforded him a ready contact 
with merchant navy officers, ship owners and the port authorities, all of w hom could keep 
him informed  of traffic through the ports in the area  In this task he also made use of 
dozens of local  French agents, the use of RAF Lancasters  from the British base at Istres 
for photography purposes and a yacht called the Lady Ann, skippered by an ex-navy
43 Hadari, Second Exodus, 148.
44TNA, CO 537/1804  30.11.46.
45 Ibid., 4.12.46.
^Documents supplied by Schlomo Nakdimon., 3.6.04. Exchange of correspondence between Nakdimon and
Cottentin, Aprii/May 1972.
96captain  called  Merlin. The latter’s  remit was to note the movement of alt ships out of the 
ports around  Marseilles.48 Further proof of Courtney’s  existence and activities  is borne 
out in a report  of one of Avraham  Polonski’s men following die departure of the  illegal 
ship,  die President Warfield  from Sete on  11th July
And now a  pretty  important matter, which 1 believe has to be dealt with by us and not the 
Mossad, and  which, in my view, puts at risk  the progress  and security of all  our 
present and future work. 1 refer to the warning letters  sent by the "Defenders  of the 
Arabs” to them [crew members?] and other cGoyinT[non-Jews] working for us. It is very 
probable that this campaign is led by a captain of the British I. S., who lives in Marseilles 
and is particularly focused on the Jewish Question. I am certain, as is my informer, that 
this captain is doing his utmost to cause us difficulties... The man is called Fred Cokney 
or Cokny. He lives at the Hotel Beauveau.  He often seeks information at  the Grand Hotel 
in Marseilles which is the meeting place of many of our Goyim.. I believe that he uses 
bribes to obtain information where he can, and that he or is henchmen are die authors of 
these letters... I am sure that by using our brains we will be able to clarify this matter and 
hopefully resolve it.49
The warning letters referred to were the subject of a file note  by Maurice 
Cottentin, the DST’s representative in die Marseilles sector. Under the subject  heading of 
“Activite du r&eau Trikabimasion”, he stated that a certain number of French Jew's, who 
were probably suspected of having helped die immigrants  to board the  Exodus, had 
received threatening letters, on behalf of "the Defenders of the Arabs of Palestine” 
stamped with a red hand . Cottentin suggested that the  vain attempt in one of the letter’s 
paragraphs to appear anti-British pointed, in effect, to  the  SIS as being the originator of 
the letters.50
This story is possibly only one manifestation of a much wider conspiracy7 . In June, 
July and September  1947, letters from the "Defenders of Arab Palestine” were sent in 
either English or French to the Italian Minister in London, Greek Ministers and officials, 
HM consul in Piraeus, the British Embassy in Paris and  HM Consuls in Marseilles and 
Lyon. This orchestrated  letter campaign complained about the laxity of the local officials 
in permitting illegal immigration to Palestine and of the w eakness of the British in
47 Haganah Archives,  Blumel files, 123/BIumel/l.
48 Philippe Bemert, Roger Wvbot et la Bataille pour la DST (Paris, 1975), 157.
49 Yad Tabenkm  Archives, Polonski files, Unsigned report dated 20th July 1947 dealing with the departure 
of the Exodus ’47.
50 Haganah Archives, Blumel files, 123/Blumel/2, File note  by  Maurice Cottentin, 18.9.47.
97bringing pressure to bear on the governments of those countries and finished by 
threatening retaliatory action. More specifically the letter to the British Embassy in Paris 
in September 1947 stated categorically that the “Defenseurs des Arabes de Palestine” 
were responsible for the blowing up of the ships Vrissi in Genoa and  die Pan Crescent  5 1  
Similar letters were received by the MAE and French Consulates.52
Liebreich in his book asserts that the steam yacht Vrissi had been prepared for 
illegal immigration by the Irgun and that it sank after an explosion on the 11th July 1947 
in Genoa He states that suspicion fell on the British Secret Service who had delegated 
the operation to Lt. Commander Crabb, Head of the Allied Navies’ Underwater 
Experimental Station in San Andrea, Venice. 53  As to the  Pan Crescent, it  was damaged 
by an explosion on 30th August  1947 in Porto Margera, near Venice.54 It was 
subsequently repaired and later used to transport illegal immigrants from Bulgaria. Again 
Liebreich indicates that Commander Crabb  was  possibly responsible, having employed 
an Italian shipyard employee to place a time bomb inside one of the holds.55 No 
conclusive evidence is presented  that the SIS was indeed responsible for both incidents 
nor that equally it was the author of the threatening letters. But is it purely coincidental 
that (a) Cottentin believed the letter campaign in Marseilles  to have been instigated by 
the SIS, that (b) One of the  “Defenders” letters accepts responsibility for explosions on 
the Vrissi and the Pan Crescent and that (c)  Liebreich using his own sources points the 
finger at a Royal Navy officer who was an expert in underwater  torpedoes and limpet 
mines?
An indication of the lengths to which the SIS were prepared to go is given in 
Andre Blumel’s  unpublished and handwritten  account of the Exodus Affair. He  alleges 
that Courtney’s task was to avoid die use of British sailors [presumably off the 
Palestinian coast] but to use all possible means to prevent an illegal embarkation, either 
by causing problems for the boat or blowing it up.  Courtney in effect specifically warned
5 1  TNA,  FO 371/61935. Copies of relevant letters.
52  MAE Archives, Immigration, File 376.
53 Liebreich, 80.
54 TNA, CO 537/2379,  Letter From Rome Embassy to Foreign Office, 27.9.47. The Embassy confirmed 
that the Italian Foreign Ministry had been warned about serious international complications if the Pan 
Crescent succeeded in packing up immigrants.  A British Field Security Police inspection  had already 
discovered newly-fitted passenger accommodation and anti-boarding devices.
55 Many years later, Commander Crabb disappeared during an underwater  mission to inspect a Russian 
warship then visiting Great Britain.
98the English agents [SIS] that  such an  act of sabotage should not be carried out in a 
French port in order not to reveal  Britain’s role in this affair.56
A  further indication  of the concern created by  SIS activity is provided  by 
Georges Loinger, recruited to the Mossad at the aid of 1946. When he arrived in 
Marseilles and reported to ‘Rudi’ Zameret, he was told that his first task would be to help 
flush out SIS agents. To do this, it was put about that Loinger was somehow connected 
with illegal immigration. It was hoped that this would cause  him to be  followed by 
British agents. The idea was that Zameret's own people would in turn carry out their own 
surveillance, identify the agents and pinpoint their location. Once this  information was 
passed to Wybot’s DST,  it was hoped that some counter action would follow.57 
A report from the RG speaks of an English official who appeared to belong to the 
Intelligence Services. He had apparently approached die Gendarmerie in La Ciotat, near 
Marseilles with the intention of procuring information on Jewish illegal immigration 
activities which had occurred in the area. In view of the delicate nature of the subject  no 
information was supplied.58
A few months after the Exodus Affair, Wybot finally7   acted against the SIS in the 
Marseilles area.  DST representatives  warned  Captain Courtney’s  fifteen or so  French 
agents  that they risked imprisonment unless they ceased their spying activities.59 On 5th 
November 1947, on the strength of a ministerial  decree, Captain Courtney7  himself w as 
expelled from French territory  60 The SIS cell in Marseilles was thus effectively 
neutralised.
The British Secret Service was one of  many foreign  intelligence agencies 
reported to be operating in France in the post-war years. This is disclosed in a remarkable 
booklet published by die DST for internal consumption in the Ministry of the Interior. 61 It 
refers specifically to the activities of MI6 (SIS) whose operational  remit  was outside the 
United Kingdom. It also stated  that MIS officers, although strictly UK based, were 
allowed to have some officers in France. British Consulates, located in major towns in
56 Haganah Archives, Blumel Files 123/Blumel/l.
57 Interview with Georges Loinger in Paris, 10 11.02.
58 Archives departementales des BDR.  148W185, RG report, 15.11.46.
59 Bemet,75.
60 Ibid..
99France, provided cover for the SIS. Its officers were prevalent in the visa and passport 
sections and in the press and information sections. It was even suggested that officers in 
the Allied War Graves Commission might also be  involved . SIS activities in France 
continued to be intense and one of their major objectives was the surveillance of all boats 
susceptible of carrying arms or immigrants to Palestine. Local agents were recruited 
among Frenchmen, who had previously been organised into resistance cells by SOE 
officers during the war. In another section of the report, undoubtedly referring to Captain 
Frederic Courtney, although not specifically by name, the DST reported that in 1947 they 
expelled from France an intelligence officer who had created in the Midi area of France 
an anti-Zionist network of agents. He was  reputed to have been implicated in the 
interception of the Exodus. The report  concludes with the statement that a large number 
of SIS agents had been identified and were under surveillance.
Hadari (originally known as Venya Pomerantz in his Mossad days) relates an 
interview he had with Frank Bateman, a Jew, working for the SIS in Italy and France in 
1947. According to Bateman, who spoke both Yiddish and Hebrew, the SIS used as many 
as 500 agents in their quest to impede illegal immigration. These also comprised 
demolition experts, frogmen and radio interception specialists. Bateman himself managed 
to infiltrate one of the transit camps in the Marseilles area in order to familiarise himself 
with die workings of the organisers. Another agent called Betty7  Fidler w as aboard the 
Farida (later renamed the Af-Al-Pi-Chen), when it was intercepted, as a result of her 
signal to a British destroyer in the vicinity of the Palestine coast.62 The name of Betty 
Fidler also crops up in a security7  report in September 1947. Soldiers interv ened when she 
w as attacked by one of the passengers at the moment she attempted to disembark from the 
Farida at die docks in Haifa63
The w7 ork of the British Secret Services was highly7  professional and 
comprehensive but it was at all times exposed to the vigilance of die DST. They in turn 
kept the Mossad informed of any SIS moves which could interfere with their activities. 
British Intelligence failed in its primary  task of preventing  the sailing of illegal
0 1  Archives Nationales, Foods  Jules Moch, 484AP14 , DST-La Lutte contre les ingerences etrangeres en 
France: Sommaire sur les Pnncipaux Services Speciaux Etrangers et leurs Activites sur le Territoire, Paris 
1.1.48.
62 Hadari, Voyage to Freedom. 61.
03 TNA, WO 275/87,  Report of 317 Field Security Section of 6th  Airborne Division, 28.9.47.
100immigrant ships from France. However, it did give early warning to the British Embassy 
in Paris of suspect boats and, in due course, their sailing dates which enabled the Palestine 
Patrol to carry out its interception work.
Such is the nature of intelligence work that whilst the SIS was battling its 
unidentified enemy, the Mossad across Europe, its opposite numbers responsible for 
counter-espionage  in Great Britain, MI5 was in indirect  contact with Jewish Agency 
(Haganah) intelligence officers in London. This is revealed in a series of documents from 
MI5 released by the  National Archives in April 2003. The major revelation of these 
documents is that in a period stretching from  August 1946 to March 1947, an officer 
acting on behalf of MIS had a number of meetings with a “Jewish Agency Security 
Officer.’*4
Despite the general  blocking-out of the name of this “officer” on all the documents, 
an inadvertent manuscript note identified him as being “Kollek”. Clearly this was  Teddy 
Kollek who, later in life, became  famous  as the  long-term  mayor and developer of 
Jerusalem. However at the time  he was known, as French reports have also  indicated, to 
be a Haganah intelligence officer. 65 It was clear to MI5 that Kollek, acting on behalf of 
the Jewish Agency, was seeking to establish direct lines of communication with MI5, 
much in the same way that he had succeeded in doing in die Middle East with the British 
Intelligence Agencv7  (SIME) and two of its senior officers Lt. Colonel Oldfield and 
Brigadier Douglas Roberts.
In London Kollek had contact with a Mr. C.A.G. Simkins, who worked in the 
War Office. Unbeknown to Kollek,  Simkins reported directly to MI5, under the code 
name of ‘Scorpion’ and was the main conduit for Kollek’s various observations and 
disclosures. In September 1946, at a time when certain leaders of die Executive of the 
Jewish Agency7  were still interned by the British in Latrun, Kollek  described  to Simkins 
the para-miltary organisations then existing  in Palestine. He asserted  that there was a 
clear distinction between the “Resistance Movement”, an offspring of the Haganah, which 
had always taken the greatest care to avoid loss of life, and die Irgun,  which he 
characterised as being composed of Fascist-minded people and the Palestine underworld.
64 TNA, KV4/216, Memo to D.D.B. from B3a (J.C. Robertson), 29.8.46.
101In  addition there was the more formidable and ideologically-driven Stem Group.  He 
asserted that after the attack by the Irgun on die King David Hotel in  Jerusalem, the 
Haganah had, in July 1946, broken off all relations with these  two organisations. He also 
indicated that an important meeting was being held in Paris that week to decide on 
participation in the London Conference. Kollek stated to Simkins “Our task is to avoid 
war between England and the Jews.” 66
In October 1946, after the adjournment of the London Conference, Kollek wrote 
to Simkins indicating that the British Government was pursuing informal talks with the 
Jewish Agency. The Agency indicated to the Government representative that their 
demands were twofold. Firstly die  release of its leaders,  which would open the path to a 
discussion on partition and secondly increased  immigration to say 5,000 per month,  a 
stop on searches of settlements, release of detainees and re-establishment of civil rights 
and habeas corpus. If these  conditions were met there would be Anglo-Jew ish 
cooperation which would make the Agency an active and effective partner in “isolating 
and  eventually annihilating the terrorist groups.”67
At a further meeting  in January 1947, Kollek indicated that he would soon be 
returning to Palestine as he had failed in his mission to establish  direct contact with 
people in the British establishment who would appreciate the strategic benefit that a 
Jewish State would represent. In his view the British were in a position to give the Jews 
what they wanted. The Arab League had no wish to see the involvement of Russia in the 
Middle East and would acquiesce. He  contended  that with Jewish co-operation the 
problem of terrorism could be dealt with inside two months. With regard  to British fears 
of Russian infiltration into Palestine through a mass illegal immigration from Central and 
Eastern Europe, Kollek indicated that the immigrants were coming not to spread 
Communism but to get away from it.68
At all times  during this brief and indirect  encounter with Kollek, MI5  attempted 
to ensure that  that he remained  unaware of die  true relationship betw een Simkins and 
themselves. They feared that any direct contact would, besides enabling the Jewish
65 Archives National  es, Fla/3368, an RG report confirms that Theodor  Kollek, bom in Austria on 27.5.11 
was  known to be a Jewish intelligence officer, lie had  arrived from London on 10.8.46 and had  booked 
into the Royal  Monceau, 13.8.46.
66TNA, KV4/216. Report of Simkins on his discussions with Kollek, 16.9.46.
67 Ibid., Letter from Kollek to Simkins, 8.10.46.
102Agency to infiltrate MI5, “involve the risk that the Jewish Agency might attempt to 
publicise this liaison in future, in order to demonstrate the closeness of their collaboration 
with  British Intelligence and thereby to clear themselves of responsibility for the 
activities of the Jewish terrorists.”69 Whether Kollek  was truly unaware of Simkins's 
connection to MI5 is open to doubt, given the manner in which he was constantly  feeding 
him with  information to be passed on to influential decision makers.
One of the last meetings with Kollek appears to have been with his old contact in 
the Middle East, Brigadier Douglas Roberts, who then reported back to Robertson at MI5. 
Kollek  again attempted to put British fears about Communist infiltration at rest. He 
indicated that the only collaboration with die Russians concerned illegal immigration. 
There w as an understanding on the subject. The Russians wanted to get rid of Jew s in 
countries under their control and the Agency was only too keen to receive them in 
Palestine.70
This review of recently released MI5 documentation serv es to emphasise how , 
despite events in Palestine and the war  being waged by both sides over  illegal 
immigration, unofficial  lines of communication between  the intelligence communities of 
both  the Jewish Agency and the  British establishment continued to remain open, even if 
in the end they did not result in shifting British policy on Palestine.
68 TNA, KV4/216, Notes on a  meeting between ‘Scorpion ‘ and [Kollek] of the Jewish Agency on 30.1.47.
09 Ibid., Memo from  B3a (J.C..Robertson) to B3 Robertson raises the question as to whether or not MI5 
should establish a link with  [Kollek] who had proved a fruitful source of intelligence in the Middle East, 
6.2.47.
70 Ibid.,Memo from B3a ( J.C.Robertson) to B3,14. 3.47.
103CHAPTER 5  The French Connection
The French Connection is basically a short-hand device to identify  the 
extensive help given to illegal immigration by a number of French Ministers and 
Government officials. By supporting the existing anecdotal narrative with an array of 
archival documents, which provide compelling evidence, the ultimate conclusion is 
that these facilitators did not just  demonstrate a benign attitude  but their  actual 
complicity in the process. Equally, it will be shown that they were so  adept at creating 
a smoke-screen over their activities,  that not only were  their colleagues  in the 
various coalition cabinets unaware of their true involvement but so were many minor 
officials under their direct control.
However the starting point to such an expose must be an examination of the 
motives which drove these facilitators. Secondly the need is to assess how motivation 
translated itself into practical steps. A third element is an assessment of how British 
diplomatic pressure, which caused inter-ministerial conflicts, proved in the end to be 
counter-productive and effectively only served the Mossad.  This chapter also 
illustrates the enduring contradictions and ambiguities within the Government 
coalitions towards the whole question of Palestine, which prevented any real 
consensus.
5.1  A question of Motivation
It might seem paradoxical that within two years of the demise of the 
Antisemitic Vichy regime, many in the post-war French Government were covertly 
assisting the Mossad in their activities on French soil. To unearth the real motivations 
behind this phenomenon, one has to consider a number of historical factors and their 
influence on French attitudes.
There is firstly the ancient Franco-British rivalry which, whilst relatively 
dormant during the war years, as befits allies, raised its head once again when France 
was able to recover its lull sovereignty after the war. There is  then the  humiliation of 
the French army being forced out of Lebanon and Syria in 1946, as part of 
arrangements which involved  British policy in those countries. This left die  French 
with the suspicion that the British had connived with the indigenous leadership at their
104expulsion from the Levant. 1  Perhaps also  the  memory of the attack by the  Royal 
Navy on the French fleet at Mers-El-Khebir in  July 1940, in which 1,200  sailors lost 
their lives, was also not entirety a dormant factor  affecting the Franco-British entente. 
On the military front the contribution of Palestinian Jews in the battle of Bir Hakeim, 
amongst others, was often commended by General Pierre Koenig  of the Free French 
Forces and thus the French military were  inclined to favour the Zionists.2 Lastly there 
were the ties which bound certain members of the French Administration  to the 
Zionist cause. Many of the Ministers in the coalition Government were Socialists who 
had retained a high regard for Leon Blum, the Jewish Prime Minister  of the 1936/38 
Popular Front Governments. Those who had been in the Resistance, had encountered 
Jewish members, both French and foreign, and felt that they owed them a debt of 
gratitude. This was equally reflected in their affinity for their Socialist counterparts 
within the Jewish Agency. Thus when the Mossad sought at least French acquiescence 
to their operations in France, they were pushing against an open door.
Weighing up all  these diverse  factors,  it appears that the major impetus for 
French complicity -and this  is a recurring theme- was a subconscious desire to get 
back at the British for France’s expulsion from the Levant states. As Georges Loinger, 
ex-member of the Mossad, contended  “The French administration hated the British for 
this humiliation and that is why they helped us.” 3  Even Sir John Beith, a senior official 
at the British Foreign Office, later  identified this particular issue as a  key motivating 
factor dictating France’s attitude over  illegal immigration.4 What then was the root 
cause for such animosity and was it justified?
After the First World War, the League of Nations granted Mandates over parts 
of the former Ottoman Empire to both Britain and France. With Palestine and 
Mesapotamia (Iraq) going to Britain, France gained control of Lebanon and Syria In 
June 1940, despite the fall of continental France, the Armistice Agreement signed with 
die Germans allowed France to retain control of its overseas Empire. Thus countries 
bordering on Mandate Palestine were  occupied by military forces  loyal to the new
1  Joseph Kennel  L’Angleterre. la France et 1’Immigration Clandestine en Palestine 1945-1948  Master’s 
Dissertation (Paris, 1985), 280.
2 Ibid., 269.
3 Interview with Georges Loinger, 10.11.02.
4 Elihu Bergman, ’Adversaries and Facilitators:The Unconventional Diplomacy of Illegal Immigration to 
Palestine,1945-1948”,  Israel Affairs. No.8, Spring, (London, 2002), 19. Bergman’s interview with Sir 
John Beith, 15.8.47.
105Vichy Government. It was only in 1941, when a revolt in Iraq, led by a supporter of the 
Axis, brought in its wake the use of aerodromes in Syria by the German air force, that 
consideration was given, by the British,  to an invasion of the Levant States. The 
purpose was to block any possibility of the Germans using these countries as a base 
for an offensive against  British forces in the area
The invasion was led in the main by Australian and British forces with de 
Gaulle’s Free French forces in support, led by General Catroux. A political dimension 
was added to the military offensive  by a simultaneous declaration by Catroux to the 
two populations that their countries would be granted independence in the future.To 
augment the effectiveness of this declaration -die Free French, not possessing much 
credibility in this part of the world- it was underwritten by a guarantee from the British 
Government5  The intention was to maintain forces in die region until the end of the 
war, when they would be withdrawn and the independence of the two states become a 
reality. The arrangements whereby French and British forces coalesced in the Levant 
were incorporated in an agreement signed by de Gaulle and Oliver Lyttelton, the 
Minister of State in Cairo, in July 1941 The agreement, whilst underlining the pledge 
of independence given to both Lebanon and Syria, recognised the pre-eminent position 
of the Free French in all matters concerned with these Levant States. 6
Msyor-General Sir Edward Spears was personalty appointed by Churchill to 
head the British Mission to the Levant States aid also to act as Head of Mission to the 
Free French forces 7 Later in  February1942 his political rank was elevated to that of 
Minister. After the defeat of France in June 1940, he had personalty brought General 
de Gaulle over to England to continue the fight and from then on acted as his liaison 
with the British Government He therefore had no illusions about the difficulties of the 
task facing him, nor of the irascible and suspicious nature of de Gaulle, as the leader of 
the Free French.
In his memoirs, Spears often speaks disparagingly of French attempts to 
restore their hegemony in the area despite Catroux’s declaration. He  recalls that  the 
French feared that the British were intent on replacing them in the Levant. He is fond 
of repeating Churchill’s comment that the British had not sent troops into the Levant
5  Edward Spears, Fulfillment of a Mission (London, 1977), 99. Hereafter Spears.
6 Archives Nationales, Fonds Georges Bidault 457AP3, Letter from Oliver I.yttleton to General de
Gaulle, 25.7.41.
106for the purpose of replacing one type of Frenchman [supporters of Vichy] by another 
[the Free French].8 Despite Spears’s claim that his main objective was to ensure that 
the British guarantee to the two states was upheld, there is no hiding his contempt for 
de Gaulle’s representatives, who were intent in maintaining the Levant as part of 
France’s empire.
Possibly that which enraged  ami humiliated the French most was Spears’s part 
in the British interv ention of November 1943. A new Lebanese Parliament had just 
been elected, the nationalist flavour of which displeased the French. Without 
consulting the British, who militarily were die strongest forces in the area, de Gaulle’s 
representative on 11th November arrested virtually all die members of the Government 
and suspended the constitution. The British Ministers thereupon issued an ultimatum 
that unless the position was restored by the 22nd November, martial law would be 
declared and die country taken in charge by die British army.9 After a period of stand­
off in which French troops rampaged throughout Lebanon, causing a number of 
casualties, de Gaulle, from his headquarters in Algiers, finally7  backed down. The 
Government Ministers were released and reinstated in their functions.
De Gaulle  recognising that he had been forced to concede because  of the 
inherent weakness of his forces in the Levant, was more than ever convinced that 
Spears had influenced both the Syrians and the Lebanese to stand up to die French. 
Georges Bidault  castigates both de Gaulle and Spears  in his memoirs for France's 
debacle in the Levant. De Gaulle is accused of lack of clarity on the subject at cabinet 
meetings and deliberately circumventing Bidault by issuing his own  instructions to his 
representatives in the area Bidault complains that although he was the Minister in 
Charge “No one ever informed me, orally or in writing, about what was going on”. As 
to General Spears, he was accused of making things worse by actions which humiliated 
the French.  Bidault contents himself with a schadenfreude  reflection that “ the British 
had chased us out of the Middle East; but once they7  had sawn off our branch, the entire 
tree finally fell on their heads.”10 He was of course referring to Britain’s subsequent 
problems in Palestine and Egypt.
Spears  introduction viii.
8 Ibid.,  151.
9 Ibid., 263.
10 Georges Bidault, Resistance: The Political Biography of Georges Bidault (London, 1967), 97/98.
107De Gaulle’s suspicion of Spears was shared by members of the British Foreign 
Office under Anthony Eden, for though Spears acted in a political capacity, he was not 
on the staff of the Foreign Office, his appointment having been made directly by 
Churchill. A revealing letter is quoted by Spears in his memoirs. The letter had been 
addressed to Churchill by the Ambassador to the French National Committee in 
Algiers, Arthur Duff Cooper, later to become Ambassador in France. A copy of the 
letter was included in Duff Cooper’s memoirs many years later and Spears was made 
aware of it The letter dated February 1944 relates to both Spears and his wife
She and her husband believe that the main object of their mission is to 
maintain the rights of the native population of the Levant against the 
dominant power, and even to encourage the natives to assert these rights.
That is not, in my  view, nor I believe the view of His Majesty’s 
Government. We have surely enough problems of our own to face without 
stirring up native problems for others ..  Spears, owing to what I think is a 
mistaken view of his local objective, seems to have... become definitely, if 
not violently,  francophobe  I do not believe there will be peace in the 
Levant as long as they [the Spears] remain there.1 1
Spears happily relates that Churchill dismissed any  suggestion of his recall 
and, as always, stood by him. Nevertheless, at the end of 1944, Spears resigned and 
returned of his own accord to London to stand in the General Election. In his final 
comments, Spears notes that die French, dismayed at their inability to tie the Syrians 
down by a treaty, bombarded Damascus in May 1945. They then suffered die ignominy 
of being escorted out by British troops and being taken to Lebanon for their own 
protection.12
As a sequel to this story; it appears that at die end of 1946 the Mossad passed 
on to the French, copies  of Spears’s files that had been captured during the ambush of 
a military' vehicle in Palestine. In view of Spears’s perceived involvement in the 
ejection of the French out of die Levant, this gift of the Mossad to their French 
counterparts at the DST, could only cement the already existing relationship even 
further.13 According to Roger Wybot, die documents contained the names of British
1 1  Spears, 292/293.
1 2  Ibid.,, 298.
1 3  Hadari, Second Exodus. 144.
108agents, active in Arab countries who might one day turn up in North Africa and France. 
He was therefore happy to be able to identify them in advance.1 4
Corroboration for Spears’s assertions that the French were  constantly fearful of 
a British take-over in the Levant was found in a number of War Office files. In a 
communication to British troops after the confinement of French troops to barracks in 
Syria, the General Officer Commanding states
On June 15th and 19* the Levant situation was debated in the French 
Assembly. Mr Bidault  and General de Gaulle defended the French actions 
and the latter made ill-tempered references to Great Britain... The average 
Frenchman  is nowadays convinced that Great Britain is trying to “steal 
Syria from France”. This conviction fits all too well with the suspicions of 
British intentions in the Levant which die French have nursed since the last 
war... ,It is strengthened by every report which reaches Paris of the action 
we have been compelled to take to prevent further disorders, protect French 
lives and keep filings going in these countries.. . In these circumstances, we 
are compelled to avoid any action which is not absolutely essential if it is 
likely to lend colour to the accusation that we are trying to usurp France’s 
position in the Levant.1 5
The Manchester Guardian in an editorial on the Levant recognised that British 
policy had two choices: either to appease Arab nationalism or to resist it. For better or 
for w orse, recognising its growing force, it had opted for appeasement
We earned a good mark with the Arabs by granting independence to Iraq 
and by closing Palestine to Jewish immigration, though we had our 
troubles in Egypt and elsewhere. Though at present Arab nationalism is 
directed against France, it is potentially as great a threat to our own 
position [which was to remain in the Middle East for the sake of strategic 
and economic interests].1 6
It could be argued that Britain’s timely  military interventions, which impeded 
France in her  desire to restore its hegemony in the Levant, created  a form of French 
paranoia which the British, although aware of, were unable to dispel. That this  mindset 
led post-war French governments to assist -as a retaliation for their  loss of their
1 4  Bemet, 59.
1 5  TNA, WO 202/112a, 6.8.45.
1 6  Manchester Guardian. 6.6.45.
109Mandate- those intent on removing  Britain’s own Mandate over Palestine, has an 
attractive  logic to it.
Despite these ingrained attitudes towards the British, realpolitik dictated that, at 
least in matters  affecting the economic viability of France, the foreign policy of the 
Quai d’Orsay was one of accommodation  with Great Britain. This attitude did not 
commend itself to General de Gaulle whilst he was still head of the Provisional 
Government. In  an angry letter to the Minister of State at the MAE he strongly 
criticised the attitude of the French Ambassador in London, Massigli, and the General 
Secretary of the MAE, Chauvei. In his view they were involved in a conspiracy  with 
the British to effect die total expulsion of the French from die Lebanon and Syria, 
whilst the British  remained in Palestine, Iraq and Egypt. As to Bidault, de Gaulle 
described  him as totally blind to what was happening and deaf to his words of 
warning. He now insisted that no further steps be taken on this “capital issue” until he 
had convened a Cabinet meeting at which he would correct the misleading information 
ministers had been fed.17 This was not the only issue on which the cabinet opposed de 
Gaulle and  on the 20th January 1946  he  resigned from the Government. Before the 
end of the year  France had left the Levant. From this moment on, Bidault was left 
virtually in sole charge of Foreign policy. His  efforts to curb  illegal immigration 
from France and  his prevarication over the  Partition vote in November 1947 
reflected, according to Tsilla Hershco “the  entrenched pro-Arab bias which had 
always been prevalent at the Quai d’Orsay.”1 8  However Bidault was also shown to be 
capable of being persuaded by other arguments, as his role in the Altaiena Affair was 
to prove.
Indiscreet  opposition  to the attitudes of the Quai’d’Orsay were the 
humanitarian and generally  pro-Zionist attitudes of the Socialist Ministers represented 
by Jules Moch, Edouard Depreux and Daniel Mayer, who took their inspiration from 
Leon Blum now outside  Government. Blum, however  was  recalled to lead the 
coalition for a brief one month spell in December 1946. All the while, as Political 
Director  of Le Populaire. the mouthpiece of the SFIO, he ensured that  Socialists 
provided Zionism the moral support it required
1 7  Archives Nationales, Foods Vincent Auriol 552AP37,  General de Gaulle to Francisque Gay, 4.1.46.
1 8  Hershco, 44.
110Part of the explanation  for this friendly attitude  towards Zionists was 
provided by  Daniel Mayer, die General Secretary of the SFIO at a meeting of Poalei 
Zion, one of the left wing Zionist parties in France. He  indicated that  during the war 
funds, provided by die  Joint, were used by Marc Jarblum  for the relief of French 
Socialists and their families  forced to live a clandestine existence.19  This 
philanthropic act w as confirmed by Edouard  Depreux in his  memoirs:  it w as in Lyon 
that 1  had numerous contacts with Mr. Jarblum, who courageously and with great tact 
brought relief, with the  funds at his disposal, to the most needy of the victims of 
Hiderite and Vichy racism, particularly families of those imprisoned or deported ... ,,2° 
These gestures were  not forgotten after the war when certain  Socialist 
politicians found themselves members of the  coalition Government. They were also 
moved  to make amends for  Vichy's active participation in the deportation of a quarter 
of the Jews of France, by a flexible attitude to refugees wishing to cross France  to its 
ports on the Mediterranean coast.
Jules Moch in his memoirs devotes only one and a half pages to a subject which 
must have been one of his preoccupations during his tenure as Minister of Works and 
Transport. Nevertheless his tongue-in-cheek revelations are quite instructive as to his 
personal involvement and commitment. His opening statement sets out clearly die 
source of his motivation: “In 1946-1947, the Jew's were my principal w orry, not 
because of religious solidarity -I am an agnostic- nor even because of national identity 
-I am French, descendant of a long line of officers-, but because, massacred in their 
millions by Hider, persecuted in Russia, in Austria or in the Balkans, the Jews were the 
most unhappy of men.”21
Clearly Modi w as keen to reassure his readers that although he was  a Jew7  this 
was not the cause of his motivation. His reference to the military background of his 
French ancestry  was a subde way to dispel arty suspidons that  race or religion played 
any part. This distanring technique  was similarly used by Daniel Mayer when he 
attended, at the request of Marc Jarblum, the  Poalei Zion meeting in March 1945. 
From the outset he was keen to establish that he came to them solely as a Frenchman 
and in the name  of the French Sodalist party addressing a fraternal party. He asserted
1 9  Yad Tabenkin Archives, Polonski files, Minutes of Poalei Zion Meeting, 1.3.45.
20 Depreux, Souvenirs d’un Militant 173.
2 1  Moch, Unc si Longue Vie. 252
1 1 1that “ Socialists do not recognise the concept of race”.22 One can also see traces of this 
defensive  approach by Rene Mayer, also Jewish, in the slightly obsequious style of his 
letter to Bidault in 1947 disclosing his unhappiness about the proposed French 
position on the Partition Plan for Palestine.(See later)
Plainly, Jewish politicians were keen to establish their credentials as being first 
and foremost  Frenchmen owing only allegiance to the country of their birth. As with 
Leon Blum they did not hide the fact that they were Jews but resented any suggestion 
that this was a motivating force for their pro-Zionist attitudes. So soon after the war, 
with the Vichy days of anti-Jewish discrimination  fresh in their minds, such a 
defensive attitude  was  understandable.
In referring to well-known events in the history of illegal immigration from 
France, Moch relates his own  positive contribution: ‘1 dealt with shipments by sea to 
Israel; with Sete, where I was elected, at the head of this traffic,  I was involved in two 
dramas, that of die Exodus and that of the Altalena...  I refused to let Bevin, Socialist 
Foreign Minister in London, know7  of the date of departure of this boat, the President 
Warfield [Exodus],.. ”23  In respect of the British decision to ship the former 
passengers of the Exodus to Hamburg, he comments:  “We found no way to prevent 
this act of savageiy.” With regard to the Altalena, die Irgun ship which shipped arms 
and personnel to Israel during the first truce, Moch reveals where his personal loyalties 
lay
Bidault, true friend of Israel, came to find me  at Place Beauvau [Moch 
replaced Depreux at the Ministry of the Interior  in November 1947] to ask 
me to permit the passage of a shipment of arms. My usual informants had 
not whispered a word about this. When I called them in, they indicated that 
the arms were for a rival organisation, on the extreme right. I could not 
confiscate these arms without making Bidault an enemy of Israel, whilst as 
Head of the Government, he regularly closed his ey es to all my actions 
[Presumably in favour of the Zionists].
The implication is that, soon after Bidault informed  him that Port- 
de-Bouc was the port of departure. Modi  quickly passed on this 
information to his friends in the new7  State of Israel to enable them to 
intercept the Altalena and “the arms purchased by the dissidents”. 24
2 2  Yad Tabenkin Archives, Polonski files. Minutes of Poalei Zion meeting, 1.3.45.
23  Moch, 253.
24  Ibid.
112Whilst direct documentary evidence of Moch’s assistance to die Mossad in 
their illegal immigration activities is not revealed even in his personal papers at the 
French National archives, he does often provide hints. In a report entitled ‘Secret Note 
on voyage to Israel in 1949’ he comments on die “ humanitarian action of the [French] 
Government in allowing the passage and embarkation of these unfortunate escapees 
from the DP camps without paving too much attention to their legal status ”.25
A more direct account  of the direct assistance given by Jules Moch is provided 
by the commander of the Ulua, which arrived in Le Havre from Sweden at the end of 
1946 with some 1000 Jewish refugees on board. At the insistence of the British 
Embassy, the boat was prevented from leaving on the basis that she was unseaworthy 
to cam so many passengers. The young Palestinian commander on board, Arieh Eliav, 
telephoned Ehud Avriel at die Mossad office in Paris to tell him of their predicament 
and requesting that a way be found to effect the ship’s release. Immediately contact 
was established with Jules Modi himself and he gave direct orders to the  maritime 
offidals in Le Havre to issue a seaworthiness certificate for the boat so that she could 
no longer be held in any port under French control. Thus die Ulua was able to continue 
her journey to Algiers to pick up more immigrants ami continue her journey to 
Palestine. After interception by the Royal Navy she was beached on the shore near 
Haifa.26
5.2  Practical help
The manner in which French complidty in  the illegal immigration process 
found its practical application is revealed in  a number of anecdotes, supported broadly 
by archival sources. Roger Wybot, director  of the DST,  was originally a member of 
de Gaulle’s entourage during the war. From London he accomplished the task  of 
setting  up for de Gaulle  a very effident service called the Bureau Central des 
Renseignements et d’Action which regrouped all the means of communication and 
espionage  in war-time France. After the liberation of France, his appointment to the 
new ly-created  DST  Agency was a natural outcome.
25 Archives Nationales, Fonds Jules Moch, 484AP74.  Note: Author’s underlining is for  emphasis.
26 Telephone interview with Arieh ‘Lova’ Eliav, 25.11.03.
113In the summer of 1946 his agents, on the look-out for illicit  radio transmissions 
out of France, detected coded radio signals originating from a Jewish children’s home 
of the religious Mizrachi organisation at 19, rue de la Piece-d’Eau, in Le Vesinet, a
27 suburb of Paris. It had been installed by Serge Perl, one of Polonski’s men.  A raid 
by DST agents on  27th September 1946 at 7 o’clock in the morning led to the 
discovery of a radio transmitter, hidden in the gatekeeper’s lodge. Its three young 
operators, posing as child carers, together with the director of the establishment w ere 
arrested. The three operators, carrying false identity papers, refused to disclose their 
true identities. As the transmissions w ere being made to Cremond in  Italy it was 
suspected that the men, who bore foreign  accents, were Germans in communication 
with  fascist counterparts.
It soon emerged however, thanks to the intervention of the lawyer and Zionist 
Andre Blumel with Edouard Depreux, that the men were from the Mossad. Blumel 
explained to Wybot that they were  working for Jewish immigration to Palestine and 
vouched that they were no danger to France. Wybot’s response was to indicate to the 
agents  that, whilst he could not permit coded  radio emissions out of France without 
knowing their contents, he was prepared to do a deal. Against the supply of the radio 
codes used by the Mossad mid regular English translations, he would provide whatever 
assistance was required in their endeavours. In particular he would inform them of the 
activities of the  SIS which, to his knowledge,  had set up a network  extending from 
Paris to Marseilles to keep the British Embassy informed of all illegal immigrant ship 
movements to Palestine. He emphasised that it was nevertheless essential for the 
Mossad to act in France with all due diligence so as not to embarrass the French 
Government vis-a-vis the British.
The men of the DST would continue to monitor illegal transmissions from 
whatever source and it was up to the Mossad to act on Wybot's advice and curtail their 
transmissions to no more than three minutes duration to escape detection. Otherwise 
further arrests would inevitably follow, which Wybot would do his best to resolve. 
What he proposed was a form of benign neutrality, which would not preclude the 
supply of genuine, if misleading, identity papers if the need arose.  The  Mossad’s men
27 Derogy, La Loi du Retour. 93.
114were then released but had to report to the police every day for a few months. This 
allowed the DST time to ensure that the code book was genuine.28
Other  radio operators shipped into France by the Mossad from Palestine, 
would, after the Vesinet affair, be protected from die inquisitiveness of the SIS by the 
DST. 29 Even Andre Blumel was involved with secret radio transmitters. He arranged 
the installation of die principal transmitter of the Haganah in his mother’s  villa  at St. 
Germain-en-Laye, a Paris suburb.30 All this was carried out under the watchful eye of 
Pierre Boursicot the  Director General of the Surete Nationale and Roger Wybot’s 
boss.31
The communications sy stem set up in France, with the covert blessing of the 
French authorities, was essential  to the Mossad’s activities. In addition to the 
transmitter set up in the outskirts of Paris, others were set up in the Marseilles area as it 
was the centre for maritime operations. From these centres and one established in Italy, 
“Gideonim” (nickname for the radio operators) were able to maintain contact with the 
Mossad in Palestine and their  counterparts on illegal immigration  ships at sea.32 
Ze’ev Hadan recalls an incident when  each time  he  attempted to drive to the 
location outside Paris to use  the transmitter, he was followed by British Secret Agents, 
in turn followed by the DST and  he had to abort his visit.  They all ended up m the 
same  cafe en route, seemingly all  studiously ignoring each other. The problem was 
eventually resolved by delegating the task to L’Abbe Glasberg. “No-one followed a 
priest.”33
Wybot, in his memoirs, identifies clearly with the Zionist cause and indicates 
how closely he and his deputy, Stanislas Mangin,  kept Edouard  Depreux and Andre 
Blumel informed of all moves by the SIS  which could imperil the activities of the 
Mossad.34 That this warm  relationship established between  Zionist circles  and the 
DST continued after the creation of die State of Israel is  illustrated by two  separate 
items of information, which one might speculate w ere interlinked.
28 Bemert, 153/155.
29 Derogy, La Loi du Retour. 96.
30 Zertal «  Le Cinqirieme Cote du Triangle », 421.
3 1  Derogy, La Loi du Retour, 97.
32 Hadari, Hamossad. 11.
33 Lucien Lazare, L'Abbe Glasberg, (Paris, 1990), 92.
34 Bemert, 157.
115The first item  is  a lunch organised by  Marc Jarblum  which brought together 
Andre Blumel, Roger Wybot and Stanislas  Mangin at his flat in Paris in  February 
1949 a month after France’s de facto recognition of the State of Israel.35 The second 
item  is an indication in Wybot’s memoirs  dial the Israelis had  requested his help to 
set up their own counter-espionage service. Unable to go in person to Israel, it w as 
Stanislas Mangin who wait  in his stead  and helped the Israelis to set up their own 
service modelled on  the DST.  Subsequently, as a quid pro quo, the Israelis provided 
the French with intelligence data, particularly at the time  of the war in Algeria, which 
had been collected by their own agents in Cairo. Wybot rendered another service to the 
Israelis when at die time of the Suez crisis in 1956 he arranged a secret meeting 
between the British SIS and their Israeli counterparts. After eight years of mutual 
suspicion  between these two agencies, a spirit of reconciliation was in the air.  36
The fact that Depreux’s own  daughter worked for his Socialist colleague 
Andre Blumel,  is further evidence of the French Socialist Party’s close relationship 
with Zionist circles among the French Jewish elite. Depreux, in his  memoirs, vaunts 
his help to the Zionist cause and states he would do it all over again. “I always believed 
that  we had an immense debt towards the victims of Nazi barbarity and that we should 
show our solidarity, not by words, but by deeds.” 37
A French official in the Ministry of the Interior who, more than any other, was 
instrumental in aiding and abetting illegal immigration was Marcel Raymond Pages.
He was a highly-placed civil servant, responsible for the Direction de la 
Reglementation et des Etrangers (Aliens Office), which  policed  die movement of 
foreigners through France. According to Ehud Avriel, Schmuel Ariel  of the Irgun 
procured  a meeting for them  with Pages to discuss the free transit of Jew's through 
France. Pages agreed that  these immigrants would be permitted a short stay whilst 
suitable boats were acquired. Despite Avriel’s assurance that the immigrants had visas 
for Latin America and Africa Pages apparently made clear that he w as not unaw are of 
the true destination
The w ords used by Pages, according to Avriel, were:  “Monsieur, I served with 
the Free French forces during the last war. I have seen the British “liberating” former
35 CZA, Blumel Papers, A426/11, Letter dated 21 st February' 1949 to Andre Blumel.
36 Bemert, 159/160.
37 Depreux, 298.
116French territories from Lebanon and Syria to Morocco. Believe me, I am prepared  to
3$ do all I can to help  in the direction of Latin America and Africa”.
If these were truly  the  words  actually spoken, Pages was certainly 
economical with the truth when alleging that he sored with the Free French Forces 
during the war. In fact, throughout most of the war he  progressed his career within the 
Ministry of Labour, largely in the town of Vichy itself, where the Government offices 
had been moved after die occupation of Northern France.39 For Pages, like thousands 
of other civil servants, the installation of the Vichy Government in June 1940 did not 
interrupt their careers, unless of course they  were dismissed because  they were 
Jewish, Freemasons, Socialists, Communists or openly opposed the Vichy Regime.
In December 1944, as part of a policy7  to move former Vichy civil serv ants out 
of departments that had dealt with personnel matters during the war, he was 
temporarily7  attached at his own request to the Ministry of the Intenor. As he continued 
to be highly regarded, this later became a permanent appointment. Pages did not suffer 
the fate of thousands of former Vichy7  civil servants in Government, the police and the 
judiciary, who were summarily purged because of the nature of their activities during 
the war. He clearly benefited from a declaration made by the investigating “Comite de 
la Liberation” set up in  the Ministry7  of Labour, that he had been totally opposed to the 
Vichy7  regime and was  a renowned  supporter  of General de Gaulle since June 1940. 
He was also credited with having  helped various resistance organisations.40 The 
suggestion that a “Renowned Gaullist” would have been allowed to continue as a civil 
serv ant under Vichy is plainly not credible, but one suspects  that, in die atmosphere 
existing in France after the war, career advancement depended largely7  on one’s 
Resistance credentials  If they did not exist in reality then they had to be invented.
In 1946 the system evolved by Pages  with the Mossad was one which at all 
times would satisfy the French  taste for bureaucratic efficiency . Consequently he 
insisted on the submission of documents which complied with existing French 
regulations and which would pass scrutiny  In this way he could ensure that his 
Minister, Edouard Depreux, could not be held to account, if a boat, after leaving
38 Avriel, 266.
39 Archives National  es, (Fontainebleau),  M. Pages, Dossier de Cam  ere, 19770340, Art. 10 . Career 
details from his personnel file show that Pages was bom in 1896 and after service in the First World War 
and captivity in Germany he entered the French Administration in 1920. After a brilliant career as a 
high-flying civil savant he retired in 1958, just when General de Gaulle was appointed Prime Minister.
117French territorial waters, set sail for a destination other than that indicated on the visas 
originally presented by immigrants on embarkation. In addition, although his 
immediate superior, the head of the Surete Nationale, Pierre Boursicot, was aware of 
the cover given to the Mossad, this information was not apparently  shared with  the 
Renseignements Generaux branch, whose agents carried out the final embarkation 
controls at the ports.
Pages indicated to the Mossad that where a contingent of Jews was due to cross 
into France from the French zone of Germany, he would only require a “collective 
visa” to the country of final destination to be submitted to the French authorities in 
Germany.41  This would comprise a list of names stamped by die Consulate of the 
country concerned.  On the basis of this document, the Aliens Office would issue a 
collective transit visa, which would enable the immigrants to enter France. As a last 
bureaucratic act, the local Prefet responsible for the port of embarkation  (either the 
Bouches-du-Rhone or Herault  departments) would issue an exit visa for the 
contingent, stamping the document “As authorised by the Ministry of the Interior 
on...”
The whole administrative process was totally dependent on the availability of 
an apparently  authentic  collective visa, delivered by the Consulate of die country of 
ultimate destination. Once this was obtained by the Mossad, the rest of the process 
presented no obstacles  As to how this was achieved, one can only surmise that the 
financial resources available  to the Mossad were sufficient to convince a local consul 
in Marseilles to act in a manner of which his  own government might disapprove.
Visas from countries as varied as Venezuela, Columbia, Bolivia, Ethiopia and Cuba 
were the most popular  Given that, at least on the surface, French regulations were 
respected, the actual embarkation process could be carried out by the Mossad in 
daylight hours without any further subterfuge or fear of preventative measures. 
However the reality that these boats were being systematically intercepted near the 
Palestinian coast, eventually led to official protests by the British Embassy and 
confrontations betw een the  Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bidault and the pro-Zionist 
ministers, Depreux and Moch. (see 5.3)
40  Archives Nationales, ( Fontainebleau), M. Pages, Dossier de Carriere,  19770340, Art. 10.
41 Avriel, 266.
118An apocryphal  story concerning Pages is told by L/Abbe Glasberg. When, on 
one occasion, two thousand DPs were due to enter France without proper transit visas, 
Pages suggested a scenario to the Mossad which was to prove successful:  “ Arrange for 
them to cross the French Frontier on Sunday during the lunch hour. Tell the officer in 
charge to telephone me at home. Here is my telephone number.. I will pretend to be a 
little drunk  and I will say something to him like ‘What do you want me to do with
2,000  Jews? Leave me alone, do as you will, let them in’.”42 In the case of die 4,500 
passengers for the President Warfield  in July 1947, the frontier crossing presented 
certain difficulties because of the sheer numbers of those involved. Pages arranged that 
for each convoy arriving at the French frontier the police would telephone the Ministry 
of die Interior for instructions. Glasberg, who had been  specially allocated an office in 
the Ministry was, on Pages’s instructions, automatically passed these calls by the 
switchboard so that he could give die necessary instructions and clear the convoy for 
transit through France.43
Notwithstanding  these amusing, if somewhat suspect,  anecdotes which are 
intended to reflect the close and illicit  cooperation between Pages and Glasberg, Pages 
w ould not tolerate uncontrolled and illegal entry into France. He had wan^d the 
Jewish organisations in October 1946 that  measures would be taken to systematically 
send  Jews, who crossed the frontier illegally, back to the French  Zone.44
That Pages was regularly  informed  that Jews were  leaving  France with 
fraudulent  visas is clear from his exchange of correspondence  with  the Prefet of the 
Bouches-du-Rhone who was responsible for the Marseilles area  Pages’s response to 
the Prefet’s cry of alarm  is remarkable for its air of feigned  ignorance
In your letter no 916 of 23rd November you indicated to me that Jews are 
arriving in France with regular transit visas which, according to you, had 
been delivered in the majority of cases on the basis of fraudulent visas for 
countries, which claim not to have been consulted.
I would be obliged if you would indicate to me the nature  of this 
information and die basis on which you found your conclusions.45
42 David Lazard, L’Opinion Francaise et la Naissance de l’Etat d’Israel  1945-1949 (Paris,  1972),  100.
43 Lucien Lazare,  L’Abbe Glasberg, 92.
44 Archives National es, F7/16088, Minutes of a conference with 15 Jewish organisations, 18.10.46.
45 Archives Departeinentales des BDR,  148W185 Memo from Direction de la Reglementation et des 
Etrangers to Mr. le Prefet des  BDR, 23.11.46.
119The report on which the Prefet had based his conclusions originated  from the 
RG Agency. In addition to their reference about die visas, it also complained  about 
the lack of a special system which would ensure  that refugees entering  France 
effectively also left and did not remain unlawfully.46 On the face of it Pages always 
managed to keep  his own officials from enquiring too deeply into such questions 
which, if pursued, would have severely embarrassed his Ministry  and ultimately the 
operations of the Mossad.
Apart from  these  anecdotes and Pages’s quizzical  reaction to the occasional 
report from police officials, there was no  direct corroborative  evidence of his 
involvement  in illegal immigration Nevertheless there is some  circumstantial yet 
compelling evidence provided by a number of memoranda prepared within the 
Ministry itself. If nothing else, they are indicative of a sympathetic  approach to the 
question of the transit of Jewish  immigrants through France en route to, as they clearly 
knew, Palestine. The first dated September 1946 and addressed to the Minister of the 
Interior, states
I believe I should set out for the record an area in which you adopt a 
humane approach... This refers to the welcome into France of foreign Jews 
in transit, who are presently fleeing central and eastern Europe. Their 
welcome into France is necessary for the following reasons:
a. Reasons of Humanity: Because we are dealing with people 
who are victims of oppression
b.Political reasons: Our attitude should evoke the high regard of 
world Jewish circles, whose presence, we know, is considerable 
in certain foreign countries
c. Finally, practical reasons: It is only at the cost of adopting a 
friendly approach that we will be able to control efficiently a 
population movement, which had we opposed it, would have 
adopted covert means, leading to substantial problems for us.47
Clearly the wiiter w as as concerned with the promotion of French interests as 
with humanitarian considerations. Nevertheless it does indicate that the French were 
keen to facilitate the smooth transit of die immigrants towards die ports in the south of 
the country. Taking the most sceptical view, one  could characterise  this  as a method 
of ensuring that the Jewish population of France was not unduly increased by refugees
46 Ibid.,  Memo From Service Departmental des RG a Mr. le Prefet des BDR, 26.10.46.
120overstaying their welcome. On the otter hand it is also quite clear, from a study carried 
out on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that a controlled rise in the number of 
immigrants staying in France was in the French national interest. The possibility of 
convincing German prisoners of war to remain in France or the entry of Germans 
expelled from Eastern Europe, despite the  expected resentment of the French 
populace, was put forward as a considered short-term solution. If such  a controversial 
possibility could be envisaged  then surety a small  rise in the Jewish population, could 
hardly have been regarded as a problem 48
Another memorandum issued in 1950, after the creation of the State of Israel, is 
more significant. Basically it refers  to an anomolous situation created by  Ministry 
departments working with both the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish Agency. How ever 
the comments are very revealing as to the real  nature of the relationships with  the 
Zionists  in the 1945-1948 period.  The writer states
As you know' the Direction de la Reglementation took over in 1946 
the important problem of the Jewish DPs and refugees who wished to 
transit through France to sail to a country where they w ould be 
welcomed...  Many Jewish associations in France dealt with this problem, 
among them the Jewish Agency for Palestine. As the State of Israel did not 
exist at the time, given the political ramifications of this affair, discreet as 
opposed to official contacts were maintained between the interior ministry 
and the interested parties. A substantial number of Jew s from around the 
w orld w ere thus able to get to Palestine and contribute to the State of Israel.
The services rendered in kind by our country, albeit little known in France, 
were considerable  Those involved in the French administration have 
continued, even after our recognition of the State of Israel, to work as we 
did in the semi-clandestine period, by  staying in contact with the various 
Jewish entities...49
4  Archives Nationales F7/16108 Affaires Diverses. To Mimstre de 1’Interieur from  sous-direction des 
Etrangers et des Passeports,  23.9.46.
48 Archives Nationaies, Fla /4742, Renseignements Generaux.  Study  cm France’s demographic problem 
presented to Minister of the Interior for discussion at Cabinet  by Raymond Bousquet of the MAE
15.10.46.  This study underlined that France had an ageing population and that inunigrants between the 
ages of 26 and 35 would be welcome. Indeed a figure of 3 million immigrants  over five years was 
suggested as desirable if the French birth rate  itself did not increase substantially over that of the pre­
war years. Even then this would only maintain the population at the existing level. The alternative was a 
French population of only 32 million, insufficient to provide a large work force  to bring about economic 
recovery and the reconstruction effort required (1 8 million houses were  destroyed during the war).
49 Archives Nationaies, F7/15589 Transit Israelites en provenance d’ Allemagne et d’Europe Centrale. To 
Directeur de la  Reglementation et  Etrangers from sous-direction des Etrangers et des Passeports,
20.10.50.  Note: Author’s underlining is for emphasis.
121Given the context of the times, there can be little doubt that  “political 
ramifications” referred to British pressure on the French Government, that “interested 
parties” would have included the Mossad and that  “ services rendered” could only 
refer to illegal immigration. To that extent the memorandum contains the most implicit 
indicator of the  Ministry of the  Interior’s  complicity in Aliyah Bet.
In another  report, also  written in 1950, the  “Renseignements Generaux” 
reflected on aspects of illegal immigration.  The following extract clearly recognises 
the clandestine nature of the embarkations
France, traditional land of asylum, found itself on one of the principal routes towards 
Palestine. That is why the Zionist leaders approached the government to ask for a right 
of passage, which it knew, given the humanitarian policy always  followed by our 
government, would not be refused. It is also worth pointing out that the geographical 
location of the port of Marseilles lent itself to  departures to Palestine, particularly at 
the beginning of the emigration, when there were a number of clandestine 
embarkations. Also the social climate which existed in France [at the time] permitted 
the Jewish leadership to engage in an important organisational effort, both as 
concerned departures as well as the setting up of the necessary transit points.50
Some years later, in 1958 , another report prepared by  Renseignements Generaux, on 
Israel and Zionism stated  that France had been  favourably disposed to  and  had aided 
the immigration process as early as 1946, when it was still  in its illegal phase.51
These revelations put  a different light on assurances given by the Ministry of 
the Interior to the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs  that the immigrants' visas etc. were 
always in order. Apart from die aid provided  by  these departments of the Ministry' of 
the Interior  it is more than probable that many civil servants and minor officials 
together with policemen, port employees, dockers and shipping agents facilitated the 
process. In addition frontier guards, customs officers and station masters were clearly 
aware of the special immigrant trains that crossed France towards the southern ports.
As to the preparation of the boats, which had to be fitted with hundreds of 
bunks, radio transmitters and provisions for die journey to Palestine, others in the 
French ports  would have been in the know.52 In March 1947, the Director of 
information of die Jewish Agency7  discreetly  alluded to this help by stating  that no
50Archives Nationaies, F7/15589  Direction des Renseignements Generaux, section frontiere, le 
mouvement de Transmigration des Israelites : la question Israelienne,  1950.
51 Archives Nationaies, F7/16107,  RG report entitled « Israel et le Sionisme »,  17.6.58.
122other government in Europe was doing as much for the Jews as  that under the 
Premiership of Ramadier. He reported that only in the last few months 20,000 Polish 
Jews had been allowed into France. There  was in France,  he stated,  concern for the 
Yishuv's problems. This extended to the question  of immigration to Palestine. They 
had  received as much  help from non-Jewish as well as Jewish sources. All this 
underlined the humanitarian attitude of the French Republic towards the  Jewish 
survivors.53
A  further appreciation of the extent of the aid afforded by the French  to illegal 
immigration are  the  impressions retained by Yigal Allon, head of the Palmach, on a 
visit of inspection to France in 1947. Allon stated
We moved around France as if we found ourselves carrying out the lawful activities of 
the Haganah. The French authorities treated us like allies. Our boats in the ports of 
Marseilles and surroundings, were repaired, prepared for sailing, whilst Jewish soldiers 
wearing British uniforms transported in “borrowed” military vehicles the survivors of 
the camps. Solidarity reigned: the dockers in the ports, the restaurant owners, the 
lawyers who dealt with our legal requirements, everybody put themselves out to help 
us. We were surrounded by love, by human kindness.54
5 .3 Inter-ministerial conflicts caused by British diplomatic pressure.
There can be little doubt that  the major player on the British side in the 
campaign against illegal immigration was the Foreign Office and that without the 
formidable  Ernest Bevin at its head,  its determination might have flagged on 
occasions. Bevin  was particularly incensed by the attitude of the French Government, 
which he considered was  less than grateful for British  war-time support. That, during 
1946, they  remained quiescent  in the face of the illicit traffic through their ports 
appeared an unfriendly act at best.
Starting in 1947 the  Foreign Office  launched  a campaign of mounting 
pressure on the French Government to bring illegal immigration from its ports to an 
end. It w’ as  aware that the French were very keen to obtain British support in their 
demands for German labour to be made available from die British zone  and  that this 
could be used as a form of leverage. Failing that, the Foreign Office w as not averse to
lizard, 96.
53  MAE Archives, Siomsme, File 373, Carton 72, Talk by M. 1. Klinow, Director of Information at the 
Jewish Agency, Radio Jerusalem, March 1947.
54 Nicault, 220.
123causing the French some difficulties with the Arab countries over their North African 
possessions.
The diplomatic pressure, applied for the most part by the British Ambassador, 
Duff Cooper, was at its most acute on  Georges Bidault, whose MRP faction in the 
coalition Government was in a minority. Believing that France’s interest lay  in 
cooperating  with the British in  economic and foreign policy matters, Bidault strove to 
convince the  two most influential Socialist ministers to resolve the  illegal 
immigration issue so that it did not interfere with his own agenda
Both Edouard Depreux, the  Interior Minister with his control over the police 
and Jules Moch, The Minister of Public Works and Transport, with his control over the 
French maritime ports, were in prime positions to give a helping hand to Aliyah Bet 
and to resolve any difficulties which the Mossad could encounter with French 
officialdom. All they asked was a measure of discretion by the Mossad so as to avoid 
embarrassment with their non-Socialist colleagues in the coalition government.
The amiable documentation analysed below7  reveals how7  difficult was 
Bidault’s  task to counteract their influence  and how  the  subject of illegal 
immigration created such tensions  between his Ministry and those of the Interior and 
Public Works and Transport.
The first real signs of protest from the British Embassy in France  came with 
the interception of the Asya,  the first ship to leave France  (See chapter 6.1).
Following its interception off the coast of Palestine  on 27th March 1946, Sir Alan 
Cunningham, the High Commissioner in Palestine, requested that urgent 
representations be made to the French Government “to persuade them to take steps to 
stop this traffic from French ports.” 55 This was taken up by Duff Cooper, who duly 
wTote to the MAE  drawing attention to the British government’s concerns about illegal 
immigration from French ports which, he argued pointedly, caused great resentment in 
the Arab States of the Middle East.56 This was a none too subtle way of telling the 
French that they were risking trouble in their North African possessions.
In a separate memorandum Duff Cooper also raised the question of  illegal 
immigrants who had tried to hide among legal immigrants on French liners  that
55 TNA, CO 537/1802, From Cunningham to Secretary of State for  the Colonies, 11.4.46.
56 Ibid., Aide Memoire from Paris Embassy to MAE,  10.5.46 (Not including separate memorandum).
124regularly called at Haifa. He mentioned the SS Champolion as a case in point  where 
among 900 immigrants 100 were found  without Entry Certificates. The memorandum 
stated quite categorically that investigations had shown that illegal immigration was 
run from the headquarters of a Jewish organisation situated somewhere in Paris. 
However it  admitted ignorance of die individuals involved and the exact location of 
the headquarters. On a separate tack, it was suggested that the Jewish Agency’s Paris 
branch, run by Ruth Kluger, was also implicated in illegal immigration.57
A week later the Embassy wrote again to the MAE, pointing out that a suspect 
boat, carrying the Honduran flag, was preparing to leave Marseilles with yet another 
load of illegal immigrants.58 In response the MAE speedily  confirmed that it had asked 
the Ministry of the Interior to take the necessary steps to put an end to the irregularities 
at the ports.59  Confronted with these claims Pages, at the Ministry of the Interior, 
launched a formal investigation. His deputy later  reported  back  to the MAE that all 
administrative procedures in relation to the boats listed had been correctly carried out 
by the police and customs officials at the ports, and that therefore no blame could be 
attached to diem.60
The problem of lack of adequate controls, from the British point of view,  was 
further exacerbated by  die existence of an arrangement between the French 
Government and  the Conseil Interoeuvres d’Aide aux Immigrants et Transitaires Juifs 
(CIATJ), which represented French Jewish organisations. Under this arrangement, 
which came into force in August 1946, France permitted, at any one time, the 
temporary residence in  its territory of some 8000 Jewish refugees pending a decision 
as to their ultimate destination. It was left to the CIATJ to procure the necessary visas 
from those countries prepared to take them.
The quota of 8,000  allowed up to  7,000 refugees to travel on  collective transit 
visas and  for up to 1,000 refugees  to travel  on individual visas.61 To die chagrin of 
the British, this enabled the entry into France of refugees without the need to produce a 
visa for a country of ultimate destination and therefore opened up the possibility of
5/ MAE Archives,  Immigration, File 376,  Aide Memoire from Paris Embassy to MAE,  10.5.46. 
(including separate memorandum).
58I b id British Embassy to MAE,  17.5.46. An annotation indicated that the contents of this letter were 
telephoned urgently to Marcel Pages at the Ministry of the Interior.
59 Ibid., Direction d'Afrique-Levant to British Embassy, 23.5.46.
60 Ibid., Letter from Bernard, sous-directeur du Service Etranger et des Passeports to Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres,  11.7.46.
125leaving France without such a visa or even a false one. Also as refugees left French 
ports, the quota was automatically renewed up to its full level.
There was also another category of refugees and these, having obtained a visa 
for a country of ultimate destination  outside of France, were automatically provided 
with a transit visa through France by the nearest French consulate. However as  this 
also opened up the possibility of the use of false visas, die MAE  now insisted that the 
consuls did not issue  transit visas without prior authorisation from  Paris. This new 
stipulation was provoked by the case of the San Dimitrio which, in October 1946, had 
embarked  in La Ciotat 1,200 illegal immigrants in possession of false visas to 
Ethiopia. The ship, now renamed the Latrun, was intercepted off the Palestinian coast 
on 30th October.
The British Embassy recognised  how sensitive the French Government was to 
the issue of Jewish refugees, as it did not wish to offend Jewish  public opinion nor 
appear in its policies to be anti-Zionist  Also there was an awareness that the French 
press was largely sympathetic as was the majority of the Government  to the Zionist 
cause. Thus, in the Embassy’s view, if Jewish refugees could be prevented from 
entering  France in the first place, this would be the preferred solution to the problem. 
However  once they were in France the interest of the French government was in 
moving them on as quickly as possible and thus there was no certainty that 
undertakings given to the British Government, regarding the application of effective 
controls would be fulfilled.62
The origins of the agreement with die Jewish organisations can be linked to the 
initiative of a former Prime Minister, Felix Gouin (26.1.46 to 12.6.46), who responded 
to an appeal by the Chief Rabbi of Palestine, Isaac Herzog, to provide a safe route 
through France to safer havens for those  Jews wishing to leave  Poland.63 Initially he 
received approval to bring 5,000 people into France. Subsequently the FSJF received a 
promise of 3,000 visas.64 These discussions took place  even before the incident at 
Kielce on 4th July 1946, when some 42 Jew’s were massacred by a Polish mob. This
61 TNA, FO 371/61750 and FO 371/61800, January,  1947.
02 TNA, CO 537/1801, British Embassy Paris to British Consul-General in Marseilles, 27.11.46. This 
detailed letter was in response to  one from S.E.Kay, the Consul, who was advocating a tightening, by 
the Ministry of the Interior, of the entry of Jewish Refugees  into France.
63 Archives Nationales, F7/16088, Memo from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to French Ambassador in 
Warsaw, 26.8.46.
64 Archives of the AJJDC,  Report on immigration from Poland to France, 25.10.46.
126tragic incident enabled the Bricha, the Jewish rescue organisation, to obtain from the 
Polish Government permission for Jews to leave Poland without exit permits or visas 
and to cross into Czechoslovakia.65 There followed  a major exodus of some 90,000 
Jews towards the American Zones in Austria and Germany. 66 The response of the 
Americans was to seek an outlet for this increasing burden on their resources, by
67 quietly facilitating die onward movement of the refugees into Italy and France.
To the annoyance of the French authorities, American military  trains full of 
DPs, organised by UNRRA and the Joint, managed to leave the American Zone in 
Germany  and transit quite freely through  the French Zone  and into France. Once 
there the DPs were taken  to camps in die south prior to embarkation for Palestine. 
This practice, which implicitly pointed to American collusion in illegal immigration, 
was an abuse of an agreement signed by the allies in August 1944, whereby the 
American forces were permitted the unencumbered transit through France of men and 
supplies.69 Eventually die  army commander in the French Zone, General Koenig 
managed to  interrupt this traffic. He demanded from the Americans proper timetables 
and details of the composition of the sealed trains.70
The creation of the CIATJ was made necessary by the deluge of visa requests 
emanating from seventeen different Jewish organisations. The French Government and 
the Joint prevailed on Marc Jarblum  to centralise the demands through one 
government-approved Agency and this was finally agreed after long negotiations.7 1  
Given France’s  professed regard for the  humanitarian aspects of the problem,  the 
details for this arrangement were agreed without difficulty  between the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs  and the Ministry of the Interior. The principal  stipulation of the MAE
65 Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics.  176.
66 Manchester Guardian. 15th and  19* August  1946
67 Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics. 260.
68 Archives Nationales, F7/16Q88  letter to Minister for Foreign Affairs from
P. Boursicot, Director of the Surete Nationale, 18.9.46, and also Report by Renseignements Generaux 
in 1950, F7/15589.
69 Archives Nationales, Fonds Georges Bidault, 457AP124. Note for Leon Blum, 22.1.47.
70 Archives Nationales, F7/16089, Memo to Minister of the Interior from Direction de la Reglementation 
Interieur, 22.4.47.
71 Archives of the AJJDC, Report from Paris office to New York headquarters of the Joint, 25.10.46:
The seventeen Jewish organisations were: Agudas Israel, Aliyat Hanoar, Anciens Combatants Polonais 
Juifs, Assistance aux Deportes et Refugies, Association des Juifs Polonais, Cojasor, Comite Hebreu de 
Liberation Nationale, Federation des Societes Juives de France, Foyer Ouvrier Juif (Poalei Zion), 
Hashomer Hatsair, Jewish Agency, Office Palestimen, Organisations des Juifs Polonais, Union des Juifs 
pour la Resistance et l’entraide (UJRE) and World Jewish Congress. The report also indicated that the 
CIATJ was to be located in the premises of the FSJF.
127was that during their stay  in France, the refugees would acquire  entry visas to a 
country of ultimate  destination, thus ensuring that their stay  would only be temporary. 
The administrative work involved in preparing applications for visas was delegated  to 
Claire Vaydat’s welfare agency the “Assistance aux Deportes et Refugies”, an offshoot 
of the  FSJF, which then had direct access to the Ministries involved.72
Having no jurisdiction over the movements of foreigners  within France, the 
MAE was  totally reliant  on the  efficiency  of officials of the Ministry of the Interior 
and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport to ensure that the refugees did indeed 
leave France  after complying with all the formalities. As events were to show, the 
MAE only belatedly and because of British Intelligence information, realised  that it 
was being  duped  both by Depreux’s and Modi’s officials and that the refugees were 
part of the illegal immigration campaign. To make amends  to the British  and in an 
attempt to ensure proper coordination with the other occupying power in Germany 
directly involved, namely the Americans, the MAE  proposed  a  tripartite conference 
in Paris, to review controls over refugees entering France. This was  held  on 11th 
January 1947 in die Salon de l’Horloge at the Quai d’Orsay and chaired by Raymond 
Bousquet, Director General of the Direction des Conventions Administratives et 
Sociales  at die Ministry. The British delegation was represented by Ashley Clarke, 
Minister  at the Paris Embassy whilst the Americans were represented by  Gerald 
Drew, die First Secretary at their  embassy.  The subjects discussed were the need to 
unify  DPs’ identification papers and the struggle against illegal emigration out of 
Germany.73
Despite initial American misgivings it was agreed that, as a matter of principle,  all 
persons leaving the zones of occupation in Germany should have individual travel 
documents and exit permits. In addition, exit permits could only be granted once a visa 
had been obtained to the country of ultimate destination74 In later bilateral meetings 
with representatives of the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the Intenor, however, 
it became clear to the British that die French would not check the validity of visas for 
the ultimate destination This was crucial as these visas were generally obtained by the 
Mossad from corrupt consular officials or were forged by Polonski’s people  in
2 Archives Nationales, F7 16088, internal  memo to Minister of the Interior from Direction de la 
Reglementation, 7.8.46.
73 Archives Nationales, RG report,  15.1.47.
128laboratories close to or within the transit camps.75 The  false visas  were created  purely 
to satisfy French bureaucracy and as a cover for the immigrants’ true destination.
The first real attempt to force  the Ministry of the Interior to take the  issue  of 
illegal immigration seriously,  appears to have been launched by  Philippe Perier, one 
of Bousquet’s officials who was in regular contact with the British Embassy. He 
appears to have twice communicated with  Edouard Depreux on the subject. In a first 
letter on 27th December 1946, ostensibly written on behalf of Leon Blum, the Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister at the time, he informed Depreux of action he had taken 
in relation to one thousand Jewish  immigrants from Czechoslovakia, due to arrive in 
France in transit to  board  the SS Archangelos  to the Dominican Republic. Apparently 
he had been informed by the British Embassy in Paris  that consultations with the 
Government at Santo Domingo had indicated that they did not wish to accept these 
immigrants on their territory. Accordingly he had instructed his representative in 
Prague to refiise any transit visa to these immigrants.76
In an apparent  second  communication  to Depreux  he  requested that all 
immigrant visas for Jews  be checked by the MAE with the embassy of the country of 
ultimate destination, before embarkation took place. Depreux, having checked with 
Leon Blum that he had not authorised Perier’s original initiative,  responded a few days 
later to  what must have been Perier’s second communication.  He pointed out that  as 
departmental Prefets were already only allowing the exit of Jewish emigrants (on 
collective lists) on presentation of visas for countries of ultimate destination, this was 
already stretching  the law. Normally any foreigner leaving France, although obliged to 
have an exit visa,  did not have to submit to this additional  procedure. In an attempt to 
deflect Perier from  pursuing his original  demand any further, Depreux ended: “To 
sum up, whilst appreciating the purpose of the British request, I believe that the 
proposed procedure is too heavy and too complicated to be efficient and could only 
damage our interests.” 77
74 TNA, FO 371/61750, January 1947.
75 Hadari, Hamossad,  12.
76 Ilaganah Archives, Blumel files,  123/Blumel/2, Letter from Perier to Depreux, 27.12.46.
77 Archives Nationales, Fonds Georges Bidault,  457AP124, Letter from Depreux to Minister of Foreign 
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129Two weeks lata*  in  a conversation between Ernest Bevin and Massigii,  the 
French Ambassador in London, the subject of illegal immigration was raised. The 
conversation took place at a reception in London for Leon Blum who, at the time  was 
still  leading the caretaker Government. Bevin informed Massigii, out of the earshot of 
Blum, that, according to intelligence reports, terrorist actions in Palestine were largely 
organised by extremist Jews in Paris. In effect, he contended, Jewish terrorists were 
being allowed to leave French ports on illegal ships. He  therefore asked Massigii to 
seek the French Government’s assistance to prevent this traffic. When informed of this 
conversation, Blum treated this particular  assertion with a certain amount of 
scepticism, although he acknowledged that illegal immigration was certainly being 
organised in Paris.7*
A day'or so after his return to Paris,  Blum dealt  more formally'with the 
problem created by Perier. Having indicated that he had not  had  advance sight of 
Perier’s  letter,  he instructed  that  Depreux  be informed that “it is not in order for us 
to verify the authenticity of entry  visas to [foreign] countries which are submitted to 
us”.79  This however was not the end of the matter, for  Leon Blum’s Premiership 
came to an end on 22nd January 1947 and the new Prime Minister, Paul  Ramadier, 
restored Bidault to die MAE. Seizing the opportunity, once again, to expose  the lack 
of controls in respect of illegal immigration activities,  Raymond Bousquet, Perier’s 
immediate superior, vented his department's  frustration  to  Bidault in the following 
terms
In any event the French authorities have not applied any control to 
ensure that the entry visas to the country of ultimate destination are valid. 
Furthermore neither die police nor die maritime authorities exercise any 
control over the departure of ships containing immigrants, which leave our 
Mediterranean ports.
Consequently a clandestine immigration exists through France, 
particularly as a result of the arrival of American Military' trains containing 
Jews who possess neither travel documents nor exit visas from Germany.
A number of ships (San Dimitrio, Merica) have since October departed 
from Franch ports with 2,000 immigrants carrying false visas to Ethiopia 
and Cuba There is no doubt that they' were on their way to Palestine. It is
^Archives Nationales, Foods Georges Bidault,  457AP124,  Note from Massigii to Chauvel, General 
Secretary of the MAE,  16.1.47.
79 Haganah Archives, Blumel files,  123/Blumel/2,  Blum’s letter of instruction to his Chef de Cabinet,
21.1.47.
130not unlikely that among the immigrants terrorists have infiltrated. In order 
to satisfy Mr. Bevin’s request, my department has made the following 
proposals:
a Verification of visas with foreign consulates, to ensure their 
validity.
b.  A very strict control of visas at the port of exit by the police 
and maritime authorities.8 0
This memorandum illustrates how well aware the senior officials of the  MAE 
had become  of the true destination  of immigrants who had transited  across France, 
despite the Ministry of Interior’s protestations to the contrary, and they now insisted on 
stringent measures to bring die traffic to Palestine to a stop. But they had yet to 
overcome  the entrenched position of both  Depreux and Moch  who, as long as 
possible, fought a rearguard action to preserve the Mossad’s area of manoeuvrability 
on French soil.
A subsequent  initiative by die MAE to intervene in an area of administrative 
responsibility, which he considered his own, serv ed to  awaken the ire of Jules Moch. 
He took exception to Perier this time  writing on behalf of Bidault to the Secretary 
General of the Merchant Navy  in which he tried to  dictate control procedures to be 
instituted at the ports.8 1 These, in Moch’s view, would have  “international 
repercussions”. This response launched  an exchange of correspondence  which, 
seemingly,  exposed  a measure of exasperation on both sides.
3rd February 1947  Moch to Bidault
In your letter to the Secretary’ of the Merchant Navy you asked him to 
prevent foreign ships from sailing from French ports if they carried illegal 
immigrants to Palestine. You believe that this would cause problems in 
Franco-British relations.
It w ould be a very sensitive matter to hold foreign owned ships. As 
a Minister, I can only intervene if a foreign vessel appears to be in breach 
of international law for merchant shipping. If it were judged desirable to 
arrest shipping on political grounds, I would not be able to take part in such 
an operation in my capacity as Minister of Public Works and Transport...
[In futurejl am interested in receiving details of every action that you have 
proposed  in the matter of preventing ships sailing from, or about to sail 
from French ports.”82
80  MAE Archives, Immigration,  file 376,  memo from Bousquet to Bidault, 31.1.47.
81 Kennet, 289.
82 Archives Nationales, Fonds  Jules Moch, 484AP13, Fonctions Ministerielles.
131Bidault’s reply, whilst polite in its terms, did not hide his dismay at Modi’s unhelpful 
attitude
The first approaches by my officials to yours were motivated by die 
numerous complaints from the British Embassy in Paris and by the 
personal appeal of Mr. Bevin to Mr. Massigii [ French Ambassador in 
London]. Mr. Bevin made note of the spirit of tolerance with  which  the 
French authorities apparently treated Jewish terrorists who were travelling 
illegally to Palestine. It therefore appeared to my officials necessary to 
provide our Ambassador with the means to show the British authorities that 
their claim against the French authorities was without foundation. Despite 
die indications in your letter, I maintain that your department does possess 
two effective means of control.
Bidault  then suggested (a) informing the British authorities of suspect shipping 
in French ports and  (b) that the port captain should obtain details, via the pilot, of the 
true destination of a suspect ship. His view was that where illegal immigration was 
suspected, die government under whose flag die ship was sailing, was unlikely to 
protest the French action, where a journey was not in  accordance with the ship’s 
manifest. Bidault went on to say : ‘The French Government would be well within its 
rights to exercise these controls, given that the illegal departure of Jews can only 
interfere with die regular movement of immigrant Jews with valid visas... ”. 83
Moch’s reply on 28th February was clearly intended to block any further 
interference by Bidault’s officials. In a clear reference to their war time activities in the 
Resistance, Moch reproached Bidault for suggesting that illegal immigrants could be 
terrorists, when only a few years previously “y °u as well as I, were branded ‘terrorists' 
by the authorities then in power in France”. He went on to decry the use of pilots as 
police spies to obtain information from ships’ masters as to their ultimate destination 
which would then be passed on to a foreign power. Neither was he prepared to impose 
this task on the captains of the ports.
Moch closed by inviting Bidault to raise the matter in Cabinet, but warned him that he 
would defend his position, namely that men under his control would only carry out 
their professional duties but not act as policemen.84
83  MAR Archives, Cabinet  du Ministre, Sous-s6rie G. Bidault. Dossier Afrique/ levant no. 156,
22.2.47.
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132Outside  government, but nevertheless an influential voice with Socialist 
ministers,  Andre Blumel  intervened directly with Paul Ramadier on 13* March 1947. 
His personal status within the Socialist Party enabled him to address Ramadier with a 
familiarity not available to others. He insisted that  Leon Blum’s former directive of 
21st January 1947  on the subject of immigrants’ visas should not  again be 
circumvented by the MAE. In other words, no investigation was to be made of the 
legitimacy or otherwise of visas issued by foreign countries in the possession of 
immigrants transiting through France. Unless Ramadier had changed the  policy,  he 
would be grateful if the civil servants in the Ministry of Foreign affairs ware reminded, 
as a matter of urgency, of their duty to apply Government directives.85 This exceptional 
letter  indicates that  the Mossad was anxious  to avoid too close an inspection of the 
visas it supplied to illegal immigrants and Blumel was the ideal man to intercede on 
their behalf.
The apparently rancorous exchange of correspondence between Bidault and 
Modi  is treated with some light-hearted sceptirism by Jules Moch in his memoirs. In 
effect he seems to imply that die whole business was a charade by Bidault, intended to 
impress others (One would assume: either Bidault’s pro-Arab officials in the Quai 
d’Orsay or indeed even the British Ambassador).
28.2.47.1  exchange memos and telephone calls with Bidault, under 
pressure from British diplomats, but at heart in agreement with me. He asks 
me (but without really meaning it) that I inform him of the real destination 
of boats leav ing our Mediterranean ports in order to help (or appear to 
help) die British to block the clandestine landings in Palestine. I refuse.
The destination of a boat, for me, is that indicated by its Master. Bidault is,
I am certain, delighted with my reply.86
This apparent suggestion  in Moch’s memoirs that  Bidault, in reality, had a 
laid-back attitude towards  illegal immigration and British diplomatic pressure, could 
possibly  be dismissed as an attempt to rehabilitate Bidault  after  his political demise 
over the Algerian independence issue. Certainly  Moch’s  high regard for Bidault is 
reflected in  the genuine feelings of warmth and sympathy that emerge from a number
85 Haganah Archives, Blumel files,  123/Blumel/2,15.3.47.
86 Moch, 269.
133of private letters addressed to Bidault by both Jules Moch and his wife between 1949 
and 1972.87
Again, as we will see later, when analysing  the Altalena Affaire, Moch 
deliberately characterises Bidault as a true friend of Israel.” This  view of Bidault as a 
closet Zionist  is supported by his biographer. He characterises Bidault’s prudent 
official  approach to all matters concerned with Palestine, whether it be on illegal 
immigration or later on the UN vote on partition or the recognition of the State of 
Israel,  as hiding,  in reality, “A real empathy for the Zionist endeavour.”88
However nothing in Bidault’s papers would indicate that these were his  true 
feelings. On the contrary, his correspondence with Depreux and Modi in early 1947 
over illegal immigration tends to underline his frustration with an issue that threatened 
to upset the rapport he had built up with Bevin in other bilateral matters more 
concerned with France’s post-war  economic  rejuvenation. Certainly in the case of the 
Partition vote, it would be difficult to credit Bidault with pro-Zionist  sentiments. In a 
telegramme to the French delegation to the United Nations in October 1947, he clearly 
sets out his position that the  delegation should abstain in the vote.
After the disclosure of the American and Soviet positions it is unlikely that 
any attempt at reconciliation [between Jews and Arabs] has any chance of 
success. As far as we are concerned our approach, as defined before the 
delegation left Paris, is to dissuade die Assembly from an imposed solution 
and if there is no agreement between the parties concerned or any 
particular plan, to propose an adjournment... If therefore, as one can 
surmise, the Assembly moved towards a settlement rejected by the Arabs, 
the French delegation should normally abstain...
According to the last information received by die department this is 
as much as is expected from us by the Arab states. It would be useful to 
inform die British delegation in advance of our intentions, reminding them 
of the reasons why we have to take into account our many interests in 
countries with Arab populations.89
Rene  Mayer, dial  a senior  member of the UN delegation reacted with dismay 
to Bidault's approach. Beginning his letter in  a somewhat obsequious tone “We have
87 Archives Nationales,  Fonds Georges Bidault, 457AP186.
88  Jacques Dalloz, Georges Bidault: Biographie Politique  (Paris,  1992), 274.
89 Archives Nationales, Fonds Georges Bidault, 457AP124, Telegramme from Bidault to French 
delegation in New York,  15.10.47.
134often spoken together about Jewish matters. You will recognise, 1  believe, that I always 
approached the subject with the greatest discretion and objectivity that I could muster”, 
he went on to alert  Bidault to the difficult moral and political situation of the 
delegation, which the telegramme had created.90 Indeed, within a day, the  telegramme 
provoked  the resignation of at least one member of the delegation, who refuted the 
contention that all  had already been agreed prior to its departure from Paris.9 1
Leon Blum added his own  stinging  condemnation, pointing out that nothing 
was worse from the point of view of France's territories in North Africa, than to show 
weakness and fear in the face of pan-Arab fanaticism. From a humanitarian point of 
view, France would have gained nothing.  Rather France would have revealed to 
world public opinion an injustice and a lack of courage92  From within the Cabinet, 
Edouard Depreux passed on to Bidault Weizmann’s expressions of dismay, as 
transmitted to him by Marc Jarblum.93 In the event, when the Partition vote came up on 
29th November, Bidault finally  acceded  to the will of the majority of the Cabinet and 
ordered the delegation to vote in favour of partition.
The conclusion that can  be drawn from this volte face is that  where Palestine 
w as concerned, Bidault  had no strong convictions either way. Rather than enter into a 
political confrontation with his colleagues in the Cabinet, he preferred to take the line 
of least resistance, even if this dismayed his officials at the Quai d’Orsay. Later, in the 
matter of the Altalena Affair he again courted controversy by adopting an approach 
w hich, even in the context of the times, appeared somewhat  irrational.
In all these matters a thumb-nail  description  of Bidault’s psychological make­
up, such as given here by Georgette Elgey, only serves to enhance one’s appreciation 
of the complex nature  of the man
Small in stature he had a very large ego. As head of the wartime 
resistance he saw himself equal to de Gaulle, but the  humiliation he 
suffered at his hands only served to turn his admiration to hate. His only 
passion was foreign affairs and  he forbade within the forums of the MRP 
any discussions on international questions.
90 Archives Nationales, Fonds Rene Mayer, 363AP36, Letter to Bidault from Mayer, 20.10.47.
91 Archives Nationales, Fonds Georges Bidault, 457AP124, letter to Bidault from  Olivier Lapie,
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135This was his private fiefdom. Bidault preferred compromise. He was 
highly intellectual, secretive, cunning, irascible, inconsistent, had few 
friends, was not well organised  and ate irregularly. His fondness for drink 
during his days in the Resistance had been noted by his comrades,  who 
nevertheless paid tribute to his courage.94
In  February  1947  following an  initiative launched by  Leon Blum during his 
tenure in office, a treaty was initialled at Dunkirk between Great Britain and France. In 
referring to this event, intended to cement even further the  existing cordial relations, 
the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, told  the Cabinet Committee on Defence 
that the British now had  ctthe right to expect active assistance in the prevention of 
illegal immigration into Palestine from the French government... ” 95  This optimistic 
assertion came at the end of a period when Britain had striven with all the diplomatic 
tact at its disposal to encourage  the French Government to meet its demands, for the 
most part without success.
On 17th February 1947, after  the failure of the London Conference on 
Palestine, Bevin announced that he was referring the question of the British Mandate to 
die UN. Faced with this new situation,  the intelligence community  anticipated that the 
Jewish Agency would make a massive effort to increase the flow7  of illegal immigrants 
to influence the outcome  of any future enquiry.96 As France  was construed as being 
the most active area for illegal immigration at the time, the British Embassy, on 
instructions from London, kept up remorseless pressure on the Quai d'Orsay, to 
persuade the French Government to take preventative  action. 97 The matter was also 
taken up by Bevin when he met up with Bidault at a conference in Moscow in early 
April 1947. After their meeting  Bidault felt obliged to telegraph back to Paris urging
94 Elgey,  174-175.
95 Zertal, Catastrophe, 63.
96 TNA, FO 371/61804,  Report by Joint-Intelligence Sub-committee of the Ministry of Defence,
10.4.47.  It was estimated that some 35,000 potential immigrants were already close to Mediterranean 
and Adriatic ports of departure and that  at least 20 ships were already available with a further  17  being 
refitted for the purpose.
9‘  TNA, CO 537/2276, Memorandum by Hector McNeil at the Foreign Office to Cabinet Defence 
Committee, 30.4.47.  McNeil repeated  that France represented 80% of all illegal immigrant  traffic in 
the previous six months.  [As Appendix 1(a) will show, the reality was nearer to 30%. The discrepancy 
no doubt arises from misidentitying the ports of departure at the time]. The majority of the potential 
immigrants were, however, in Italy (some 22,000).  McNeil  felt that although  strong pressure should 
also be exerted on its government, he also recognised  that the Italians lacked the necessary' military' and 
police forces to control their long coastline.
136the Cabinet to respond to British demands. Clearly though, Duff Cooper did not hold 
out much hope of a positive response. On 3rd April he telegraphed the Foreign Office
Mr. Bidault has telegraphed from Moscow strongly urging that French 
Government should meet us on matter of illegal immigration, and 
Mr.Teitgen who is in charge at the Quai d’Orsay was also on our side as 
were the MRP in general. Socialist Ministers however and particularly Mr. 
Depreux, Minister of die Interior and Mr. Moch, Minister of Transport 
were strongly pro-Jewish and had so far refused to cooperate in measures 
to stop this traffic.98
This emphasis on  Socialist Ministers being “pro-Jewish'’ (in other words pro- 
Zionist), as opposed to the MRP Ministers considered as  favourably disposed to 
British entreaties, is also  a popular refrain in Foreign Office correspondence. A typical 
example is  ‘Trench left-wing politicians (and in particular the Socialists) are strongly 
biased in favour of the Jews... ” 99
As a measure of their frustration with the French Government there were 
advocates within the Foreign Office of moves to embarrass the French. Generally this 
amounted  to weakening France's position in North Africa by publicising its aid to 
illegal immigrants. A report by Hector MacNeill, Minister at the Foreign Office, 
reviewed the steps taken to pressurise the French Government to control illegal 
immigrants transiting through France. He expressed regret that the intransigence of 
Socialist members of the Government had prevailed a satisfactory response despite the 
positive discussions between Foreign Ministers Bidault and Bevin in Moscow7  at the 
time.
MacNeill  also revealed  a machiavellian side to his character when he 
suggested that die French could be brought to order by causing them embarrassment 
with the Arabs. Given Arab antipathy to their presence in North Africa it would not 
help the French if the Arabs were to realise that the Jews were mostly arriving from 
French ports. The suggestion was that if the French failed to respond to unofficial 
warnings and continued to obstruct British demands, then suitable articles could be 
planted in the Arab press in London or the Middle East. He also disclosed that in the 
last few months the  British had tried to de-register suspect boats in order to delay their
98 TNA CO 537/2276, Telegramme from British Embassy, Paris to Foreign Office, 3.4.47.
99 TNA  FO 371/61750, R.G.Howe to J.Martin at the Colonial Office, 4.2.47.
137departure and to facilitate their interception by the Royal Navy. He also opened up the 
possibility of a legal justification for interception to take place on the high seas.
As to other coercive measures, MacNeill proposed stopping the practice 
whereby the monthly quota of 1,500 for entry' into Palestine was half filled by 
detainees from Cyprus, originally taken off illegal boats.  He suggested that there could 
also be a threat, publicised in the press, that once Cyprus had reached its limit of illegal 
immigrants, the rest would be taken far away to the Seychelles or Sierra Leone.100 
There was also an implication that the  French desire to recruit German workers, a 
move dependent on British goodwill, might not be supported as much as it might 
otherwise be. Finally there was also the suggestion, for die first time, that shiploads of 
illegal immigrants would be forced to return to France and place the French 
Government in a dilemma of its own making.1 0 1
A confrontation within the French Cabinet on the subject of illegal immigration 
finally took place in April 1947. Bidault, who was attending a Foreign Ministers’ 
Council Meeting in Moscow at the time, mote to the Prime Minister, Paul Ramadier, 
about  a veiy insistent letter he had just received from Bevin  on illegal immigration.
As a result he wished  to impart a note of caution to  the cabinet at its forthcoming 
meeting on 9th April: “I must give you my firm opinion that die continuation of the 
present state of affairs, which the department [MAE] has vainly tried to remedy, will 
no doubt cause within a short period of time veiy serious complications in our 
relationship with England.” 10 2
In the event the Cabinet meeting on 9th April was inconclusive as Jules Moch 
was absent. At a subsequent meeting on 16th April, Ramadier agreed in the absence of 
Edouard Depreux to cany the discussion over to  a more restricted Cabinet  meeting to 
beheld on 21st April at his residence.103  At this meeting it was left to  Bidault’s  and 
Depreux’s  deputies, Pierre-Henri Teitgen and Marcel Pages respectively' to lead the 
debate. Teitgen presented a paper with a proposal that all visas for the country7  of 
ultimate destination be checked as to their validity by the MAE.104
100 TNA, CO 537/ 2276,  30.4.47.
101 TNA, FO 371/61806/61807 12.5.47.
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138In response, Pages pointed to the constant requests of the Quai d’Orsay to 
forbid the transit of Jewish refugees through France and  accused the MAE of 
attempting by all means to force the Government into adopting British Government 
policy. In his view, this was tantamount to France being forced to apply 
discriminatory policies  on racial grounds against the survivors of the concentration 
camps, which could incite unwanted reactions to the Jewish question. At the end, the 
meeting finally  approved  a compromise going some way to  satisfying the MAE and 
by extension the British but at the same time laying down its own firm views on the 
question of Jewish immigration to Palestine. The terms of the response to be given to 
the British Embassy in Paris that day were  that the French government:
a.  Refused any racial discrimination against foreigners under its control whether 
they be Jews or otherwise.
b.  Could not easily accept that Entry Certificates for Palestine be available only 
to Jews in the British zone of Germany.
c.  Will control entry visas on collective passports to  show that it  did not approve 
of illegal immigration,
d.  Demands that Jew’ s sent bade from France should be returned to the zones from 
whence they came.
e.  Would apply to ships leaving its ports the International Convention of 31st May 
1929 in respect of the seaworthiness of boats.10 5
Pages in reporting to his Minister on the  Cabinet meeting at which the 
response to the British had been discussed, indicated that only the control of the 
collective visas would be “a nuisance for the Jews”. He proposed to discuss with the 
Jewish associations the conditions under which they would be able to operate in the 
future. He pointed out that the control envisaged would only be to ensure that the 
collective visa had been granted by the consulate of the host country concerned. 
However  he conduded ingeniously “We don’t have also to check with their 
governments that they really are prepared to accept the foreigners involved.”106 
Neverthdess, the oft-stated  position of the Ministry7  of the Interior  that they7  w ould 
not  check  the validity of collective visas under which die majority of immigrants
105 Archives Nationales, F7/16089, Details provided in memo to the Minister of the Interior by  Marcel 
Pages cm 22.4.47.
106 Archives Nationales, F7/16089, Memo to Ministre de I’Interieur from Direction de la Reglementation 
et des Etrangers, 22.4.47.
139travelled, was somewhat upset by the Government’s letter to the British Embassy of 
21st April 1947  which stipulated  that they would  henceforth do so.
From die viewpoint of  the British Embassy, there was nothing in the French 
Government's statement to which  they  could  reasonably object However behind the 
scaies  the British tried to exploit the protracted  fight to control  policy on  illegal 
immigration  that was being  quietly waged between the lower echelons of the 
Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Whilst the true  attitudes  and actions of Government Ministers, in relation to 
Jewish  illegal immigration, could  to some extent be  dissimulated from their fellow 
cabinet colleagues within the coalition, they relied heavily  on the complicity of their 
officials to cam7  them through  in the most covert manner. Here we can cite as  prime 
examples two such officials, Raymond Bousquet at the Quai d'Orsay and Marcel Pages 
at the Ministry of the Interior who, according to  their actions, seemed to be promoting 
diametrically opposed policies. Both, in their  own way, used their limited authority to 
fulfil (w hat they interpreted as) the policy guidelines of their respective Ministers.
Whilst Bousquet developed a particularly friendly relationship with staff at the British 
Embassy, Pages worked closely and discreetly with the various Zionist organisations in 
Paris, including the Mossad. Each of them was careful to avoid compromising his  own 
position by disclosing the extent of his  involvement in matters outside the remit of his 
department
The main bone of contention between the two Ministries was the extent to 
which die French Government should verify die  validity of entry' visas apparently 
accorded to Jewish immigrants by a number of foreign  countries. It w as on the basis of 
these visas that the immigrants were allowed to transit across France to the southern 
ports for embarkation. The British embassy contended that the majority of the visas 
were bogus, granted by venal consular officials and that the true destination of die 
immigrants was Palestine.
In advance of a meeting with Raymond Bousquet  by their representative at the 
Paris Embassy, the Foreign Office  suggested a ploy that could be used to bring the 
French Government to heel on the question of illegal immigration.
It has occurred to us that the French Government, in allowing Jewish 
illegal immigration to Palestine to go on unchecked from French ports, are
140running the risk of alienating Arab opinion generally and thereby 
weakening their position in North Africa, which they are at present at such 
pains to maintain... 1 think it might be useful for you to have this 
consideration in mind during your talks with Bousquet.
We have no intention of blaclonailing the French over this, but they7  ought 
to realise in their own interests the damage that their open support of illegal 
immigration may do throughout the Arab world.107
On 28th April, Raymond  Bousquet, anxious to tie the Ministry7  of the Interior 
down on the question of the verification of visas, convened a meeting with the British 
Ambassador at the Quai’d’Orsay, to which Marcel Pages was invited. In a subsequent 
report on the meeting to Pierre Boursicot, Pages complained at the underhand way in 
which Bousquet only revealed  die agenda once all were present. Ostensibly convened 
to discuss the recruitment of DPs and German workers  from the British  Zone to help 
the French economy, the third item on the agenda, to Pages’s surprise,  was the 
“Palestinian question”. In effect, Bousquet was offering  the British a quid pro quo: 
workers from Germany' for France’s depleted industries against a deal  to stringently 
verify immigration visas to other countries. In Pages’s view, Bousquet, in attempting to 
tie these two matters together, had committed a “ fundamental error”. In addition the 
move appeared to be  in contradiction of the decisions of the Cabinet on 21st April 
1947.
Pages, in reporting to Boursicot, remarked: “One wonders, under these conditions, 
what Mr. Bousquet can hope to  derive from these negotiations.”  He  further asserted 
that  there w as no point in entering  into  discussions which were both  “sterile and 
dangerous in respect of good Franco-British relations.” He suggested that Edouard 
Depreux should request that the Palestinian question  not be discussed, under any 
circumstances, until the decision of the United Nations on the matter was known and 
certainly not in relation to the recruitment of DPs.108  Pages, true to his own agenda, 
w as attempting to thwart Bousquet at every7  turn by supplying  his own Minister with 
ammunition to be used to counter the efforts of the MAE.
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141Following this first meeting with the British, Bousquet, doggedly pursuing his 
objective,  reminded the Ministry of the Interior that  the French Embassies under his 
control were now responsible for checking the validity of collective visas.109
At a second joint meeting with British Embassy officials that he attended with 
Bousquet on 12th May 1947, Pages rejected the British request that the French provide 
the nominal lists  of those inscribed on collective visas. They would be used, the 
British contended, to help identify those arriving illegally in Palestine who had thrown 
away their papers. Bousquet, being  more circumspect, promised to refer the matter to 
his Minister. Pages, to pre-empt any  positive decision on this matter insisted, in a 
report to Boursicot on the meeting, that the French Government must oppose two of 
the British demands, the first being to supply  the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the 
nominal lists of those on collective passports and the second, to  take action to stop the 
supply of diesel or coal to ships identified as suspect by the British. Pag&s also reported 
that the British, for the first time, proposed to send back to France those illegal 
immigrants presently in Cyprus or those who in the future  had come from France, so 
that they could be sent back to the Zones from whence they had come.
At the same meeting, Ashley Clarke, who led the British delegation, intimated 
to Bousquet and Pages that between the British problems with illegal immigration and 
the French problems in its empire, a clear inter-dependence existed. He underlined that 
Britain had always tried to stop arms traffic from its overseas possessions to Indo- 
Chinese or North African rebels. Finally he intimated that a positive French attitude 
towards repression of illegal immigration would permit the British to satisfy France in 
its desire to recruit German labour in the British Zones of Austria and Germany.1 1 0  
However, there is some doubt as to whether Britain, at the time, would have effectively 
supported French demands for German labour. According to Foreign Office documents 
se«i by Kochavi, the Paris Embassy was instructed to oppose any attempt to link the 
two matters as, among other reasons, the British themselves had an interest in 
expanding the labour force in their Zones.1 1 1  The fact that the British Zone  included 
the coal-producing facility of the Ruhr was a source of envy  for the French who
109 Archives Nationales, F7/16089. Bousquet to Ministry of the Interior, 7.5.47.
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142suffered from a chronic shortage of coal through low manpower in their own mines. 11 2  
It was only towards the end of 1948 that France, through an agreement with the 
International Refugee Organisation, was finally able to import  DP labour  from the 
French, British and American Zones of Austria and Germany.1 13
There can be little doubt where Pages himself stood with regard to Jewish 
illegal immigration and, where he could, he attempted to counter the pro-British 
policies of the Quai d’Orsay. Bousquet on the other hand nurtured a cosy relationship 
with the British Embassy in Paris. In a memorandum to the Foreign Office  it was 
reported that Bousquet had alluded at meetings with the Embassy to the pro-immigrant 
bias of the Socialist Ministers in the French Government and to the influence of the 
Socialist leader, Leon Blum.114 More likely to compromise Bousquet, however, was 
the  fact that he had covertly agreed to supply the nominal lists of those on  collective 
visas to the British Embassy.1 15 Unbeknown to Bousquet, this particular demand by the 
British Embassy had been formulated in a paper prepared by the Minister of state at the 
British Foreign Office back  in April 1947. At the time the Minister felt that the French 
would resist the demand because “It is designed to produce just the evidence against 
them which has so far been lacking”.116 It appears that, in Raymond Bousquet, the 
Foreign Office believed that they had found a dupe who w ould unwittingly supply 
them with a stick with which to beat the French Government.
Bousquet was also not averse to making suggestions to the Embassy which they 
could adopt as their own and not reveal the original source. Specifically, he suggested 
to Duff Cooper that if the British were to extend to France a significant part of the 
monthly quota to Palestine, this would effectively cut the ground from under the feet of 
Jewish bodies. He also suggested that if the British were at the same time to announce 
that any renewal of illegal immigration would result in the withdrawal or reduction of 
the monthly quota, it would make  it difficult for certain elements within the
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143Government, namely Socialist Ministers, to “continue to facilitate the illicit traffic”.
Duff Cooper was careful to stipulate to the Foreign Office  that the suggestion should 
come as a British initiative and that Bousquet should  certainly not be quoted on this 
matter.117  However when Bousquet presented this “British proposal” to the Ministry of 
the Interior, he was effectively rebuffed. He later told the Embassy that despite his 
willingness to pursue die matter further he felt that the outcome might be to reduce 
such influence as his ministry still  possessed with the Ministry of the Interior.118
Bousquet's ultimate  vindication  came with die embarrassing political fall­
out over the Exodus Affair  in July 1947 when the Cabinet had to admit that errors had 
been committed at die port of departure. It had become abundantly clear, in view of the 
Columbian Government’s refusal to recognise the \isas held by the  immigrants who 
boarded the President Warfield, that a large-scale fraud had been perpetrated by the 
organisers of the boat. This incident, as the MAE was quick to point out, was one of a 
whole series of similar cases involving bogus visas. It had been shown that boats 
ostensibly sailing for countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Columbia and Ethiopia, 
according to the immigrants’ visas, invariably turned up off the coast of Palestine. In 
addition it was undeniable that the President Warfield had left port carrying three times 
the permitted number of passengers and was therefore in breach of the 1929 
International Convention regulating ships at sea
The Ministiy of the Interior and the Ministry of Public Works and 
Transport, being the Ministries responsible for the police, customs and maritime 
authorities, were put in the embarrassing position of having to acknowledge that their 
agents had consistently failed to prev ent these illegalities, despite constant w arnings 
from the MAE that they were occurring. To make amends both ministries issued new' 
instructions in October 1947 to prevent a recurrence of the Exodus Affair. These 
stated specifically:
1.  Suspect boats arriving on the Mediterranean coast would immediately be 
identified and the Ministry of the Interior informed by the Prefet  of the 
department concerned.
2.  The services of the maritime authorities would ensure that the supply of fuel 
and other necessities to foreign boats was strictly limited.
117 TNA, FO 371/61823, Duff Cooper to Foreign Office,  1.9.47.
118 TNA, CO 537/2386, Paris to Foreign Office,  1.9.47 and 14.9.47.
1443.  All visas on individual passports for those countries where visa  fraud had been 
detected would be validated with the country concerned before exit visas were 
issued.119
Intensive enquiries  in October 1947 by various police agencies into Zionist 
organisations  attest to an apparent radical change in attitude by the Ministry of the 
Interior. (See chapter 6). Whatever the  true purpose  of this activity, the ultimate 
effect was to restrict the Mossad’s ability to manoeuvre for fear of upsetting the 
authorities.
Besides Bousquet’s department another of die major departments within the 
Quai d’Orsay  was that of Afrique-Levant, which supervised  its diplomatic 
representation  in the Middle East and Africa Whilst its anti-British sentiments 
often rose to the surface, this did not imply any positive attitude towards Zionism, 
except in so far that it sored French interests. These were primarily concerned 
with retaining French dominance over Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in the face of 
opposition from die Arab League and re-establishing its position in the Levant.
Such considerations dictated its reaction to a letter from Rend Cassin, the 
head of the Alliance Israelite Universelle in July 1946. Cassin challenged Bidault, 
then Prime Minister as well as  Minister of Foreign Affairs, to demonstrate French 
Government  support for Zionism by confirming  that the Balfour Declaration still 
held validity. Recommending the avoidance of such a public statement, Afrique- 
Levant referred to France’s delicate situation in North Africa  “ It is not in the 
interests of France to awaken antisemitic reactions nor to bring together nationalist 
passions among  different Arab populations and by so doing facilitate the task of 
the Arab League”. It also pointed out that a confirmation of the terms of the 
Balfour Declaration would represent a danger to the 475,000 Jews in North 
Africa.120
In a different vein, when the British took repressive action in Palestine, the 
French Consulate in Jerusalem revealed to Afrique-Levant its general contempt for 
the Mandatory authorities
119 MAE Archives, Note from Direction des Conventions Administrative^ et Sociales, 21.10.47.
120 Archives Nationales, Fonds  Georges Bidault, 457 API 24, Note from Direction Afrique-Levant,
13.7.46.
145We can only say  that they have failed to lead the country towards 
liberty and autonomy. The Mandates given to France at the same time over 
Lebanon and Syria  effectively led to the establishment of a government 
and an administration in those countries, able to function, leaving aside the 
ethical  quality of their leaders. The hatred with which Great Britain helped 
these two countries in their haste to abandon the terms of the Mandate 
presents a sad contrast with its obstinacy to remain in a country where 
everything points to its failure. 1 2 1
Although not particularly in favour of a Jewish State, members of the 
French Consulate  maintained cordial contacts with members of the Jewish Agency 
and were particularly interested in obtaining intelligence from them regarding any 
anti-French activities in Arab countries which could interfere with their hegemony 
in North Africa 122
A report in April 1946 from General Beynet, the French commander in 
Beirut, recommended  Moshe Shertok, head of the political department of the 
Jewish Agency to Georges Bidault, as a person who was keen to share the 
Agency ’s intelligence sources with the French Government. In return Shertok 
would seek a discreet agreement that where Zionist and French interests coincided, 
a common approach could be taken to resolving political problems. All the while 
Shertok would be conscious of France’s need to maintain its neutrality on the 
Palestine issue, in view of the Moslem population in North Africa123 No indication 
was found, in the documentation, that Bidault  ever took up the General’s 
recommendation
Much later in December 1947, taking a decidedly more anti-Zionist line, an 
official at  Afrique-Levant bewailed the fact that France had voted in favour of 
partition at the UN Assembly, rather than abstaining, as the British had done
It is evident that, in Arab eyes, England is the only great power 
which, in this matter, had not taken sides against them. The British 
Government is thus able to recover in die Levant the exceptional position 
which General Spears’s actions had created for her to our detriment.
121 MAE Archives, Administration Britannique en Palestine, File 372,  Note from Hardy to MAE 
Direction Afrique-Levant, 5.5.47.
122 Hershco, 40.
123 MAE Archives, Sionisme, File 373, Carton 72, Palestine, 8.4.46.
146Actions the effect of which our patient efforts over eighteen months had
*  124 managed to correct.
It would seem that even  within the Afrique-Levant department  attitudes 
towards either  the British or  the Zionists were dictated more  by passing 
sentiments than  clearly defined  policies.
124 MAE Archives file 373, Carton 72, Secretariat General, Note pour le Ministre,  1.12.47.
147CHAPTER 6 The Sea journey to Palestine
The  acquisition of ships for the purpose of illegal immigration was carried out by 
Mossad operatives in a variety of ways. Initially small fishing boats were acquired in 
Greece or Italy. Later, as surplus  ships previously used in wartime came onto the 
market, intermediaries were used to rent them. However, as their interception by the 
British became a regular feature, outright purchase became the only viable option, 
pushing  financial resources to their limits. Once acquired, the ships with limited 
passenger space had to be fitted out with kitchens, tightly serried rows of bunks, 
sanitary facilities, ventilation equipment and additional  life-boats if possible. This 
work was often done in the small ports of the Mediterranean in Italy or France 
depending on the attitude of the local  authorities and the level of surveillance by the 
British Intelligence Service. Later, when larger ships were acquired in the USA, the 
prevailing sympathetic environment was such that fitting out could be carried out less 
covertly. Nevertheless, as this activity did not escape the attention of the British, some 
of these ships were moved to ports in Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria Here the 
loading of immigrants could be carried out openly in daylight hours with the 
acquiescence of the local authorities, now under Communist rule. The  attempts at 
intervention by  British  diplomats in the area to prevent the sailing of the ships was 
generally ineffectual.1
After a few relatively small landings of immigrants on die shores of Palestine 
between July and October 1945 originating in Italy and Greece, die Admiralty was 
given the task of blockading the coast to prevent any further illegal arrivals.2 Its plan, 
entided “Operation Tableland”, envisaged  the use of the Royal Air Force  to cany' out 
reconnaissance and provide early warning of the approach of suspect boats. The 
Royal Navy would then take over and, with a flotilla of one cruiser, two to four 
destroyers and Palestinian police launches, patrol the coast and detain and inspect  any 
suspect ship once it had entered the  three mile limit. If illegal immigrants were found 
on board, the boats were to be brought into Haifa Strict orders were given not to use
1  Hadari, Hamossad. 20.
2 See Appendix 1(a).
148force beyond that which was absolutely necessary.3  In practice, when the boats were 
brought into harbour,  application was made to  the Haifa District Court for their 
forfeiture.4 If the Master and crew could be identified, which  was not often the case, 
they were prosecuted.
The  army, under the orders of the Commander in Chief, Middle East Land 
Forces (MELF), was also given an important role to play. Once an illegal boat 
docked, soldiers  took  over from the navy, removed the passengers and interned them 
until such time as  a decision was taken as to their future. At the same time the 
military was to attempt to arrest any illegal immigrants who managed to avoid the 
naval patrols and secretly land on the shores of Palestine. Crucial to the satisfactory 
implementation of these various tasks was the intelligence information transmitted by 
British agents placed at the potential areas of embarkation around die Mediterranean 
coast. Early warning of the names and size of illegal immigrant ships with their 
estimated time of arrival often enabled an initial sighting  to take place well before the 
ships readied the three mile limit
Starting in November 1945 almost all suspect boats were systematically 
intercepted  and boarded by the Royal Navy, following which  a “ Report of 
Proceedings” would be drawn up by the ship’s commanding officer. This detailed the 
wiiole process of faking  control  of the illegal ship, including information as to 
casualties if these occurred. Once the ship was brought into Haifa further reports were 
prepared by the Field Security Section  of the 6th Airborne Division. These invariably 
comprised a careful and generally objective analysis of the origins, political 
persuasion and a numerical breakdown of the illegal immigrants.
In a booklet published in July 1948, the Admiralty  analysed  the lessons learnt 
from  the interception  of the illegal immigration  ships. They considered that the 
attitude of the immigrants underwent radical changes as the campaign failed to meet 
its objectives. Thus in the first six months to May71946, immigrants reacted passively 
to their ship being boarded, whilst in the succeeding two months until mid-August 
they7  only reluctantly submitted. The major change came about when the British 
Government no longer allowed die immigrants to land in Palestine, albeit to be
3 TNA, ADM1  21103, Instructions from Office of the Flag Officer, Levant and Eastern Mediterranean,
8.10.45.
4 TNA, CO 537/3942, List of illegal immigrant vessels as at 6.3.48.
149detained temporarily in Athlit, but were trans-shipped to Cyprus. From that moment 
on until December 1947, fierce resistance met all naval boarding parties. This was 
particularly illustrated in July 1947, in the case of the President Warfield (see Chapter 
7). With heavier resistance being met, die navy increased boarding parties from 12 to 
30 men and set about developing new tactics. A six-day boarding course to provide 
individual training in agility, hand-to-hand fighting and weapon handling was 
initiated in October 1946 at the Royal Marine Training Centre in Malta.5
It was assumed by the Admiralty that the level of resistance offered was 
dictated by orders received at virtually the last minute from the  Haganah ashore. 
Although preparations on board ship had been made by the Palyam escorts, die 
ultimate decision was dependent on such factors as the ship’s ability to escape and 
beach herself or the propaganda advantages to be obtained by embarrassing the 
British. It was  left  to the Palyam commanders on board to maintain discipline and 
deal with the boarding parties. It was a rule of the Mossad that resistance, except in a 
rare instance, would not include the use of fire-arms. In most cases, where they 
existed, they were thrown overboard together with radio transmitters and 
incriminating documents once interception was in the offing. Also, after the ship was 
boarded,  members of die crew  would merge with the immigrants to escape detection 
and consequent trial and imprisonment. 6
6.1  Ships from France
The usual route for DPs into France was through die French  Zone in the 
Baden-Wurthenberg area of Germany. They were brought here from the  DP Camps 
in die adjacent American Zone where  visas for die country of ultimate destination 
(often fraudulently acquired) were presented to  French consular officials. Ultimately 
transit  visas were issued by the Ministry of the Interior in France for presentation at 
the French border. Once in France  the DPs were taken to  the railway station in 
Strasbourg, Mulhouse or Colmar. Trains took them to  Lyons from where they were
5 TNA, ADM 239/412, The Campaign against Illegal Jewish Immigration into Palestine: November 
1945 to August  1947, pages 1-39.
6 TNA, ADM1  20789.
150moved into transit camps in the Marseilles area as the last stage before boarding their 
ship at the coast.7
The process of embarking would-be immigrants to Palestine from the southern 
ports of France had been an intermittent feature from March 1946 to April 1948. 
Some 16,200 immigrants were  transported in some 15 ships, the vast majority to be 
intercepted by the British and their passengers interned. Those  ships that did manage 
to reach the Palestinian coast undetected by the Royal Navy were usually directed by 
radio to deserted beaches near Tel Aviv, Caesaria or Nahariyah in the north. The 
Haganah would then organise the speedy disappearance of both passengers and crew 
to neighbouring kibbutzim, before the British army was alerted. The crew members, 
often volunteers recruited in the USA, would be led by a Palyam Commander. In 
addition to a trained radio operator, essential for maintaining contact with both the 
Mossad in France and Palestine, members of the Palyam escorted each boatload so as 
to maintain discipline during the hazardous sea crossing. In addition selected 
youngsters on board were given training in how to repel the British boarding parties 
without causing loss of life. In a controversial directive, Yigal Allon, the head of the 
Palmach, had insisted that any attempt by the British to board had to be resisted for as 
long as possible. At die  December 1946 World Zionist Congress in Basle, Allon 
explained
We want to fight the British in every possible way, including 
immigration. This struggle brings the immigrants and the Jewish 
community together in the fight against the British Government and by 
resisting at sea, we shall draw world Jewry to our side and give added 
force to our campaign The struggle will expose Britain’s unjust and 
immoral behaviour and win support for a people fighting for its life.8
As there were often French or American journalists aboard illegal ships, this ensured 
that the fiill propaganda effect of the struggle of the She’erit Hapletah to reach  their 
chosen homeland would reach as  wide a world audience as possible.9
The first illegal ship to leave France was the Asya. After being prepared in 
Marseilles with bunks for 700 passengers, she left La Ciotat  on 16th March 1946.
7 Bauer, Flight 280.
8 Hadari, Second Exodus.  153.
9 Zertal, Catastrophe. 13.
151Until then Greek and Italian ports had been used.1 0  It was decided that she would 
carry' DPs then  encamped in Belgium and so relieve die pressure there. The problem 
was that the agreement with the French for transit rights only applied to DPs from 
Germany, so a clandestine route had to be chosen. Here die knowledge of French 
roads acquired by Haganah  operatives, involved in arms procurement (the Rekesh 
organisation), w as put to good use. Using British army trucks a convoy including 
ambulances and mobile kitchens was put together. At the front in a jeep, rode a 
captain of the Jewish Brigade. As military convoys were a common sight at the 
French border no problems were encountered. On the outskirts of Marseilles, 
Shmariah (‘Rudi ) Zameret of the Mossad led the convoy to the berth of the Asya  and 
the DPs were speedily taken on board. At sea her name was changed to the Tel Chai. 
On 27th March she was intercepted by the Royal Navy off the Palestine coast and 
escorted to Haifa All  733 passengers ware temporarily  interned in Athlit.1 1  
According to MI5, the passengers, when questioned in Palestine, asserted that they' 
were embarked under the supervision of the French police, who recorded their names 
and particulars at the time. None was in possession of travel documents on arrival.1 2
The next ship to leave France  was die Norsyd, one of two  ex-Canadian 
corvettes acquired by the Mossad. On board was die American reporter  Isidore  F. 
Stone who, within months of his return to the USA, published a book on  his 
experiences.1 3  Crewed almost entirely by young American Jews, the ship  left Sete on 
21st June 1946. She carried 1,108 immigrants, two thirds of whom were men. Only 
196 of the immigrants  were aged over thirty. They' included Orthodox Jew s, 
Revisionists and left-wing pioneers from some sixteen  European countries but at least 
half came from Poland, made up of the pioneering youth of Hashomer Hatsair (the 
Young Guardians) intent in living on communal settlements in Palestine.14  With them 
Stone established a  particularly strong rapport and recorded their individual stories 
about how they had survived the Holocaust.
10 Zertal,  « Le Cinquieme Cote du Triangle » , 412.
11 Avriel, 268/9.
12 TNA, FO *371/56239 Appendix C. Report on Jewish illegal immigration from Europe to Palestine, 
August 1946.
1  Isidore. F.  Stone, Underground to Palestine. (New York, 1978) (First edition  published in 1946). 
Hereafter Stone.
14 Ibid.,  144/150.
152Earlier, in New York, Stone had obtained the Mossad’s agreement to sail on 
one of their boats against his promise not to reveal in any future publication, names of 
places and individuals, which British intelligence could use to counter illegal 
immigration. This, to some extent, he complied with. Nevertheless his careless 
revelation in his book  of the actual  names allocated by the Mossad to three illegal 
immigrant boats he spent time on, would have enabled the British to piece together 
his movements in Italy and France without too much difficulty. In any event, the 
British military occupation authorities in Genoa were aware that he had attempted 
unsuccessfully to sail on  board the Josiah Wedgwood before  it escaped  the clutches 
of the Italian police on the Italian Riviera in June 1946.1 5
Stone was equally indiscreet in  describing  the routes taken out of Poland by 
Jewish refugees attempting to reach Vienna via Bratislava in Slovakia and the 
complicity of both the Joint and UNRRA.16  In  Vienna, as he  quite clearly hinted, 
the authorities in the American zone, not least of whom  was General Mark Clark, the 
US commander in Austria, provided every facility to the refugees for their onward 
journey, whether this was to DP Camps in Germany or over the border into Italy.17 
By and large, Stone’s vocation as a reporter got the better of him and he rushed to 
publish his experiences the moment he returned to the USA  later in July 1946. The 
Mossad must have despaired  at the amount of incriminating information his book 
revealed at a crucial stage in  the illegal immigration campaign. But this may have 
been mitigated by his closing words in which he states: “I believe the only hope lies in 
filling the waters of Palestine with so many illegal boats that the pressure on the 
British and the conscience of die w orld will become unbearable. And if those ships 
are illegal, so was the Boston Tea Party.”1 8
Having failed to sail on the Josiah Wedgwood from Italy, Stone’s  eventual 
journey to Palestine took place on the Haganah (formerly the Norsyd) from another 
port on the Mediterranean coast. Zertal, in her own book, reveals this as being  Sete, 
a quiet fishing port to the  w est of Marseilles. This  was particularly fortuitous as the 
port was in  the constituency of Jules Moch. Here, not surprisingly, the officials in
15 Stone, 125.
16 Ibid., 52 and 90.
17 Ibid., 98.
18 Ibid.,  224.
153the docks were most accommodating.1 9 Of the fifteen illegal  ships to leave French
20 ports between 1945 and 1948, five  are recorded as having left from Sete.
This  particular venture of the Mossad was all the more  remarkable in that it 
involved die transfer at sea  of all the immigrants on to a smaller boat for the final 100 
miles  of the journey to Palestine.  Under very precarious conditions they were 
transferred on  the corvette’s launches to  a Turkish freighter, the Akbel, at a 
prearranged spot. The intention was to safeguard the Norsyd from interception and its 
confiscation by the Royal Navy.2 1   It  was, in any event,  intercepted on a second 
journey, some weeks later, when it arrived from Yugoslavia with more illegal 
immigrants. However  before this happened  the Admiralty had already  been  warned 
“This [tactic]suggests a policy of transport by the fast and seaworthy corvettes to a 
point outside territorial waters where the immigrants are transferred to smaller or less 
valuable ships.”22
The nearly' disastrous experience of the Akbel which, according to Stone  w as 
overloaded and subjected its passengers to inhumane conditions, most likely  deterred 
the Mossad from repeating this type of operation.23  These conditions were vividly 
described by Stone. The major problem was the lack of ventilation in the holds of the 
freighter and the fierce heat. Added to which was the lack of water and food. Also, 
fist fights broke out between immigrants, some of whom  refused to leave the decks 
so that others could come up for fresh air from the holds.  The Palmach escorts had 
great difficulty in maintaining a semblance of order. Some of the men had to be 
picked up bodily and carried to the hold. Compared to the already cramped conditions 
on the Norsyd, the 1015 immigrants had to make do with a ship half the size.24 
Fearing that die overloaded ship might capsize, the Palmach commander sent out an 
SOS. But other than being overflown by RAF planes there was no sign of help at 
hand.25
19 Zertal, Catastrophe. 68.
20 See appendix 1(b).
21  Stone,  180.
22 TNA, ADM1  19856, Office of the CIC Mediterranean Station to Secretary  of  the Admiralty,
23.7.46.
23 Stone,  181/191.
u Ibid.,  180.
25 Ibid.,  191.
154The Akbel  was first intercepted near Cyprus  some 180 miles from Palestine 
by the British destroyer Virago.26 The Turkish captain had deliberately altered course 
away from the short route to Palestine. After a cursory inspection of the Akbel  by an 
ensign and six sailors, they  then  rejoined their ship. It departed from the area 
without supplying the water and food requested by an increasingly desperate Palmach 
commander. Eventually when the Akbel was in sight of Haifa and had entered 
Palestine territorial waters, she was again boarded by sailors from the Virago, this 
time accompanied by Arab Palestine police.27 The ship was  brought into Haifa on 2nd 
July, under ter new name  the Biria The journey from Sete had taken 10 days.28 
Fearing that there was bubonic  plague aboard, the British moved all the passengers 
on  to an illegal ship which had been confiscated earlier, the Smyrna (later renamed 
the Max Nordau) and kept them  in quarantine for six days. During this period  only 
100 passengers  were allowed to land. The rest of the passengers then staged a hunger 
strike, which ended once they were allowed ashore and takai to Athlit for 
internment.29
Stone left the Akbel at an earlier stage. Dressed in his Amen  can military 
correspondent’s uniform he simply walked off the ship  and out of the port area in the 
company of a  Palestinian Jewish doctor sent from die shore. In any event he had a 
properly authenticated visa for Palestine which he had obtained from a British 
diplomat two months earlier in Washington/0 After making this eventful trip with the 
DPs to Palestine, Stone relates that he found himself a hero in the American Jewish 
community, called upon to speak regularly  at their conventions. He was prevailed 
upon  by the Zionists to persuade American Jews to make common cause with the 
Yishuv.3 1
In his book, Stone  revealed two incidents which should have  alerted the 
British to the extent of French complicity in illegal immigration. The first was the use 
of German prisoners of war  to load cases full of life belts onto the Norsyd in a 
French port under the eyes of the port’s pilot. Only the army or police could have had
26 Stone,  196.
21 Ibid.,  210.
28 Ibid.,  213,
29  Paul Silverstone,  Clandestine Immigration to Palestine 1938-1948  (New York 1999),  16. Hereafter 
Silverstone.
30 Stone, 215.
31  Stone,  232.
155the  authority  to provide POWs for this purpose and, as Stone himself commented, it 
must have been obvious that  a boat containing a  crew of only  twenty-five had no 
need of a quantity of life belts suitable for a small passenger liner.32 Secondly the 
immigrants arriving by a convoy of trucks to the quay side were supervised  by large 
numbers of police and port officials on shore as well as on the boat. Indeed these 
servants  of the government all had the opportunity to sample the  Mossad’s  lavish 
hospitality in the ship’s mess during the six hours it took to load the boat with its
1,000  or so immigrants. Stone  observed:  ‘The more they ate and drank the friendlier 
the atmosphere became.”33
The details concerning the sailing of the Sagolem (later renamed the Yagur) 
from La Ciotat, a small port in the vicinity of Marseilles, have already been dealt with 
in Chapter 3. It will be recalled that this was the first time that immigrants were no 
longer interned in Athlit but were trans-shipped to Cyprus.
On  19th October  another  ship  sailed from La Ciotat.  She was called the San 
Dimitrio. In her  case,  it was the MAE that  warned the British Embassy in Paris  that 
the passengers probably  included a group of 500 Jewish refugees  whose  collective 
visa had previously been declared by the Ethiopian Legation  to have been 
fraudulently obtained. Despite appeals to the Ministry of the Interior, no attempt was 
made to stop the immigrants from embarking with their dubious visas. According to 
MI5 the ship then sailed “with die connivance of die French authorities.”34 On  30  th 
October, now renamed the Latrun she was intercepted by the Royal Navy. She was 
leaking and  listing badly owing to overloading and water in her holds. Nevertheless 
the boarding  party was resisted strenuously by the young Polish immigrants on board 
and tear gas was used to subdue them. The following day her 1,279 passengers were 
trans-shipped in Haifa onto two liberty ships and  taken to Cyprus.35
Among the documents found on board the San Dimitrio were two issued by 
the French customs at La Ciotat permitting the departure of the ship, ostensibly for 
Beirut.  A third document, a certificate of seaworthiness issued in Marseilles also 
gave the destination as Beirut and the number of passengers as over 1,200. In its 
report  MI5 indicated that these documents were proof of “the slackness of the French
32 Stone,  133.
* Ibid., 141.
34 TNA, KV 3/56, MI5 report on illegal immigration activities, 21.11.47.
156port authorities in clearing a ship with an obviously excessive number of 
passengers.”36 The departure of this ship particularly angered the British Embassy 
because for once they were ahead of the game and had been  working in close liaison 
with die MAE to prevent its departure. But they had not reckoned with  the devious 
complicity  of the two Socialist-led French Ministries  which effectively controlled 
both the police and die maritime authorities. The British Embassy reported to the 
Foreign Office that in their conversations with Mr. Bousquet, Director of 
Administrative Affairs at the MAE, he had acknowledged that the Ministry of the 
Interior had been at fault, but assured them that exit visas in future would only be 
granted after die validity of visas for countries of ultimate destination had been 
checked. He further confided that the present Socialist-led government under Ldon 
Blum were not only disposed to give full weight to humanitarian considerations but 
were much better disposed towards Jewish emigrants from Eastern Europe than the 
Communists in the coalition He concluded that as long as there was a Socialist 
Minister of the Interior, it was to be expected that these persons would receive very 
benevolent treatment.37
Two days later a further meeting was held with Bousquet, this time in the 
presence of a representative of die Ministry of the Intenor. In his report, Ashley 
Clarke, the Charge d’Affaires, was forced to admit to the Foreign Office that ‘the 
meeting was most unsatisfactory and die French went back on their  previous 
position” In effect the Ministry of die Interior was not prepared to check visas for 
foreign countries, thus squashing Bousquet's previous commitment  Clarke concluded 
that the MAE  “have been too lavish with their assurances in the past, having regard to 
the lack of co-operation offered by the Ministry of the Intenor."38
In 1947, as if to emphasise Britain’s inability to stop the traffic to Palestine, 
the number of ships from French ports doubled. The first ship in the new year was the 
Merica winch  sailed on 17th January 1947 from Sete, carrying  656 immigrants from 
Poland and  Czechoslovakia, ostensibly to Cuba However the Cuban visas were not 
inspected by the French authorities.39 The trip took 22 days through stormy seas.
55 Silverstone, 19.
36 TNA, KV 3/56.
37 TNA, FO 371/61750 Paris to Foreign Office,  16.1.47.
38 Ibid.,  18.1.47.
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157There was extensive overcrowding and the food was so inadequate that die ship had to 
drop anchor at Messina to take additional provisions on board. This attracted the 
attention of the Italian police and the ship made a hasty departure. As a result of 
storms near Crete, water penetrated die engine room and, with the  failure of the 
mechanical pumps, had to be pumped out manually. When the ship approached the 
Palestinian coast, a dispute erupted with the Mossad on shore as to  the choice of 
landing spot. Reluctandy, the beach at Tel Aviv had to be abandoned in favour of 
Ceasarea In the event, interception and boarding by the British,  which took place on 
8th Februaiy, negated that option.40 There was fierce resistance by the immigrants 
leading to one dead and three injured. The next day, under her new name of LaNegev, 
she was brought into Haifa with gashes in her hull where she had been rammed.41 At a 
later date  the Mossad’s man in Tel Aviv explained “We were forced to direct 
LaNegev to Ceasarea, because in the present situation it was impossible to land boats 
at the desired spot. The ship was  spotted [only when] close to shore. It is clear that 
had there been boats on the ship and  if we had been free to direct it, the chances of a 
successful landing would have been good/’42
MI5 pointed out that the French quota, which accepted the presence in France 
of 8,000 Jewish immigrants at any time whilst they awaited visas for a foreign 
destination, was open to abuse as they could all embark as illegal immigrants without 
any interference from the French authorities. Such, in their view, was die case with 
the passengers of the Merica, many of whom had arrived in Strasbourg from 
Czechoslovakia on 14th December 1946, under this arrangement.43
On  22nd January 1947 a note was prepared for Leon Blum, both Prime 
Minister and  Minister of Foreign Affairs  at the time, detailing die use of fraudulently 
obtained visas in die case of die San Dimitrio and the Merica In both instances, on 
the basis of information supplied by the British Embassy, the MAE had warned the 
Ministry7  of the Interior about die presence in La Ciotat of die two suspect ships. In 
neither case had die Ministry of the Interior mounted a surveillance operation or
40 Hadari, HaMossad. 59.
41  Silverstone, 22.
42 Hadari, HaMossad. 59.
43 TNA,  KV 3/56.
158checked the validity of the visas.44 Also on 22nd January,  the British Embassy in Paris 
informed the MAE that  the San Miguel and the Arbil both suspect ships, had arrived 
in Marseilles.
The Embassy chided the French to make amends for past failings “ His 
Majesty’s Embassy earnestly trust that all possible steps will be taken by the French 
authorities to prevent a repetition of the ‘San Dimitrio' incident in connection with 
these two ships.”45 To British dismay, the San Miguel sailed from Sete on  3rd 
February’  and die Abril from Port-de-Bouc on 1st March. The San Miguel carried 807 
immigrants on board, mostly from Poland, Yugoslavia and Romania. They comprised 
462 men, 212 women and 133 children. On being  intercepted on  16th  February, the 
passengers had to be subdued with water jets and tear gas. As the engines were 
sabotaged it took 14 hours for a British minesweeper to tow ha* into port, now under 
her new name of Ha’Maapil Ha’Almoni. During trans-shipment in Haifa there w as 
no resistance and die immigrants were even smiling and singing.46
The Abril is unique in  being the only ship to have been used  by the Irgun for 
the transport of illegal immigrants  in the period from die end of the war to the 
creation  of the State of Israel. With great fanfare, the Abril was purchased and 
repaired in Brooklyn by the American League for a Free Palestine. She was later 
named the Ben Hecht in gratitude to the playwright of the same name, who, as an 
ardent supporter of die Irgun, wrote “A Flag is Bom” a tribute to “the fighters for 
Palestine.”47 Compared to the average Mossad ship, the  599 passengers on the Abril 
were transported in comparative luxury’. The organisational details in France had been 
dealt with by Schmuel Arid, the Irgun’s European representative and Claire Vaydat, 
the Director of “Assistance aux Refugies et Deportes”, which until March 1947 
worked under the umbrdla of the FS  JF. According to die RG die  passengers were 
covered by three collective visas delivered by the French Consul in Munich on 18th 
February. The exit visa was ddivered against a visa for 658 immigrants from the 
Bolivian Consulate General in Paris dated 1st February and  the Consul’s signature
44 Archives Nationales, Foods Georges Bidault, 457AP124. Note prepared by the Direction des 
Conventions Administratives for Mr. Leon Blum, 22.1.47. It is unlikely that  Blum ever saw this note 
as he resigned that very day and  was replaced by Paul Ramadier another Socialist.
45 MAE Archives, Immigration, File 376, 22.1.47.
46 Silverstone, 22.
47 Ibid., 23.
159was validated by the MAE on  26th February.4*  In all respects the RG could claim 
that  all legal  requirements were fulfilled. However die boat set sail for Palestine and 
not Bolivia
According to the Field Security Section in Haifa, all equipment on board was 
American, the engines were in perfect order, food was plentiful and sanitary 
arrangements were  adequate. When intercepted on 8th March, the Section’s 
commanding officer, Captain Linklater  was surprised  that  no resistance was offered 
and trans-shipment also passed off peaceably. Among die passengers was Jacques 
Meyer of “Paris Presse”, who represented ‘Life Magazine’. 49
The task of the Field Security Section, stationed in the Port of Haifa, differed 
from that of the navy in one particular respect. They were primarily concerned with 
intelligence gathering in an attempt to identify the organisers involved, the manner in 
which immigrants were brought to the ports of embarkation, their political or religious 
affiliations and  the terrorist element amongst them, if indeed such existed. From their 
reports, it is clear that their investigators were of a particularly high calibre, well 
versed in foreign languages including Yiddish and Hebrew (possibly using personnel 
from the local population). Whatever documents they could find aboard illegal ships 
were immediately passed to the local CID for further examination. Unfortunately 
only the reports of the Field Security Section from January 1947 were available at the 
PRO. Nevertheless they  were a mine of information as to the prevailing attitudes of 
the military towards illegal immigrants.
In a  paper prepared in March 1947 by Captain J. Linklater, entitled “Report 
on Jewish Propaganda concerning Immigration into Palestine”  there is an  attempt to 
debunk the notion  that illegal immigrants were truly refugees  worthy of world-wide 
sympathy. He relates that, according to a Jewish  source, whilst the discipline on a 
ship during the voyage was good, orders were given about a day before reaching 
Palestine, to convert the ship into a veritable pig-sty. He comments
It has been seen, during the arrival of recent illegal vessels, that the 
Jewish settlers on board are mostly in a disgusting state of filth and 
squalor, poorly dressed with few clothes, wild eyed, with hang-dog looks
48 Archives Departementales  desBDR 148W185,  RG Report, 3.3.47.
49 TNA, WO 275/87 Report by Captain J. Linklater, Officer Commanding 317 Airborne Field Security 
Section 9.3.47.
160on their faces, hair dishevelled, and unshaven. Many are hysterical. The 
ships themselves are, if possible, in an even worse condition, with garbage 
and litter lying deep on the deck and stinking in a foul manner. This is 
acknowledged by Jews in Haifa, and by the Jewish press, as proof of the 
dreadful sufferings  which the ‘refugees’ have beat through-
He goes on to relate that exposed film taken off one of the immigrants from 
the Abril and taken a few days before interception “show smiling, plump, and 
confident faces of settlers and pioneers bound for the shores of a promised land. Their 
hair is tidy and well brushed, their boots polished, and their clothes sound, smart and 
efficient. Anything less like the ship which finally arrived in Haifa is hard to 
imagine.”5 0
Whilst this report might be considered as unrepresentative and a none-too- 
disguised  attempt to d  migrate the immigrants, there are other indications that the 
arrival of illegal immigrant ships in Haifa were well choreographed  by the Mossad 
to engender an anti-British bias among the assembled press. Local reporters were 
particularly keen to report to their readers the number of children, pregnant women 
and stretcher cases on board. It was also not unusual to find that reporters,who  had 
managed to establish contact with the Mossad in the USA or Europe accompanied the 
immigrants from their point of departure.
The Guardian (later renamed the Theodor Herzl) left Sete on  2nd April 1947 
with 2,622 passengers. After interception on 13th April a furious battle ensued in 
which the boarding party used their guns. At the end there were 3 dead and 27 injured. 
According to the Commander of die Haydon, which  led the interception, no adequate 
explanation was given for the scale of casualties. Orders had been given to fire over 
the heads of die 100 strong group of immigrants who resisted the boarding party.5 1  
On board were a British journalist Moshe Perlman  representing die Illustrated 
London News  with a  photographer called Auerbach  and two  French journalists, 
Francois  Armorin of Franc-tireur and Joffiov of Le Parisien Libere.52 They  were 
chosen for the journey by the Mossad after bong thoroughly vetted as to their 
political leanings.  All were provided with assumed names in case they  were arrested 
by the British. Armorin had a proper six-month  visa for Palestine dated 15th October
50 TNA, WO 275/87, Report by Captain  J.Linklater, 20.3.47.
51 TNA, ADM1  20643, Report of commander of HMS Haydon,  16.4.47.
1611946. He only disclosed this and his true identity when he was transferred to Cyprus 
with die rest of the passengers. After three weeks he was deported for illegal entry 
into Cyprus.53 Whilst Armorin, a non-Jew and former Resistance member could be 
considered an independent witness, the same could not be said of Moshe Perlman 
who, notwithstanding  his British passport, was  responsible for Mossad’s 
international press relations.54
In Haifa a detailed report  on the passengers was completed by the Field 
Security Section. This briefly stated that from  conversations with the passengers 
(French, German, Belgian,  Czech and Hungarian) and remarks overheard by  field 
security officers, details of their route to the port of departure emerged. These 
disclosed that the passengers had arrived at the port of embarkation in about five 
trains of five hundred each. One train came from Czechoslovakia and one from 
Belgium. At the port of embarkation, the master of the ship at first refused to accept 
very young children and very pregnant women, but let himself be persuaded by a 
“Jewish Agency leader”. It was an American ship, reasonably seaworthy but 
incredibly overcrowded. On die whole few passengers carried any documents at all, 
except for some left-wing and Communist Party cards and DP and UNRRA 
certificates. As the ship came alongside the quay in Haifa, the bodies of two Jews who 
had died during the boarding were produced, draped in Zionist flags. One of the 
passengers came forward and pointing dramatically at die corpses shouted in English 
“You killed him, assassins!” After an initial refusal to disembark, all die Jews on 
board suddenly decided to go ashore.  Of the four journalists known to have been on 
board, the two English ones  came forward and were handed over to CID. The others 
had not come forward. In his now familiar disparaging style, Captain Linklater 
reported on die Guardian incident, concluding
1 That there is a Jewish Agency organisation which lays 
down the propaganda policy for immigration and enforces 
the implementation thereof at all stages of the journey.
2.That the average Jew is a pawn in the game and does not 
himself, fed the need for such propaganda, although he 
may quite easily have swallowed the 'Palestine bait’ hook
52 Francois Armorin, Des Juifs quittent FEurope. (Paris, 1948), 30.
53 Ibid.,  234.
54 Zertal, Catastrophe. 136.
162line and sinker. He considers the journey more on the lines 
of an enterprising adventure rather than an escape from 
horror.
3.That at least Belgium and France are openly conniving at, 
if not assisting, illegal immigration into Palestine, since at 
least the organised train journey must have been known by 
the authorities. It would appear that the organisation in 
Europe is being carried out on a fantastic scale, quite 
openly.5 5
Linklater’s second comment reflects a commonly held belief in the Colonial 
administration that the Jews aboard illegal ships had been misled by  propaganda and 
had been  duped by unscrupulous Zionist organisers to leave the comparative  safety 
of their DP Camps. However this simplistic assessment failed to recognise die 
profound  needs of the DPs to escape from internment in countries they loathed and 
their ability to decide for  themselves that, in the absence of any other offer  of 
asylum,  Palestine  indeed  offered the  best chance of a new life.
On 18th July 1947 die Exodus ’47 was intercepted off the Palestine coast. 
Given the world  media  attention attracted by this particular ship and the political and 
public relations storm it generated,  a separate and wide-ranging chapter has been 
devoted to the Exodus Affair (see Chapter 7).  The  Affair  also had repercussions on 
the Mossad’s ability to operate in France. There is some evidence of the hardening of 
the French  Government’s attitude towards illegal immigration once the storm had 
abated. This  is indicated in a report by a  Mossad operative to Palestine  on the 
activities of the French police during October and November 1947. He indicated that 
following a circular issued by die Ministry of the Interior on 5* September,  a special 
department of the police was investigating such organisations as the AJ (Polonski’s 
organisation), ORT (technical training organisation) and the Jewish National Fund.  In 
early November the residents of the Hotel Metropole, which included a number of 
Mossad people, were subjected to an identity check, as was another Mossad location. 
How ever it was noted that the police inspectors involved were acting in a friendly 
manner and that their investigation was superficial. In the same period, however, the 
Ministry of the Interior  issued an instruction to all the Prefectures bordering the 
Mediterranean that they must prevent illegal immigration of Jews, Italians  and
55 TNA, WO 275/87 Report on trans-shipment from the Guardian by Captain. J. Linklater.
163Spanish from French and North African ports. Equally, ships’ captains would be 
obliged in future to disclose die names of their passengers in order to identify illegal 
immigrants. Failure to do so could result in the loss of the captain’s licence.
In addition, the Mossad’s contacts in the French security services indicated that 
although such instructions had been issued, their implementation was dependent on 
individual regional authorities. It was also indicated that the French security services 
and the Ministry of the Interior had been infiltrated by British agents and therefore 
caution should be exercised by the Mossad in their activities.56
Although it is difficult to hypothesise, the whole exercise may indeed have 
been carried out to allay British suspicions of continuing French duplicity after the 
Exodus Affair.
Allied to these moves by die French police, an  RG report  of October 1947 
refers  to the temporary arrest  on 4th October of five  Jews and a local fisherman who 
were caught  surveying various inlets along the coast near Marseilles. It was 
immediately assumed that the intention was to locate embarkation points for illegal 
immigration. The interrogation of the individuals concerned revealed that one was 
Georges Loinger, another was “Welwel Pomeraniec”, [i.e Venya Pomerantz later 
known as Ze’ev Hadari] both, as previously indicated, members of the Mossad. 
However, to the police  Loinger represented himself as  a director of the Jewish 
charity, Oeuvre de Secours aux Enfants (OSE ) whilst  Pomerantz described himself 
as a journalist working for Davar (The Histadrut’s daily paper) and the Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency. All die others, to die exclusion of the fisherman who was their 
guide, were  connected with one or other  Zionist institution. They7  all  insisted  that 
they were all out for a walk along the sea and therefore had the need for a guide. The 
fact that they’ w ere caught with a maritime map in their possession  wras, they7  asserted, 
purely coincidental. It was confirmed by the RG in their report that Loinger had 
already been in contact with their local office in La Ciotat, with a view, as he put it, to 
the legal embarkation of Jews from that port. A further factor placing the RG on the 
alert was the activities of Frederic Thau, the local representative of the FSJF. On 
frequent occasions in October he had sought to discover from the RG, the attitude of 
the police to a resumption of illegal immigration. It was also noted that 1,051 Jewish
56 Haganah Archives, Aliyah Bet files,  14/732 “To 23 from Yanai”.
164immigrants had arrived by train in the department on 5th October and had been placed 
by the FSJF in their centres. A second convoy of 783 Jews arrived in Marseilles on 
15th October and had been dealt with in the same way. There was therefore every 
reason to suppose that an attempt at illegal immigration was in the offing. The RG, on 
instructions from Paris, was determined to prevent that occurring and indicated the 
steps that were being taken.57 But as far as those arrested were concerned, a phone 
call to Roger Wybot of the DST from the police station secured the release of the 
whole party.58 Hadari, in his own memoirs also confirmed that the DST's intervention 
secured die release of die Mossad’s men.59
It would appear that the RG did not entirely succeed in their task to prevent 
further illegal immigration, for on  6th November a small ship, die Albertina (later 
renamed Aliyah) left Bandol, near Marseilles. It  managed to evade the British 
blockade and safely land 187 immigrants at Nahariyah, in northern  Palestine on 16th 
November. An Arab boy reported that at 5 o’clock in the morning he had seen four 
buses containing Jews leaving Nahariyah in an easterly direction.60  Two weeks or so 
later, a small schooner renamed the Haforzim managed to slip through the blockade, 
land 167 immigrants near Tel Aviv and effect an escape undetected.6 1
On  12th December 1947 the Giovanni Maria (lata- renamed 29th November 
1947)  left France with 688 illegal immigrants on board.  Earlier on 20th July 
Hungarian  immigrants from Sweden had been  allowed to land in France 
temporarily.  They had originally been provided with visas by Raoul  Wallenberg in 
1944. In early December, they  embarked on the  Setti Fratelli at Bandol near 
Marseilles. They were then transferred  off the coast of Corsica to the Giovanni 
Maria, newly arrived from Leghorn in Italy. 62  The boat  was intercepted by the 
British Navy on 28th December  and the immigrants interned in Cyprus.63
Archives Depart ementales des BDR,  150W163, le Commissaire Principal to Directeur des RG, Paris 
(Section des Frontieres), 22.10.47.
58 Interview with Georges Loinger,  10.11.02.
59 Hadan, HaMossad. 25.
60 TNA, WO 275/87, Report by HQ 3rd Parachute Brigade.
61  Silverstone, 29.
62 TNA,  CO 537/3942, letter from  Consulate-General in Marseilles to British Embassy Paris, 
confirming details of the two ships received from the police authorities in Toulon. It was  also noted 
that the  captain of  the Sette Fratelli was subsequently fined for  embarking passengers at Bandol 
under conditions which endangered the safety of both passengers and ship,  11.2.48.
63 TNA,  ADM1  21092.
165From party membership cards passed by Field Security to the CID, it appeared that 
the immigrants on the Maria Giovanni  were connected either with left-wing or 
religious movements in Hungaiy, Germany, Romania and Austria64 Among those on 
board  was a 17 year old youngster from Oran, Algeria, called Henri Cohen.
Part of the remains of Cohen’s diary, written in French, was found on the 
quayside in Haifa after he attempted to destroy it during trans-shipment. The 
fragments  were reconstructed by CID officers in the hope of obtaining some 
intelligence information. In the event ail they could learn was that, finding himself 
and his cousin virtually destitute in Marseilles in mid-November 1947, they had been 
directed to 24 rue des Convalescents 65 From there they were sent to a transit camp at 
Le Grand Arenas  at Mazargues,  some 7 kilometres from Marseilles. There, in the 
former prisoner of war camp, they met fellow Jews  of all nationalities waiting for 
their turn to leave for Palestine. They  spent their  time working in the kitchens, 
sewing, singing, playing cards and learning Hebrew. On 1st December they rejoiced 
at the news that the UN had approved the partition plan for Palestine. One of the final 
entries in the diary was  “ Camp D’Arenas. 3rd December 1947. They gathered us all 
together and told us not to leave the camp as we might be going off any time.”6 6
A further three boats left in early 1948, no doubt carrying the rest of the DPs 
who arrived in October 1947. They were the Abdul Hamid (renamed Komemiut), the 
Salvador (renamed Mishmar Ha’Emek) and the Tadome (Renamed Nachshon Kastel). 
All were intercepted by the British and their passengers trans-shipped to Cyprus.
There were other boats that left France in the spring of 1948 but they arrived in 
Palestine after the end of the Mandate and were therefore not illegal.
6.2  Overall  statistical results
Before moving from  the microcosm of France to the wider  picture, we will 
recall  that out of 63 illegal ships, only 15 actually  sailed from France.67 However, 
many others were fitted out in French shipyards or received fuel supplies there  but
64 TNA, CO 537/3941, CID, HQ Palestine Police Force to Chief Secretary, 27.1.48.
65 The  “immigration  office” run by the  FSJF.
66 TNA, CO 537/3941. CID, HQ Palestine Police Force to Chief Secretary, 27.1.48.
67 See Appendix 1(b), breakdown  of illegal ships by country of departure.
166picked up passengers in other foreign ports. 68 Although the names of the 63 ships 
that  approached the shores of Palestine  with illegal immigrants were  easily 
identified from a number of primary and secondary sources, the recorded  numbers of 
immigrants on each boat  tended  to vary  slightly from one account to another.69 
Consequently the statistical analysis  which follows will, of necessity, contain some 
margin of error:
In the last five months of 1945, eight boats with 1,041 immigrants 
successfully beached on the Palestine shore and only twenty immigrants were arrested 
and temporarily detained in Athlit. However  during 1946, out of 22 boats  containing 
21,983 immigrants only one, die Ideros, managed to land some 183 immigrants 
undetected, whilst two other boats with  1,014  immigrants from La Spezia, Italy 
were treated as a special case  and were  allowed to land without interference. 70
In 1947, out of 24 boats containing 40,527 immigrants one, the Ulua, managed 
to beach itself, even after being captured, whilst three others managed to reach the 
shore without being intercepted. In the first case, 835 immigrants from the Susannah 
were immediately rounded-up by the army. In die other two cases, 187 immigrants 
from the Aliyah and 167 immigrants from the Haforzim successfully  disappeared into 
the hinterland. Finally in the four months or so to 14th May 1948 eight out of nine 
illegal boats  were intercepted, and their  5,556 immigrants  trans-shipped to Cyprus, 
if only to maintain the fiction of the continuing existence of the quota The  nineth 
ship, the Archimedes, managed on 1st January 1948 to land undetected 537 
immigrants on the beach at Nahariyah, whilst the coastal watch w as celebrating the 
New Year.7 1
For the sake of clarity, one ship has beat  left out of the statistical analysis 
because after it began to sink,  all  of its 500 immigrants were transferred to the 
Lohita This 64* ship, as it were, was  the Agia-Anastasia, which left Yugoslavia on 
26th November 1946 in company with the Athenia
68  Hadari, Second Exodus. 141.
09 See Appendix 1(a) for a ship by ship analysis.
70 In May 1946  1014 illegal immigrants,  embarked cm the Fede and the Felice, were initially detained 
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1676.3  Other perspectives on illegal immigration
An analysis  of the  point of departure  of the 69,644 illegal immigrants  who 
attempted to land in Palestine, shows that  less than half actually came from the DP 
Camps of Germany  and Austria This was a comparatively small number when 
compared to the overall DP population which, in 1946, had risen to some 200,000  as 
a result of the massive Polish exodus. The reality was that some 39,000 came directly 
from transit camps in Italy (having crossed the border illegally after  travelling across 
Czechoslovakia and Austria) or from their villages and towns in Romania,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and even North Africa72
Kochavi argues that  from early 1947, Soviet influence on die new 
Communist-dominated states of  Romania and  Bulgaria greatly facilitated the 
departure or transit of Jews from or  through those countries.  The Soviets’  intention 
was  to aggravate the position of the British in the Middle East and was part of Cold 
War politics. The Soviet support from the middle of 1947 for the establishment of a 
Jewish State was also part of that policy. The Mossad therefore took advantage of the 
favourable climate then existing in that part of die world and swung its efforts away 
from the Mediterranean and  towards the Black Sea.73 The result was the sailing in 
December 1947 of die two Pan ships from Bulgaria, containing over 15,000 
Romanian immigrants en route for Palestine. This far surpassed anything the Mossad 
had achieved to date in toms of numbers. As a sign of changing times -the British by 
now7  having indicated that they were leaving Palestine- an accommodation was 
reached with the Jewish Agency, whereby the two boats would sail direcdy to Cyprus.
The  fact that embarkations from the Balkan ports alone accounted for some 
40% of the immigrants effectively explodes die myth that the rescue of Jews from the 
DP Camps was the priority.74 In  reality  wherever large  numbers of immigrants 
w ere more readily accessible, pragmatic  considerations led the Mossad to choose that 
easier option,  rather than attempt to satisfy  others who had a more urgent need.
TNA, WO 275/87 Report dated 1st January 1948 on beaching of the illegal ship Archimedes.
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168Another controversial  feature of Aliyah Bet was the question of how the 
candidates for illegal immigration were chosen That  selectivity of candidates, 
according to  well-defined  criteria, for  Aliyah towards Eretz Israel was axiomatic 
within the Zionist establishment before the Second World War is undeniable. At that 
time the essential criterion was whether a potential immigrant possessed a “pioneering 
spirit”, a prerequisite for the harsh and austere  life on kibbutz.75
The question is: To what extent was this abandoned when confronted with the 
plight of the She'ent Hapletah (Holocaust survivors) in the DP Camps? According to 
Tuvia Friling, Ben  Gurion had already  accepted  in 1943, when the news of 
extermination of the Jews was widely known, that this policy no longer had any 
validity. However, faced with a restrictive  British immigration quota there were 
others who insisted  that preference still be given to “Quality Aliyah.” Against this, 
calls within  the Jewish Agency for mass, indiscriminate Aliyah, seemed to many
7f» members to be totally unrealistic.
After  his visits to  the DP Camps in the American Zone in Germany in 
October 1945, Ben Gurion returned to Palestine.  He  reported to the Agency's 
Executive that he had secured the agreement of the American military authorities that 
the Jews would be given a large measure of autonomy and that emissaries from the 
Yishuv would be permitted to enter the camps for the purpose of instruction 
However,  it later became clear that  each of these  emissaries would bring with him 
the  particular ideology of the political movement to which he belonged and that he 
would seek among the candidates for illegal immigration  those who were prepared to 
adhere to that ideology.77
This state of affairs  is confirmed by Anita Shapira, who contends that politics 
was at the root of selection. She points to the split in Mapai in 1944, when Achdut 
Avodah, part of the Kibbutz Hameuchad movement, led by Yitshak Tabenkin 
defected.  As this left Mapai with only a 53% majority in the Histadrut (Federation of 
Labour), the political orientation of the new wave of immigrants was crucial to 
Mapai’s hegemony. As to  the kibbutz movement, the lack of immigrants in the war
75 Hadari, Voyage to Freedom. 48.
76 Tuvia Friling, “Changing Roles: The Relationship between Ben Gurion, the Yishuv and Sh’erit 
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169years had frozen the growth, originally fuelled from Poland and they were now
78 desperate for new recruits.
An emphasis on the youth of those selected for illegal immigration is indicated 
by Nahum Bogner,  who comments that 80% of the 52,000 or so  illegal immigrants 
deported to Cyprus  were ago! between 12 and 35. Amongst these were some 8000 
orphans.79  Furthermore, as  Mankowitz comments,  most of the illegal immigrants 
who left Germany in 1946 were members of kibbutz movements who were allocated 
Entry Certificates proportional to the size of their movements.80
For her part, Dalia Ofer comments on the changing approach of the 
historiograph}’ of Aliyah Bet from the beginning of 1980, which  now recognised that 
the Yishuv’s professed  willingness to rescue  all Jews from Eastern Europe  was not 
such a clear-cut issue. In particular she underlines the failure, in the early 
historiography, to deal with such matters as the conflicts which arose  after the war 
between the emissaries on the ground  and the political leadership regarding the 
criteria for the selection of immigrants.81
Even when prospective immigrants had to be chosen for the 750 certificates 
allocated each month to the Cyprus detainees, the Jewish Agency did not strictly 
apply the “first in, first out” principle. As a British officer reported, there was an order 
of priority. Basically Palyam escorts and ships’ crew's came first and these were 
followed  by compassionate cases and pregnant women  Next came Haganah 
members who had been deliberately infiltrated into the camps. Finally about 50% of 
the quota was allocated to those Jews who had actually been waiting their turn.82
With the majority of emissaries  to the DP Camps emanating from the kibbutz 
movement it is not difficult to assess the profile of the candidates they were seeking. 
The}' were to be young, pioneering and ideologically motivated. Selection, however
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170unfair to the old and the infirm, was part and parcel of the whole process of illegal 
immigratioa In mitigation it would only be fair to consider that the journey for 
prospective illegal immigrants was certainly not devoid of hardships or danger and 
therefore required a certain level of fitness. However how this could be applied to 
pregnant women, who often made the hazardous journey, remains questionable as the 
experience of the Exodus illustrates (see Chapter 7).
The brief given to the British delegation to the UN in November 1947, 
includes the following statement  about illegal immigration which, although clearly 
partisan, is perhaps not entirely  devoid of truth
Humanitarian considerations take only secondary place in the minds of 
the organisers. It is only infrequently that the real compassionate cases, 
the relatives of people in Palestine, the sick and die old are included in the 
shiploads of illegal immigrants. The human cargoes consist mainly of 
young men and women; pregnant women are particularly included 
because of their propaganda value in the event of an incident involving 
loss of life.8 3
In the historiography a  largely forgotten, not to say marginalized , aspect of 
immigration into Palestine is that from January 1946 the British had actually made 
available  for entry into Palestine a quota of 18,000 Jewish immigrants per year. 
Generally, any reference  made by Zionists  to this quota, sought to  underline how 
inadequate it was given the thousands of Jews confined to DP Camps. Yet in theory' at 
least, Entry Certificates  were available to marry Jews in Europe, particularly those 
with relatives already7  in Palestine.  In January71947, there w as a w aiting list of some
6,000  at the Department of Migration in Palestine.84 Certificates were also reserved, 
in priority, for those  Palestinians who had fought in the British army during the w ar 
and their dependants.
The official  quota lost real significance for legal immigrants  as a result of an 
arbitrary  decision  by the High Commissioner, supported by the Colonial Office, to 
find a speedy solution to die thousands of illegal immigrants he already  had on his
82 TNA, CO’ 537/2385, Tour report by an officer sent under orders of GHQ, MELF, June 1947.
83 TNA, CO 537/2345, Copy of brief to Martin in New York on suggested statement to UN  Assembly, 
November 1947.
84 TNA, CO 537/2276, Letter from The High Commissioner to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
10.1.47.
171hands. In essence, illegal immigrants were substituted for  legal immigrants in 
allocating  the monthly quota. However as  die number of illegal immigrants 
swamped the quota in the first half of 1946,  they  were  initially detained and  only 
released from die Ahdit detention camp as the quota was freed up in subsequent 
months. This process accelerated  after August 1946, when instead of detention in 
Athlit, illegal immigrants were taken to camps in Cyprus. As a result Athlit was 
cleared  of illegal immigrants by November 1946 and the following month, for the 
first time,  a quota of  750 certificates pa- month was granted to the  Cyprus 
detainees.
This reduced allocation to illegal immigrants did not bring a commensurate 
benefit to waiting legal immigrants as the next 300 certificates  were then  granted in 
priority  to  DPs in the British Zone  in  Germany. Despite demands from the Jewish 
Agency7  none were allocated to the American Zone where the majority of DPs 
resided.85  Starting in April  1947 under an operation termed “Grand National”, DPs 
for the first time legally left the British Zone for Palestine. By the end of the year 
3,700 had arrived under die scheme. Officially the  monthly quota of  1,500 was now 
allocated as to:
Jews in Cyprus: 750; Servicemen recruited in Palestine :150; Parents and 
children of people in Palestine :275; British Zones  of Austria and Germany .300; 
French Zones of Austria and Germany: 25. 86
The irony of applying part of the official  quota to  the illegal immigrants in 
Cyprus  was not lost on the Foreign Office, which complained that its whole policy of 
deterring governments around the Mediterranean from permitting the departure of 
illegal ships  was being  totally undermined by the pragmatic approach of the Colonial 
Office.87  If the Foreign Office had hoped to staunch the flow of illegal immigrants by 
the prospect of detention in Cyprus, this gambit had obviously7  failed, for 1947 saw an 
increasing  number of illegal immigrants on ever larger boats. Creech Jones at the 
Colonial Office struggled to increase die capacity of the camps in Cyprus and 
rejected calls to reallocate the quota away7  from the detainees in Cyprus  to DPs in
85 TNA, CO 437/2277, Telegramme from Creech Jones, Colonial Secretary to High Commissioner,
1.8.47.
86 TNA, CO 537/2369, Letter from Foreign Office to Pans and Rome embassies, 3.10.47.
87 TNA, FO 945/469 Correspondence between  Frank Pakenham  at the Foreign Office  and  Creech 
Jones, 16.7.47.
172Germany. In a letter to the  British official responsible for DPs in Germany he 
revealed  that if die accommodation problem in Cyprus readied  crisis proportions, 
without die prospect of finding  accommodation on some other British possession 
“we should have to admit that we were beaten by the  illegal immigration problem 
with incalculable political consequences.” 88
Creech Jones’s foresight was vindicated, for when the Pan ships disgorged 
over 15,000 illegal immigrants in Cyprus at the end of December 1947, the camps 
were just about  able to absorb them  The shipment  of the 4,500 Exodus immigrants 
from France to Germany in August 1947 also indirecdy  relieved the Cyprus situation.
Of die 51,594 illegal immigrants who arrived in Cyprus betw een August 1946 
and April 1948 there remained some 23,500 when the State of Israel came into being. 
89  If the quota of 750 certificates per month had  been stricdy maintained there would 
have been thousands  more. But from the moment the British decided to leave 
Palestine, the release of so-called ‘compassionate cases’ from Cyprus reached ever 
increasing  levels.90  The colonial Secretary later divulged  to the British UN 
delegation that this was the reason  why  the quota  had been exceeded by some 
13,500 Jews. He requested that the information not be revealed “as you know 
prospects of unfavourable Arab reaction has prevented us giving publicity to these 
figures.”91 Implicitly, even if the Arabs were unaware of this massive breach of the 
quota system, die Jewish Agency was not. Clearly' both the British and the Zionists 
adopted a pragmatic approach when their interests coincided. However the irony of 
the story is that despite this cosy arrangement a further 5,600 illegal immigrants were 
trans-shipped to Cyprus in the first four months of 1948, following the interception of 
eight ships. Fritz Liebreich’s assertion that the British had  abandoned its fight against 
illegal immigration only became  a reality in the  very last days of the Mandate.92
Following a UN  embargo  in July 1948 on supplying arms and men of 
military age to Palestine,  the British ceased releasing men in this category7  and their
88 TNA, CO 537/2276, Correspondence between John Hind (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) and 
Creech Jones, 24.3.47 and 8.4.47.
89 TNA, CO 67/364/4 Report from the Acting Governor of Cyprus to Colonial Secretary, 24.3.49. The 
report also revealed that during the period there had been 120 deaths and 1,916 births in the camps.
90 TNA, CO 537/2386, Memo From Commissioner for Jewish Camps to British  delegation in New 
York,13 .10.47. Also FO 371/61894 Telegramme from High Commissioner to the Governor of Cyprus,
19.11.47.
91 TNA, CO 537/3939, Memo from Colonial Secretary to British delegation in New York, 21.4.48.
173families remained in Cyprus  too. It was not until February71949, after appeals from 
die Governor of Cyprus to the Colonial Office that the last 12,000 or so were finally 
released.93 A discrepancy in die final numbers indicated that over the previous  period 
some 1,600  had tunnelled their way out or found some other means of escape from 
the camps. It is a reasonable assumption, given the Mossad’s increasing use of larger 
ships which were difficult to board at sea,  and the reservoir of Jews prepared to make 
the hazardous journey to Palestine, that the  ongoing policy of interception at sea and 
detention in Cyprus would have been unsustainable in die medium term. However 
once the British had signalled, in the latter part of 1947, their intention to leave 
Palestine the whole question became academic. Nevertheless to the credit of the 
Palestine Naval Patrol  and the Colonial Office, in terms of actual  permitted entry 
into Palestine, as opposed to the arrivals in Cyprus, the Mossad hardly managed to 
breach the official annual  quota  of 18,000 immigrants during 1946 and 1947.94 But 
they came pretty dose.
A quite separate perspective on illegal immigration is provided  by the  Royal 
Navy. It is set out  in a book written by  one of its offidal  historians, Ninian Stewart. 
As one would expect  a large part of his book is a detailed analysis of each 
interception and die naval forces that comprised the Palestine Patrol at the time. 
Nevertheless Stewart does reflect on the humanitarian side of the operation. This 
extract summarises the attitudes of the sailors involved
Despite their knowledge of what the Jews had suffered from Hitler, 
members of Ships’ companies might be expected to be antagonised by 
immigrants who showed diem so much hostility and whose compatriots 
were killing and kidnapping British servicemen. Nevertheless 
contemporary accounts show that whilst contemptuous of the squalor, 
members of boarding parties remained fair minded, were not given to 
excessive force and, once opposition ceased did what they could to ease 
the lot of the immigrants, provide first aid and make friends.95
92  Liebreich, 191.
93 TNA, CO 537/4058,  letter from Governor of Cyprus to Colonial Secretary,  15.12.48.
94 Archives Nationales, F7/16107, According to a RG report entitled « Israel and Zionism », the 
nimibers of Jewish entrants to Palestine were  1946:18,000;  1947:21,000 ;  1.1.48 to 14.5.48 :17,000. 
After the creation of the  State on 15th May  a further 102,000 entered by the end of the year. Report 
dated 17.6.58.
95 Ninian Stewart, The Roval Navy and the Palestine Patrol  (London,  1997),  174.
174In  reviewing  Stewart’s book in  2004  Ronald Zweig, of Tel Aviv 
University, expresses the view that in the public relations war being fought, the 
struggle against illegal immigration was devastating to Britain’s reputation as the 
Mandatory power. Nevertheless he emphasises  that the organisers of Aliyah Bet and 
Jewish opinion in general relied heavily on the fact that the  British  applied 
humanitarian standards in their interception policy. “ A determined naval power that 
had no humanitarian scruples could easily have ended the flow of refugees. A few 
sinkings at sea would have had a powerful deterrent effect.”96 Of course at the time, 
Zionist propaganda did not acknowledge that the Royal Navy’s actions  contained any 
element of restraint  and continued to portray each interception as akin to piracy at 
sea
Having read many of the reports on interceptions emanating from Admiralty 
and War Office sources it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, given the British 
Government’s policy on the matter of illegal immigration,  the officers concerned 
were generally carrying out their duties in the most humane manner possible. 
Although there is, in these reports, some stereotyping of Jews and the occasional 
derogatory remark, a charge of antisemitism would be difficult to justify. At  the 50th 
anniversary’ reunion of illegal vessel crews held in Israel in 1997, the Royal Navy’s 
unique forbearance was acknowledged and praised by those directly involved on the 
illegal immigration side.97
What has emerged from this narrative  is that the  British were  aware  that 
they were  engaged in a losing  propaganda war with the Zionists, even if the results 
of interception  proved that the  naval blockade of Palestine was in general  very 
effective. Deporting illegal immigrants to Cyprus as a deterrent, proved ineffective in 
the long term, as the camp populations had to be constantly reduced  by transferring 
the inmates to Palestine, in order to provide room for new detainees.
The only7  policy which might have kept immigrants out of Palestine was one 
originally suggested by the army to counteract  the failure of  existing measures, 
which  still allowed illegal immigrants to remain in Palestine after a brief internment 
in Athlit. The army’s suggestion, in February’ 1946, was to return illegal immigrants
96 Ronald Zweig, “The Royal Navy and the Palestine Patrol”,  War in History'  11(2) (London, 2004), 
233.
97  Stewart, 174.
175right  back  to their point of departure. However at the time this was considered 
impractical, let alone highly controversial.98 When this policy, later  known as 
“Refoulement” was finally applied  in the case of the President Warfield  in July 
1947, it led to the famous Exodus Affair and this had the most disastrous public 
relations effect for the British Government and was never again attempted.
98 TNA, WO 204/49 Report on Illegal immigration into Palestine. Fran Middle East Face to CIC 
Central Mediterranean Forces,  18.2.46.CHAPTER 7  The  Exodus Affair
The consequences  of the Exodus Affair from a public relations and  political 
point of view went far beyond anything previously experienced in the confrontation 
with the British over illegal immigration Unwillingly drawn into the human drama 
rapidly developing in Marseilles, the French Government found itself squeezed 
between its Zionist friends in France and Palestine and its former ally, the British.
Both the Yishuv and Britain saw the Exodus Affair as a test of wills.
Bevin was determined to score on two accounts: Firstly to show the Yishuv 
that the easy option of internment in Cyprus was no longer available and that 
immigrants would be returned to their country of departure. Secondly  to bring home 
to the French that they could no longer facilitate the transit of DPs across France to 
their ports of departure without repercussions. The new British policy, that of 
‘Refoulement' was to return to the point of departure all illegal immigrants captured 
at sea It was perceived that the ensuing embarrassment and inconvenience of having 
to contend with thousands of unwanted immigrants would force the French authorities 
to curtail their covert assistance. The same policy was to be adopted for Italy.
The Exodus Affair, which began in July 1947, coincided with the launch of the 
Marshall Plan, a massive American injection of material and funds, devised by the 
American Secretary of State, George Marshall, to regenerate die European economies. 
For the sake of both countries, it was essential that Great Britain  and France worked 
in concert and that no bilateral problems interfered with the understandings that 
Bidault had so assiduously built up with Bevin.  In response to George  Marshall’s 
initiative a Foreign Ministers’ conference had been called in Paris for  12th July, at 
which it was intended to formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation programme to meet 
Europe’s needs.1  Bevin and Bidault were to be die joint sponsors of the conference. It 
w as by no means an appropriate moment for a much less significant issue, such as the 
departure of the President Warfield, to cause political embarrassment.
In this epic saga the three contestants either increased their prestige to a 
greater or lesser extent or suffered ignominy. The French Government, rent by 
internal conflicts between Ministers, took no decisive steps, except to refuse any 
assistance to forcefully disembark the passengers from the three prison ships in the
1  Zertal, Catastrophe. 53.
177harbour of Port-de-Bouc. In the face of this impasse, the British kept the boats in the 
harbour for over three weeks, hoping that the conditions on board would finally 
convince the passengers to disembark peacefully, offering as the only alternative their 
return to Germany ami internment In Palestine, Ben Gurion, anxious to reap as much 
public relations benefit as possible from the British discomfiture, used all his contacts 
in France to ensure that the Government would take no action because of British 
pressure to bring the stand-off to an end by a forced evacuation of the ships. There is 
no doubt however that, as a result of the rugged determination of the passengers to 
remain on board until they were safely landed in Palestine, politely refusing all offers 
by the French of asylum,  die Exodus Affair, as a public relations exercise, was 
disastrous for the British, a qualified success for the French and a triumph for the 
Zionists.
7 .1 The  Exodus story
In early June 1947, with UNSCOP in Palestine preparing for the meeting of 
the UN General Assembly in September, the temptation for the Mossad  to score a 
public relations coup proved irresistible. It also responded to Yigal Alton's call to his 
men in Europe to expedite the movement of ships precisely during this period.2
From 22nd  June 1947 over 4,000 DPs were transported from Germany  to 
Southern France in one of the most ambitious and complex operations the Mossad 
had ever attempted.3 Prior to their departure it was necessary that  transit visas be 
delivered by the French consular authorities. To avoid the preparation of individual 
visas, Marcel Pages, presumably at the request of  his friend L’Abbe Glasberg, 
indicated  that a collective transit  visa would suffice for Ministry of the Interior 
purposes. Given the time constraints, members of the Mossad concocted overnight  a 
fictitious list of 858 would-be immigrants and delivered it to Marcel Pages in early 
June. A fully authorised collective transit  visa was then issued by the French vice- 
consul in the American Zone on 23rd June.
As it was in duplicate, the copy  was  also used, thus conferring transit rights 
on twice the original number.4 Once again the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s
2  Zertal, Catastrophe. 56.
3 Ibid.
4Halamish,  47.
178opposition to mass movements of this nature  had been circumvented.5   The DPs 
were assembled and split into five groups.  Three road convoys carried the majority' of 
the DPs together with hastily arranged forged papers prepared by a fictitious Mossad 
entity called The Jewish Refugee Aid Society.6 They  were provided with food and 
other essentials by the Haganah command in Germany, as they' set off across the 
French Zone to the border with France.7 The  other  immigrants, using respectively 
the two copies of the  authentic collective visa,  boarded  specially chartered  trains 
near Munich.  These included some DPs from Bergen-Bel  sen in the British Zone  who 
had been secretly smuggled into the American Zone, the point of departure.8  The 
whole operation was carried out with military precision and was completed within 
eight days.
Information later gleaned by  CID  officers in Haifa from the immigrants who 
w ere being transferred from  the Exodus  to  prison ships, indicated that many had 
originated from the Landsberg DP Camp in Germany and that  they had come by train 
to Marseilles where they7  had been accommodated  in a large number of private 
houses. They had remained indoors for a period of two weeks and then proceeded by 
night in ex-army trucks to Sete. 9 At the moment of embarkation, it was anticipated 
that the French authorities would  insist on inspecting the entry' visas  for the country' 
of ultimate destination. To meet this need, the Mossad  managed, for a price, to 
convince the Columbian Consul  to furnish a load of blank visas and the necessary 
stamps. It only remained for photographs of the immigrants to be taken in the various 
transit camps. In the space of a few days, with the active cooperation of the street 
photographers of Marseilles and the Mossad’s expat team of forgers in Lyon, the task 
was accomplished.1 0 Had  an himself was one of the team who stamped the visas in the 
washroom of his hotel.1 1
British surv eillance of the President Warfield had been extensive from the 
moment it  had  left its American home. Originally  a river steamer, which had seen 
service during WW2, it was  acquired in the USA in 1946 by a Mossad-front 
company.  After a call at Marseilles it arrived at La Spezia in Italy but because of
5 Halamish,.57.
6 Ibid. Al.
7 Ben David, 267.
8 Arieh Boaz. Olam Vnochet Bechol: Havech Shaul Avigur (Tel Aviv, 2001), 212.
9 PRO,  FO 537/2400, CID to Chief Secretary Palestine Government, 21.7.47.
1 0  Zertala Catastrophe. 67.
1 1  Iladari, HaMossad. 21.
179British pressure on  the authorities there  it  then  left  again,  accompanied by an 
Italian torpedo boat, for French territorial waters. It arrived at Port-de-Bouc on 13th 
June. Here it was extensively  refitted to carry passengers and took on board large 
amounts of fuel. It was thoroughly searched by RG agents and customs officers 
without finding anything illegal.1 2 However there can be little doubt that these 
officials and indeed the workers in the port were well aw are of the intended  use and 
destination  of the President Warfield. A few w eeks later  it was decided by the 
Mossad  to move the boat to Sete in Jules  Modi’s constituency, where the likelihood 
of interference by the authorities  was considered negligible. When the boat arrived 
on the night of  9th  July however, British  alarm bells began to ring. The following 
morning Captain Courtney of the SIS arranged for aerial  photographs to be taken of 
the boat and the results were immediately sent to the British Embassy in Paris.
London was informed and  Bevin instructed the British Ambassador, Duff Cooper, to 
make urgent representations to the  MAE to prevent or delay its sailing for as long as 
possible.1 3
At 4 am on 10* July the process of embarking the immigrants  on the 
President Warfield was commenced. The passenger list  comprised  1615 men, 1784 
women, 170 youngsters and 685 children. These included, in addition to the DPs from 
Germany, over 150  immigrants from North Africa and France. The arrival of these 
4,554 immigrants  at the embarkation point  had not been without some last minute 
hitches as the movement  of the 178 lorries involved was temporarily  blocked  by a 
general strike covering the whole of France. A million franc donation to the strikers’ 
fund by the Mossad enabled the  CGT, the Communist-run union, to remove all 
obstacles.14 Embarkation  was completed at 1pm under the supervision of the French 
police and the more covert surveillance of the SIS, just as a stage of the Tour de 
France (annual cycle race) swept through Sete.
The  sudden  activity of the SIS had not escaped the attention of Wybot’s DST 
men in Marseilles. Wybot immediately warned the Mossad chief, Shaul Meirov, that 
the British Ambassador was about to inform die French Minister  of Foreign Affairs 
of the impending departure of the President Warfield.1 5  To forestall  Bidault’s 
attempts to stop the sailing,  Venya Pomerantz was immediately despatched to seek
1 2  Archives Departementales des BDR, 150W163, RG du Port-de-Bouc a Chef des RG, 4.7.47.
1 3 Zertal, Catastrophe. 54.
1 4  Yoram  Kaniuk. D Commanda PExodus  (Paris, 2000), 173.
180the help of his  political contacts and  friendly civil servants in the French 
administration, but he met with little success. Paul Ramadier, the Prime Minister on 
the eve of an important conference with the British was no more inclined than Bidault 
to upset Bevin, due to arrive on the 12th.  Even Leon Blum and Daniel Mayer 
counselled prudence.16  Bidault put pressure on Jules Moch, responsible as he was for 
maritime matters, to forbid the sailing on the basis that the ship was not  equipped 
with sufficient lifeboats and the captain was unable to produce a certificate of 
seaworthiness. Concurrently at a more local level, die British Consul managed to 
convince the maritime authorities of these facts, and the captain was then  forbidden 
to set  sail. That same afternoon an attempt  by the maritime authorities to remove a 
part of the ship’s engine to immobilise her, was thwarted by the captain. In the 
evening  he  set off with a delegation to the Prefecture at Montpellier to plead for the 
ship’s release, but to no avail.
It was left to  Depreux, with Wybot’s support,  to give a surreptitious  green 
light to Pomerantz. for the ship to sail: “Go ahead but be quick or soon it will be too 
late.”17 The captain of the Warfield, an American by the name of Ike Aronowicz, was 
however faced with a number of constraints. The authorities ensured that no maritime 
pilot or tug  were  available and police were on hand to ensure that the boat remained 
moored to the quay.  At 7.15 pm  ‘Rudy’ Zameret received a radio message from 
Paris to dispense  two or  three million francs to facilitate the departure. 1 8  However 
despite the promise of a massive fee to a local pilot, die latter failed to materialise.19
A while later  the Palyam Commander on board, Yossi Harel came under 
intense  pressure from the Mossad in Paris.  According to Ze’ev Hadari he personally 
phoned Harel with the following message from Meirov
I am informing you dial all our efforts to enable the sailing of the vessel 
through negotiations with die central French authorities have failed. You 
must set out on your own. You must sail whatever happens. We have 
arranged for them to look the other way if you do this. Therefore you must 
sail and take whatever opportunities come your way. Do not argue, that is 
an order, understand? 20
15Boaz, 212.
1 6  Bemert, 158.
17 Derogy,  La Loi du Retour. 146.
1 8  Hadari, Hamossad.  Transmission taken from  the Mossad7s Operational log, 112.
1 9  Zertal, Catastrophe. 70.
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181This telephone message was reinforced  by a radio message from Meirov 
himself (code name: Ben Yehudah) at 9.15 pm, in which he intimated that costs were 
not a factor if this helped to have the boat released.21 A further radio message at 
midnight from Pomerantz reflected an increasing sense of desperation. He announced 
that if any port workers, who aided the departure of the ship, lost their jobs as a 
result, a fund of five  million francs was available to compensate diem22 A decision 
was finally made and at 4.30 am on the morning  of 11th July the mooring ropes were 
hacked off at the ship’s end  and she slowly'  moved out of the harbour. Almost 
immediately  she  became stuck on  a sandbank at the port entrance. After one and a 
half hours of risky manoeuvres, she was  eventually extricated  and set out for the 
open sea. The port authorities followed ho- progress  through binoculars and then 
alerted the British Consulate in Marseilles.23
In conversations much later with his biographer, Yossi Harel freely confessed 
that he persuaded the captain of the boat, Ike Aronowicz, to take the boat out of the 
port against his better judgement. When they were  then stalled on the sand bank at 
the port entrance, Harel ordered the  engines to be pushed beyond their  safety limit, 
risking that the boilers would explode,  in order to free the boat.24
Shortly  after the sailing, Ze’ev Hadari and L’Abbe Glasberg  convinced 
Francois Armorin at  Franc-Tireur to write an article  sympathetic to  the immigrants 
on board the President Warfield. The public relations exercise had already begun.25
Bevin’s outrage, when he arrived the following day in Paris to co-chair the 
economic conference with Bidault,  is  wonderfully encapsulated  in a letter he sent to 
Bidault  following a private meeting earlier that day. An extract from  the original 
letter  found in die files of die MAE, is reproduced here  in order to give the clearest 
illustration of Bevin’s frustration and anger  at what he regarded as  France’s 
continuing  cavalier attitude towards Illegal Immigration.
2 1  Hadari, HaMossad. Transmission taken from  the Mossad’s Operational log, 112.
22 Ibid.
23 Archives Nationales.  F7/16089, Telephone conversation between Ministere de l’lnterieur  and 
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24 Kaniuk, 180-182.
25 Lucien Lazare,  1/ Abbe Glasberg. 93.
182Dear Mr. Bidault,
On numerous occasions in the past few months we have appealed 
to our French friends to help us in our difficult task in Palestine by taking 
all possible steps to stop die illicit Jewish traffic through France. The 
French Government have responded by giving assurances that among 
other things die validity of the visa would be closely scrutinised before 
they were allowed to leave France and that die provisions of the 
international conventions regarding the safety of life at sea would be 
rigorously applied to ships suspected of participating in the traffic.
As recently as 27th June I wrote to Your Excellency once again 
invoking your help and requesting in particular that a ship the President 
Warfield should be strictly controlled in accordance with  the requests 
made to your Ministry by HM’s Embassy.
As I told you this morning, I was dismayed to find on arriving in 
Paris that not only had the President Warfield escaped from France but 
that she had been permitted to embark some 4,000 illicit immigrants, in 
spite of the fact that she possessed a clearance certificate valid for only 
one journey without passengers and in fine weather.
In die circumstances I must protest most strongly against the 
facilities which have been accorded to the President Warfield and I 
request that the French Government should readmit her to France with all 
the passengers on board as soon as arrangements can be made to cause the 
President Warfield to return.
... I should also be grateful to learn that the necessary disciplinary 
measures have been taken as regards those who permitted her departure in 
contradiction with the assurances of die French Government..
... I take this opportunity to remind you that among the suspect 
vessels in French ports are the Paducah and the Northlands which are at 
Bayonne and the Bruna and the Luciano  and the Archangelos which are 
at Marseilles.
I shall be glad if, in view of the departure of the President 
Warfield, you will agree to maintain a warship in the vicinity of 
Marseilles with standing orders to stop any of these vessels which may 
leave port. You will realise that only  a French vessel can take effective 
action to prevent clandestine embarkation of illegal immigrants in French 
territorial waters.
I am, Dear Mr. Bidault, yours sincerely
Ernest Bevin.26
Bevin then  pursued the matter  with Paul Ramadier, the Prime Minister, and  hinted 
darkly that France’s benign attitude to illegal immigration from its ports could well 
have unfortunate repercussions for French interests in North Africa.27 
The British Embassy ottered the fray7  by throwing  doubt on the validity of the 
individual  Columbian entry visas which had been presented. The response  of the
26 MAE Archives, Immigration, File 376,12.7.47.
27 Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics. 266.
183French was that they were not allowed to query their authenticity.28 In fact the 
Government issued a press release indicating that it had never committed itself to the 
British Government to check individual, as opposed to collective, entry  visas 
delivered by foreign consulates.29
Marcel Pages was later  to assert that each person on the list  carried an 
individual  Columbian visa delivered by  its consulate in Marseilles and a proper 
French exit visa delivered by the Prefecture of die Bouches-du-Rhone.30 Another 
report stated  that the Prefecture had acted in accordance with an authority from the 
Ministry of the Interior dated 26th June.31 All these affirmations were backed up by 
Renseignements Generaux whose agents had checked the documents of those who 
had embarked.32 This  flurry of reports and Government statements issued after the 
escape of the President Warfield from Sete  were, as it later turned out, carefully 
drafted and coordinated  to reassure the Cabinet and Prime Minister that correct 
procedures had been adhered to at alt times by the authorities concerned.33
The Government of Columbia then interv ened to  assert that the visas were 
indeed fakes and that in any case they would have  refused  to accept the DPs.34  This 
statement  therefore disavows  a note previously  issued by the Columbian Consul in 
Marseilles, where he states categorically that he was prepared to deliver visas to 
immigrants from Germany, subject to exit visas being issued by the Prefecture.35
From the moment the President Warfield  left Sete,  she was continuously 
shadowed by Royal  Navy ships and Lancasters of the Royal Air Force. On 18th  July 
she was rammed and forcibly boarded off the coast of Palestine.  A report to the Chief 
Secretary at the Colonial Office indicated that very strong resistance had been offered 
during die boarding operation. Smoke bombs, oil fuel jets, steam jets as well as 
fireworks and tins of corned beef were amongst the weapons employed by the 
immigrants.  Naval officers fired shots, in one case to stop a rating being decapitated 
with an axe and in another when an immigrant was seen wielding a rifle. No other
28 Lazard, 82.
29 Archives Nationales. F7/16089 Press release, 1.8.47.
30  Ibid., Memo from Direction de la Reglementation to President du Ccoseil,16.7.47.
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184case of tiie use of such  lethal weapons by  immigrants  has been reported.  Casualties 
suffered by crew are! immigrants were two men dead and 28 immigrants taken to the 
Government hospital in  Haifa, one of whom later died. Many other immigrants were 
injured but these were dealt with on the spot.36 After  the seriously  injured and dead 
were removed  the rest of the passengers were then transferred to three prison ships, 
the Ocean Vigour, the Runnymede  Park and the Empire Rival. After sailing away, 
the passengers discovered that they were not headed  for Cyprus, but for France.
As with previous  intercepted boats,  there remained a  controversy over 
whether  the Exodus  had been boarded within the three mile limit. The British 
contended, despite indications to the contrary,  that the interception  complied with 
international law. This was because the Admiralty was aware that detaining vessels on 
the high seas was prima fad illegal and could be used as a defence in court to prevent 
confiscation of the boat and the detention of the crew. Nevertheless, practical 
considerations led many a naval captain to board and seize boats well outside the 3 
mile limit in order to prevent a determined dash to beach the boat on the shore. As a 
rule of thumb, boarding and seizure had to be effected the same number of miles 
from the shore as the number of knots the ship was travelling. Thus at a speed of 
seven knots, the boarding party had to take control some seven miles from the shore. 
With bigger and faster ships, even an interception and boarding at some twelve miles 
from shore became quite common. 37
A letter from the Admiralty in 1947 to  the Foreign Office, provides the 
clearest  indication that both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office were fully 
aware that ships were being boarded outside the three mile limit. The letter  states
May you be forgiven for the last paragraph of your letter... of the 7th 
November to Higham [Colonial  Office] about the relation  between the 
territorial water and arrest at sea.. . I do not think you can really get away 
with the view that the Foreign Office have not been informed that ships 
are, in fact, being boarded outside territorial waters. I thought in any case 
that this was common knowledge between us and the whole purpose of 
the correspondence was to regularize the position. I trust that this 
complicated matter will not have to be pursued further in view of the 
imminence of our departure from Palestine.38
36 TNA, CO 537/2400, C.I.D. Jerusalem to Chief Secretary, 21.7.47.
37 TNA,  ADM1 23526, Assessment tty the CIC Mediterranean, 31.3.47.
185The Exodus is unlikely to have been the exception to the rule and was 
therefore  most likely boarded well outside the territorial waters  of Palestine.
7.2  Public relations issues
To counter the  adverse publicity in the world’s press  occasioned by  acts of 
terrorism and other forms of armed action in Palestine against  British rule, both the 
Jewish Agency and the Revisionists used propaganda tools to persuade world  public 
opinion of the justice of the Zionist cause. In the  post-war anti-colonial atmosphere in 
the United States  this was put  to good effect. In particular the newsreel pictures  of 
blood-spattered and bandaged  illegal immigrants being dragged along  the quay in 
Haifa by  soldiers to prison ships, caused immense harm to the British Government’s 
image abroad. The stories of interception and boarding  at sea, with graphic 
descriptions of the fights which ensued, were reported on at length. Whatever the true 
circumstances, the vision of white-helmeted sailors clubbing men, women and 
children, cast the illegal immigrant as the under-dog in an unfair fight. Clearly the 
Palyam escorts encouraged resistance for the publicity value, but only to a point 
which would not endanger their ship or die lives of the immigrants. The bigger the 
ship and the numbers who sailed, the greater the publicity value when the ship was 
intercepted.
It is not unreasonable to speculate whether plans to beach these larger ships on 
the shores of Palestine were ever a practical proposition, given the difficulty of 
disembarking and secreting away such a large number of passengers in the likely 
presence of British soldiers waiting  on shore. It is noteworthy that those very few 
ships which successfully reached shore and disembarked their passengers out of sight 
of the British, were the smaller ships with only a few hundred illegal immigrants on 
board. Thus the question as to whether a ship of the size of the President Warfield was 
seriously intended to be  beached  is an intriguing one.
The Mossad was certainly aware that British surveillance had been continuous 
ever  since she left the USA  and that therefore there was no possibility of escaping 
detection by the Palestine Naval Patrol once she approached territorial waters.  On the 
other hand, the ship had exceptionally powerful engines and, once in territorial waters
38 TNA, ADM1 23526, Letter from G.C.B. Dodds of the Military Branch of the Admiralty to John 
Beith at the Foreign Office, 8.12.47.
186could have  attempted to out-distance the destroyers in a fast dash for the shore, where 
her flat bottom would have facilitated an easy beaching.
The  question of the true intent  of illegal immigration  is addressed  directly 
by Idith Zertal. In discussing  the Exodus affair, Zertal  develops a thesis that illegal 
immigration was both an exploitation of the immigrants and a carefully arranged 
propaganda stunt. She asserts that the attempt to break through die naval blockade off 
the coast of Palestine was ‘hot even the main goal of illegal immigration”39 and that 
furthermore “the Zionists had never intended to actually bring the 4,500 refugees onto 
the shores of Palestine, and  such an effort had no chance of success since the Exodus 
was a show project from its inceptioa” 40
Such a  conclusion, if true, would reflect very negatively on Mossad. To 
encourage violent  resistance when at the same time it counted on the  Exodus, like 
most  previous ships, being intercepted and  brought into Haifa would have been a 
cynical exercise indeed. To do  so deliberately  to obtain  the foil glare of world 
publicity in  the presence of the UNSCOP team would be even more questionable. 
There is, according to Idith Zertal, strong evidence to suggest that the timing of the 
departure of the President Warfield was not fortuitous, but was linked to the presence 
in Palestine at the time of the UNSCOP enquiry team. Indeed a contemporary 
newspaper account  reported that the Haganah had announced its determination to 
bring in a ship during UNSCOP's presence in Palestine. As it was, it arrived just days 
before their departure. 4 1
As  the  Exodus approached the shores of Palestine, instructions had been 
transmitted by the Mossad in the Yishuv to the Palyam escorts  as to how to convey 
the plight of the immigrants to UNSCOP representatives on shore.42 In the event, the 
Jewish Agency managed to persuade Emil Sandstrom,  the Sw edish chairman of the 
committee,  to at least watch the trans-shipment of the immigrants  to prison ships in 
Haifa. 43
Most  historical accounts speak of the determination  by  the American crew 
to keep  the ship directed towards Palestine, despite being intercepted and rammed 
continuously, fourteen  miles outside the territorial water  limits. Added to this, the
39 Zertal, Catastrophe. 170.
40 Ibid., 83.
4 1  New York Herald Tribune (European Edition! 18.7.47.
42 Zertal, Catastrophe. 56.
43 New York Herald Tribune (European Edition). 19.7.47.
187fact  that organised groups of immigrants and  the crew constantly tried to prevent the 
British from gaining a toe-hold on the ship and from  entering die wheelhouse, makes 
it  less than conceivable that all this was staged purely to meet the propaganda needs 
of the Mossad on shore. In addition there is the eye-witness report of John Stanley 
Grauer, correspondent of The Churchman, who was serving as a volunteer member of 
the crew. When interviewed, he stated  that the intention had been to beach the boat 
in the early hours of the morning, but that at 3 am British destroyers came up and 
rammed the ship, making this task impossible.44
The violent death of the American  Second Mate, Bill Bernstein and two 
young  immigrants, as well as more than 200 injured,  attests to the level of sustained 
and violent resistance put up against the British sailors. Also, given the  Palyam 
commander Yossi Hard’s known consideration for the safety of his immigrant 
charges on board, it is equally illogical that he would have gone through such a 
dangerous charade, knowing full well that a successful beaching was out of the 
question. In  any event, he had  the example of the successful beaching of the Ulua 
near Haifa, a few months previously with one thousand  immigrants on board, as an 
indication of what could be achieved. The fact that the Ulua’s immigrants were all 
captured and transferred to Cyprus does not  necessarily detract from the original 
intent of a quick dispersal of all those on board once a landing had been achieved.
In this instance, one feels that Zertal has overstated her thesis  that illegal 
immigration was primarily a propaganda exercise mounted  by a non-compassionate 
Ben Gurion and  without regard for die safety or the real needs  of die immigrants. 45 
This  unusually categorical assertion is well  out of kilter  with the otherwise 
analytical and insightful appreciation of the subject, which she constantly displays in 
her book.
In his own  book, Zeev Mankovitz takes Zertal lightly  to task by asserting 
that  treating  Holocaust survivors purely  as victims of history, was misleading.46 
He strongly disagrees that, weakened by die privations they had endured,  they7  did not 
have minds of their own, were unable alone to find their own way out of the DP 
camps  and were therefore  putty in die hands of Zionist emissaries. In his view this 
took  no account of what these survivors had already achieved by their own efforts
44 New York Herald Tribune (Huropean Edition), 19.7.47
45 Zertal, Catastrophe. 13 and 219.
46  Mankowitz, 295/297.
188and it diminished their stature as human beings. To him illegal immigration was a 
shared burden between the Mossad’s emissaries and the survivors.  Without this 
merger of distinct but interlocking interests, the whole project of bringing the 
survivors to Palestine had no hope of success.47
Such  moderate  criticism is overshadowed by a real broadside aimed at her by 
Elihu Bergman, who was involved  with Aliyah Bet as a crew member on the Tirat 
Zvi in April 1948. In a review article on her book, Bergman’s central issue is  that 
Zertal, ”by her own admission” was predisposed from the outset to find the Zionist 
establishment in the Yishuv guilty of exploiting the She’erit Hapletah as a means to 
Jewish statehood.48 Clearly labelling Zertal among the “new historians” and 
“revisionist historians” who had in recent years emerged in Israel, he castigates her 
interpretation of the factual information and, more pedantically, disputes the accuracy 
of small points of detail, which in no way can be said to detract from Zertal’s 
scholarly treatment of the subject. However  he  does comment favourably on her use 
of factual and archival material as an “impressive piece of historical writing.”49 
Those compliments aside, the main thrust of his accusation against Zertal is that of 
bias against the Zionist establishment and the ‘elite’ represented by the kibbutz and 
labour movements, die Haganah, Palyam, Mossad, Ben Gurion, Yigal Allon, Shaul 
Meirov, etc. Another equally damning assertion by Bergman refers to Zertal’s 
characterisation of the main players in illegal immigration as reflecting subjective 
judgements and that she substitutes name-calling for serious historical analysis.30 He 
concluded “The Exodus account provides another example of how Zertal mixes bias 
with fact.”5 1
In reality, Zertal argues that after 50 years it was time for different 
perspectives on the subject  to be explored. In particular the necessity to strip Aliyah 
Bet of its Zionist mythology and  to recognise that the campaign had other motives 
such as using the propaganda effect of violent resistance to advance the call for 
unlimited immigration. She also asserts that Ben Gurion saw the ultimate effect of the
4 1 Mankowitz, 295/297.
48 Elihu Bergman,  “Israel: Bom in Sin?” in Israel Affairs. Vol.7. Nol ,Autumn (London, 2000), 121.
* Ibid.,  120.
50 Ibid., 127.
5 1  Ibid.,122.
189campaign as advancing Jewish sovereignty over Palestine and, in so doing, fortifying
52 his own political base.
Given the body of evidence presented in previous chapters, one would find it 
difficult to disagree with Zertal’s  interpretation of the Realpolitik behind Aliyah Bet. 
The Zionist leaders in the Yishuv were pragmatic individuals who had to overcome 
their inherent powerlessness in the face of a colonial power. Neither Mankowitz nor 
Bergman should  have been all that surprised that inevitably there was also  a more 
dispassionate or callous side which emerged in die course of the campaign.
Aviva Halamish, who also takes an opposite view to Zertal  repudiates the 
contention that, in the case of the President Warfield, many pregnant women and 
children were taken on board  purely to increase the dramatic effect. In her view, the 
mixed bag of immigrants was due more to circumstances in the DP Camps than to a 
carefully thought out programme.53 However in a report provided by a French 
member of the  Haganah, special attention was drawn to the existence of hundreds of 
women well-advanced in their pregnancy, which he considered  was an onerous 
responsibility for the escorts on board. He suggested applying better selectivity to 
such women before allowing them to leave  Germany.54
Tom Segev voiced  scepticism about Halamish’s view s but also about  illegal 
immigration in general. In his view its only inherent benefit  lay in its actual existence 
as a strategic weapon to achieve die creation of a Jewish state. Taking a controversial, 
but nevertheless  arguable,  position  he contended  that  “The illegal operation did 
not... bring the Yishuv many more people than would have come legally; from that 
point of view it was futile”.55
For Arieh Kochavi there were “no clear winners in die struggle over Jewish 
immigratioa” However he recognised that world-wide coverage of British actions 
against the ships kept international attention on  the Jewish  DP problem, which 
otherwise was in danger of waning.  He makes the point that the fact that thousands 
of DPs attempted the journey' to Palestine was in itself a considerable achievement. 
World opinion was thus made aware how  the DPs  predicament and  the question of 
Palestine were inextricably interlinked.5 6
52 Zertal, Catastrophe. 14.
53  Halamish, 45.
54 Yad Tabenkin Archives, Polonski files, Unsigned report dated 20th  July 1947.
55 Tom Segev, The Seventh Million (New York, 1991), 131/132.
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190These academic debates in Israel  over the issue of Zionist propaganda 
indicate  how  illegal immigration  moved  in the historiography from its initial 
glorification to a more balanced view of its true purpose  and achievement.
Turning now to the broader  public relations dimension of the Exodus Affair, 
this clearly readied unprecedented levels, with each party in the conflict  concerned to 
portray its image in the most favourable light. From die moment that the Exodus was 
intercepted outside Palestine territorial waters in July 1947 until the arrival of her 
passengers in Hamburg in September, both the Zionists and die British  were aware of 
the importance attached  to  the presentational aspects of their respective viewpoints 
to the world’s press.
After the trans-shipment of the Exodus passengers to the three British prison 
ships for their onward journey to France, Bevin saw an  opportunity to counter the 
negative image for the British that newsreel film of the arrival of the Exodus in Haifa 
had created around die world. In a revealing memo to the Paris  Embassy he wrote
The fact that Mr. Bidault personally agreed to return the passengers and 
we are actually returning them must not, repeat not, be disclosed until you 
receive further instructions. If the French Government refuses to accept 
them they may' yet have to be returned back to Cyprus. You may however 
allow your press attaches to make use of the information  in paras 2 and 3 
above. They should stress the inhumanity of the Jewish organisers in their 
gross overcrowding of the President Warfield...  If this incident provokes 
sufficient interest we shall make it an occasion for the maximum publicity 
possible by the BBC ...57
Unfortunately for Bevin, one negative image followed another, as the 
passengers on the  prison ships refused, over a period of three weeks, to disembark in 
Port-de-Bouc and die French would not permit force to be used.
With regard to  press comment on the  Affair in France, it should first be noted 
that with the disappearance of extreme  right wing newspapers after the war, public 
opinion was largely guided by papers created at the Liberation. Thus national papers 
like Combat Franc-Tireur and Liberation, imbued with the spirit of the resistance, all 
quickly espoused the Zionist cause.58 Others such as Le Monde (Liberal) and 
L’Aurore TVirulently anti-Communist and Gaullist) were more measured, but 
nevertheless criticised British policy. It was felt that  British public opinion was too
57 TNA, FO 188/595A, Swedish Legation files, Bevin to Paris Embassy, 19.7.47.
191insular and that because, unlike the French, they had no experience of the suffering of 
the Jews or those in the Resistance, they could not empathise with the plight of 
thousands of DPs some two years after the end of the war.59
A reporter from L’Aurora who managed to hire a small boat to approach the 
Runnymede Park commented
As you approach you perceive  something like a  lobster-basket, from 
which hands appear to acknowledge our calls. Imagine under the blue sky 
of the Mediterranean, a narrow prison where lie 1,500  naked  men and 
women, who wished to live in freedom in the land of their faith. Have the 
British understood this? The obstinacy of die Jews has clearly upset 
them... Are the immigrants going to be forced to disembark at the end of a 
bayonet? The problem is a delicate one for France, which above all wishes 
to show itself a hospitable country.6 0
The mouthpiece of the French Socialist Party (SFIO), Le Populaire. of which 
the former Prime Minister, Leon Blum, was the political director, no doubt expressed 
the unofficial views of the Socialist Ministers within the Cabinet. These, whilst 
opposed to the terrorist activities of the Irgun, regretted that  the British  had refused a 
request from UNSCOP  to commute the death sentences on three young Jew's who 
earlier had attacked the Acre prison 61
When later in July the passengers of the Exodus w ere on their way back to 
France, the newspaper stated that despite the change in British tactics, France would 
not employ methods such as the use of force  w hich  were contrary to all its traditions. 
France would welcome them, but would not force them to disembark  Reflecting the 
sentiments of other French  new spapers, Le  Populaire emphasised  that the idea of 
again  incarcerating the  “Jewish survivors of Hitler” was pure anathema Humane 
solutions had to be found to the problem of Palestine and of the Jew ish DPs.62
During the following month, Leon Blum himself was so moved by the plight 
of the Exodus passengers  that he devoted three leading articles to the subject. He 
addressed himself  directly  to his friends in the Labour Government, calling on them 
to act with greater wisdom, to recognise that their policy in respect of the immigrants 
was  “outraging the universal conscience.” Such a spectacle was ‘unbearable, heart
58 Zertal,  « Le Cinquieme Cote du Triangle », 419.
59 Le Monde, 26.8.47.
60 L’Aurora. 29-30.7.47.
6 1  Le Populaire. 15.7.47.
192rending and intolerable.” He begged his English friends to think again. They had 
come up against an  unanimous and adverse public opinioa Everybody knew that the 
passengers would not disembark voluntarily. So did the British authorities. It was time 
for them to decide where they were to be taken. Then the boats could leave with their 
unfortunate  and heroic cargo. It was also time for the United Nations to come to a 
decision.
In his third article, Blum took time off to  answer the  Manchester Guardian 
which, stung by his previous articles,  had pointedly  questioned his  views on the 
matter of Palestine. In his reply he started off by disclaiming that he was  in any way 
the spokesman of the Zionists and that he  only spoke on behalf of the French 
Socialist Party63 In this way he politely rejected  any question of partisanship because 
of his Jewish origins.
To add to the embarrassment of the Labour Government, Harold Laski, then 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Labour Party, used the columns of 
Le  Populaire to express his congratulations to the French Government for its courage 
in its noble refusal to force the Jewish refugees to disembark in Port-de-Bouc, despite 
the pressures from London. Having, as he put it, committed a grave error at the start 
of its new administration in dealing with the Palestine problem, Laski suggested  that 
the [British] Socialist Government would be well advised to start off again by 
recognising its errors, rather than camouflaging the results and trying to make the 
French people an accomplice in its injustices.64
The local  regional newspaper  La Marseillaise  (Communist) also fell within 
the category of those newspapers which totally disapproved of the British action. 
Interspersed with reports from Palestine of the hanging of the  three young members 
of the Irgun  and of the subsequent reprisal culminating in the hanging of tw o British 
sergeants, the paper’s reporter concentrated his venom on the British. Under the 
headline  “ I saw7  human beings kept like animals aboard the Runnymede Park”, he 
characterised the ship  as a “Floating Auschwitz”. This followed a boat-trip out into 
the harbour  to view conditions on board from some distance  away. Referring to the
02 Le Populaire. 24.7.47.
63 Ibid.,  1.8.47 and 9.8.47
64 Ibid.,30.8.47.
193children, women and old men he could see through the wire of the cages he 
commented that all right-thinking people would be revolted by such a spectacle.65
The bad press that the British Government was receiving in French and 
American  newspapers over the  Affair was sufficiently exasperating  for  Creech 
Jones  to complain in the House of Commons that  “ "malicious vilifications... had not 
made their [ i.e. the Government’s ] task any easier.”66 This was followed up by a 
meeting between the British Ambassador and the Secretary General of the MAE, in 
which  Duff Cooper asked for his intervention so that British intentions were not “ 
systematically misconstrued in the French press.” 67
The British Government aware that it risked losing the public relations battle, 
made a last effort to explain its position to the world at large. In a press statement 
issued on 21st August 1947 it warned that, failing any change, the immigrants were 
about to be taken to the British zone in Germany where they could safety be 
disembarked. It sought to justify its actions on a number of counts:
1.  That the French Government had originally agreed to the return of the 
immigrants to France.
2.  That tiie immigrants had boarded with false papers and that the Exodus had 
left port without authorisation.
3.  That the Jewish Agency could have used its influence to encourage the 
immigrants to land in France but chose to act otherwise.
4.  That pending a decision of the United Nations on the future of Palestine, 
nothing should be done to prejudice the outcome. In particular the question of 
immigration was a major issue and HM Government could not vary the 
present  entry quota of 1,500 per month.
5.  The practice of transferring illegal immigrants to Cyprus only encouraged the 
organisers of the illegal traffic.
6.  There were still in Germany thousands of Jews who could have been admitted 
legally to Palestine, were it not for the flow of illegal immigration 68
The effect of the British decision on the Yishuv was one of extreme shock. It 
was felt that this could only increase the sense of humiliation, not to say impotence, 
of the more moderate elements. Most of the Hebrew7  press joined in sharp attacks on 
Bevin’s ultimatum. Even Ha’Aretz. Dr. Weizmann’s mouthpiece, decried “ the crime
La Marseillaise  1947.
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194which will remain engraved in the memory of mankind, the return of the survivors of 
Nazi massacres to the slaughterhouse itself.”
Fearing an extremist backlash, one  moderate Jewish leader remarked, with a 
certain irony: “Mr  Bevin has asked for trouble and the dissidents [Irgun and Stem 
Group] who easily match Mr. Bevin in lunacy and stubbornness, will certainly not 
disappoint him”. Even in the Palestine government, which was not involved in the 
events at Port-de-Bouc, a number of officials considered Bevin’s step  a major 
political blunder.69
The  Affair was possibly the event which brought Britain’s public image in 
relation to Palestine and illegal immigration to its lowest point. Within weeks 
however attention moved to the United Nations Assembly where Britain’s role in 
Palestine was speedily to be brought to an ignominious end.
The glare of publicity created by the Exodus Affair also had its downside. 
Firstly it compromised the Mossad’s clandestine network and its connections with the 
highest levels of government.70 Secondly, the Mossad had to keep a very low profile, 
so as not to embarrass the French Government  any further.7 1   There are, however, 
indications that the ensuing moratorium on immigration activities was also  exercised 
because of the discussions on partition then proceeding at the United Nations.72
One could also surmise that the level of injuries and fatalities on the Exodus 
also caused the Palyam Commander on board, Yossi Hard, to reflect seriously 
whether the results of violent  resistance to the Royal Navy served any purpose. He 
had already expressed his misgivings to a gathering of Zionist  leaders  in November 
1946, following  die seizure of another boat  which had been  under his command.
He stated that in view of the fatality and dozens of injured  which occurred on the 
Knesset Israd, the overall safety of the ship’s passengers must always be considered 
paramount. In Harel’s own words “We are not fighting to kill the British but to save 
Jews.” 73 If the Palmach wished to  confront the British then the place to do so was on 
the shores of Palestine, rather than using well motivated but  ill-equipped immigrants 
in dangerous confrontations at sea In addition Harel  complained  that,  whilst the
69 New York Herald Tribune (European Edition! 22.8.47.
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195immigrants were battling the British on board the Knesset Israel, then docked in 
Haifa, there was no demonstration or  intervention by the Yishuv to prevent the trans­
shipment of die immigrants onto boats for  Cyprus.74 Furthermore, on board ship,  he 
was often faced with contradictory and confusing instructions transmitted by both the 
Mossad and the Palmach headquarters.75 Such sentiments and criticisms, however, did 
not necessarily provoke  a positive response  from his chiefs in Palestine.
A definition of die Mossad’s and the Palmach’s respective responsibilities for 
Aliyah Bet is not easily achieved  given their overlapping functions and their uneasy 
political relationship. In simple terms, however, whereas the Mossad involved itself in 
providing the ships, refurbishing them, stocking them with supplies  and  selecting 
the ports of departure, the Palmach escorted the immigrants on board, allocated their 
berths and looked after their needs during the journey. They were also responsible for 
discipline on board and training the teams who would be called upon to resist the 
British Navy when an attempted boarding took place. On land as well as at sea they 
provided the radio operators who maintained contact with the Mossad headquarters in 
Paris and Tel Aviv. Once at sea, the primary responsibility for bringing the ship to 
Palestine  lay with a Mossad-appomted overall commander to whom both the ship’s 
captain and the Palmach commander reported
It is  misleading to imply, as Liebrdch  unfortunately does, that because of 
the different backgrounds of the Mossad  and Palmach people and their different 
political affiliations (the Palmach’s patrons were the  Map  am party, whilst those of 
the  Mossad were from Mapai) that their approach to Aliyah Bet was  different.76 It is 
equally  gratuitous  to assert that, because the Palmach escorts were generally young, 
bom in Palestine and militarily trained, that  they had more of a propensity to confront 
the British than the Mossad emissaries, with their  European backgrounds, who 
allegedly had more of  a tendency towards conspiracy, moderation and an abhorrence 
of violence.77
The basic reality' is that both partners in the Aliy ah Bet enterprise shared the 
dual objective of getting Jews to Palestine, whilst at the same time seeking to obtain 
the most publicity out of the event  They believed there was no better way to 
influence  world  public opinion  than  the distressing sight of immigrants being
74 Kaniuk, 149.
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196hauled off illegal ships, which bore all the signs of a fierce battle at sea before their 
arrival in Haifa That said, it is acknowledged  that there was continuous and 
sometimes acrimonious  debate  on the best  methods to  be adopted. As to the 
question of die level of resistance to be offered, Liebreich is correct in asserting that 
this was left to the discretion of the Mossad commander, as the case  of the Pan ships 
will  demonstrate.78
The sailing of the Pan ships from Burgas in December 1947 was 
preceded  by  weeks of debate within the  Mossad and between die Mossad  and the 
Jewish Agency  as to whether the time  and the political environment were  ripe for 
the  ships to sail to Palestine with over 15,000 illegal immigrants on board.79 In 
addition, Harel,  now having  experienced  the fatalities and injuries among the 
immigrants  on both the Knesset Israel and the Exodus, decided to confront Shaul 
Meirov in order  to establish the rules of engagement. In the case of the Exodus, as 
the ultimate commander on board, he had  relied  on his own assessment of the 
situation. He had brought confrontation with the British to an end when he considered 
that further ramming by the destroyers would imperil the ship and  that the level of 
injuries sustained was too high. For this he later had to suffer the recriminations of his 
colleagues in the Mossad and elsewhere.80 If he was to encourage  die immigrants to 
resist British boarding parties again, he wanted a clear and unambiguous  order from 
the Mossad. In his own heart he felt that such an order would be a mistake. Harel's 
own words, as later related to  Kaniuk, express vividly the conflict he faced as 
between carrying out  orders as a soldier and his overriding responsibility for the lives 
of the immigrants in his charge
Our war is to bring them [the immigrants] to the country [Palestine], not 
to turn them into soldiers in a lost batde. We do not have the right to turn 
them into the elite forces of the State-to-be, because this State-to-be is 
precisely the home  which they need.
They no longer believe in anything, they are exhausted by years of trailing 
around and of betrayal. We do not have the right... Once the 15,000 [from 
the Pan ships] will have crossed the Mediterranean, we can say that they 
have forced  the blockade. The crossing wall itself be the guarantee that 
they pre on their way to the country [even if this lay via Cyprus], and that
77 Liebreich, 181.
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197will be our victory. This is what our war is all about. Each Jew that 
survives intact will be our reward.
Meirov, reflecting on his own  share of responsibility for  the sinking of the 
Patria back in 1940 with the loss of 267 lives,8 1  tacitly  acknowledged that the 
immigrants should never  be exposed to unnecessary risks.82 Nevertheless after the 
sinking of die Patria, he did not feel remorse. He commented to one of his 
subordinates at the time “People like us had no other way to operate. Despite all the 
terrible, fierce pain over the victims... our political, moral right was drawn from our 
absolute recognition that we had no other way of fighting the war of immigration and 
freedom... not that we were happy about these methods... The responsibility falls on 
the enemy regime [i.e the British].”83
Another ongoing  issue revolved around the size of boats to be used. Harel and 
Meirov were in favour of using large boats  in order to “save the largest possible 
number of immigrants in  the shortest possible time.” Others such as Yehuda Arazi, of 
La Spezia fame, and even Ben Gurion were more in favour of a continuous stream of 
small boats which were more likely to evade British surveillance and make successful 
landings because of their sheer numbers.  In the end  the proponents for the large 
boats won the day.84
7.3  The political dimensions of the Affair
It would appear that, in applying Refoulement,  Bevin was relying on verbal 
assurances given to him by Bidault that if die immigrants were returned to France 
they would be disembarked and returned to  Germany. However Bevin remained 
sceptical as to whether Bidault would be able to carry the French Cabinet with him 
and indeed whether the ‘"refoulement policy” would indeed work.85
A  Foreign Office spokesman  announced on 21st July, very  prematurely as it 
turned out, that France had agreed to the return of the immigrants. He indicated that 
there were two reasons for choosing France rather than Cyprus. Firstly Cyprus was 
overcrowded. Secondly the more vigorous policy was to put future illegal
8 1  Kaniuk 76; Hadari, Voyage to Freedom. 85. In order to prevent its use by the British in deporting 
Jews to Mauritius, Meirov had ordered  that the boat  be disabled by explosives.
82 Ibid., 234.
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84 Kaniuk, 155; Hadari, Voyage to Freedom, 78.
85  TNA, FO 188/595A, Memo from Bevin to Paris Embassy, 19.7.47.
198immigrants on notice that they could no longer rely on being sent to Cyprus and from 
there being slowly filtered into Palestine. In Jerusalem however this news was kept 
from the local population and  a dusk to dawn curfew imposed to prevent violence 
when it eventually filtered through. A curfew was also imposed on Haifa, after the 
Haganah attacked two  naval radar stations on Mount Carmel in order to prevent 
further interceptions at sea86 The following day,  Creech Jones told the House of 
Commons that Great Britain was not concerned with what happened to the 4,500 
Exodus immigrants. It was, he declared, a matter entirely for the French authorities.87
The political objectives sought in  the Exodus Affair were reflected  in  the 
extensive efforts of both the Mossad and Zionist groups in France  to exercise their 
presence at Port-de-Bouc when the three prison ships dropped anchor  in the bay. The 
first task was to get into contact with the Paly  am leadership on board so as to bolster 
the resolve of the DPs  not to disembark voluntarily on French soil. This gambit with 
the risks to  health which it involved was intended to call the British bluff and force a 
return to Palestine or, at worse, Cyprus. The Mossad worked with both the Minister of 
the Interior, Edouard Depreux and its own operatives to arrive at this goal.
Depreux, who had secretly  encouraged  the departure of the President 
Warfield  some  12 days before, now convinced the Cabinet at a meeting held  on 23rd 
July 1947 at  Rambouillet, the Prime Minister’s summer residence, of the firm  line to 
be taken with die British  when their  prison ships arrived off Port-de-Bouc. Bidault, 
aw are that the British would press for the return to France of the passengers, had 
already  taken  the unusual step of asking Duff Cooper to meet him in Rambouillet 
for a discussion prior to the deliberations on the topic by the Cabinet.
Duff Cooper  reported later that day to the Foreign Office that Bidault, having 
come out of the Cabinet  meeting  especially to meet him,  had felt  that it was the 
height of madness for the French Government to give the British  so much trouble 
over this matter when so many things of greater importance were being considered.
He attributed the attitude of his Socialist colleagues, especially that of the Minister of 
the Interior and the Minister of Transport to the influence of Mr. Blum.88
Bidault had  effectively found a pretext to disguise  his own inability to meet 
his commitment to Bevin by placing the blame squarely on the Socialist faction within
86 New York Herald Tribune ('European Edition). 21.7.47
87 Ibid., 22.7.47.
88 TNA, CO 537 Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 23.7.47.
199the coalitioa At a later appearance before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the 
National Assembly, Bidault declared: “It is clear that in this affair [of the Exodus], I 
say it frankly, French generosity has gone too far. I am not in a position to give any 
explanations as to the surveillance of the ports. This is outside of my control”. 89
Within the confines of the MAE, the Secretary General, Chauvel, also vented 
his frustration at the turn of events. Besides  neither satisfying the Jews nor the Arabs, 
he foresaw7  a major diplomatic incident with the British at a time when France needed 
them to resolve its major issues concerning Germany.  In his view die only way to 
make amends for the “scandalous” default of allowing the embarkation of the 
immigrants in the first place, was for France to permit their return to  French soil. He 
was amazed that certain people in positions of authority were “ as stupid” as to 
maintain a contrary position, in the face of the law and  France’s international 
obligations. He  characterised  the Zionist  sympathies of certain members of the 
government  [obviously referring to Depreux and Moch] as sabotaging French policy 
at a time when major issues were at stake.90
Two Cabinet  meetings were held to discuss the Government’s attitude to the 
return of the Exodus immigrants. Bousquet on behalf of the MAE stated  that 4,500 
individual visas, alleged to have be issued by the Columbian Consul General in 
Marseilles, were forgeries issued by one or other Jewish organisation. Equally the 
letter of the Consul General, previously referred to, was a forgery. Consequently, as 
the Government had to take responsibility, it would have to respond favourably to the 
British request for the immigrants to be readmitted into France. Boursicot, the head of 
the Surete, representing Depreux,  responded that  without using force, the police 
would be unable to return die 4,500 immigrants to Germany and Austria.
In the present circumstances the Ministry of die Interior was not prepared to take on 
such a responsibility. Having checked with one of the Jewish  welfare organisations, 
the OSE, it appeared that the immigrants would refuse to leave the British boats. On 
the basis of this revelation, Depreux, later in the day, officially  confirmed that he 
would not allow a [forced] disembarkation from the three English boats.91 Depreux, as 
the Minister in Charge, then  gave precise instructions to die Prefet of the Bouches- 
du-Rhone that die liberty of choice of the DPs was to be respected. In other words no
89 Moine. This refers to the  session of the Commission on 9.8.47.
90 Archives Nationales, Fonds Georges Bidault, 457API 24, Note du Secretariat General MAE, 22.7.47
200forced disembarkation would be allowed. Port-de-Bouc was chosen in preference to 
the better amenities in Marseilles, specifically to isolate any incidents that might occur 
after the arrival of the ships.92
In view of Andre Blumel’s close relationship  with the police and Jewish 
circles, he was specifically appointed by Depreux to establish contact with  the DPs 
and the various Jewish organisations. He was to be part of a commission constituted 
by the Government and made up of officials from the MAE, the Interior Ministry and 
the Public Works Ministry, who would board each one of the three ships.93 By placing 
the MAE in a junior position, Depreux clearly intended to ensure that his officials as 
well as those  of Jules Moch, maintained complete control of the situation vis a vis 
the British and thwarted any possibility of disembarkation by force. On 25th July, 
Nahum Goldman of the Jewish Agency Executive  and Marc Jarblum, President of the 
French Zionist Organisation called on Edouard Depreux, to thank him for the position 
taken by the Government and asked him to do everything possible to prevent the 
British from forcibly disembarking die Jews on French soil.94
A few years after die creation of the State of Israel and in belated  response to 
an invitation from Israel’s representative, Maurice Fischer, issued in May 1948, 
Edouard Depreux and his wife visited Israel as guests of the Government. On his 
return to Paris he related his views of the country to an invited audience. In referring 
to the Exodus Affair 1 m commented that he refused Bevin’s demand to land the 
immigrants by force on French territory. He also remarked that, faced with  the 
MAE’s pleas for  action, he adopted their own  renowned  reputation for 
procrastination  and only responded when the matter was virtually over.95 Later in his 
memoirs, Depreux stated: “The police service that was under my authority facilitated 
the departure of the President Warfield. In my view we had neither to  force its 
departure nor to forbid it. It was for the immigrants to make die decision, whilst 
taking into account the risks they ran.” 96
9 1  Archives Nationales, Foods Georges Bidault, 457AP124,  Note de la  Direction Generale des Affaires 
AdministratiVes et Sodales, re: President Warfield, 22.7.47.
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201In addition to delegating Andre Blumel to meet the immigrants, members of 
the Mossad such as  Venya  Pomerantz  and L'Abbe dasberg, were provided by  the 
Interior Ministry with letters of introduction  to the local authorities in Marseilles. It 
appointed both of than to the Government's  welcoming committee and specifically 
designated Pomerantz  as a  Yiddish and Hebrew interpreter.97 According to Hadari, 
besides himself another Mossad operative, Chanan Zunborn,  also acting as an 
interpreter managed to join the French delegation permitted by the British to board the 
prison ships a few days later 98
On 28th July 1947, the Mossad  itself mobilised both its own operatives and 
those of Polonski’s AJ to travel post haste to Marseilles and organise overt and covert 
actions. The overt actions were to take the form of mass demonstrations against the 
British by a contingent of Zionist youth in the presence of the French and 
international  press.  They wore also to take food to the boats and, if necessary, resist 
any  attempt by the British at forced disembarkation on to French soil.99 The purpose 
of covert action was  to extricate  the  Palestinian escorts and  crew of the Exodus, 
whilst at the same time  emboldening the other  passengers in their refusal  to 
disembark.
A description of the scene at Port-de-Bouc on 29th July 1947, is encapsulated 
in the  following newspaper report
In Port-de-Bouc, the population of this little town has doubled as France 
prepares to welcome die deportees. About 1,000 young French Jews, most 
of them wearing short trousers, rucksacks and blanket rolls have arrived 
since dawn to laid their moral and if needed physical support.
The old maple-shaped esplanade bordering the inlet where the Jew s w7 ere 
expected to have been landed was lined with waiting trucks and 
ambulances. Two companies of blue-uniformed Republican Guards held 
the crowds back with wire-rope cordons and wooden barriers  White 
smocked doctors and nurses scurried around. A girls school had been 
converted into an emeigeney hospital and feeding station.
The report also stated that statistics on die number of passengers in  the three prison 
ships were provided by the Public Health Director of the Port of Marseilles. They
97 Archives Nationales, F7/ 16089, Letters of introduction  from la Direction de la Reglementation et 
des Etrangers, 25.7.47.
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99 Yad Tabenkin Archives, Polonski files, Box no2, Report by Arthur Epstein, Toulouse Group 
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202indicated a total passenger list of4,389 made up of 1,832 men, 1,602 women and 955 
children. Of these some 40 were ill.100  Compared to the 4,554 immigrants who 
originally left from Sete on 11th July, one can assume that the difference was 
accounted for by  the deaths on board and  those remaining  in Haifa  because of their 
injuries.
On 30th July, the French National Assembly voted unanimously a resolution 
asking Britain to solve urgently and humanely the “tragic affair” of the 4,500 who had 
refused to land in France  The resolution congratulated Paul Ramadier  and his 
Ministers for their liberal action in refusing to enforce the disembarkation of the 
homeless Jews.101A few days later, following a  lead given by  Marcel Pages, 
Depreux wrote to Bidault describing conditions on board the ships and stating  that 
the presence of the British in French  territorial waters  might have a detrimental 
effect on  French public opinion. He therefore  discreetly suggested that the British 
be encouraged to bring their controversial  exercise to a speedy conclusion.102
Bidault’s reply  concentrated on the serious effect that, according to the 
French Ambassador in London, the stand-off at Port-de-Bouc, was having on Anglo- 
French diplomatic relations. It was reported that The Times’  accusation of French 
bad faith was being supported by ministers in the Foreign Office. In the 
circumstances. Bidault felt it unwise to put pressure on the British, especially as, in 
their view, the few immigrants who had already disembarked would lead to a greater 
movement in the  days ahead.10 3
Vincent Auriol, the French President, indicated that because of this  cooling- 
off in Anglo-French relations, Georges Bidault decided not to attend in London at the 
ceremonies ratifying the Franco-British Alliance, previously signed in Dunkirk in 
February of that year. Instead diplomatic channels were utilised.104
The major British complaint, as expressed to L’Aurore’s London 
correspondent, was that France had made certain commitments in April  to the British 
Government regarding controls on suspected illegal immigrants which it then failed to 
carry out. Specifically in the case of the Exodus, the British had given the French 
early warning of its intended destination and still it had been permitted to depart. In
100 New York Herald Tribune (European Edition). 30.7.47.
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203addition, France were now reneging on  Bidault’s commitment to Bevin that there was 
no problem with the return of the immigrants to France. In effect it was Edouard 
Depreux who was in the firing line but Bidault, considered  Bevin’s  most 
trustworthy  ally, had badly let him down and embarrassed him. Hie crisis was all the 
more serious because even those British political circles, which normally condemned 
government policy in Palestine, were outraged by die French stance, which it deemed 
to be in bad faith.1 0 5
Not  prepared to  allow  these British recriminations  to go unanswered, a 
political commentator wrote to L’Aurore  expressing  “to his British friends” the 
thoughts of a great number of Frenchmen, whose admiration for Britain’s wartime 
polices were now diminished by her current policies in Palestine, hi one of his more 
telling jibes, he remarked
We suggest that our former allies  bring to mind  that since the 
Liberation, they had for their part, given  us cause for more 
disappointment than enthusiasm.... The brutal fashion in which, as 
holders of the Mandate in Palestine, they brought to an end our own 
Mandate over Syria, and their weak occupation procedures in Germany.... 
are not  matters  that would strengthen an ‘Entente’ that they needed as 
much as we do.1 06
This moral  lecture  would indicate that  many Frenchmen were still smarting 
from the alleged  British involvement in  France's ejection from Lebanon and Syria 
and the differences of opinion over post-war Germany.
Georges Loinger, now working in Paris for the Mossad, was deputised to drive 
the eminent priest, L’Abbe Glasberg, down to Port-de-Bouc. One of his tasks was  to 
present the Zionist case  to the press. Given die intense heat, Glasberg resorted to 
giving interviews in his hotel room from the comfort of a cold bath. Loinger, together 
with Venya Pomerantz  and Andre Blumel,were allowed by the British to board one 
of the ships and speak to the passengers. Ironically it was Glasberg, the former Jew, 
who best  translated the Yiddish of the passengers for the benefit of the other two. 
They were  all present w hen die Secretary General of the  Prefecture, Collaveri, read 
out a declaration  to the passengers inviting them to disembark if they so wished. 107
105 L’Aurore. 5.8.47.
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204Printed copies of the declaration in French, Yiddish and Hebrew  were then 
distributed. 10 8
According to Loinger, die immigrants were told, by messages slipped on board 
by Haganah members, that if they disembarked die creation of a Jewish state was at 
risk. Whilst admitting that they were certainly exploited, Loinger pointed out that the 
immigrants’ stoicism and desire to go to Palestine at all costs was die true motivation 
for their resistance. The presence of large numbers of pregnant women was, he 
conceded, certainly planned for its publicity effect. “It was a political matter. 
Everything is fair in love and war. They [The Mossad] contrived a great scoop!”109
In recognition of Blumel’s efforts on behalf of the Exodus immigrants, Shaul 
Meirov, in a departure from his usual and secretive habits, sent him a short note on 
9th August 1947. It read: “It is my pleasure to transmit to you today the 
congratulations and thanks of the headquarters of the Haganah in Palestine, for your 
courageous and intrepid activities in respect of the Exodus Affair.” In a covering note, 
also in French, Meirov explained that for understandable reasons, he signed the thank- 
you letter only with his initials. Despite this precaution, this separate letter was 
unaccountably  signed in full: “S. Meverov” 110
The stand-off betw een the British and the immigrants on board the three 
prison ships lasted for over three weeks in the blazing heat of summer. Only some 130 
immigrants were taken ashore, 77 of them  for reasons of ill-health.1 1 1  Nevertheless 
the British officer in charge of the three ships, a Colonel Gregson, was optimistic in 
the early days that die small trickle of Jews disembarking would grow into a flood. 112 
He was to be sorely disappointed in this  and blamed the failure on both the Zionist 
propaganda efforts and the complicity of the French authorities who, he alleged, 
hardened the immigrants into refusing  all blandishments. His assessment was  largely 
supported by the RG, who  referred to messages concealed in food taken on board, the 
intervention of Jewish helpers, the presence of Jewish interpreters on French police 
launches and  the use of a loud-speaker mounted on a fishing boat. They also singled
108 Yad Tabenkm Archives, Polonski files Box no2, Undated notice.
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1 1 1  Kochavi, Post-Holocaust Politics, 269.
1,2 Archives Departementales des BDR  148W185, Prefet BDR to Minister of the Interior, 1.8.47.
205out the representatives of the FSJF as being opposed to disembarkation. Finally they 
listed 19 members of the Haganah identified  at Port -de-Bouc.11 3
That the Palyam members on board used strong-arm tactics to discourage 
immigrants from volunteering for disembarkation is referred to in the report of a 
British naval officer.114  Also Renseignements Generaux reported a fight among the 
immigrants on die Empire Rival.1 15 Clearly on the question of disembarkation there 
was never 100% solidarity.
The  announcement on 22nd August that the immigrants had one last 
opportunity to disembark voluntarily in France or face shipment to Hamburg met, 
except for six volunteers, with a negative response. According to  Renseignements 
Generaux, the leaders on board as well as the local Jewish  leaders in France saw 
some benefits in the immigrants being taken to the British Zone in Germany. Firstly 
as conditions in Germany would be worse than they could expect in France, the 
immigrants would be motivated to insist on their removal to Palestine. Secondly, 
communications in Germany being easier, the immigrants had a better chance of 
receiving Entry Certificates into Palestine.1 1 6
Before the ships departed, Pomerantz accompanied the representative of the 
MAE on board the ships. Whilst the latter attempted to encourage the immigrants to 
disembark, Pomerantz, during his translation, secretly  intimated that the Yishuv 
would endeavour to facilitate their Aliyah as soon as possible.117
On  21st August Duff Cooper had a meeting with Bidault. In his subsequent 
report to the Foreign Office he indicated that he had  previously sent Bidault extracts 
from a captured diaiy (presumably from one of the Exodus passengers) which proved 
the assistance the immigrants had received from the French authorities. Bidault 
responded that he was not prepared in any way to defend or excuse the actions of the 
French Government. At die same time he did not wish to provoke a ministerial crisis 
as in any event, in his opinion, the present Government would survive only until
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206118 October. He indicated that  he would  then, most probably, become Prime Minister.
It turned out that he was wrong in that assessment.
The following day Duff Cooper had a call from Leon Blum indicating that if 
the British Government would guarantee that the immigrants at Port-de-Bouc would 
be allowed to land in Palestine within two to three months, the Jewish Agency would 
advise them to disembark. Faced with a negative response,  Blum then  asked him to 
receive Marc Jarblum on behalf of the French Zionist Federation, which he agreed to 
do. At a meeting a quarter of an hour later  Jarblum mentioned  to Bidault the case of 
the ships in La Spezia (1946 incident) where the British had made a special  gesture 
by allowing over 1000  illegal immigrants to land in Palestine within the monthly 
quota He suggested a similar arrangement could be made now for the Exodus 
immigrants. Duff Cooper, however, had never  heard of that agreement and in any 
event as it was now nearly 5.30 pm,  and the ships were about to sail to Germany, he 
indicated that it was definitely too late. He would nevertheless report the suggestion to 
his superiors as he was anxious to find a solution.119
The day following the departure of the three prison ships towards Germany, 
the British Embassy handed a note to Raymond Bousquet, requesting that the French 
Government welcome back onto its territory the immigrants from the Exodus  if and 
when they were moved out from the British Zone. The response recommended by 
Bousquet, after a long analysis of the history of the Affair, was that  France should 
only accept those who came voluntarily to France and that this should not be 
considered a precedent. Whatever the numbers of those who volunteered to re-enter 
France, they would be treated as part of the existing transit arrangements1 20 (i.e within 
the revised quota of 19,000) That this request  was open knowledge in Zionist circles 
is suggested by  a letter sent by  Marc Jarblum to the Interior Minister, Edouard 
Depreux. The informality of the  letter also attests to the degree of close  consultation 
existing at this level between French  Zionists and senior Government officials.
I am leaving tomorrow morning for Zurich to attend a meeting of die 
Directors of die Jewish Agency for Palestine. At the last moment I’m 
hurrying to ask of you the following: to accept die British demand to
118 TNA, FO 371/61823, Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 21.8.47.
1,9 Ibid., Duff Cooper to Foreign Office, 22.8.47, 6.55PM. The prison ships set sail for Hamburg at 6 
pm on that day.
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207receive [back] in France the refugees from the Exodus that the British 
would send to Hamburg, under the following conditions:
1  .It must concern only those who would come voluntarily.
2.To receive them on a temporary basis like other refugees in 
transit
3.The British Government commits to giving these refugees a 
certain monthly number of certificates for Palestine, out of the 
present quota, (let us say: 700 to 1,000).
It seems to me that these conditions are justified and not exaggerated.
France has been wonderful in this affair and you personally, my dear 
Minister, have really reflected die sentiments of the people of France with 
a rare nobility.
Thank you,
Your devoted M. Jarblum.1 2 1
Depreux answered Jarblum by simply indicating that he had written to the 
MAE, expressing views similar to those of Jarblum.122
The MAE appeared to have taken up the suggestion, for in early September 
there were reports of a new French initiative bang discussed with the Foreign Office 
in London. Specifically the French had recently increased the quota of Jewish DPs 
permitted to transit through France from 8,000 to 19,000, which easily accommodated 
a return by the Exodus passengers, should they volunteer to do so. The French 
Government made one essential proviso however and that was that the British 
guarantee to provide every month  thereafter, a certain number of certificates for 
Palestine. 12 3
That an attempt was then  made by the British to encourage those  who had 
been taken to the Poppendorf and Amstau internment camps in the British Zone of 
Germany  to volunteer for repatriation to France is clear from Foreign Office records. 
However by  28th September the British had to recognise that the attempt, except for 
three volunteers, had failed dismally.124 The new French initiative was consequently 
still-bom.
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2087.4  Prologue
In July 1982, a metal  plaque was attached to the sea wall at  Sete  at the point 
of embarkation of the Exodus passengers. It reads “On 11th July 1947, 4,530 
clandestine, resistant immigrants facing the British naval blockade, embarked here on 
the Exodus ’47 assisted by the people of Sete and the regional authorities, in order to 
build  a new life in their ancestral home in Israel.”1 2 5
At the plaque’s unveiling ceremony  delegations from Israel and former 
members of die French administration were present. Hadari interviewed Stanislas 
Mangin, previously of the DST and asked him why they had assisted the Mossad. He 
replied
The French were ashamed of what they had done to the Jews during the 
Vichy Regime. Above all, we had not forgotten that the British had 
thrown us out of Syria and Lebanon. 1 remember receiving clear 
instructions from the appropriate ministers that we had to help the 
Haganah, both with arms and ammunition and by getting illegal 
immigrants to Palestine.126
Could there be any better confirmation of French  Government complicity in 
Aliyah Bet than this statement by die Deputy Director of the  counter-espionage
agency ?
125 As recorded on a visit by the author  to Sete  in August 2003.
126 Hadari,  Second Exodus,  198/199.
209CHAPTER 8 French military aid
The whole subject of France’s military aid to the nascent Jewish state 
in 1948 has for years remained in virtual obscurity and little official 
documentation has emerged to describe its extent and the underlying 
objectives of those French ministers involved. Certainly the UN-imposed 
truce between the Israeli and Arab belligerents, effective from 11th June 
1948, which precluded the importation into the area of military manpower 
and equipment, provided clear legal constraints on the French government. 
Nevertheless its evident caution was more likely to have been engendered by 
a concern not to draw the attention of the Arab League to its covert help to 
Israel.
Recent research into this additional area of French Government 
complicity in support of Zionist endeavours has underlined  the complexities 
involved in France  providing substantial military hardware, whilst at the 
same time proclaiming  support for UN efforts to embargo arms shipments 
to die belligerents. Even more thought-provoking  has been the discovery of 
a sub-plot, whereby die Irgun,  generally opposed to the political flavour of 
die Provisional Government of the State of Israel, was itself  supplied with 
arms by a French  Government Minister, acting on his own initiative. (See 
8.2 below).
The narrative  set out below, in which French arms were supplied to 
both entities, was assembled  from  archival sources, documents  graciously 
supplied by an Israeli journalist and a very informative book  written by two 
investigative journalists. It is not suggested that this  provides the complete 
picture of what took place. Further research is certainly required including 
access to die  records of the French army. An initial attempt in early 2005  to 
tap this potential source to reveal more substantive evidence of the arms 
transactions referred to, did not succeed.  An application  made  to  the 
Ministry of Defence received the response that  2026 was  the earliest year 
when the archives of the period would be open to inspection.
210In the circumstances, the following collected facts, anecdotes  and 
conclusions  are presented, not so much as an attempt to encompass the 
whole story of French military aid to Israel in 1948, but to emphasise the 
unbroken continuity of French support for the Zionist endeavour in the 
immediate post-war period.
8.1  Arms for the  Provisional Government of the State of Israel
After the  decision in November 1947 to partition Palestine,  the 
French administration’s support  in facilitating  illegal immigration 
discreetly lapsed  as die whole question now  moved  into a more  diplomatic 
phase centred on the United Nations. The Jewish Agency ’s  priorities  also 
changed  and  die emphasis was now less on breaching die British blockade 
than on recruiting Jewish youth  in Europe and covertly  providing  them 
with Haganah  military  training in its camps in  France and Italy. 1  It was 
envisaged that as soon as the British fulfilled their declared intention to leave 
Palestine in May 1948, the new recruits together with the accumulated 
supplies of light arms would be despatched post haste to the new Jewish 
State. The hunt was also on  for major sources of heavy arms supplies such 
as artillery, tanks and planes.
Thanks to the efforts of two journalists, Lany  Collins and 
Dominique Lapierre, a detailed but non-academic  account  of the 1948 War 
of Liberation  entitied O Jerusalem? has been written  From  this and other 
narratives together with some  archival sources  it can be shown,  with a fair 
degree of credibility, how Israel  acquired heavy weaponry  from France as 
one of a number of suppliers. The disclosures  also cover  the provision of 
landing facilities  in Corsica  which facilitated the  trans-shipment to Israel 
of fighter aircraft  to form the nucleus of an air force.
1  Jewish and non-Jewish volunteers for Israel were grouped under an organisation 
with the acronym “Machal” (Mitnadvei Choutz l’Aretz). Known as Machalniks  they 
numbered some 4,000 and came from 43 countries. France and its North African 
possessions accounted for 600 of them. Many were trained  in the Grand Arenas camp near 
Marseilles which had previously accommodated illegal immigrants. See “The Machal 
Story” by Dr  Jason Fenton-one of the volunteers,  www.sabra.net/machal/sect ion 4. Web 
site last accessed 3.10.05.
211Ben Gurion had no illusions that, once the British  left Palestine, the 
Yishuv would face an onslaught from the better-equipped neighbouring 
Arab States. Consequently, even before the Partition vote at the UN,  the 
Mossad leaders, Shaul Meirov, Ehud Avriel and Yehuda Arazi were  given a 
mission  by him  to acquire modem weapons wherever possible so that the
*y
Haganah could transform itself into a fully equipped army.
Following the Agency’s decision to send  Golda Meyerson to raise 
funds in the United States  the Yishuv’s purchasing power, previously a 
constraining factor, was no longer a problem In January 1948 she set off on 
a  tour of Jewish communities across the  country. Spelling out the dangers 
that the Yishuv would have to face in the anticipated Arab invasion, she 
managed to raise pledges for fifty million dollars specifically for 
armaments.3
It was now time to approach the French authorities directly  for 
military supplies. Given the obvious difficulties of any such supplies 
reaching Palestine whilst it was still  under the Mandate discretion, as 
always, had to be observed. An initial  approach was made to Hotchkiss, the 
arms manufacturer, by a “former French officer."4 Information  was passed 
on to the MAE by the French  Ministry of Defence in February 1948 that the 
Haganah wished to obtain artillery equipment to a value of $1 million, 
mainly Hotchkiss anti-tank weapons and ammunition. In view of the delicate 
nature of die request, die verbal opinion of the MAE was sought.5
This initial contact was followed up by an official request to the 
MAE by the Jewish Agency itself for a much larger consignment of arms. It 
was argued that  such supplies would be in conformity with  the  terms of the 
UN Partition Resolution  which envisaged the arming of a Jewish militia 
after the end of the British Mandate. The Jewish Agency estimated a total 
budget of $26 million, including  $5million for weapons, $10 million for
2 Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Q Jerusalem!. (London,  1973),  153. Hereafter 
Collins and Lapierre.
3 Ibid., 150/151.
4 Possibly this was  Maurice Fischer, the Jewish Agency representative, who had previously 
served in the French army in Lebanon.
212artillery ammunition and $3 million for vehicles including tanks. An official 
in the Afrique-Levant department was quick to note that such a contract was 
not only advantageous for the French arms industry but also for the treasury, 
which was short of foreign currency 6
Georges Bidault’s private  papers give no indication as to  whether he 
personally  involved himself in the matter. However Vincent Auriol, in his 
famous diary, notes that  at a Cabinet meeting in March 1948, Bidault, in an 
uncharacteristic change of attitude, reacted positively to a suggestion that the 
Jewish Agency legally purchase its arms requirements in France, so that it 
no longer took the risk of the discovery and confiscation of its covert arms 
caches on French soil.7
More significant is the existence of an unsigned memo  in the 
ministerial papers of Robert Schuman at the MAE.  The memo  addressed to 
“Monsieur le Ministre”  specifically refers to arms supplies to the new State 
of Israel. Because of its date, namely 5th June 1948, it undoubtedly  was 
originally  destined for  Bidault as Schuman only took over at the Ministry 
on 26th July.8
The clear objective of the memo was to dissuade Bidault from any 
formal act of recognition of the new State of Israel The main reason given 
was the possibility of trouble from the nineteen million Moslems in France's 
North African possessions. Other reasons referred to the large French 
financial investments in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt and the sixty cultural 
centres which France subsidised in Jerusalem, all of which could be put at 
risk. The writer  expressed the view that there was no doubt the Jewish State 
would survive  and that Jerusalem would come under international control. 
Therefore a postponement of recognition to a more favourable time was 
recommended.
5 Archives Nationales, Fonds Georges  Bidault, 457AP124, Mimstcre des Forces Armces . 
Note d’information. Conceme: Cessions d’armes a la Palestine, 6.2.48.
6 Ibid., Note pour le Ministre,  16.2.48.
7 Auriol,  Journal du Septennat  151.
8 MAE Archives,  Cabinet du Ministre,  Sous-serie  R.  Schuman, 5.6.48.
213He further  argued that the covert help, already being given by the MAE, 
was of far greater use to Israel than any formal recognition. The memo 
specified  that this help took the following form:
1.The cessation of arms deliveries to Lebanon and Syria, despite 
existing contracts.
2.Pressure on the Swiss and Belgian governments to cease 
deliveries of arms destined  for Arab countries or the Arabs in 
Palestine.
3.The refusal to grant stop-over facilities to the British for planes 
destined for Trans-Jordan.
4.Permission given to Air France on the 13th May to fly cargo to 
Tel Aviv.
5 .Help given to assist the transit of planes destined for the new 
State of Israel through  France  and adjoining countries.
6.The ‘‘ Nicaragua contract” worth 641 million francs, details of 
which were set out in an appendix.9
As France could  legally only enter into arms contracts on a state-to- 
state basis, the  so-called  ‘Nicaragua contract’ was a subterfuge  intended to 
indicate that the weapons ware destined for the Nicaraguan  army. In reality 
the purchasing agent, ostensibly acting  for the Nicaraguan Government, was 
none other than one of the Haganah’s  arms procurement officers, Yehuda 
Arazi  Apparently he had obtained his official status, as a roving Nicaraguan 
Ambassador, on payment of a $200,000  bribe.1 0
9 According to the Appendix the  “Nicaragua Contract” comprised the following 
armaments  and cost:
First consignment.
5000 x 7.92mm rifles plus 5 million ordinary bullets.
25 000 x  Three-bullet  and 5000 x five-bullet  rifle magazines.
12x120mm Brandt mortars  type A plus  12,000 mortar shells.
Second Consignment:
50 x  65mm artillery canons  plus 50,000 shells.
10 x 75mm artillery canons (1932 model) plus 10,000 shells.
15 x 13.2mm Machine guns plus 300,000 bullets.
200 x  7.5mm sub-machine guns (1924-29 model) plus 3 million bullets. 
10 x H.39 [Hotchkiss] tanks plus 10,000  x 37mm shells 
and 150,000 x  7.5mm bullets.
I million x 8mm bullets.
1 million x 6.5mm bullets for Italian rifles.
Total price  to be paid in US Dollars: $ 2,467,191
10 Collins and Lapierre, 265.
214A first consignment of these weapons, including five  65mm canons 
and 48,000 shells was shipped  from France on the SS Borea. The ship  was 
intercepted by the Royal Navy and brought into Haifa on 12th May 1948. 
There she was guarded by a detachment of British soldiers. On the 15th of 
May at the expiry of the British Mandate, the control of the ship and its 
cargo was released back to its captain.1 1  It would seem that the balance of 
the weapons, including  ten 75mm guns and  ten Hotchkiss tanks, reached 
Israel secretly  on a second trip by die  Borea  on 14th June 1948.1 2 There is 
no doubt that this arms shipment  breached  the terms of the UN imposed 
truce of 29th May which came into force a few days earlier. However, from 
the French point of view, as the ship had left France before the UN embargo 
came into force, no blame could be attached to France.
Clearly the MAE  was always  aware that  the weapons were 
destined not for Nicaragua but  for  the Provisional Government of the State 
of Israel. From this we can assume  that in 1948, for the first time, all the 
major  agencies of Government acted in concert  in order to underpin Israel’s 
capacity to overcome any threat from its Arab neighbours. Such an 
assessment finds support  in a June 1948 diary entry by the French 
President. Vincent Auriol noted that Pierre-Hairi Teitgen, the Minister of 
Defence, informed him, in great secrecy, that to maintain a military balance, 
weapons had been supplied to the Jews with the agreement of Jules Moch, 
the Minister of the Interior and the Prime Minister, Robert Schuman.1 3
Later in October 1948, four of the  ten small  French Hotchkiss 
H.39 tanks saw action on die Egy ptian front  together with two larger 
British Cromwell tanks previously stolen from the British army.1 4 Other than 
for a Sherman tank this represented die nucleus of Israel’s armoured brigade 
in the War of Independence.
11 Collins and Lapierre,  393.
12  Ibid. ,545; Ben Gurion Yoman Ba’Milchamah. Volume 2 , (The War of Independence 
Diary), eds., Gershon Rivlm and Elhannan  Oren (Tel Aviv, 1983), 519.
13 Auriol, 255.
14 Dan Kurzman,  Genesis 1948:The First Arab-Israeli War (New York,  1970), 582; Dr. 
James Fenton, The Machal Storv-Section 4. wvvvv.sabra.net/machal/section 4.
215Another area where French assistance was crucial was in providing 
landing and storage facilities for aircraft transporting military supplies to 
Israel. Jules Moch’s revelations in his memoirs leave no doubt as to his 
personal invol  vement in this operation as Minister of die Interior at die time. 
With Government permission, the French island of Corsica was used as a 
staging post for a variety of American-acquired  aircraft flying from the 
Haganah-controlled base of  Zatec in Czechoslovakia to  Israel. The Campo 
delFOro air base in Corsica had already been designated for this task even 
before  the  proclamation of the State of Israel in May 1948. Genuinely 
proud of his own contribution, Moch provides clear details of the 
subterfuges employed by him to create an air-bridge to Israel
To provide this aid, I nominated trusted men to the airport of 
Campo delFOro near Ajaccio... I arranged for its commander,
Desire Latour, to meet Marc Jarblum, a Polish refugee and 
Fischer, die future Israeli Ambassador... When consignments 
arrived for Israel and a plane for its onward transportation,
Latour would establish a flight plan to Casablanca... but the 
relative telegramme would be sent to Lod. Very quickly modem 
arms containers, supplied by the Czech factory Skoda, before the 
Communist regime took over, and even from the USSR, 
converged on Campo delFOro. Pilots, American generally, flew 
the planes chartered by the Jewish Agency'. Nearly every' night  a 
large cargo plane linked Campo delFOro to Lod. There were 
hundreds of flights without incident. If the secret army of Israel, 
the Haganah, was so quickly victorious ... it was perhaps because 
of this organisation.1
Moch’s references to Maurice Fischer and Marc Jarblum, both 
representatives  of die Jewish  Agency in Paris are but yet  one more 
example of the depths of the complicity  which united French  Socialist 
Ministers with active Zionists.
The supplies from the Czech Skoda Works undoubtedly refer to 
thirty  dismantied Messerschmitt fighter aircraft  delivered in crates between 
May and July 1948. Four of them arrived in Israel on 23rd May 1948 and
15 Moch, 252/253.
216were quickly assembled.1 6  Six days later they were flown in action against 
an Egyptian column  threatening Tel Aviv.17 Other supplies, which transited 
through the Campo delFOro, were the bulk of the arms deal which Ehud 
Avriel had successfiilly concluded with die Czech arms manufacturer, 
Zbrojovka Bmo, back in November 1947. In addition to 25,000 rifles, the 
contract included 5000 machine guns, 175 Howitzers and 58 million rounds 
of ammunition. 1 8
An even more interesting  example of die ability of Fischer, later to 
become Israel’s first Ambassador to France, to obtain the complicity of the 
Ministry of Defence can be constructed from a note discovered in his 
correspondence with Cletta Mayer, the wife of the Minister of Works and 
Social security. One could speculate that the document, obviously prepared 
well in advance of the 15th May 1948, reflected Fischer’s discussions with 
the Ministry of Defence as to Israel’s  immediate needs on independence. 
Although impossible to confirm that  its source is indeed Fischer, as it is 
untided, undated, unsigned and on plain paper, the contents indicate that it 
was  a draft plan to deal with the movement of planes and military supplies 
through France and areas controlled by France  to an unspecified destination. 
The plan envisaged that planes in crates would arrive by plane in Ajaccio or 
Oran (Algeria) and be reassembled on an adjacent  airfield  After a few days 
the planes would be first flown to Fezzan and  from there to  Koufra  for 
refuelling. Both  locations were French military  bases  in Libya  until 1955. 
Another part of the plan envisaged the arrival of arms and ammunition in a 
French port which would then be transported by road to a French airport 
near Paris controlled by the security services. Following the arrival of 
bombers and  transport aircraft the weapons would then be loaded and the 
planes depart within 48 hours, presumably for Israel.19 One could assume 
that  this draft plan referred  to the Czech-produced  Messerschmitt fighter
10 Collins and Lapierre, 358.
17 Israel Defence Forces. IDF; 1948 War of Independence. The first IAF fighter Mission,
29.5.48. www.idf.ii. Web site last accessed 3.10.05.
18 Collins and Lapierre, 358.
19 Archives de la Fondation Nationale  des Sciences-Politiques, Fonds Cletta et  Daniel
Mayer, 3MA15. Draft plan.
217aircraft and the  Czech arms supplies, which Israel urgently needed for its 
defence.
In the event it does not appear that these particular parts of the plan were put 
into effect since, based on  Moch's disclosures, alternative solutions were 
clearly found.
All these examples of French military assistance to the nascent  State 
of Israel, however covert and discreet, can be seen as a natural adjunct  to 
the aid accorded to the Mossad in its illegal immigration campaign.
Certainly those Socialist Ministers who were involved viewed  the two acts 
as one seamless and  concerted effort to support the Zionist  endeavour. 
Nevertheless on the matter of France’s official recognition of the State of 
Israel, this appeared  to be too premature a step even for  President Vincent 
Auriol.
On 10th August 1948, Cletta Mayer, on her return from Israel, handed 
Auriol a note from Moshe Shertok, the Israeli Foreign Minister, which 
noted  the Provisional Government's disappointment that France had failed 
to extend its  official recognition. Despite this, Shertok  expressed his 
nation’s gratitude for France's assistance. This was unspecified but likely to 
refer to the arms shipments that the French Government had recently made 
available. Auriol noted in manuscript in the margins of Shertok’s letter that 
he had told Cletta Mayer that France, for the moment, had to remain prudent. 
Nevertheless he assured her that the Government was slowly preparing the 
Moslems of North Africa for the news  that recognition  of the State of Israel 
by France  would  soon be forthcoming.20
8.2  Arms for the Irgun Zvai Leumi
No subject underlines more clearly the basic ambiguities and 
contradictions inherent in Georges Bidault’s  policies regarding Palestine 
than the case of the arms supplies to the Irgun. Having  previously and on 
more than one occasion shown his distaste for illegal immigration activities
20 Archives Nationales, Fonds Vincent Auriol, 552AP71. Letter from Moshe Shertok to 
Auriol, 3.8.48.
218out of French ports and the lax attitude of his Socialist Cabinet colleagues  to 
the question of effective  visa controls, Bidault, in May 1948, seemed to 
have undergone a radical conversion in favour of Zionism But whereas  the 
Government's  intention  was to provide covert  militaiy aid  to  the 
Provisional Government of the  Jewish State, this was surreptitiously 
extended by Bidault to  its  main political rival, die Irgun, a para-military 
organisation, regarded with ill-concealed contempt  by the Socialists in the 
Government coalition.
Although not strictly an illegal immigrant ship- the Altai  ena, loaded 
with arms and some 900 volunteers,  having left a French port actually  after 
the creation of the State of Israel -the affair does  provide yet further 
evidence  of covert  French complicity in pro-Zionist activities. However 
this time die conspirator was neither the Ministry of the Interior nor the 
Ministry of Public Works and Transport but, surprisingly,  the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Before discussing  how and why  this phenomenon came about, one
needs first to appreciate the sheer size of the weapons consignment
delivered by  military convoy to the Irgun’s ship, the Altaiena  at Port-de-
Bouc on 9th June 1948. According to Irgun sources, it comprised 5000
British Lee-Enfield rifles, 5 million bullets, 250 Bren Guns, 150 German
Spandau machine guns and thousands of rocket-grenades. In addition to the
above, there were also 5 Bren-gun carriers.  After delivery of this first
consignment, the Altai  ena was due to return to France to pick up heavier 
21 weapons.  In die event, as we will see later, this did not occur.
The story of the Altaiena is well documented in so far as its 
arrival in Israel and its subsequent destruction by the forces of the 
Provisional Government are concerned.  However little attention was paid 
by academics to the identity of the supplier of the weapons it carried and, 
consequendy, Bidault’s motivation in agreeing to the deal was not examined 
at all. At least this was the case until, in 1978, two books  each entitled “The
21  Yitzhak Ben-Ami, Years of Wrath. Days of Glory (New York,  1983), 485.
219Altalena” by authors, supposedly on opposite sides of die political spectrum, 
were published in Israel.
The first  by Uri Brenner  was published by the left-wing Kibbutz 
Hameuchad  Publishing House at Yad Tabenkin and the second was the 
work of Schlomo Nakdimon, the senior political  commentator for the Israeli 
evening paper, ‘Yedioth Ahronot' and was published  by one of its 
offshoots.  Unfortunately neither book was ever translated from the Hebrew. 
As he would himself admit, Schlomo Nakdimon is a great admirer  of 
Menachem Begin, the former  leader of the Irgun and later of its political 
successor the Herut party. He  was Begin s media advisor in die years 1978- 
80 during the peace talks with Egypt. One might then assume that he would 
take a right-wing view of the events surrounding the Altalena Affair. In 
reality, however, in so far as die French connection to die Affair is 
concerned, namely the supply of arms, his  work was meticulous  in 
acquiring verbal testimony from many of the major players in the French 
Government and the  Irgun  operatives in Paris at the time.
From an academic standpoint, the major weakness of Nakdimon’s 
narrative has been the lack of documentary as opposed to anecdotal or oral 
evidence. This is also the case with Uri Brenner’s book. However, the 
difficult question which both writers tried to resolve was  Georges Bidault’s 
motivation and,  other than proposing a number of speculative scenarios, 
neither  reached  any firm conclusion. Part of these weaknesses  have now 
been partially corrected by the recent  discovery  of a number of documents 
in the private papers of Georges Bidault now made available at the French 
National Archives. From these we  have for the first time  documentary 
proof  of the various steps leading to the arms delivery to the Altalena and 
the names of those officials from the MAE and the Defence Ministry who 
were involved. However the documentation did not of itself resolve the 
question of motivation.
The man at the heart of die Altalena Affair was  undoubtedly 
Schmud Arid, the Irgun’s European representative stationed in Paris, 
described by Schlomo Nakdimon as a “one-man institution”. An extract
220from a SHAI (Haganah Intelligence) report provides the following profile of 
Ariel
Ariel, of Romanian origin, had originally been the  cultural officer of 
the Revisionist party in Romania  and published its newspaper. Although 
married, he did not live a regular family life and was considered  a 
womaniser. He had been involved in gathering the immigrants in a camp  for 
the ill-fated Struma. Having upset the Romanian authorities, he spent some 
three months in gaol before bribing his way out. He then  emigrated to 
Palestine in 1944, carrying with him a large sum of money and jewellery. 
Once in Jerusalem  he led a very high life and swiftly dissipated his fortune. 
Through his contacts with the Revisionists he was posted in 1946 as their 
emissary to France and Belgium22
Another side to Ariel was his interest in intelligence work.
According to American military intelligence, Ariel  approached one of their 
field operatives in Palestine  and offered to set up for the Americans  an 
espionage system in Romania or any Balkan country, by using Jews who 
were in responsible government positions.23
Once  established in Paris, Ariel whose French was impeccable, 
gained entry to French political circles through the intermediary of Claire 
Vaydat. From this position he set out to  portray  the Irgun as the principal 
Jewish military force in Palestine. However his greatest achievement came 
only  after the UN’s decision on the Partition of Palestine, in November 
1947.
The positive vote resulted in  wide-scale attacks by Arab gangs in 
Palestine. Even more  than  the Haganah,  the Irgun’s  lack of weaponry 
seriously hampered its military capabilities against die Arabs. The large- 
scale acquisition of arms then became a priority as the meagre arms caches 
which die Irgun had assembled in France were all too often discovered by 
the French police and confiscated. Ariel therefore turned his attention to the 
MAE, where he felt he could use his persuasive powers to do a deal with the
22 Document supplied by S. Nakdimon, 3 .6.04. From SHAI  re: Schmuel Lev Ariel- Etsel,
8.3.48.
23 Ibid. .Extract from  General Intelligence Report from 400th CIC detachment USAFIME, 
14.10.44.
221French Government. An opportunity presented itself when, on 5th March 
1948, the French  Government's UN representative, Alexandre  Parodi, 
made disparaging remarks about the Irgun to 1he Security Council. Ariel, 
referring to France as the only country in the world  where  “the  legitimate 
claims of the Palestinian Resistants” could receive a sympathetic hearing, 
sought from  Bidault  an audience in which to  express his surprise and 
disappointment at Parodi’s statement.24
On the original of Ariel’s letter to Bidault  issued on the headed 
paper of “Assistance aux Deportes et Refugies’” run by Claire Vaydat, there 
is an annotation in Bidault’s own handwriting  that an invitation be issued to 
Mr. Ariel and Mme Vaydat for a meeting on “ Monday at 1 lam”.25 It is 
interesting to note that by now Claire Vaydat was virtually treated as a 
pariah by the FSJF. A year earlier she had seriously upset the Joint which 
was financing the movement of Jews granted temporary visas to France. 
According to the Joint’s Director in Paris, she had, whilst directing the 
“Assistance aux Deportes et Refugees”
disregarded the directives and understandings to which all the 
Jewish organisations and the Coordinating Committee had been 
committed. Consequently it was necessary for die Conseil 
Interoeuvres and for the Federation of Jewish Societies to 
disperse with her services and to disclaim responsibility for her 
activities...
There is no official support, nor any sanction or working 
relationships of any kind with Mme Vaydat and die Assistance 
aux Refugies et Deportes.26
One could speculate that Claire Vaydat’s involvement with the 
organisation of die Irgun illegal immigrant  ship, the Ben Hecht (Abril), in 
March 1947 was at the root of the problem. Certainly the Joint, already very
24  Jabotinski Institute Archives, Personal Papers of Schmuel Ariel, 2/4 -315, Copy of letter 
seht by  Ariel to  Bidault, 7.3.48.
25 Archives Nationales, Foods Georges Bidault, 457AP124. Original of letter from Ariel to 
Bidault, 7.3.48.
26 Archives of the AJJDC France-General,  1944-1947, From Irwin Rosen, Director 
American Joint Distribution Committee, Paris to all JDC immigration offices,  17.5.47.  The 
correct name of the organisation was ‘Assistance aux Deportes et Refugies'
222careful about its contacts with the Mossad, would have had a great aversion 
to any involvement with the Irgun, which it considered  extremist.
The extending of an  invitation to Claire Vaydat also indicates that 
Bidault was already well acquainted with  die lady and with the Revisionists. 
Indeed in mid-1946, when he was both Prime Minister and  Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, he had  met  Samuel Merlin,  die General Secretary of die 
HCNL.  Unfortunately, following that meeting, Merlin in an interview with 
France Soir apparently gave a misleading impression  that Bidault favoured 
the HCNL  and was, in all probability, then taken to task by Bidault’s office. 
In November 1946 in a series of letters to Bidault and Georges Gombault, 
the editor of France Soir. he sought to rectify any slips of the tongue which 
may have occurred. A few days  later Merlin received a letter of thanks from 
Bidault’s office for putting the record straight.27
The meeting with Ariel and Vaydat  on 20th March was chaired, not 
by Bidault but by his “Charge de Mission” Jacques Boissier.2* According to 
Ariel, Bidault’s  response to his letter,  as conveyed by Boissier, was 
couched in friendly terms.29  During the meeting Ariel took the opportunity 
of raising the possibility of a formal  agreement on arms  supply betw een the 
Irgun and the French Government and the meeting ended on the 
understanding that  Ariel would produce  a draft of such an  agreement.
It is conceivable that  Bidault’s  previous  attitude of strict neutrality 
concerning  French Government policy towards  Palestine  underwent  a 
radical  change after the United Nations had voted on partition  and British 
policy in Palestine was shown to be bankrupt. But why then did Bidault 
secretly  arrange a  separate supply of arms to the  Irgun  knowing, as he 
must have done, that at virtually  the same time other supplies were going 
directly to the Provisional Government of the State of Israel?
At first sight this  separate  but  hidden deal with the Irgun,  appears 
as a divisive manoeuvre, but such an  intent is by no means substantiated. 
Bidault’s later assertions, in an  interview with Schlomo Nakdimon that
27 Archives Nationales, Fonds Georges Bidault, 457AP124, 20.11.46.
28 Ibid. ,20.3.48
223only the Irgun asked him for arms and that he was unaware of the  political 
differences between the Haganah and the Irgun  appear, on the other hand, 
very  disingenuous.
Nakdimon sought  answers  directly from Bidault at an interview at 
his home on 21st June 1972. It had not been easy to gain access to the man 
who shortly before had returned from exile in Brazil and Belgium There he 
had sought refuge from de Gaulle after siding with the OAS  during the 
crisis over Algerian independence.
In  Nakdimon’s original letter to Bidault in January 1972, which 
remained unanswered, he had offered Bidault a number of alternative 
reasons as to his motivation for supplying arms to the Irgun. These ranged 
from suggesting that Bidault  sought  revenge on die Haganah for French 
embarrassment over the Exodus Affair  to the  more sensitive accusation that 
he gave  his support to the Irgun  in order to exacerbate internal political 
dissentions within Israel in the interests of the British, the actual suppliers of 
the arms. One of die other suggestions indicated that Nakdimon was 
unaware at the time that arms had already  been supplied to the Provisional 
Government.30
In the absence of any reply from Bidault to his letter, or  to that of 
his publisher’s follow-up letter, Nakdimon came to Paris in June 1972, intent 
on interviewing the major players in the Altalena Affair. In this project he 
was guided by Schmuel Arid who had remained in Paris throughout most of 
the intervening period since 1948. He had apparently, because of his anger 
over the Altalena Affair, declined a post offered to him  in die Israeli 
administration by Ben Gurion himself and returned to France.
Accompanied by  an interpreter -Nakdimon did not speak French- 
he went to Bidault’s address a first time, only to be told by his wife,
Suzanne, that Bidault was too drunk to receive them. On the 21st June the 
interview finally took place.31 From the French transcript of that interview a
29  Schlomo Nakdimon* Altalena. (Jerusalem,  1978), 90.
30 Archives Nationales, Fonds  Georges  Bidault, 457AP187, Shlomo Nakdimon  file.
31 Interview with Schlomo Nakdimon, Tel Aviv, 3.6.04.
224number of interesting assertions, some less convincing than others, were 
made by  Bidault These are die more interesting ones:
(a)No records would be found in the military archives of the supply of 
these weapons  Nevertheless the arms could not have been supplied without 
the complicity of the military.
(b) He was not aware that the arms supplied were British and had no 
recollection of having put anything in writing about the “Affaire”. He had 
certainly not given an order in writing to General Revers  [the COS]  to 
supply arms to the Irgun.
(c )As to how the arms were supplied, Bidault replied: “ the 
explanation is simple, there was here an Ambassador called Ariel...  who 
had got into contact with a member of my office, Mr. Morin...
Morin arranged this affair with Ariel and, in substance, I only had to say 
yes.  Morin would not have proposed something to me which I would 
have refused.”...
(d) Because the question of help to Israel was so delicate, the French 
Government was never informed of this “clandestine affair” and had not 
been since.  Certainly Robert Schuman [the Prime Minister] was not 
involved. Teitgen, at the Ministry of Defence was possibly involved.
(e) Because France was a “great Moslem power” and there were 
difficulties in Algeria, the whole affair was treated covertly. Bidault took 
charge of it, entirely under his responsibility.  He arranged for the 
massive arms delivery, in the absence of official approval, because at the 
time he was a powerful figure [in Government], He stated that his only 
role was to ask for a proposal to help Israel, to which he gave his 
blessing. It was never debated by the Government, was not publicised 
and even today the French are completely ignorant of the matter.
225(f)The first time he had heard of Etzel [Irgun] was at his meeting in 1948 
with Ariel. He did not consider the Irgun as a new force which would 
permit France to get rid of the Arabs. He, personally, was not conversant 
with the [political] divisions which separated the various military forces 
which existed in the country.
(g)In providing weapons to the Irgun, his intention, however irregular 
and worrying, was to provide Israel with material means, not in order for 
Israelis to fight among themselves, but only that arms reached Israel.
[All, except for  Ariel,] other ministers or ambassadors never  asked 
anything of him.  “As a consequence,” said Bidault  “I was now 
prepared to help Israel, whenever an opportunity presented itself. And so 
it happened that Ariel made this proposal to me.”
(h)The aid given to the Irgun  was linked to the security of Lebanon, to 
maintaining a balance of forces in the Middle East  and for reasons of 
justice.  “Something had to be done. If I had been asked by others, they 
instead  would have profited. Only Ariel asked me for something.”
(i)He was aware that the Altalena was destroyed by fire but there was 
nothing he could do about it. In any event he left the Government at the 
end of June 1948 and spoke to no one about the affair.
At the end of the interview, Nakdimon  asked Bidault whether he 
was still involved in politics. Bidault" s ascerbic reply was ” Of course I am. 
What else  would you have me do?  Write a love story!” 3 2
Bidault’s answers certainly include factual mistakes but he is 
particularly disingenuous in suggesting that he was unaware of the nature of
32 Document provided by Schlomo Nakdimon, 3.6.04. French transcript of Bidault interview 
in June 1972.
226the opposing forces within the Yishuv. The Afrique-Levant department in 
die MAE  was continuously supplied  with information from its Consulat 
General in Jerusalem as to  political events within the Jewish Agency  and 
the respective  military strengths  of the Haganah, the Irgun and the Stem 
Group.33 Furthermore, de la Charriere, of the Consulate,  had reported to 
Paris on his recent  contacts with Irgun and Stem group  representatives. 
They were protesting to him against arms seizures and the arrest of their 
members in France 34
It is probable that the French Consul had a tendency to overestimate 
the power of the Irgun, as opposed to that of the Haganah. This could have 
left Bidault with the impression that the Irgun was in a good position to take 
power after die creation of the State and this certainly was what Ariel 
wanted him to believe. To suggest however, as Bidault implies, that he had 
only responded to the Irgun’s request for arms because no other faction in 
Palestine, such as the Haganah, had approached him, is taking credulity too 
far.
Jean Morin, in a  monograph on Ariel, provided some rationale for 
the arms delivery.  Possibly this is the closest one can get to defining at least 
Morin’s  motivation to see the deal succeed.  Morin’s recollections of his 
first meeting  with Ariel on the 15th May 1948 and the actions he took 
subsequently provide possibly the only  succinct account by an official in 
Bidault’s office of the deal with the Irgun.
According to Morin, the essence of Ariel’s representations to him 
was that the Irgun was the strongest military body in Palestine and would 
eventually take over power. It was therefore in France’s interest, particularly 
in view of its concerns over its North African possessions, to reach an 
agreement with the Irgun for future cooperation. This would enable  France 
to once again become a great power in the Middle East.
33 MAE Archives, Sionisme, File 373, Carton 72. Note to Afrique-Levant from Consul 
General: “The Jewish Agency indicates that the Irgun had 5,000 members and the Stem 
Group 1,500 members. There had been no movement for two years.”, 16.4.47.
34 Archives Nationales, Foods Georges Bidault, 457API 25, Report from de la Charriere, 
March 1948.
227To this end, as a representative of the Irgun for Europe, he was authorised to 
negotiate in the first instance,  an arms deal with the French Government.
Morin  recalls  that he responded that France could only sign an 
agreement  with a  sovereign state and therefore as a prerequisite a 
government led by the  Irgun would have to be in situ. Nevertheless, even in 
the absence of such a written agreement, he indicated that die French 
government would secretly supply armaments which had been downgraded 
by the army but which were still operable. These would be transferred to 
Port-de-Bouc and loaded onto the Altalena. Bidault, he indicated, had given 
him the task of obtaining approval for  die arms deal from  the Prime 
Minister, Robert Schuman and the Minister of Defence, Pierre-Henri 
Teitgen. Subsequently, Morin relates, full agreement was reached with the 
Army Chief of Staff,General Georges Revers, on the details of the 
shipment. Although the supply of the weapons and their delivery to Port-de- 
Bouc presented a number of logistical problems, he notes that these were 
sorted out by Ariel  with the help of die DST, the Prefet of the Bouches-du- 
Rhone and the COS’s representatives on the spot. Morin concluded his 
monograph by suggesting that despite Ariel's self-confidence and 
exaggerated demands, even he was surprised by the success of the venture. 
From then on, as he recalls, Ariel felt an obligation to him35
A copy  of the draft agreement previously submitted to Jacques 
Boissier on 25th March 1948 was handed by Ariel  to Morin at their meeting. 
Basically the agreement provided for the supply of light and heavy 
weaponry to two Irgun infantry divisions and die provision of a military base 
on French soil for the training of one of these divisions. In return France 
would benefit from a “Hebrew Palestine” which would act as a bulwark 
against the ambitions of the Arab League and w ould supply France with 
considerable leverage in the Levant and, by extension, in North Africa.
The receipt  of this document had been  confirmed by Boissier two 
days later. He had  promised to transmit it to Bidault, “who will no doubt
35 Jean Morin,  “Menahig, Adam, Yedidi-Nefesh” in Yalkut Ariel, Ha’ish shel Altalena 
(Jerusalem,  1994), 68-75.
228study it and discuss it with his colleagues.” 36  However at some point 
Boissier seems to have disappeared from the scene and the proposed 
agreement remained dormant until presented anew to Morin  on 15th May, 
the day which marked the creation of the Jewish State.
Morin’s recollections  would tend to indicate that he accepted Ariel’s 
contention that France would best be served by an Irgun-led government in 
Israel. Possibly it was on this basis that he convinced Bidault to approve the 
supply of arms.
However this is not  the view of Tsilla Hershco, who suggests that 
Bidault’s action was primarily intended to embarrass the new Provisional 
Government dominated by Ben Gurion’s Mapai party. She  further states 
that when Maurice Fischer,37 the first Israeli envoy  to France, presented a 
note of protest in relation to the arms shipment, Bidault used Jean Morin as 
the scapegoat, and promised that such an incident would not recur.38
The various  steps  leading up to the departure of the Altalena  to 
Israel on the 11th June 1948  are  fairly clear  and a  detailed chronology can 
now  be presented.This has been achieved  through  merging a number of 
corroborating sources including extracts from Ariel’s  diary39, Morin’s 
monograph  and  a truly significant handwritten, un-signed and undated 
note in Bidault’s papers headed “Affaire Irgoun/’40
The starting point is  Ariel’s initial meeting with Boissier  on 15th 
March and the submission of the draft agreement  ten day s later. There then 
followed a  series of meetings betw een them during the month of April.
36  Jabotinski Institute Archives, Personal papers of  Schmuel  Ariel. 214-315.
37 Archives departemen tales des  BDR  148W141. Information note on Maurice Fischer,
12.11.52: ‘‘Maurice Fischer, of Belgian nationality' was well known to the Special Services 
of the French army for his wartime service in the Free French army in Lebanon. Under the 
name of Lieutenant Lavergne he worked in Military Intelligence in Beirut He was 
acknowledged to be an expert an the Kurds and his wade-ranging contacts in the Middle 
East were much appreciated by his superiors.”
38 Hershco,  72.
39 Document provided by Schlomo Nakdimon, 3.6.04.
40 Archives Nahonales, Foods Georges Bidault, 457API 24. Document entitled ’’Affaire 
Irgoun”. This so-far unpublished document is possibly the only  conclusive and 
incontrovertible  evidence of Bidault’sand  the French governments complicity in the so- 
called Altalena Affair and is therefore of  significant  historical importance.
229From there the  chronology  develops  with a series of highly significant 
meetings and arrangements:
4th May: Meeting between Ariel and Boursicot die head of the 
Surete Nationale. | Ariel's diary|
According to Bidault’s papers, Boursicot  then arranged for 
Ariel to have a meeting with Jean Chauvel, the General 
Secretary of the MAE,  because  at this point  Jacques Boissier 
was  no longer available 41
7th May: Following Ariel’s  meeting with Jean Chauvel,  Jean 
Morin was delegated by Bidault to enter into discussions with 
Ariel to assess his demands 42
15th May: First meeting with  Jean Morin (Directeur-Adjoint au 
Cabinet du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres).  Having presented 
an immediate  request for military aid,  Ariel  submitted to 
Morin  a copy of die draft agreement previously sent to Boissier. 
43Morin’s monograph  gives some idea of the discussion that 
ensued.
17th May: Ariel’s second meeting with  Morin. [Ariel’s diary] 
With Bidault’s approval  Morin then contacted General Georges 
Revers, the Chief of Staff of the army and they discussed the 
logistics of the project. Following Revers’s acceptance of the 
task allotted the army, he assigned  Major-General  Henri 
Coudraux to liaise with Ariel and discuss his needs. It was 
envisaged that obsolescent weapons and British weapons would 
be supplied free of charge and  that  an arms manufacturer,
41 Archives National es, Fonds Georges Bidault, 457API24 “Affaire Irgoun.”
42 Morin, 68.
43 Archives National es, Fonds Georges Bidault 457AP124 “Affaire Irgoun.”
230Etablissements  Brandt, would be recommended  to furnish the 
Irgun with other material.44
21st May: Ariel met Georges Bidault in the  presence of Morin. 
According to Ariel, Bidault is said to have stated that France 
would supply arms to the Irgun at a rate commensurate with the 
Irgun's possibilities to transfer them beyond France’s frontiers.45
24th May: Ariel’s second meeting with Georges Bidault. Final 
instructions were  given. [Ariel’s diary]
After General Revers’  total approval of the logistics of the 
operation, he requested an order in writing  from the Minister of 
Defence, Pierre-Henri Teitgen. It was  after the end of a Cabinet 
meeting that Teitgen discussed die matter privately with Bidault 
and they  decided to go ahead with the operation, subject to the 
approval of Schuman, the Prime Ministar. 46
28th May: Ariel met General Revers and later in the day with 
Roger Wybot die head of the DST. They discussed security' 
arrangements at Marseilles to permit die safe sailing of the 
Altalena [Ariel’s diary] Wybot  subsequently delegated Maurice 
Cottentin, head of the DST in Marseilles to liaise with Ariel.
4th June: Ariel wait to Marseilles in order to deal with all 
necessary preparations on the spot and to establish contact with 
the regional security services and military command [Ariel’s 
diary]
1st to 10th June: Preparatory work is carried out by:
44  £ts.Brandt were well-known manufacturers of heavy mortars.
45 Archives Nationales, Fonds Georges Bidault 457AP187. Letter from Nakdimon to 
Bidault, 25.1.72.
46 Archives Nationales, Fonds Georges Bidault 457AP 124, “Affaire Irgoun. ”
231-Major-General Coudraux.
- Pierre Boursicot with the agreement of  Jules Moch.
-The  Director General of the Customs service.
The armaments are  then assembled in the Marseilles Military 
Region and delivered to Port-de-Bouc.47
11th June: Departure of the Altalena with the agreement of the 
French Navy.48
As will have been noted, Ariel’s diary entries  indicate meetings 
with the respective  heads of the Surete, Pierre Boursicot and the DST, 
Roger Wybot. One can therefore safdy assume that  the Minister of the 
Interior, Jules Modi, was kept informed of progress on die Irgun’s arms 
deal. Indeed Moch’s memoirs confirm as much (see Chapter 5). 
Consequently there can be little doubt that the Haganah, both in France and 
Israel was also fully in the picture. At this stage  therefore, the assumption 
has to be diat the Provisional Government in Israel raised no objection to the 
ship’s sailing.
Despite the security measures taken, the content of the cargo of  the 
Altalena  became  widely known. Indeed there was a newspaper article in the 
Marsellaise on the subject49 Thus not only was  the Haganah fully aware but 
also the Arab  North African  inhabitants  of Marseilles. In their case they7  
had enough influence to ensure that on 9th June the dockers at  Port-de-Bouc 
refused to continue the loading of the ship with die armaments. Their leaders 
insisted that die terms of the truce about to be initiated betw een the Israeli 
and Arab armies precluded the supply of war materials to the belligerents. In 
the event die loading was completed with help from  the ship's crew and the
47 Archives Nationales, Fonds  Georges Bidault 457API 24, ’’Affaire Irgoun.”
48 Ibid.
49 Archives Departementales des  BDR,  148W185, report of RG indicates that the 
instigator of the article in the Marseillaise was the Secretary General of the town hall at 
Port-de-Bouc,  11.6.48.
232young immigrants on board. A plan  by Arab militants in Marseilles to 
descend on the port and sabotage the ship was only averted by the 
intervention of their local leaders, who cautioned restraint.50
The date of departure of the Altalena coincided, according to 
unsubstantiated  Israeli sources, with the French Government’s decision to 
abide by die UN decision of 29th May to impose an arms embargo for the 
period of the truce between the Arabs and Israel. This was then, seemingly, 
the final arms shipment to be made to  Israel until the end of the truce.
Bidault’s involvement in the Altalena affair was a well-kept secret 
within the MAE and was not even communicated to their representatives 
abroad. In two instances, French ambassadors reported to the MAE on local 
newspaper articles concerning the Altalena in terms which showed their 
complete ignorance of the involvement of die MAE.51 The French consulates 
in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, as their reports were to show7 , were equally in die 
dark as to the origin of the arms. Thus far, those around Bidault could 
congratulate themselves on a successful and secret operation, but they were 
to be dismayed at the outcome.
On  21st June 1948, after the Irgun had rejected an ultimatum to give 
up the arms, a  bloody confrontation  developed on the shores of Israel at 
Kfar Vitkin  betweei the Irgun and  Palmach forces  despatched to the area 
by the Provisional Government. With more than  50% of the cargo of the 
Altalena  unloaded on shore  and the immigrants already  transferred to 
military training camps,  the Palmach  suddenly opened fire on the Irgun. 
Those on shore were eventually forced to surrender, but prior to that  the 
Altalena had sailed off down the coast with Menachem Begin, the head of 
the Irgun and otter leaders  on board. The confrontation with Palmach forces 
recommenced  the next day  on the  Tel Aviv shore line and in adjoining 
streets, as Irgun forces attempted to reach Begin
50 Archives Departementales des  BDR, 148WI41-Israel.  Service Departemental des 
Renseignements Generaux, Marseille.  Surveillance reports on  Altalena  dated  9th,  11th 
and 15  June 1948.
51  MAE Archives, Volontaires Arabes, File 401, Letter from Gilbert Arvengas, 
Ambassador in Cairo, 14.6.48 and a letter from Rene Massigli, Ambassador in London,
5.7.48.
233These internecine battles finally ended after  Ben Gurion gave 
orders to shell the Altalena. She caught fire but  most on board, including 
Begin, managed to get ashore. Irgun forces were then  disarmed by the 
Palmach both in the streets of Tel Aviv and at their barracks.52 In Kfar 
Vitkin and Tel Aviv  there had been about twenty fatalities. This  episode 
remains a source of rancour between the Israeli right and the left to this day, 
each side blaming the other for this tragic  confrontation.
Menachem Begin has always asserted that despite the extreme  provocation 
that the destruction of the Altalena presented to the Irgun, he wished at all 
costs to avoid a fratricidal conflict in Israel amounting to civil war and 
therefore ordered his forces not to retaliate.53
The stated Provisional Government  position was that Ben Gurion, 
by this action and the subsequent mass arrests of Irgun members, had 
averted a right-wing Putsch and saved the State of Israel.54 There is  little 
doubt that Ben Gurion himself promoted this view7  at the time. In a letter to 
a fellow Minister, Isaac Gruenbaum, on the  Altalena affair, he went out of 
his way  to argue that there had been such  a conspiracy. He even went 
further and professed to have information  from France that the voyage of 
the Altalena had been facilitated by  British agents undo* the influence of 
Bidault, in order  to place the Israeli Government in a difficult position.5 5
Whatever the real  truth of this very controversial  matter, the 
political consequences of the  Altalena Affair  ensured  that neither  the 
Irgun, as a military force, nor its political successor the Herut Party, could 
give effect to their ideology until, in 1977, the ascendancy of Mapai in the 
political arena was finally weakened.56
52 Interview on 17.9.05  with Maurice Szwarc, a forma" member of the Palmach forces, 
who was present in  Tel Aviv on the day  and was  involved in  the subsequent  disarming of 
the Irgun at the Sarafand Army Camp.
Menachem Begin, The Revolt (London,  1951), 214.
54 Archives Nationales, Fonds Georges Bidault, 457API 25, Telegramme from Charrevron 
in Tel Aviv, 24.6.48 reporting on his meeting with Maurice Fischer and other officials.
5  Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, Jerusalem, Item no.38. Letter from David Ben 
Gurion, Ministry of Defence, to Isaac Gruenbaum,  15.7.48.
56 Archives Nationales, F7/16107. A  RG report of  17.6.58 disclosed that  the Herut Party 
only held 15 seats in a Knesset (Parliament) of 120. The Socialist parties, led by Mapai, 
controlled 65.
234To add further  spice to  this story, a perplexing entry appears in 
Vincent AurioFs diary on 29th June. This is seven days after the destruction 
of the Altalena
I have a meeting with Lejeune [ Max Lejeune, Minister of State 
at the Ministry of Defence], who tells me that the Irgun has taken 
arms that were destined for die Haganah.
It had been  believed that delivery was being made to members 
of the Haganah, whilst in reality they were Irgun people. Bidault 
made a mistake.
Furthermore Bidault is asking that arms be delivered to the 
State of Israel, specifically 75mm canons. Lejeune wants to 
refuse this demand. I advise him to see the Prime Minister and 
ask him to sign the delivery authorisations...  57
The most plausible  interpretation of this particular  entry’ is that 
Bidault, realising that he had carried out a monumental political  error in 
deciding to supply  die Irgun,  tried  to cover his tracks by belatedly 
suggesting that he had been duped by their representatives into believing that 
he was actually  dealing with the Haganah. To make amends he  then 
proposed  die supply to die Provisional Government of die State of Israel 
quantities of  the famous  75 mm canon of the French army.
The  disastrous fate of the  Altalena  was referred to by Ariel  in a 
letter  to Bidault  a couple of weeks after the event. In this letter Ariel 
sought  to reassure him that in spite of this set-back, the Irgun remained 
committed to its unsigned agreement with the French Government.5 8 
However as  Bidault was then  replaced at the MAE by Robert Schuman, 
Ariel was unable to pursue matters.
Ariel recommenced writing  to Bidault in fawning  terms, when he 
temporarily  returned to  a position of power in 1949/1950. As ever, there is 
no indication  that Bidault ever  replied. Ariel's major hope remained that 
France should replace British influence, which he contended subverted the 
present Israeli Government under Ben Gurion. He asserted  that only when
57 Auriol, 29.6.48.
58 Jabotinski  Institute Archives, Personal  Papers of  Schmuel An el, Letter to Bidault 
from Ariel, 7.7.48.
235the successors to the Irgun, the Herut Party, took over power would France 
obtain a suitable partner in the Middle East.59
The  real motivation  behind Bidault’s involvement in the Altalena 
affair, if one discards his testimony as being self-serving and basically 
dishonest,  still remains elusive. Nevertheless one suggestion by the French 
reporter Jacques Derogy is worthy of some consideration 
He refers to French concern for their Catholic and other institutions 
threatened by die conflict then  raging  in  Jerusalem between Irgun and 
Haganah forces on the one hand and Jordan’s Arab Legion on the other. 
According to him the delivery of arms to the Irgun was made against their 
promise that they would safeguard these institutions.60
Given that Bidault’s party, the MRP, although not tied to the 
Catholic Church, had its origins among Catholic militants and that the Prime 
Minister, Robert Schuman was a staunch  Catholic, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that religion may have played some part in considering the Irgun’s 
request. 61
What is certain is that Schuman rejected all blandishments within the 
Government coalition to  recognise the State of Israel until he had received 
some assurances from the Provisional Government as to the evacuation of 
French institutions by Israeli forces and compensation for the damage caused 
to them. This was achieved in January 1949.62
In retrospect, supplying arms to die Irgun, could  be seen as an 
irrational and irresponsible  act, much  as  Bidault’s later  clandestine 
activities in the OAS  in 1962  against de Gaulle over his granting of 
independence to  Algeria On the other hand, radio" than seeking deep 
reasons for Bidault’s action, one perhaps should  treat this matter  purely at 
face value. In effect, a friendly  gesture by him  to the Irgun, with wiiich he 
possibly had more  political affinity than the Mapai-dominated  Provisional 
Government.
59 Archives Nationales, Foods Georges Bidault, 457AP126, letter of 22.5.50
60 Jacques Derogy and Hesi Carmel,  Histoire Secrete d’lsrael.  1917-1977  (Paris,  1978), 
125.
61 Elgey, 159.
236Morin, to a greater extent than Bidault, seems to have been 
completely captivated by Ariel's charm and charisma and his arguments that 
France  would regain its position in the Levant thanks to the Irgun. From 
their first meeting their friendship blossomed.
Later, Jules Moch brought  Morin  to the Ministry of the Interior. 
However when it was noticed that Schmuel Ariel used to visit him there, 
Morin was warned  by  Moch, that contact with the Irgun was incompatible 
with die friendly relations of France with  die Israeli Provisional 
Government. He stressed that it would be inconceivable for Morin  to help 
the Irgun to oppose that Government63 However once Morin had left 
Government service, his friendship for Ariel undiminished, he ensured 
through his many commercial  contacts that Ariel was able to earn a decent 
living by  writing promotional literature for overseas governments.64
After his initial meetings in Paris in 1972  Nakdimon wrote to a 
number of Government Ministers, civil servants and others whom he thought 
might have been involved in the Altalena Affair. Their  responses  varied 
between obfuscation and some  reasonably clear indication of their role, 
whether in die matter of the Altalena or, alternatively,  in aiding  illegal 
immigration.
In his response, Pierre-Henri Teitgen hid behind the cloak of 
Government secrecy and refused to comment. Roger Wybot admitted to the 
assistance given at the time to groups who worked for the creation of the 
State of Israel. Edouard Depreux  gave a subtie confirmation that Marcel 
Pages took his cue from Depreux’s benign attitude towards visa problems. 
Maurice Cottentin tacitly admitted that he had worked hard to expedite the 
arms shipment for the Altalena and that he had worked closely with Schmuel 
Ariel. Jules Moch admitted  that “A private, discreet and continuous working 
relationship existed between certain French Ministers and Israeli 
emissaries... well before the creation of the State of Israel.” He further 
commented that there had been no discussions in Cabinet on the supply of
02  Hershco,  175.
63  Morin, 73.
237arms either to the Irgun or the Haganah. General Georges Revers admitted 
that the arms supply  for die Altalena was “somewhat clandestine and not 
dealt with through normal administrative procedures.” The operation was 
carried out  through direct contacts between General Coudraux and the 
colonel  in charge of the  army depot.65
In the case of Claire Vaydat, Nakdimon  was able to interview her 
when she came to Israel in  August 1980. Amongst other details mainly 
concerned with her efforts to extricate  Yitzhak Shamir and Arye Ben 
Eliezer from Djibouti, he reported that she was instrumental in obtaining 
large supplies of weapons from the French Government for the Altalena and 
that most of her contacts  in France had been  with Irgun representatives and 
particularly Schmuel Ariel.66
The  Altalena affair, although exceptional  in that it  solely involved 
the MAE, underlines once again the closeness of the  contacts, albeit covert, 
which Zionist emissaries were able to achieve with  French Government 
Ministers and their officials and the sympathy and material assistance which 
was extended to them. However the signs of strife between the Provisional 
Government and die Irgun over the  Affair provided  Robert Schuman, the 
new Minister of Foreign Affairs, with a pretext for  proposing  that  the 
French Government  postpone the immediate  recognition  of the State of 
Israel.67 De facto recognition finally came in January 1949 in a coordinated 
move with the British. Although this was upgraded to de jure recognition in 
May 1949, the respective legations of the two countries were not raised to 
Embassy level until November 1952. Five months later, Maurice Fischer's 
term as the first Israeli Ambassador to France came to an aid with his 
transfer to Ankara.68
’  64 Morin, 75.
65  Documents provided by Schlomo Nakdimon, 3.6.04. Copies of letters and replies.
^Yediot Ahronot article by Shlomo Nakdimon,  11.8.80.
67Archives of the Faodation  Nationale des Sciences- Politiques, Fonds Cletta et Daniel 
Mayer, 3MA15, Note of comments made by Robert Schuman to Marc Sangnier on
18.8.48, (supplied by Maurice Fischer, Israel’s Paris Representative  to Cletta Maver on 
20.8.48).
68Ibid., 1.23MIA-Service Israelien d ’ information-Ambassade d’Israel.
238The evident  coolness in diplomatic relations between 1948 and 1952 
is attributed by Benjamin Pinkus to the lingering dispute between the two 
countries over the status  of the holy sites in Jerusalem. Basically France had 
wished for international as opposed to Israeli control over them 69 In the end 
France had to accept the status quo, whereby Israel established its authority 
over the part of divided Jerusalem it controlled.
09 Benjamin Pinkus, “Bra Gurion et la France »  Les Nouveaux Cahiers  No.90, 
Autumn (Paris,  1987), 23-31.Conclusion
As one might have anticipated, because of the overriding need for secrecy, 
archival documents did not directly provide  incontrovertible proof of complicity by 
the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Public Works and Transport in the 
illegal immigration activities  of the Mossad F Aliy  ah Bet in France. On the contrary, 
it has required a careful analysis and interpretation of documentation from a number 
of diverse  sources, aided by the historiography on the subject, to bring the pieces of 
this complex jigsaw puzzle together.
The picture that  finally  emerged from this exercise  did  provide compelling 
circumstantial evidence that the assistance  which was afforded by the heads of these 
Ministries not only facilitated illegal immigration through French ports but w as 
extended to other issues which were of  major concern to the Yishuv. These included 
France’s position  on die Palestine Partition vote in the UN, the official recognition of 
the State of Israel and the supply of military supplies at its birth. Although treated as 
separate projects, with greater or lesser degrees of success from the Zionist viewpoint, 
together they represent a considerable effort by  identified elements within the French 
Government to ensure the creation and then the survival of a Jewish State in Palestine. 
As we have shown, taking the Altalena Affair as an example, even those factions 
within the Government who, at first sight, appeared to be opposed to the Zionist 
endeavour, did at the aid of the British Mandate appear to somewhat reverse their 
positioa
It was not merely  by chance that a decision was taken by the Zionist leaders 
to set up die European headquarters of the Mossad  in France. The favourable 
conditions, which were self-evident to the Palestinian emissaries, made France the 
ideal location from which to organise and control all the facets of illegal immigration. 
Standing astride the routes from the DP Camps  to die Mediterranean ports, France’s 
geographical location  offered ideal transit facilities by either road or rail for potential 
immigrants to Palestine. But there were even more important considerations. Unlike 
its close neighbours, France regained its sovereignty immediately at the end of the 
war  and could determine its own political agenda, particularly with regard to the 
treatment of refugees who sought a temporary haven within its borders. Secondly, 
within the Jewish community there was a powerful Zionist sentiment in favour of 
opening the doors of Palestine to unlimited Jewish immigration.
240This tendency  was developed into a political programme by a number of 
intermediaries who had connections in both the French Zionist and Socialist camps.
As a result, they wielded considerable influence over Socialist Ministers within the 
ruling coalition and in particular, their spiritual head, Leon Blum. The contribution of 
such  intermediaries  as Andre Blumel, Marc Jarblum and L Abbe Alexandre 
Glasberg  have yet to be  more fully assessed, as their work  often demanded extreme 
discretion and tact, which left  little by way of a documentation trail. The same could 
be said of a number of influential  Zionist lobbyists  who also had direct lines of 
communication to various Ministers.
On a purely practical level it has been noted how the skills acquired by 
Avraham Polonski’s Armee Juive, during their war-time activities, were  appropriated 
by Ben Gurion to serve  the Haganah in Europe. Testimonies  have been presented 
from young French Jews as to how they were recruited into the Haganah and the 
missions they were asked to cany out on its behalf. There  can be little doubt that 
Polonski’s contacts and knowledge of French culture and the ways of its bureaucracy 
facilitated the creation of an effective infrastructure for the Mossad’s own operations 
with the least exposure. Also France provided Ben Gurion with a safe and secure 
haven at a time when he needed it most. The various reports of Renseignements 
Generaux illustrated only too well  how this environment enabled continuity in the 
activities of the Jewish  Agency  's Executive despite the incarceration in Palestine of 
many of its leaders. We also noted  that after Weizmann’s defeat  at  the 22nd World 
Zionist Congress Ben Gurion became, on his  return to Palestine,  the undisputed 
leader of the Jewish Agency and all its institutions.
With regard to the day to day operations of the Jewish Agency in France, the 
letters of complaint  by the local Director, Ruth KJuger revealed  the chaotic manner 
in which Palestinian emissaries of different political affiliations  were assigned to DP 
Camps in  Europe and  the  lack of discipline with which they approached their tasks. 
As against this state of affairs, the positive  manner in which the Mossad operatives 
carried out their work reflected a cohesiveness and motivation  which had much to do 
with the experience gained  in die  Haganah  and their allegiance to the  kibbutz 
movement. Much has been made of their probity in situations where vast sums of 
money were carried around and  distributed either to pay bribes or to  buy and equip 
ships. In this respect  the level of financial assistance given by the Joint, almost 
against its better judgement, to illegal immigration has been carefully  assessed and 
was found to be at considerable variance from previously published estimates.
241An  attempt has been made to present  an image of  Shaul Meirov, as seen by 
those who  either worked for him in Paris or later  wrote biographical notes on him. 
Except for one notable exception in the historiography, there was  a grudging 
admiration for his leadership of the Mossad and the sense of mission he instilled in his 
“soldiers.”  He was clearly a man who preferred to keep a very low profile and is 
reputed to have refused the Defence Ministry portfolio which Ben Gurion offered to 
him in the first Knesset.
A phenomenon which clearly  had positive  consequences  for the Mossad was 
the nature of coalition politics in post-war France. This enabled the individual 
components of the Government to operate on party-political lines, with little regard 
for solidarity or consensus politics. Despite the many changes of Government, the 
Mossad was assured of continued support for its activities at least until the Exodus 
Affair  when the laxity of controls at the ports was exposed to the embarrassment of 
certain Ministries.
Although this thesis concentrates on  French political involvement in illegal 
immigration activities, this issue was very low in the Governments own order of 
priorities. Rather, it was  the severe social and economic problems arising from  the 
destruction caused in die liberation of France  which particularly concentrated the 
minds of the politicians. At the same time the need to create new and  viable political 
institutions to replace those of the Vichy regime  was also an important part of the 
agenda The problem of how best to deal with Germany was also an issue and the 
French Government was keen to tap into the German labour-force to speed up its 
reconstruction efforts. In this they needed the active support of Great Britain w hilst 
the latter, as a quid-pro-quo, sought the MAE’s cooperation  to stop illegal 
immigration from  French ports. The launch of the Marshall Plan also required close 
coordination between France and Great Britain to obtain the most beneficial outcome 
for their economies. These various  factors were certainly major pre-occupations of 
the  MAE and, consequently, illegal immigration proved to be an unwelcome 
distraction. Much of the interchange of correspondence between the various 
Ministries attests to the level of frustration and pure annoyance which the whole 
subject generated. In this battle of wills some of the main contests  were led by senior 
civil servants, who clearly were subject to outside influences either pro-Zionist or pro- 
British depending on the Ministry they served. The documentation certainty suggests 
that in many cases they attempted to  dictate policy  to their  Ministers rather than, as 
one w ould expect, the other way round.Although much reference has been made to the assistance provided by 
Socialist Ministers, it is also clear that within the Executive  of the Party (the SFIO's 
Comite Directeur) there was no overall  consensus on the attitude to be adopted 
towards Zionism. One is left to conclude that whatever  pro-Zionist tendencies existed 
they were confined to a number of Ministers particularly close to Leon Blum and one 
should not evade die conclusion that  because many were Jewish  this was a large 
influencing factor. One has to  treat with a degree of caution  claims that their actions 
were  primarily dictated by humanitarian considerations for Jews less fortunate than 
themselves and that this was a natural obligation devoid of religious sentiment.
The advent of the “Cold War”, which set the Soviet Union against her former 
Western Allies, was a particularly difficult problem for France to deal with, given the 
pro-Soviet position  of the French Communist Party, the largest political party in 
France at this time. With the removal of the Communist Ministars from Government 
in May 1947, the days of‘Tripartism”, which had served the Mossad so well, were 
drawing to a close. But the major factor affecting die Mossad’s ability to operate 
effectively in France was the unwelcome exposure of its activities as a result of the 
Exodus Affair. This caused  embarrassment to the Socialist Ministars in the 
Govemmait who were forced to acknowledge die laxity of controls over immigrants' 
visas and  therefore had to take appropriate action. Nevertheless, as has been 
demonstrated, the  subde games played by the Intoior Ministry's  Marcel Pages  to 
deflect the MAE’s attention from the true nature of the immigration traffic through 
the ports,  had provided die Mossad with virtually two years of unimpeded action.
Ancillary to Pages’s efforts  w as the protective shield  placed by the French 
counter-espionage Agency (DST) around the Mossad's activities and its operatives. It 
successfully  deflected the British Secret Service from the  mission it had received 
from the  British Govemmait to  disrupt die illegal immigration traffic. Certainly the 
documentation  showed that the Cabinet Defence Committee deployed vast resources 
in manpower and equipment to bring illegal immigration to an end, all to no avail. In 
the process and despite the fact that  die majority of illegal ships were successfully 
intercepted, this resulted in much  adverse publicity for British standing in the world.
In essence, by far the majority of illegal immigrants w ere  grudgingly admitted 
into  Palestine, with varying degrees of delays, even before the aid of the Mandate.
In that soise, although one could find good reason to criticise the conditions and the 
selection process under  which illegal immigrants were transported to Palestine, the 
campaign could be said to have been a success.
243The  expose of French military aid to the State of Israel  served to underline 
the continuing commitment of Socialist Ministers to ensure that, in addition to 
facilitating the DPs’  transit through France,  material aid to ensure their ultimate 
survival was also forthcoming. Research into this particular feature also revealed the 
strange and puzzling  case of the personal inv olvement of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Georges Bidault, in the  Altalena Affair and brought into question his real 
attitude towards Zionism. Unfortunately this enigma still persists as both the available 
documentation and historiography presented no clear conclusions. Bidault’s own 
testimony lacked so much credibility that it has to be discarded as a serious answer to 
the question.
There certainly  remain other aspects of French complicity  in Aliyah Bet yet 
to  be fully explored. Fortunately, the  French National Archive's sixty-year rule 
appertaining to the period under consideration will soon come to the end of its term. 
Thereafter, access  to other  documentation on the subject  will become more readily 
available. In the meantime I hope that this dissertation has firmly established  that  a 
French connection to Aliyah Bet  not only existed and was  extensive but was also 
the vector  for the provision of other  assistance  to enable  the new State of Israel  to 
establish itself in 1948.
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ABBREVIATIONS
[n a m e  [a c ro n y m   [c o m m ent
American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee
AJJDCorJDC. Jewish philanthropic welfare and relief organisation set up after 
WW1. Popularly referred to as The Joint'
Conseil Interoeuvres de 1'Aide 
aux Emigrants et Transitaires 
Juifs
CIATJ Joint Council for assistance to immigrant and transiting Jews. 
Council set up by 17 Jewish organisations to obtain transit visas 
for Jewish immigrants from French authorities
Conseil Represenlalif des 
Institutions Jinves de France
CRIF Official representative body for all Jewish institutions in France 
created in 1944
■Direction de la Surveillance du 
Terri  toire
DST French internal counter-espionage agency
Displaced Persons DPs Population forced to leave its own country' and reside in another 
country
Eclaireurs Israelites de France EIF French Jewish scouting movement
Federation des Societes Juives 
de France
FSJF Federation of Jewish Societies in France. Umbrella organisation 
of all Jewish organisations in France. Generally pro-Zionist
International Refugee 
Organisation
IRO Replaced UNRRA in !947
Irgun Zvai Leumi IRGUN/ETZEL National Military Organisation. Para-military' organisation which 
took its ideology from the Revisionists
L’ Armee Juive AJ Jewish Resistance Group set up in France in 1942. Later known 
as Organisation juive de combat (OJC)
Lochamei Herut Israel (Stem 
Group)
LECHI Israel's Freedom Fighters. Break-away faction from the Irgun. 
Initially led led by Avraham Stem
Mifleget Prialei Eretz Israel MAPAI Eretz Israel Workers Party (Labour) in Palestine led by David 
Ben (hirion
Military Intelligence MI 5 British Military Intelligence. (Theoretically only operated within 
Great Britain and overseas possessions)
----------------------------1
Ministere des Affaires 
Etrangeres
MAE French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
245NAME ACRONYM COMMENT
Mossad 1'Aliyah Bet MOSSAD Institute for Parallel (Illegal) Immigration set up by the Haganah 
to bring Jews clandestinely to Palestine before WW2
Mouvement de Jetmesse Sionist MJS Zionist Youth Movement. Active in the resistance during the war
j  Mouvement Republican! 
Populaire
MRP Christian Democratic Party (Right of centre)
Organisation Reconstruction 
ITravail
ORT Jewish international technical training Agency
Parti Communiste Fran$ais PCF French Communist Party
j
Parti Socialiste Franfais SFIO Section Franyaise de 1'intemational Ouvriere (French Socialist 
Party).
Plugot Mahatz PALMACH Shock troops of the Haganah.
Plugot Yam PALYAM Naval arm of the Palmach
Rassemblement du Peuple 
Franyais
RPF Rally of the French People. A  party set up by General de Gaulle 
in 1946
Renseigncmcnts Generaux RG French Political Police (Responsible for surveillance of 
potentially subversive organisations). Controlled by’ Ministry of 
the Interior
Secret intelligence Service SIS/ MI6 British Secret Service. (Operated only abroad)
Service de la Reglementation et 
des Etrangcrs
SRE French Aliens Office within Ministry of the Interior. Controlled 
by’ Surete Nationale
Service de Documentation 
Exterieure et Contre- 
Espiormage
1 —   -...................-
SDECE French overseas counter-espionage agency
Union des Juifs pour la 
Resistance et i’Entraide
UJRE Jewish Union for Resistance and Mutual Help. A Jewish 
Communist organisation
United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Agency
UNRRA Organisation set up in 1943 by the United Nations to supervise 
the welfare of Displaced Persons
United Nations Special 
Committeee on Palestine
UNSCOP Special UN committee set up following Britain's proposal to 
relinquish the present Mandate.
United States Forces European 
Theatre
USFET Replaced SHAEF after the war.
World Jewish Congress WJC International Jewish body
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260ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION BOATS 1945-1948
Immigrants interned or free in Palestine
APPENDIX 1(a)
A B C D E F G H I J K
1 Original Name
'
Renamed at Sea Departure Departure Date Total Interned Interned Interned Free In Notes
2 Port Country arrived Immigrants Athllt Cyprus Germany Palestine
3
4 From August 1946 I
5 Dalin MonopoN Italy 28.8.45 35 35 Landed at Caesaria
6 Netuno A Bari Italy 4.9.45 79 79 Landed at Caesaria
7 Gabriella Piraeus Greece 9.9.45 40 40 Landed at Caesaria
8 Pietro A S. Margherita Italy 19.9.45 168 168 Landed at Shefayim
9 Netuno B Monopoli Italy 1.10.45 73 73 Landed at Shefayim
10 Petro B Taranto Italy 26.10.45 174 174 Landed at Shefayim
11 Dimitrios Bert Katznelson Lavrion Greece 23.11.45 220 20 200
12 Marie Hanna Senesh Savona Italy 25.12.45 252 252 Beached  atNahariya
13 Total 1946 6 Boats 1041 20 1021
14
15 YEAR 1946
16 Rondina Enzo Sereni Savona Italy 18.1.48 908 908
17 Kismet Wingate Pellestrina Isl. Italy 25.3.46 248 248
18 Asya Tel Chai La Ciotat France 27.3.46 733 733
19 Smyrna Max Nordau Constanza Romania 14.5.46 1662 1662
20 Fede Dov Hos La Spezia Italy 18.5.46 500 500 Special case
21 Fenice Eliahu Golomb La Spezia Italy 18.5.46 514 514 special case
22 Agios loannis Havtva Reik Piraeus Greece 8.6.46 462 462
23 Beauharnois Josiah Wedgwood Savona Italy 25.8.46 1278 1278
24 Akbel Biria Sete France 2.7.46 1108 1108
25 Norsyd Haganah Bakar Yugoslavia 29.7.46 2760 2760
26 Hochelaga Ha 'Chayal Ha'lvri Antwerp Belgium 31.7.46 510 510
27 Sagolem Yagur La Ciotat France 11.8.46 754 754
28 Maria Serra Katriel Yaffe Bocca di Magra Italy 13.8.46 614 614
29 Arietta Salom Henrietta Szold Greece Greece 12.8.48 535 535
30 San Pisero Kaf Gimmel Yordei (The 23) Bocca di Magra Italy 14.8.46 615 815
31 Ideros Amiram Shochet Pozzuoli Italy 16.8.46 183 183 Landed at Caesaria
32 Fede 2 Arba heruyot Bocca di Magra Italy 2.9.46 997 997
33 Arietta Palmach Bocca di Magra Italy 21.9.46 611 611
34 Fenice 2 Bracha Fuld Mola di Bari Italy 18.10.46 816 816!
Sourced  from:
Fritz Liebreich, Britain's Naval and Political Reaction to the Illegal Immigration of Jews to Palestine;P.H.Silverstone, Clandestine Immigration to Palestine; N. Stewart, The Royal Navy and the Palestine
Patrol.  JL (p jILLEGAL IMMIGRATION BOATS 1945-1948
Immigrants interned or free in Palestine
APPENDIX 1(a)
A B C D E F G H i   I   I   J K
35 Original Name Renamed at tea Departure Departure Date Arrived Interned Interned Interned  |  Free In Notes
36 Port Country Athllt Cyprus Germany  Palestine
37
38 1946 (Continued)
39 San Dimitrio Latrun La Ciotat France 30.10.46 1279 1279
40 Lohrta (Anna) Knesset Israel Bakar Yugoslavia 26.11.46 3914 3914:
41 Athina Rafiah Bakar Yugoslavia 7.12.46 782
C
D
r
o
i
_
_ Sunk at Sirina
42 TOTAL 1946 22 Boats 21983 9669 11117 r   0 11971
43
44 YEAR 1947
45 Merica La Negev Seta France 8.2.47 656 A£A 090
46 San Miguel Ha' Maapil Ha'Almoni Seta France 16.2.47 807 807
47 Ulua Chaim Arloeoroff Meta  ponte Italy 27.2.47 1398 1,398 Beached at Bat Galim
48 Abril Ben Hecht Port de Bouc France 8.3.47 599 599
49 Susanna Shabtai luzinski Metaponte Italy 12.3.47 835 835 Beached at Nitzanim
50 San Felipo Moiedet Meta  ponte Italy 29.3.47 1577 1,577
51 Guardian Theodor  Herzl Sete France 13.4.47 2622 2,622
52 Gaiata She'ar Yasuv Bogliaeco Italy 23.4.47 768 768
53 Trade Winds hatikvah Bocca di Magra Italy 17.5.47 1422 1,422
54 Arietta Mordei Haghetaot Moladi Italy 23.5.47 1457 1,457
55 Anal Yehuda Halevi Tenes Algeria 31.5.47 399 399
56 Pesident Warfield Exodus'47 Sete France 18.7.47  • 4554 4554 Shipped to Hamburg
57 Luciano M Shivat Zion Algiers Algeria 28.7.47 398 398
58 Bruna Y.D.Halelei Gesher Aziv Miglarino Italy 28.7.47 685 685
59 Farida Af-AI-Pi-Chen Bay of Gaeta Italy 27.9.47 446 446
60 Northlands Medinat HaYehudim Burgas Bulgaria '2.10.47 2664 2,664
61 Paduca Geulah Burgas Bulgaria 2.10.47 1385 1,385
62 Raphael Luccia Kadimah Pellestrina Isi. Italy 16.11.47 794 794
63 Albertina Aliyah Bandol France 16.11.47 187 187 Beached at Nahariya
64 Maria Annick Ha'Forzim Bazoule France 4.12.47 167 167 Boat escaped
65 Mara Christina Lo Tafchidinu Porto Venere Italy 23.12.47 850 850
66 Maria Giovanni Kaf Tet Be'November Corsica France 28.12.47 688 688
67 Pan Crescent Atzmaut Burgas  ‘  Bulgaria 31.12.47 7612 7,612
68 Pan York Kibbutz Galuyot Burgas  I Bulgaria 31.12.47 7557 7,557
69 TOTAL 1947 24 boats } 40627 35,619 4664 364
Sourced  from:
Fritz Liebreich, Britain's Naval and Political Reaction to the Illegal Immigration of Jews to Palestine;P.H.Silverstone, Clandestine Immigration to Palestine; N. Stewart, The Royal Navy and the Palestine
Patrol.  il>ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION BOATS 1945-1948
Immigrants interned or free in Palestine
APPENDIX 1(a)
A B C D E F G H i J K
70 Original Name Renamed at Sea Departure Departure Date Interned Interned Interned Free in Notes
71 IPort Country Arrived Athlit Cyprus Germany Palestine
72
73 Year 1948 r .................  “
74 Archmides Ha'Umot Ha'Mduchadot Bay of Gaeta Italy 1.1.48 537 537 Beached at Nahariya
75 Sylvia starita L.H. Giborei Kfar Ezion Venice Italy 1.2.48 280 280|
76 Cicino Viareggio Yerushalayim Ha'Netzura Civitavecchia Italy 10.2.48 679 679
77 Abdul Hamid Komemiut Saint Tropez France 20.2.48 705 705
78 Rondina  2 Bonim VeLochamim Bakar Yugoslavia 1.3.48 982 982
79 Pepino( Esmerelda) Yechiam Bay of Gaeta Italy 29.3.48 769 769
80 Vivara Tirat Tsvi Bay of Gaeta Italy 12.4.48 798 798
81 Salvador Mishmar Ha'emek La Ciotat France 24.4.48 785 785
82 Tadorne Nachshon Kastel Bandol France 27.4.48 558 5581
83 i I
i
84 TOTAL  to 15.5.48 9 boats 6093 65561 537
85 i
86 GRAND TOTAL 63 Boats 69644 9689 52292 4554 3109
87
88 i
89 SUMMARY TOTALS 1946 1946 1947 19481
90 i
91 Interned Athlit 9689 20 9669 I
92 Interned Cyprus E   52292 11117 35,619 55561
93 Interned Germany :  4554 4554
94 Total interned \  66535 20 20786 40173 55561
95 \ I
96 Landed by agreement 1014 1014 I
97 Escaped on landing '  2095 1021 183 354 5371
98 Total free in Palestine I  3109 1021 1197 354 537
99 f I
100 GRAND TOTAL 69644 1041 21983 40627 6093
101
--------------------------------- 1
i
102 Number of Boats 63 8 22 24r   9
103 s
104 t
Sourced  from:
Fritz Liebreich, Britain's Naval and Political Reaction to the Illegal Immigration of Jews to Palestine;P.H.Silverstone, Clandestine Immigration to Palestine; N. Stewart, The Royal Navy and the Palestine
Patrol.  51 b 3ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION BOATS  1945-1948
by Country of Departure
APPENDIX 1(b)
A B C E F G H I J K L M
1 Original Name Renamed at Sea Departure Total
I:
I
2 country Immigrants
3 Italy Greece France Romania Yugoslavia Belgium Algeria Bulgaria
4 From August 1945 * I
5 Dalin Italy 35 35
6 Netuno A Italy 79 79
7 Gabriella Greece 40 - 40 ij!i
8 Pietro A Italy 168 168]
9 Netuno B Italy 73 73 i;
10 Petro B Italy 174 ifi
11 Dimitrios Bed Katznelson Greece 220 220
12 Marie Hanna Senesh Italy 252 252 S i
13 Total 1945 8 Boats 1041 781 260 Ii
14 ji
15 Year 1946 I
16 Rondina Enzo Sereni Italy 908 906
17 Kismet Wingate Italy 248 248 !
18 Asya Tel Cbai France 733 733 j!
19 Smyrna Max Nordau Romania 1662 1662 i|
20 Fede Dov Hos Italy 500 500 .....  ...  I  "  '
21 Fenice Eliahu Golomb Italy 514 514 ---  I  ....... I;
22 Agios loannis Haviva Reik Greece 462 462 [
23 Beauharnois Josiah Wedgwood Italy 1278 1278 i!
24 Akbel Biria France 1108 1108 1
25 Norsyd Haganah Yugoslavia 2760 2760
26 Hochelaga Ha 'Chayal Ha'lvri Belgium 510 510
27 Sagoiem Yagur France 754 754
28 Maria Serra Katriel Yaffe Italy 614 614
29 Ariette Salom Henrietta Szold Greece 535 535
30 San Pisero Kaf Gimmel Yordei (The 23) Italy 815 815
31 Ideros Amiram Shochet Italy 183 183
32 Fede 2 Arba heruyot Italy 997 997
33 Ariella Palmach Italy 611 611
34 Fenice 2 Bracha Fuld Italy 816 816
O  Drtortrtlwoio  rtf  ArtrtfiinHiY  'MILLEGAL IMMIGRATION BOATS  1945-1948
by Country of Departure
APPENDIX 1(b)
A  j B C E F G H I J K L  |  M
35 Original Name Renamed at sea Departure Total
36 Country Immigrants s
37 Italy Greece France Romania Yugoslavia Belgium Algeria  Bulgaria
38 1946 (Continued) !i
39 San Dimitrio Latrun France 1279 1279 :j
40 Lohita (Anna) Knesset Israel Yugoslavia 3914 3914
41 Athina Rafiah Yugoslavia 782 782
42 TOTAL 1946 22 Boats 21963 7484 997 3874 1662 7456 510
43 J;
44 Year 1947 j|
45 Merica La Negev France 656 656 i!
ii
46 San Miguel Ha' Maapil Ha’ Almoni France 807 807 I
47 Ulua Chaim Arlosoroff Italy 1398 13981 I
48 Abril Ben Hecht France 599 599
49 Susanna Shabtai luzinski Italy 835 835
!
50 San Felipo Moledet Italy 15  77 1577 |
51 Guardian Theodor  Herzl France 2622 2622 li
52 Galata She'ar Yasuv Italy 768 768 f
53 T rade Winds hatikvah Italy 1422 1422 i
54 Arietta Mordei Haghetaot Italy 1457 1457
55 Anal Yehuda Halevi Algeria 399 399
56 Pesident Warfield Exodus’47 France 4554 4554
57 Luciano M Shivat Zion Algeria 398 398:
58 Bruna Y.D.Halelei Gesher Aziv Italy 685 685
59 Farida Af-AI-Pi-Chen Italy 446 446 \
60 Northlands Medinat Ha'Yehudim Bulgaria 2664 2664
61 fPaduca Geulah Bulgaria 1385 I  1385
62 Raphael Luccia Kadimah Italy 794 794 I
63 Albertina Aliyah France 187 187
64 Maria Annick Ha'Forzim France 167 167 .................J  ■
65 Mara Christina Lo Tafchidinu Italy 850 850
!
!; .... ....  ii-------------
66 Maria Giovanni Kaf Tet Be'November France 688 688
67 Pan Crescent Atzmaut Bulgaria 7612 7612
68 Pan York Kibbutz Galuyot Bulgaria 7557 7557
69 TOTAL 1947 24 boats 40527 10232 10280 797|  19218
US'
Source: Reanalysis  of  Appendix 1(a)ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION BOATS  1945-1948
by Country of Departure
APPENDIX 1(b)
A B C E F G H I J K L  |  M
70 Original Name Renamed at Sea Departure Total
71 Country Immigrants
72 Italy Greece France Romania Yugoslavia Belgium Algeria Bulgaria
73 Year 1948
74 Archmides Ha'Umot Ha'Meuchadot Italy 537 537 f
75 Sylvia starita L,H. Giborei Kfar Ezion Italy 280 280
76 Cicino Viareggio Yerushalayim Ha’Netzura Italy 679 679
77 Abdul Hamid Komemiut France 705 705 s
78 Rondina  2 Bonim VeLochamim Yugoslavia 982 982 j
79 Pepino(Esmerelda) Yechiam Italy 769 769
)
80 Vivara TiratTsvi Italy 798 798 I
81 Salvador Mishmar Ha'emek France 785 785
82 Tadorne Nachshon Kastel France 558 558 \
83
84 TOTAL  to 15.5.48 9 boats 6093 3063 2048 982 I
85
86 GRAND TOTAL Number of Immigrants
32
1257 16202 1662 8438 m 797  19218
87 Number  of boats 63 4 15 1 4 1 2  4
88
89
90 Number of boats by year I
91 i i
92 1945 8 6 2 j
93
94 1946 22 11 2 4 1 3 1
95
96 1947 24 10 8
...
2 4
97
98 1948 9 5 3 1
99
100 Grand Total 63 32 4 15 1 4 1 2 4
101
102
Source:Reanalysis  of  Appendix 1(a)-i/j
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